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Abstract
The study of emotion is an interdisciplinary field.  One key aspect of this field is the 
cultural  variation  of emotion.   This thesis  is  a contribution to the above area by 
means of a specific analysis of the ancient Greek conception of the emotion ἔρως. 
The focus for this study is the Greek Novel, a collection of literary works emerging 
from the Greek speaking culture  of  the eastern Mediterranean during the Roman 
imperial  period (1st to 4th cent C.E.).   These novels are based upon the universal 
topics of love and sexual passion, while at the same time reflecting and reworking 
both the specific social and literary climate of the period and ancient Greek folk and 
philosophical models of psychology.  My thesis argues that the role of conceptual 
metaphor  in  the  understanding  of  ἔρως as  an  emotion  has  not  yet  been  fully 
appreciated, and that an understanding of metaphor is essential for gauging which 
parts of the folk model of the emotion are culturally specific or universal, and how 
these sections interact.  
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Emotion, Prototypical Categorisation, Metaphor, and the Greek Novel
The title of this thesis signifies its focus upon the role that metaphor plays in the 
structuring and understanding of emotions.  The proliferation of scholarship on the 
emotions during the last half century has been echoed by a recent surge in the study 
of  emotions  in  classical  antiquity  and  their  relationship  to  our  own  emotions. 
Classical  scholarship is  currently  engaging with many issues which influence  the 
portrayal of emotions in Greek and Roman culture, including non-verbal factors such 
as  body language  or  facial  expression,  and  emotional  scripts  (how emotions  are 
played out in social interaction).  Emotions are a rich and multidimensional area of 
study and a key part of the continuing discourse on the extent of cultural relativism. 
Emotions are vital for many strands of experience, ranging from the most personal 
inner reflection to societal models, practices, and morals, and the interaction between 
the two extremes of personal and social identity.  Emotions deserve to be studied as 
much as any other part of culture.   
The contribution  made by this  thesis  will  be to examine and promote the 
crucial  role  which metaphor  plays  in  conceptualising and structuring emotions  in 
ancient Greek.  I am using the concept of  ἔρως as a case study, an ancient Greek 
word which  is  commonly  translated  as  ‘love’  or  ‘desire’.   Specifically  I  will  be 
looking at its portrayal in the Greek Novel, a body of prose works in ancient Greek 
dating from the Roman imperial period.  This introduction will be divided into four 
sections.  I will first define what I am referring to as emotion, in terms of ancient and 
modern theories, and argue not only for the importance of studying the portrayal of 
emotions in cultures such as ancient Greece, but for the validity of doing so.  Second 
I will look at prototypical categorisation, which modern linguistics and psychology 
claim is essential for understanding the categories of emotion terms.  Third I will 
look at the contemporary theory of metaphor which underlies my research, and state 
why this theory is so important for studying the emotions.  Finally, I will outline why 




In recent years the category of emotion has been seen as problematic in scientific 
fields, but its importance as a part of everyday life has not diminished.  We discuss 
emotions, use them and, most importantly, feel them.  Scholarship on the emotions 
has  undergone  an  enormous  change  in  the  last  century,  with  the  increasing 
importance  of  scientific  studies  on  the  relationship  between  psychology  and 
neurology.  These two areas of study highlight two questions vital for the study of 
emotions: how universal are ‘emotions’ and what is their physiological basis?  These 
questions  provoke  a  further  one:  what  ‘fit’  is  there  between  the  ancient  Greek 
emotions and our own?  Are these ancient emotions exactly like ours, because all 
emotions are universal, or are they nothing like ours, because emotions are culturally 
constructed?  The answer lies somewhere in between, since humans have a common 
physiological make-up and are emersed in specific societies, but in order to identify 
cultural  variation  we  should  first  have  a  good  idea  of  what  is  universal  about 
emotion.   The  nature  of  emotions,  as  postulated  psychological  kinds,  has  the 
potential  to  confirm or  undermine  any approach  to  emotion  in  antiquity.   I  will 
therefore take some time here to discuss several contemporary theories of emotion, 
and outline their significance for the present study.     
In the twentieth century Paul Ekman provided groundbreaking evidence for 
the universal nature of emotions by studying facial expression.1  He found that six 
emotions, labelled in English as happiness, disgust, surprise, sadness, anger, and fear, 
each had a specific facial expression across a large number of different cultures, and 
that people could correctly interpret  these expressions on the faces of those from 
different  cultures.2  Ekman  used  this  evidence  to  argue  that  these  emotions  are 
universal  and  rooted  in  physiology,  despite  the  difference  in  their  linguistic 
expression across cultures.3  This is not to say that emotion expressions are never 
1 The  main  conclusions  of  his  initial  research  can  be  seen  in  Ekman 1973.   An account  of  his 
emergence from the behaviourist tradition, the opposition between him and cultural relativists such as 
Margaret Mead and his responses to their criticisms can be read in his afterword to Darwin 1998 (363-
93).   
2 The only exception to this was that in pre-literate cultures fear and surprise were not differentiated as 
to facial expression, whereas they were in literate ones (Darwin 1998, 379).
3 Obviously other cultures do not use the English terms for these emotions.  However, this does not 
invalidate his results, which argue that emotions approximate to the ones expressed by these English 
terms are universally experienced.  See Ekman and Friesen 1971 and Cairns 2008a, 44: ‘It is not just 
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mediated.   Different  cultures  have  different  display  rules  which  influence  the 
expression  of  emotions.   For  example,  in  one  experiment  conducted  by  Ekman 
American  and  Japanese  participants  were  shown  a  video  designed  to  elicit  an 
emotional response.  When the subjects were alone they displayed the same facial 
expressions, but when another person was present the Japanese subjects controlled 
their facial expressions.4  Ekman also found that this concealing of emotions led to 
what he calls ‘leakage’, and that feigned facial expressions for emotion and genuine 
ones are not completely identical.5  The situations which elicit emotions will vary 
from culture  to culture.   For example,  even if  shame is  a  universal  emotion,  the 
conditions which elicit shame are culturally determined.6  Ekman therefore provides 
evidence for core universal emotions which, nevertheless, can be culturally mediated.
The  problem with  Ekman’s  list  is  that  it  denotes  only  six  emotions  and 
requires facial expressions to be constitutive of emotions.  In the future more may be 
added, but we are left with the possibility that many further concepts, such as love 
and jealousy, which native English speakers would categorise as emotions, cannot be 
distinguished by facial expression alone, or even by facial expression at all.  Ekman 
postulates  that  if  an  emotion  is  a  ‘compound’  then  it  might  not  have  any  set 
expression.  
Jealousy seems to have no distinct expression, perhaps because it is an emotion where the 
person feels a number of other emotions: anger with the one whose attention is lost or with 
the rival; sadness at the loss; fear in anticipation of further loss; or disgust at himself and 
herself for feeling jealous.7  
This notion of compound emotions is a difficult one, as it involves assuming that 
some emotions  are prior or more ‘basic’  than others,  and forming a hierarchy of 
emotional experiences.  What this passage makes clear is that facial expression is 
only  a  partial  approach  to  emotion.   If  facial  expression  fails  to  provide  a 
comprehensive understanding of emotions, then it alone cannot justify the category 
that cultures share facial expressions; according to Ekman they also share the association between 
those expressions and their evaluations of certain types of scenario’.  
4 Darwin 1998, 384-5.
5 Darwin 1998, 373.  
6 On shame in ancient Greece, or rather the related Greek emotion term αἰδώς, see Cairns 1993.
7 Darwin 1998,  391.  I  will  approach  this  possibility of  ἔρως being a compound emotion in  the 
conclusion.    
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of emotion.  Furthermore, if we persist in maintaining the category of emotions, then 
we need additional criteria for studying it.   Paul Griffiths has made an important 
contribution to this problem of categorisation by questioning whether we can retain 
the term emotion at all.  He argues that it is an arbitrary category.   
Does our best current science have any role for these postulated psychological kinds?  If it 
does not, then there is an important sense in which the emotions do not really exist.  This 
does not mean that nothing is going on in people who are said to be experiencing emotion.  It 
means  that  the  emotion  category  does  nothing  to  illuminate  what  is  going  on  in  those 
people.8
It is perhaps the case then that the category of emotions will  cease to be a valid 
scientific one.  Griffith himself compares this to the category of superlunary objects, 
objects  ‘beyond  the  moon’,  which  was  an  arbitrary  category  and  subsequently 
disproved by science.9  Scientific theories can be dropped to make way for new ones, 
as  Popper  insisted.10  His  problem  concerning  the  diverse  nature  of  emotional 
experience leads him to question the validity of concepts for individual emotions.
If science can find no interesting kind corresponding to all the paradigm cases of fear, then 
we must either reclassify some of the paradigm cases or replace fear and its companions with 
some more adequate categories.11
If  emotion  does  not  really  exist  as  a  non-arbitrary  category  then  this  would 
potentially undermine the proposal of this thesis.  One does not have to agree with 
Griffiths to see that the scientific definition of emotion is still very much debated.  It 
is also clear that what is at stake is a notion of categories, what they are, and this 
8 Griffiths 1997, 1.  Griffiths believes that the term emotion covers three different classes, short term 
affects, prescribed social roles which mimic these and higher cognitive emotions, and that therefore it 
cannot be or become a unified psychological category (Griffiths 1997, 15, 17).  For a lucid discussion 
of his theory see Cairns 2008a, 43–4.  Cairns has a valid objection to Griffiths’ view.  The three 
classes  are not necessarily heterogeneous if  we look at  the relation between the input side of the 
emotions and the output (Cairns 2008a, 44).  Ekman’s facial expressions are on the output side of the 
emotion.  The input side—which perceptions  and conditions  elicit  the emotion—can vary among 
individuals or  cultures,  but  Ekman’s  research  shows that  there are  cultural  scenarios  which elicit 
emotions, and partial universal agreement on these kinds of scenario.  There is a cognitive-evaluative 
aspect to all emotions, and so the input and output sides of emotion are not necessarily heterogeneous. 
Furthermore the terms input and output are a little reductive when used of the emotional experience. 
This is why emotions will be viewed as scenarios in this study; for more on this see below and the 
final chapter.  
9 Griffiths 1997, 1.
10 Popper 1968.  See also Kuhn 1962 on the structure of scientific revolutions, where he claims that 
science undergoes periodic paradigm shifts.  
11 Griffiths 1997, 5.
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feature will be dealt with in a subsequent section.  For now I will argue that as far as 
Classics is concerned, the distinction between folk and scientific theories becomes 
vital,  if we are to justify the study of ‘emotions’ in our own field of work.  The 
distinction between folk and scientific models is important for my work, and so I will 
define the terms here.12  Folk models are any given society’s ways of conceptualising 
phenomena in ordinary,  everyday language,  and their  way of communicating and 
understanding them.  A scientific model is an explanation of the same phenomenon 
in an expert way.13  Folk models are present and used in our everyday lives, despite 
the existence or availability of scientific models.14  
Most studies of ancient Greek emotions start from the premise that they had 
emotions, whatever they are called, and that we have emotions.  Konstan begins his 
work The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks with the following proposition:     
The premise of this book is that the emotions of the ancient Greeks were in some significant 
respects different from our own, and that recognising these differences is important to our 
understanding of Greek literature and Greek culture generally.  What is more, I argue that the 
Greeks’ conception of the emotions has something to tell us about our own views, whether 
about the nature of particular emotions or the category of emotion itself.15 
Konstan’s criteria for looking at the emotions of the ancient Greeks are correct, in 
my view, but do not clearly spell out the relationship between the study of emotions 
by Hellenists and the study of emotions by scientists.  We are not researching into 
the  ‘nature  of…emotions’  nor  the  ‘category  of  emotion  itself’  as  a  non-arbitrary 
scientifically  valid  category.   What  we are  doing,  as  Konstan essentially  says,  is 
looking at the beliefs and concepts of the ancient Greeks in relation to our own: their 
models for emotions, or whatever can best be termed emotion in Ancient Greek, and 
our models of emotions, and the relation between the two.  We are constructing a 
comparative study of folk and scientific models of the emotions.    
12 For work on metaphors and models in the history of psychology see Leary 1990.  For cultural 
models  see  Holland  and  Quinn  1987,  which  provides  many  good  studies  of  models  in  culture, 
language and thought.  
13 For example Kempton studied two folk theories of home heat control in contemporary America, and 
these folk theories’ relation to an expert model of the same system (Kempton 1987, 222–242).  There 
was an interesting relationship between the notion of the heating system the ordinary users had in 
mind, their implementation of that model, and the expert model which took more factors into account.
14 Folk models continue to play a vital role in society.  Now more than ever the overwhelming volume 
of  information  available  means  that  no  one  can  ‘know’  the  expert  models  for  everything  they 
experience or use in their lives.  Folk models will therefore continue to be immensely important.   
15 Konstan 2006, ix.
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Griffiths thinks that we might have to drop our current scientific models for 
emotion in favour of new ones, yet another step in the long intellectual history of 
paradigms  for  emotion.   In  ancient  Greece,  however,  even  the  most  prestigious 
scientific models relevant to emotions were erroneous by today’s opinions: one only 
has  to  think  of  the  humoral  theory  prevalent  in  ancient  studies.16  Studying  the 
ancient Greeks involves studying folk models of emotion.  This is not to say that the 
scientific  models  of  the  ancient  Greeks  are  not  relevant.   Folk  models  can  be 
influenced by scientific models and vice versa.  The primary focus of my research is 
folk models of ancient emotion,  but their relationship to scientific models will be 
crucial for this.  To avoid confusion between what is related to modern day science 
and what is not, I will use the term expert models instead of scientific models.17 
This is not to say that modern scientific studies of emotion are not relevant. 
Non-verbal signifiers of emotion,  such as facial  expression or types of behaviour, 
have  the  potential  to  reveal  connections  between  the  discoveries  of  Ekman  and 
descriptions or depictions of emotions in ancient Greece.  If one is studying anger (or 
the approximate Greek term) in antiquity then one should be aware that the ancient 
Greeks possibly made universally recognisable facial expressions during parts of the 
emotional experience, and that this might be reflected in art or descriptions of non-
verbal signals.  However, the main product from the study of folk models is a view 
of  the  concepts  or  beliefs  of  the  ancient  Greeks.   I  must  show  that  there  are 
correspondences between the folk concept of an emotion in English and the Greek 
concept of  ἔρως,  which justify my classifying it as an emotion.   The thesis as a 
whole will  discuss this  further,  but in the next  section of this  introduction I  will 
16 ‘The explanation of disease—and even human behaviour—in terms of the interactions and relative 
proportions of fluids in the body’ (OCD S.V. ‘humours’).  On humoral theory see Nutton 2004, 116, 
121-2, 209, 241, 366, 367, 343.  
17 Following Kövecses 2000, 114-38.  See also Barton 1994.  In her excellent study of three ancient 
areas  of  knowledge—astrology,  medicine,  and  physiognomics  (a  discipline  which  postulated  a 
relationship between outward appearance and inner mentality)—Barton has argued that contrary to 
popular modern prejudices, in which medicine is considered a real science and the other two pseudo-
sciences, their respective statuses in antiquity could not be fitted into such a neat binary division.  One 
of  the primary reasons for  this is  the relationship of power and knowledge in the ancient  world. 
During the second sophistic, at the time when most of the extant Greek novels were written, sophists 
debated with each other publicly in subjects such as philosophy or medicine.  The supreme importance 
of  this contest  was winning the debate,  not  necessarily on reaching  ‘the truth’ or  even  ‘a  truth’. 
Therefore I will call all ancient Greek scientific models ‘expert’, to reflect their assumption of power 
and status.  On Greek sophists and their cultural context under the Roman Empire see Bowersock 
1969 and Swain 1996.
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outline a basic feature of the concept which I feel justifies my connection of two 
potentially disparate folk models: the passivity of emotions.                        
Ἔρως is commonly translated as ‘love’ or ‘lust’, and not only are these terms 
absent  from  Ekman’s  list,  but  it  is  doubtful  that  there  exists  a  universal  facial 
expression for this emotion, even if it corresponds in some way to our emotions (see 
above).  To justify the use of the word emotion I will begin with some observations 
Ekman makes about what he considers an emotional expression.  Emotions reflect 
inner feeling, but they are also communicative.  If someone has an angry expression, 
then communicating the information that  they are feeling  angry is  useful both to 
themselves and another person.  If they are angry they might become violent, and 
this  can aid them in making their  opponent  back down, or aid  their  opponent in 
revealing  the  danger  of  an  attack.   So  there  is  a  rationale  for  the  successful 
communication of emotion.  Yet there is an important element behind this emotional 
communication which allows it to be trusted: it is an involuntary reaction and occurs 
without choice.  As we can see from the example of anger above, understanding this 
revelation of inner feelings as involuntary, as accurate, is vital on a communicative 
level.  Furthermore, since expression in these cases is often read instinctively and 
accurately,  and universally (according to Ekman), it is a good contender for being 
part of any human folk model of emotions.  If humans have always noticed these 
expressions and acted upon them, concerning themselves and others, then they were 
part  of  the ancient  Greeks’ folk model  as  much as ours.   It  is  this  definition  of 
emotion as ‘involuntary’ which I employ to justify my use of the terminology.  What 
the concept of ἔρως shares with Ekman’s six universals is that it is an involuntary 
emotion.  All the evidence in the Greek Novel points towards this.  It is a passive and 
involuntary drive, and although it has no particular facial expression, it influences the 
behaviour of the person feeling the emotion.  It is important to emphasise here that 
emotions as a group are passive.  This does not mean that they cannot be actively 
manipulated, but that the sensation is an involuntary one.18  This is one aspect in 
which the ancient Greek folk model matches up with our own one.   
18 In addition, because a prototypical emotion is passive, this does not necessitate that all emotions 
must always be passive.  See prototypical structuring in the next section.
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The purpose of this thesis is to understand the Greek concept of ἔρως in the 
Greek Novel.  Although I am starting from the premise that ἔρως is in the category 
of emotions, I am not beginning from the premise that it corresponds exactly with 
any particular emotion in English.  This is not the same as saying that the Greeks 
might not have felt the emotions that we have.19  Wierzbicka has argued that Ekman 
was misled in his experiments on emotion expression by the western terms for the 
emotions;  that  because he was using English words to start  with,  he found these 
English terms: a circular argument.   However, the Japanese-American study cited 
above used  visuals  and  not  words  to  stimulate  emotions,  so this  criticism is  not 
valid.20  Without maintaining that all cultures have exactly the same emotions, not 
having a word for an emotion is not proof that a culture does not feel that emotion. 
Ekman writes:
 
Not having a word for an emotional state may well influence emotional experience.  Without 
being able to name feelings, it may be harder to distinguish them, think about them, and so 
on.21   
This is an interesting hypothesis from a psychologist that language might have the 
potential of affecting emotional experience (but not completely determining it).  In a 
study of Tahitian culture, Levy has postulated that because their culture has no word 
for  sadness,  they  react  to  the  emotion  in  a  different  way.22  For  instance,  when 
rejected by a lover they do not relate their experience to the rejection, but conceive of 
it as a sickness.  The substitution of metaphor for an emotion term, as we shall see in 
this  thesis,  is  not  proof  that  a  society  has  difficulty  conceiving  of  a  concept. 
Therefore I remain unconvinced by Levy’s reasoning; even if they had a word for 
sadness,  it  is  entirely  possible  that  they  would  continue  to  conceptualise  it  as 
‘sickness’.   His  study  highlights  the  fact  that  societies  can  come  to  terms  with 
19 See Konstan 2003, who argues that the Greeks did not have exactly our notion of jealousy.
20 Wierzbicka 1992.
21 Darwin 1998, 392.
22 Levy 1973.  His thesis seems to be a version of linguistic relativity, as famously seen in the Sapir-
Whorf  hypothesis.   The  Sapir-Whorf  hypothesis  suggests  that  thought  is  shaped  by  language. 
However, see Cairns 2008a, 50: ‘The (frequent and often productive) disagreement of native speakers 
over the sense and reference of key psychological terms is important in another respect too—it is a 
sign  that  thought  is  not  determined  by  language.  Aristotle  and  Chrysippus,  like  Ekman  and 
Wierzbicka, share a language, but differ on the nature of the psychological phenomena labelled by the 
words they use and on the meaning of those words themselves.’
13
emotions they do not have words for, and that emotion term studies which do not 
take into account the broader picture are necessarily limited.  
Griffiths’  argument  that  folk  models  do  not  necessarily  indicate  anything 
about the actual nature of emotions is also pertinent here.  Folk models for Greek 
emotions might be different in some respects from our own, and the folk model of 
ἔρως might differ from our models for love or lust, or be an amalgamation of the 
two, but this does not mean that the Greeks felt different emotions from us.  For 
these  reasons  Konstan’s  thesis  in  his  article  on  jealousy  in  ancient  Greece,  that 
perhaps  the  Greeks  did  not  feel  jealousy,  cannot  be  substantiated  by  the 
(predominantly)  linguistic evidence he provides in his study.23  If he is correct,  it 
merely  proves  that  they conceptualised  and described  the  emotion  differently;  to 
equate feeling with conceptualisation is gross reductionism.  If a study of the ancient 
Greek emotions does not tell us about the actual nature of emotions, then is there 
justification for attempting it?  There is, as was said above, and this is based on the 
importance of folk models.  Folk models of emotion are used pervasively in social 
interaction,  and the ancient Greek folk models of emotion give us much valuable 
cultural  information.   This  information  is  mostly  of  relevance  to  our  own  folk 
models, but work on facial expression by Ekman can be relevant to both our own and 
the ancient  Greeks’  folk models,  even though it  is  scientific.   This  is  because it 
involves  external  signals  and  experience.   However,  the  Greeks’  beliefs  about 
internal psychological functioning are essential to their folk and expert models, and 
so it will be necessary to look at their versions of internal psychological processes. 
We  are  not  committing  ourselves  to  any  internal  physiological  version  of  the 
emotions, merely external non-verbal signifiers and the expression of a folk model 
through language.   Furthermore,  if  we accept  the proposition  put  forward  in  the 
section on metaphor,  then concepts  reveal  important  aspects  of human cognition. 
Folk models of emotion are not merely used, but they structure human understanding 
of the concepts themselves.  So whether or not our folk models of emotion tell us 
anything  about  ‘real’  emotions  or  feelings,  they  are  important  in  terms  of  their 




II – Prototypical Scenarios
In the previous section I argued that passivity was a feature which marked emotion in 
general.  Even though this appears to be the case, this aspect does not exhaust the 
study of  emotion  and in  some ways  limits  it.   In  what  sense  is  a  person acting 
through anger passive or active?  They are passive in the sense that they have no 
control over their feelings, but active in that their course of action is a choice not 
determined by the emotion.24  This complexity involved in emotional experiences has 
led  many  scholars  to  advance  a  critical  apparatus  called  a  scenario:  a  series  of 
feelings, actions, and events.25  It is only by viewing an emotion as a scenario that we 
can view it in its entire complexity: its physiological effects and the subject’s taking 
up and manipulation of social roles and courses of action.
This  criterion  of  an  emotional  scenario,  although  not  explicitly  used  in 
ancient Greek thought, is not completely alien to at least some of their philosophical 
studies of emotion.  The ancient Greek word which comes closest to our category of 
‘emotion’ is πάθος.  Πάθος designates a category of wider extension than our own 
term emotion.26  Indeed,  as Wierzbicka has made clear (see above),  the differing 
semantic  ranges  of  words  from  different  languages  can  cause  problems.   This 
difficulty with semantics reinforces the need for a scenario based approach.  
The validity of such an approach to ancient Greek literature can be seen by 
looking at Aristotle’s analysis of  πάθη in his  Rhetorica.27  Aristotle does not cite 
24 The active or ‘participant’ nature of the emotional subject is something which perhaps Kövecses 
underplays.  He posits a master metaphor underlying others in American English and other languages, 
that emotion is a force acting upon a person.  See Kövecses 2000, 61-86.  See also Damasio 1995, 
123: ‘when we consider our own species, however, and the far more varied and largely unpredictable 
environments in which we have thrived, it is apparent that we must rely on highly evolved genetically 
based biological mechanisms, as well as on suprainstinctual survival strategies that have developed in 
society,  are  transmitted  by  culture,  and  require,  for  their  application,  consciousness,  reasoned 
deliberation, and willpower.  That is why human hunger, desire, and explosive anger do not proceed 
unchecked toward feeding frenzy,  sexual assault, and murder,  at least not always, assuming that a 
healthy human organism has developed in a society in which the suprainstinctual survival strategies 
are actively transmitted and respected.’
25 See  in  particular  Cairns  2008a,  Kaster  2005,  Lakoff  and  Kövecses  1987.   Kaster  uses  the 
terminology of a script instead of a scenario, but the approach is essentially the same. 
26 See Cairns 2008a,  45, Konstan 2006, 3-4,  and Lloyd  2007, 67-9,  72.   However,  this does not 
prohibit an overlap with our own category.  
27 On πάθη and this treatise see particularly Fortenbaugh 1975 and Konstan 2006. 
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ἔρως as a πάθος in his discussion, but then he does not discuss all πάθη.28  This 
could merely be due to the fact that his discussion focuses on rhetorical contexts, 
where πάθη can sway one’s listeners, and therefore ἔρως is less likely to feature.29 
I am not assuming that Aristotle’s definition of a πάθος is either comprehensive or 
even prototypical for the ancient Greeks.  Even if Aristotle did not consider ἔρως a 
πάθος, this does not mean that it  was not considered as one in a broader social 
context,  or by other philosophers.  However, correspondences between Aristotle’s 
definition of a πάθος,  ἔρως in the Greek Novel, and the work on emotion carried 
out by Lakoff and Kövecses should make it clear that the phenomena at hand overlap 
significantly and that the interpretation given here is not alien to at least one ancient 
Greek expert model of emotion.
Aristotle maintains that τὰ πάθη involve the sensations of pleasure and pain 
and a change in judgement30:
ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι'  ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται 
λύπη καὶ ἡδονή,  οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα,  καὶ τὰ τούτοις 
ἐναντία (Rh.1378a20-3).31
28 The πάθη discussed are anger, satisfaction, shame, envy, indignation, fear, gratitude, love (φιλία), 
hatred and pity.  See Konstan 2006 with the reservations on Konstan’s work in Cairns 2008a.  Since 
his analysis of πάθη is based upon opposites, such as anger and satisfaction, it is not clear what place 
ἔρως would have in the work, since hatred is already used as the opposite of φιλία.
29 See Konstan 2009, 13, on  ἔρως in the  Rhetorica: ‘I expect because he (Aristotle) was uncertain 
whether it could be properly classified as one, although it may be that it was not one of the passions 
that an orator frequently sought to arouse or quell’.  
30 This  work  by  Aristotle  has  remained  remarkably  robust  in  the  history  of  scholarship  on  the 
emotions.   For  example,  the  neurologist  Damasio  writes  that  'the  internal  preference  system  is 
inherently biased to avoid pain, seek potential pleasure, and is probably pretuned for achieving these 
goals in social situations' (1995, 179).  His description fits well the trajectory of the discussion in 
Aristotle’s Rhetorica.  In another treatise Aristotle states that the philosopher and the natural scientist 
will  approach  emotion  from different  angles:  the  philosopher  will  say  that  anger  is  a  desire  for 
revenge,  whereas the natural  scientist will say that it  is a seething of blood around the heart  (De 
an.403a29-b2).  Recently Lloyd 2007, 4-5, has argued that it is more important than ever to look at 
subjects  like emotion from a multidisciplinary perspective,  in  order  to take into account  multiple 
frames of reference.   
31 Freese 1926.  For other lists of πάθη see NE 1105b21 and de An.403a16-17.  Aristotle is not the 
only Greek philosopher to discuss the emotions in terms of judgment.  Stoic theory is fragmentary and 
complicated, but Chrysippus notes that the passions are false judgments which are predicated upon 
either good or bad: see Long 1974, 176-77 and SVF 3, 466 and 486.  Seneca, who although Roman is 
a significant part of the stoic tradition, also denies that anger is merely an impulse.  He says that it acts 
with the approval of the mind, animo adprobante, and that forming the impression of an injury with 
the propositions that one should not be wronged and that one should seek revenge is not merely an 
impulse,  impetus,  which  occurs  without  our  will,  voluntate  nostra  (Sen.De ira 2.1.4).   Therefore 
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Examples of a πάθος are such concepts as anger, pity, fear, and their opposites.  If 
we turn to Aristotle’s first analysis of a specific πάθος, ὀργή, we see an approach 
which views the concept as it is enacted in a social discourse. 
Ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας [φαινομένης] διὰ φαινομένην 
ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἤ <τι>  τῶν αὐτοῦ,  τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος 
(Rh.1378a30-2).32     
The goal of ὀργή is a longing, ὄρεξις, for revenge upon a person due to a slight: a 
socially orientated action.  Aristotle goes on to say that an angry man is angry with a 
particular individual and that his ὀργή is accompanied by pleasure at the thought of 
the revenge to come: this is the pleasure of thinking one will obtain what one wants 
(Rh.1378b1).   Aristotle  goes  on  to  detail  the  end  point  of  anger.   Mildness, 
πράϋνσις, is the settling and resting of anger: κατάστασις καὶ ἠρέμησις ὀργῆς 
(Rh.1380a8-9).   When  those  who  caused  the  anger  apologise  and  repent, 
ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ μεταμελομένοις, the person feeling anger considers justice to 
have been done through the pain of the other,  ἔχοντες δίκην τὸ λυπεῖσθαι, and 
then ceases to feel angry (Rh.1380a14-6).  Therefore Aristotle  considers anger or 
rather  ὀργή as a diachronic passion which is socially embedded.33  The emotion is 
caused by another’s action which is socially mediated, since what counts as a slight 
Seneca  also envisages  a scenario (in terms of judgments)  which is  complex and involves  several 
stages: hic compositus et plura continens (Sen.De ira 2.1.5).  Kaster notes the importance of judgment 
as  an  element  of  cultural  diversity  in  the  emotions,  since  judgments  and  beliefs  are  products  of 
culture:  ‘returning  the  spotlight  to  cognition  means  that  culture  too—with  its  role  in  shaping 
judgments  and  beliefs  and  in  giving  us  the  emotion-talk  by  which  we  make  our  experiences 
intelligible—has regained a central place in the little drama that must be grasped as a whole’ (2004, 
9).  
32 On this passage see Konstan 2003a, 100.  
33 Aristotle also recognises that emotions can be causative of others.  He says that the sick, those in 
need, those at war, those in love (ἐρῶντες), and the thirsty, all those who desire something not easily 
obtainable, are liable to being angry and roused: ὀργίλοι εἰσὶ καὶ εὐπαρόρμητοι (Rh.1379a16-8). 
Interestingly Freese  1926, 179, translates  ἐρῶντες as  ‘the lovesick’.   This shows how pervasive 
metaphorical conceptualisations of emotion inform interpretations of the emotion terms themselves. 
Aristotle goes on to say that each one is disposed towards ὀργή (‘prepared in advance’) by the ruling 
passion:  προοδοποιεῖται  γὰρ  ἕκαστος  πρὸς  τὴν  ἑκάστου  ὀργὴν  ὑπὸ  τοῦ  ὑπάρχοντος 
πάθους (1379a23-4).  Note the metaphor in προοδοποιέω which conceptualises time as ‘preparing 
a path in advance’. This would seem to imply that Aristotle feels that ἔρως is a πάθος, and that one 
πάθος can provoke another.   
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will vary from culture to culture.  The emotion is then appeased in a social context 
when reparation is made.  Aristotle does not mention physiological symptoms in his 
Rhetorica as  part  of  the  scenario.   However,  elsewhere  Aristotle  does  state  that 
emotions  are  accompanied  by physical  affections  (De an.403a16-27).   Therefore 
Aristotle is aware of both the social and physiological facets of emotion.34  
Aristotle recognised the importance of social interaction in studying emotion, 
and this has become increasingly important in modern scholarship.  Emotion and 
πάθος, however, are also categories,  as are specific emotions and  πάθη, and in 
recent decades our understanding of categories has undergone a significant change. 
These  are  predominantly  folk  categories:  those  used  in  non-scientific  language. 
However, they are also intrinsic to how language works.  Subsets of categories can 
be  seen  to  show  prototypical  structure,  and  this  is  a  prominent  feature  of  new 
cognitive  approaches  to  grammar.35  Fortenbaugh  has  argued  that  the  category 
34 Aristotle devotes far more space to the social aspect of emotion rather than its physiology, and this 
might be behind Konstan’s assertions in his book on the emotions in ancient Greece.  He attempts to 
set  up a  dichotomy between  the  Greeks’  intensely social  understanding of  emotion and  our own 
understanding of them as internal to the self: ‘the Greeks did not conceive of emotions as internal 
states of excitation.  Rather, the emotions are elicited by our interpretation of the words, acts, and 
intentions of others, each in its characteristic way’ (Konstan 2006, xii).  This is clearly not a valid 
dichotomy as emotions involve internal states and social interaction at the same time.  For the Greeks 
emotions could be internal states of excitement, as evidenced by numerous works of literature such as 
the great tragedies.   Konstan goes on to emphasise the social interpretation of emotion: ‘It  would 
appear that the Greeks were constantly jockeying to maintain or improve their social position or that 
of dear ones, and were deeply conscious of their standing in the eyes of others. When ordinary people 
stepped out of the house and into the streets of Athens, they must . . . have been intensely aware of 
relative degrees of power and their own vulnerability to insult and injury. The emotions of the ancient 
Greeks, in turn, were attuned to these demands’ (Konstan 2006, 259).  There is a problem with this. 
Leaving aside the philosophical and scientific writings (which are likely to be idiosyncratic), a vast 
amount of Konstan’s evidence on emotions in ancient Greece comes from either rhetorical speeches 
(where  status  is  focused  upon intensely),  the  powerful  in  myth  and  history  who have  important 
statuses to maintain (for example the gods, Medea and Xerxes) or the educated aristocracy up to the 
imperial period.  Therefore, even if Konstan’s assertion applies to the literature, it does not necessarily 
apply to everyday life (for instance if a study of English emotion was done which privileged the cases 
of the God of the Old Testament, Othello, Juliet, and Henry II and Thomas Beckett).  Furthermore it is 
the case that emotions in contemporary culture are also social: in the way Konstan has phrased it his 
description could equally apply to our own society or many others.  Libel cases against newspapers 
and periodicals, common in the current day and age, concern ‘vulnerability to insult and injury’ and 
are often motivated by anger.  People who purchase a house in order to live in a better area and place 
their children in a catchment area for a better school are ‘constantly jockeying to maintain or improve 
their social position or that of dear ones’.  One could argue that all people are (partially but not fully) 
‘aware of relative degrees of power’ and that this permeates human relations.  So it is not important 
that the emotions of the ancient Greeks were attuned to the demands of power and knowledge: we 
need to know how this was quantitatively or qualitatively different from our own society.  
35 For prototype theory see Lakoff 1987, Rosch 1973a, 1973b, 1975, 1978 and Rosch and Mervis 
1975.  See Cairns 2008a, 49: ‘a ‘prototype’  is a central example of a category around which less 
prototypical  forms  cluster  and  to  which  these  less  prototypical  forms  are  related  by  ‘family 
resemblance’’.  
19
πάθος in Aristotle’s  Rhetorica is not a consistent one but united by similarity.36 
Although Aristotle defines emotions as accompanied by pleasure and pain, one of his 
emotions, hate (μῖσος), occurs without pain.  However, it is still included because of 
its similarities to the other concepts discussed (according to Fortenbaugh).  This is 
based on the notion of Wittgenstein’s family resemblances, a theory which is one of 
the founding principles of prototype theory.  He argues that a category in ordinary 
language  use  such  as  ‘game’  (Spiel)  does  not  have  a  feature  common  to  every 
member  of  the  category,  but  that  members  can  be  related  to  one  another  by 
resemblance.37  He compares this to family relations: all members of a family are 
related, but there is not one single characteristic which applies to every member (e.g. 
blue eyes).38  Therefore there might not be one consistent attribute which applies to 
every instance of  ἔρως,  but  there might  be similarities  between different  models 
which unite them under one category.     
Furthermore prototype theory emphasises the propensity to grade members: 
some members of a category are better than others.  Using a list of pieces of furniture 
Rosch  asked  two  hundred  students  to  rate  how good  an  example  of  a  piece  of 
furniture each item was.  The best examples of the category furniture were seen to be 
chair and sofa.39  Thus anger, fear and sadness might be more central members of the 
category of emotion than, say, hope or pride.  There are also basic and less basic 
elements of a category.  If we see certain English emotion terms as subsets of the 
category ‘emotion’ then native speakers feel that some emotion terms are more basic 
than others.  So anger would be a basic term, and terms such as annoyance, wrath, 
rage,  and  indignation  would  be related  but  less  basic  terms.40  Perhaps  Ekman’s 
36 Fortenbaugh 2003-4.  
37 See Wittgenstein 2001, 66: ‘consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”.  I mean 
board-games, card-games, Olympic games, and so on.  What is common to them all?—Don’t say: 
“There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’”— but look and see whether 
there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see something that is common 
to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.’
38 Wittgenstein 2001, 67: ‘I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 
“family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build features, 
colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say: 
‘games’ form a family.’  
39 See Rosch 1975.  
40 Kövecses 2000, 3.  See Lakoff 1987, 31–8 for a more detailed explanation.
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emotions are central members of the category emotion because they are based on 
universal expressions, and further emotions are more culturally structured.41  
Of  course  I  cannot  use  native  speakers  to  test  which  emotions  are  more 
central  to the Greek category than others.  However, prototypes can be used in a 
profitable way when analysing ἔρως.  Cairns has already shown that the concept of 
anger in ancient Greek shows prototypical structure.42  I previously quoted Ekman on 
the possibility of compound emotions.  Is ἔρως a basic Greek emotion, or do more 
basic emotions structure it?  Second, although I am not studying whether the Greek 
emotions show prototypical structure, I can attempt to see whether the concept of 
ἔρως shows prototypical structure.  Are certain conceptualisations of  ἔρως better 
examples of the category than others?    
The following is the prototypical scenario of anger as postulated by Lakoff 
and  Kövecses.   Their  scenario  or  progression  of  events  is  envisioned  as  the 
prototypical  sequence  of  actions  and  reactions  in  an  incident  of  anger  among 




Agent of Retribution = S
Target of Anger = Wrongdoer
Immediate Cause of Anger = Offending Event 
Angry Behaviour = Retribution     
41 Lakoff 1987, 38–9, certainly thinks so. 
42 Cairns 2003b, 27: ‘Aristotle’s account of orgē establishes not an exhaustive, all encompassing, but 
a prototypical definition of anger’; ‘The Homeric scenarios in which cholos does not straightforwardly 
spring from a perception of unwarranted offense…(should be) recognised as less prototypical cases’. 
If  one does not take into account prototypical  categorisation then one has difficulty fitting all the 
instances of a concept into one definition.  See Cairns 2008a, 49–50: ‘it would be perfectly easy, for 
example, to construct a prescriptive definition of the English word ‘jealousy’ that focused (e.g.) on its 
prototypical scenario in which A believes that B is a rival for the affections of C, but any descriptive 
account of the term will have to account (e.g.) for the fact that many ordinary users of English use the 
term as a partial synonym of ‘envy’ (e.g. to be ‘jealous’ of another’s success).  It is a crucial element 
of our project  of conceptual  analysis  to recognise that a single term has many senses,  that native 
speakers rarely encompass the full semantic range of a term in their attempts to capture its meaning, 
and that they disagree over what terms mean and which uses are typical.’
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Stage 1: Offending Event
Wrongdoer offends S
Wrongdoer is at fault
The offending event displeases S
The intensity of the offense outweighs the intensity of the retribution (which 
equals zero at this point), thus creating an imbalance.  The offense causes 
anger to come into existence.
Stage 2: Anger
Anger exists.
S experiences physiological effects (heat, pressure, agitation).  
Anger exerts force on the S to attempt an act of retribution.
Stage 3: Attempt to control anger
S exerts a counterforce in an attempt to control anger.  
Stage 4: Loss of control
The intensity of anger goes above the limit.
Anger takes control of S.
S exhibits angry behaviour (loss of judgement, aggressive actions).
There is damage to S.
There is a danger to the target of anger, in this case, the wrongdoer.
Stage 5: Retribution
S  performs  retributive  act  against  W  (this  is  usually  angry  behaviour 
directed at W).
The intensity of retribution balances the intensity of offense.
The intensity of anger drops to zero.
Anger ceases to exist.43    
This prototypical scenario is an example of how an emotion is played out in a folk 
model as a syndrome.  Emotions are not necessarily single experiences but scenarios 
of experiences and actions/reactions.  There can also be non-prototypical instances of 
anger.  Lakoff and Kövecses list many such cases in their study,  one of which is 
Redirected Anger.44  In this case the anger is not directed at the person who causes 
anger, but at someone else.  In this case stage five of the prototypical scenario is 
changed.  Lakoff and Kövecses’s article is more a proposal than a comprehensive 
43 Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, 213-4.
44 Lakoff and Kövecses  1987, 214-6.
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study (with selective evidence).  Kaster, on the other hand, has shown firmly that 
scenarios,  or  ‘scripts’  as  he  calls  them,  are  deeply  rooted  in  Roman 
conceptualisations of the emotions.45  The goal of this thesis is to put together a folk 
model of ἔρως in the Greek Novels.  This will involve a prototypical scenario, such 
as the one above, and non-prototypical cases.  
45 Kaster 2005 has done this for Latin literature in the form of ‘scripts’.  See his taxonomy of four 
scripts for the Latin emotion of invidia, 87.  Scripts also take into account the different settings or 
circumstances  which  may  elicit  a  particular  form  of  an  emotion.  In  my  study  I  will  retain  the 
terminology of prototypical scenario, in order to be consistent with my terms for categorisation.    
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III – Metaphor
Contemporary  science  has  the  potential  to  highlight  aspects  of  ancient  Greek 
emotions, but folk models of emotion in English and Ancient Greek are conceptual, 
and a study of them is not one of emotions as natural kinds.  However, as stated 
above, emotions are integral to cultural interaction.  A study of a culture’s concepts 
of  emotion  is  vital  for  understanding  emotion  in  that  society.   The  Greeks  used 
concepts which we would recognise as emotions, and the importance of notions such 
as  ἔρως in their societies justifies its study.   Just as it  emerges that concepts are 
important for the study of ancient emotions, since we cannot study a past culture with 
empirical  experiment,  language  comes  to  the  fore.   There  may  be  evidence  of 
universal facial expressions or physiological responses in descriptions of non-verbal 
symptoms or behaviours and artistic representations, but concepts are expressed and 
used to their greatest complexity in language.  This is where metaphor comes in, as 
an essential feature of language and thought, and this section will describe in detail 
what  part  metaphor  plays  in this,  my theoretical  approach to metaphor,  and why 
metaphor is essential for concepts of emotion.
Traditionally emotion is studied by means of what are called emotion terms, 
such as happiness,  disgust,  surprise,  sadness,  anger,  and fear (see above).   These 
terms  feature  in  only some of  the instances  where language  describes  emotion.46 
Figurative terms can be descriptive of concepts, and this is where metaphor performs 
its role in structuring emotions.  These descriptions do not include the emotion term, 
but  are  recognised  as  referring  to  the  emotion  due  to  culturally  (or  universally) 
shared conceptualisations.  For example, if I say that someone has ‘reached boiling 
point’ then a native speaker of American English (and probably those who speak 
many other languages) can understand that the person is angry, despite the fact that 
no emotion term is given.  Lakoff and Kövecses argue that this communication of 
emotion  through  language  is  not  merely  idiomatic,  but  is  based  on  shared  and 
46 The distinction made by Kövecses  2000,  2-3,  is  also relevant  here.   Some words can  express 
emotion, like the English yuk! which indicates disgust, but these are not the focus of this study.  I will 
be  looking  at  descriptive  terms,  which  describe  the  emotion  and  the  emotional  experience.   For 
example ‘I’m about to explode’ is a colloquial American English description of anger, and it describes 
the experience metaphorically in terms of an explosion.  For a study of anger and conceptual metaphor 
in American English see Lakoff and Kövecses 1987.
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systematic conceptual metaphors.47  One of the metaphors used of anger in American 
English  conceptualises  it  as  the  heat  of  a  fluid in  a  container.   This  is  a  shared 
cultural conceptualisation and allows all phrases such as ‘you make my blood boil’, 
‘simmer down!’, and ‘let him stew’ to describe and communicate anger.48  In the 
same way when one of the characters in the Greek Novel says ‘I burn’, φλέγω, they 
are  communicating  the  fact  that  they  are  feeling  ἔρως by means  of  a  culturally 
pervasive concept in Ancient Greek.49  This thesis will map out the concepts used of 
ἔρως in  the  Greek  Novel,  since  metaphor  reveals  the  underlying  conceptual 
framework of the emotion.
There  are  several  other  features  of  figurative  descriptions  which  deserve 
mention.   Metaphors do not necessarily name the emotion term itself,  but denote 
aspects of the concept, such as intensity, cause, control and so on.50  They therefore 
add much information and nuance to ‘fill out’ the structure of the concept.  I will be 
using two terms for two related types of metaphorical conceptualisation: metaphor 
and metonymy.  Both terms are defined by Kövecses in his book on emotion.
Conceptual metaphors bring two distant domains (or concepts) into correspondence with one 
another.  One of the domains is typically more physical or concrete than the other (which is 
thus more abstract).  The correspondence is established for the purpose of understanding the 
more abstract in terms of the more concrete.51 
Conceptual metonymies, unlike conceptual metaphors, involve a single domain, or concept.52 
    
The use of the word domain is important, as metaphors map concepts, not words. 
Mapping refers to the process of understanding the abstract  in terms of the more 
47 Their use of conceptual metaphor builds on the ground breaking study by Lakoff and Johnson 1980.
48 Examples are taken from Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, 198.
49 And in English too.  To ‘burn with love’ is a common enough phrase.  The potential objection here 
is  that  ‘burning’  can represent  multiple  psychological  states,  and is  therefore  ambiguous.   So for 
instance, if someone is ‘burning’, how do I know whether they are burning with love or anger?  The 
answer is that context usually makes it clear, and there is no problem with context being an integral 
part of meaning.  For instance,  if I say ‘the window is open’, the semantic meaning of the words 
greatly underdetermines  the speaker’s  meaning.   Apart  from expressing a simple fact,  I  could be 
asking someone indirectly to shut the window, or be explaining why the room is so cold.  So there are 
multiple possible meanings,  but not infinite ones, and multiple meanings can be whittled down in 
context.  This is why all excerpts in this study will take into account context, as speaker meaning can 
differ from sentence meaning.
50 Kövecses 2000, 4.
51 Kövecses 2000, 4 (the Italicism is mine).  
52 Kövecses 2000, 5.
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concrete: thus for the metaphor ‘ἔρως is fire’ the more concrete concept of fire is 
mapped  onto  the  more  abstract  notion  of  the  emotion.   If  the  domain  of  fire  is 
mapped onto the emotion of ἔρως, as seen above, the potential is there for mapping 
many aspects of the source domain.  Fires are hot, can flare up, cool down, and can 
be harmful or beneficial to humans.  The term domain reflects the multivalent aspect 
of  these  mappings,  and  the  potential  for  different  aspects  of  each  domain  to  be 
mapped onto one another.  So the metaphor of extinguishing ἔρως, seen often in the 
novels, refers to a specific part of the experiential domain of fire, i.e. its putting out. 
This part then maps onto a specific part of the ἔρως domain, denoting the absence or 
ending of the emotion.53  The terms source and target domain are also relevant here. 
The  source  domain  is  the  metaphor  used  to  explain  the  concepts,  and  the  target 
domain is the concept intended to be explained.  In the example above fire is the 
source domain and ἔρως is the target.  The concept is explained and understood by 
conceptualising it as a fire.       
Metonymy on the other hand involves mapping within the same domain.  A 
part represents the whole or a part represents another part.  In Longus’ novel Daphnis 
blushes due to αἰδώς.54  The term αἰδώς is not mentioned, but part of the cultural 
model  of  the  emotion  involves  blushing,  and  so  this  physiological  reaction  is 
understood as metonymic of the emotion.55  This also relates to one emotion being 
understood in  terms  of  another.   Often  characters  in  the  Greek Novel  feel  grief, 
λύπη, as a metonymy for ἔρως.  This is understanding one abstraction in terms of 
another,  and although the concepts overlap, as in the case of erotic grief, it  is an 
instance of metaphor rather than metonymy.56  
Domains,  manipulated  in  terms  of  metaphors  and  metonymies,  provide 
structure  for  concepts,  and  hence  for  emotions.   Ἔρως is  a  concept  which  is 
structured by metaphors, metonymies, and the linking of various domains within it. 
It is a domain structured by sub-domains and interaction with other domains, and this 
53 For examples of all these instances see the section on Fire.
54 Longus 1.17.2.
55 More specifically it is erotic αἰδώς here.  Subsections of a domain, such as blushing being a part of 
the domain of αἰδώς, do not have to be exclusive to that domain.   
56 Of course there are concrete manifestations of λύπη in ancient Greece, such as the beating of breasts 
or the tearing of hair, but I maintain that the emotion itself, as with all emotions, is abstract.  
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will become clearer as this thesis maps out the extent of its range in the Greek Novel. 
Metaphor is the primary conceptual instrument at use here, but the way in which 
metaphorical concepts are structured is also important.  This also differentiates my 
use of metaphor  from the way others have used it,  especially in a literary sense. 
Silk’s excellent studies are concerned with whether metaphors are ‘felt’.57  He wants 
to know which metaphors stop the reader in their tracks and which slide under the 
radar, so to speak.  This is an important aspect of literary metaphor, but it is vital to 
my own studies that I do look at what has been called ‘dead’ metaphor.  These deep-
rooted  metaphorical  conceptualisations,  which  are  common  in  a  language,  are 
important for the study of emotion precisely because they fall under the radar.  They 
are the natural categories people use to conceptualise their emotional experience, and 
therefore they are anything but  ‘dead’,  as we will  see through the course of this 
thesis.58           
Lakoff and Johnson’s theory is one of conceptual metaphor, and this refers to 
the way in which metaphor is an aspect of thought rather than language.  Above 
Kövecses specified that metaphorical mapping typically involves the mapping of a 
more concrete concept onto a more abstract one.  Metaphor is often the use of basic 
image  schemas  which  result  from  human  perception  to  understand  abstract 
concepts.59  If thought (and therefore language) about abstract concepts relies upon 
human experience and perception of concrete realities, then Greek metaphors will 
57 For a good treatment of these issues see Silk 1974 and 2003 on poetry, particularly early ancient 
Greek poetry.
58 The issue of how metaphors are processed in the brain is more difficult.  See Pinker 2007, 235–78 
for the relevant issues.  
59 This influence is not just culturally specific.  For evidence that cognition of everyday experience 
structures  metaphor  we  may look  at  a  common metaphor.   In  the  English  language  there  is  an 
orientational  metaphor  which  conceptualises  happiness  and  sadness  in  terms  of  height.   This  is 
referred to as the HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN metaphor and the following are linguistic examples 
from American English: I’m feeling up.  That boosted my spirits.  My spirits rose.  You’re in high 
spirits.  Thinking about her always gives me a lift.  I’m feeling down.  I’m depressed.  He’s really low 
these days.  I fell into a depression.  My spirits sank.  These metaphors are explained as having a 
physical basis: drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with 
a  positive  emotional  state  (Lakoff  and  Johnson  1980,  15).   This  example  shows  the  potential 
importance of the connection of metaphorical conceptualisation with perception and physiology.  If 
metaphor is grounded in experience and perception, then we can make two important conclusions. 
First human perception is physiologically based, and therefore universal, and so we might reason that 
there  are  metaphorical  universals.   Second,  different  cultures  have  different  environments  and 
different modes of behaviour, and so we would expect metaphorical conceptualisations to be grounded 
in their own cultural experience.  The historicism/universalism argument becomes less relevant, since 
perception is routed in physiology and culture, and we approach a model more like the one used in 
evolution, where physiology and environment are cooperative factors.
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also use basic features of experience.60  Cairns has shown that in ancient Greek the 
concepts  αἰδώς and grief often utilise metaphor  which is based on the empirical 
reality of veiling one’s face.61  This is an example of cognitive metaphor reflecting 
cultural concrete realities.
Above we mentioned folk and expert models of thought, and this distinction 
is no less relevant to the ancient Greeks than to us.  Ancient Greek science occupies a 
famous niche in history, and great minds such as Plato, Aristotle, Galen, and others 
built up a considerable repository of knowledge in many different fields.  These are 
firmly expert  models of knowledge.   The considerations of metaphor  above have 
been ahistorical, in the sense that they treat metaphor grounded either in universal or 
culturally  relative  experience,  rather  than  as  something  which  can  change 
diachronically.   It  has  been noted in  other  disciplines  that  metaphor  can play an 
important role as a link between folk and expert models of thought.  Science can 
develop new interpretative metaphors which then filter down into folk models of the 
same concepts and vice versa.  The Greek Novel occurs at a later stage than classical 
Greek literature, and therefore metaphors for emotions which might have been expert 
ones for Plato could have become commonplace by the time of the Greek Novel, 
with the result that they assume the register of folk metaphors.  The relationship also 
goes both ways.  It has been postulated that the success of scientific metaphors in the 
past might be linked to how well they ‘fit’ with existing folk models.  Therefore the 
interaction of folk and expert models will be important for any analysis of metaphor 
in the Greek Novel.
In conclusion: there are three important features of metaphor which I will be 
using throughout this study.  The first is its role in structuring an abstract concept 
such as an emotion, and its relation to and action in a prototypical scenario.  The 
second is the grounding of the metaphor, or how many metaphors are universal ones 
resulting  from  human  perception  and  experience,  and  how  many  arise  from 
specifically  Greek conditions  of  experience.   Finally,  on a  more  specific  cultural 
level, I will look at which metaphors, if any, have been influenced not so much by 
60 Furthermore if experience influences metaphor, then it  is possible that Ekman’s universal  facial 
expressions may influence the portrayal of emotions in ancient Greek language.  
61 Cairns 2008b.  
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direct experience but by ancient Greek scientific or expert modes of thought.  I will 
now go on to specify the material I am working with and why it has been chosen. 
29
IV - The Ancient Greek Novel
The Greek Novel is a collection of works written roughly between the first century 
BCE and the fourth century CE.  There are five (probably) complete novels which 
survive:  Chariton’s  Callirhoe,  Xenophon  of  Ephesus’  Anthia  and  Habrokomes, 
Achilles  Tatius’  Leucippe  and  Cleitophon,  Longus’  Daphnis  and  Chloe,  and 
Heliodorus’  Aethiopica.62  They  are  placed  together  as  a  genre  because  they  all 
display similar  structures  in which a pair  of young lovers are  united at  the start, 
undergo trials and tribulations, often in the form of extensive voyages, and are finally 
reunited at the end.63  There seems to have been an appeal for this type of literature in 
antiquity, since we also have fragmentary novels, but due to the wealth of examples I 
have restricted my focus to these five.  I have also left out relevant Latin works, such 
as Lucius Apuleius’ Metamorphoses and Petronius’ Satyricon, due to considerations 
of space, since the Greek Novel provides me with enough material.  This thesis is a 
study  on  conceptual  metaphor  in  Greek,  and  so  examples  from  Latin  are  less 
relevant.  A distinctive feature of this genre is that the romances are generally set in 
an helleno-centric past.  It almost totally ignores the Roman Empire, a factor perhaps 
based on its historical settings.64
The Greek Novel has enjoyed a growth in treatment similar to that of the 
emotions, and is a particularly vibrant area of study.  They are literature, and good 
literature at that, as has been proved by books and articles too numerous to cite here. 
I therefore must deal with emotions and metaphor not merely on a conceptual level, 
but on a literary level.  I do not see these aims as necessarily distinct, and feel that 
literary manipulation of emotion and metaphor owe a great deal to their grounding in 
cultural conceptualisations, without being reducible to this.  Indeed the presence of 
62 The dating of the novels has been a considerable task, but current consensus is within the range 1st 
century  BCE to  4th century  CE.   The  general  dating  or  order  of  the  novels  does  not  affect  my 
argument, but Chariton is usually seen as the first novelist chronologically and Heliodorus as the last. 
On the dating of the Greek Novel see Bowie 2008, Bowie and Harrison 1993, Morgan 1995.
63 I call it a genre here for convenience’s sake.  No part of my argument rests upon any notion of genre  
as regards the Greek Novel.
64 Xenophon of Ephesus’ mention of an eirenarch (X.Eph.2.13.3), an office not known before Trajan 
(emperor 98-117), reveals the author’s period as imperial, and he is usually dated to between 100 and 
150 CE.  Perhaps this is just on historical requirements, i.e. the Roman Empire did not exist at the 
time when the (historical) novels are set, such as Chariton and Heliodorus, but this celebration of the 
past is strongly Greek, and should be seen as a promotion, conscious or not, of hellenic culture, in 
particular as concerns the hellenic interaction with the eastern Mediterranean, Persia and Egypt.  
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emotion and metaphor in literature has been touched upon by previous studies, and 
my work owes a great deal to these.65              
Why focus upon the Greek Novel?  The first and most important reason for 
this  is  that  these novels provide so much evidence.   They are  romances,  or love 
stories, and ἔρως features heavily throughout.  Second, they are not expert treatises, 
such as philosophical or medical texts, and therefore provide evidence for the folk 
models of Greek emotions.66  I have chosen to have a focus in the first place, not only 
because  of  the  breadth  of  evidence  available,  but  because  of  the  literary  aspect. 
These novels, as with previous Greek literature, are written in a specific historical 
and cultural context, the Greek culture of the eastern Mediterranean under Roman 
imperial rule, and engage in a discourse with previous influences.  There is also the 
author as an author, an individual identity rather than a mere mouthpiece for cultural 
stereotypes, and his sophisticated manipulation of the narrative.  I am aware of all 
these issues, and will engage with them where relevant.  Identifying the metaphorical 
conceptualisations  which  underlie  the  folk  models  of  ἔρως presents  us  with  the 
conceptual blocks which authors use to build with, not with prisons which restrict 
their every movement within bars of culture.  It is the consistency of these models 
across the Greek Novel which I will emphasise, while attempting to highlight any 
significant variations.  
This  introduction  has  highlighted  the  theoretical,  methodological  and 
contextual  grounds  of  my  thesis.   I  have  tried  to  justify  studying  emotion  in 
language, language by metaphor, and language through literature.  Folk models are a 
valuable source of a culture’s concepts, and aspects of the ancient Greek folk model 
of ἔρως bear enough resemblance to our folk model of emotions for a comparison to 
be  profitable.   It  only remains  to  detail  the  subsections  of  this  thesis.   The first 
chapter, ‘The Erotic Syndrome’, will look at the classification of symptoms of love 
and argue that ἔρως should be seen as a collection of symptoms, and that symptoms 
can be metonymous.  Chapter 2 will look at the metaphorical conceptualisation of 
65 On  love  in  the  Greek  novels  see  Konstan  1994.   Many  studies  emphasise  the  importance  of 
metaphor in the novels but see particularly Bowie 2004, Harrison, Paschalis and Frangoulidis 2005, 
Létoublon 1993, and Mignogna 1991.  
66 This is not to say that scientific models are not influential.  See the introductory section on Folk and 
Scientific Models.
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ἔρως as  fire and argue that it  is  not merely imagery but structures the emotion. 
Chapter  3  will  explore  two  conceptualisations  of  ἔρως which  complement  one 
another:  disease  and  madness.   Chapter  4  will  explore  the  most  pervasive  non-
symptom based metaphorical  conceptualisation:  ἔρως as an opponent.   Chapter 5 
will look at ἔρως and vision and chapter 6 at internal psychological entities relevant 
to the operation of  ἔρως.  Chapter 7 will detail an ontology of  ἔρως or how the 
existence of the emotion is conceptualised metaphorically in the Greek Novel. The 
final  chapter  will  look  at  ἔρως in  relation  to  other  emotions,  and  define  a 
prototypical scenario of the emotion and any alternative scenarios.  Throughout all of 
these chapters I will look at the interaction of folk and expert models and analyse 
how extensive metaphors of ἔρως are in the conceptualisation of other emotions. 
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Chapter 1 – The Erotic Syndrome
Symptoms have always been an important part of the study of emotion in Greek 
literature, and recent works which engage with the Greek Novel are no exception. 
Maehler names his article on erotic correspondences between the Greek Novel and 
the Greek Anthology ‘Symptome der Liebe’ and Toohey gives an important place to 
symptoms in his extensive survey of lovesickness.67  Calame states that (usually) ‘in 
ancient  Greece,  the effects  of love are portrayed…in terms of their  physiological 
aspects’.68  Furthermore  Liviabella  Furiani  has  written  extensively  on  non-verbal 
communication in the Greek Novel, studies which make extensive use of symptoms 
and behaviour.69      
I wish to use this chapter to make two points concerning symptoms.  The first 
is that there are no symptoms which are unique to ἔρως.  This is interesting in light 
of  Ekman’s  exploration  of  which  emotions  are  associated  with  a  specific  facial 
expression  and  which  are  not.   I  have  therefore  titled  this  chapter  the  ‘erotic 
syndrome’:  ἔρως involves  a  specific  collection  of  symptoms  with  some  more 
prototypical than others.70  However, since many of these symptoms are associated 
with  other  emotions  there  is  a  further  complexity:  some  symptoms  may  not  be 
directly representative of  ἔρως per se, but of another emotion which is erotically 
motivated.  Second I will argue that metonymy is particularly important in the case 
of symptoms: they can also represent the emotion in terms of the part for the whole 
67 See Maehler 1990.  In the introduction to the volume Hofmann states that ‘Maehler traces a number 
of (mainly physical) symptoms of love’.  See also Toohey 1992 and 2004.  
68 Calame 1992, 5.
69 See Liviabella Furiani 1996 and 1998.  For further work on non-verbal elements in Greek literature 
see Lateiner 1995 and 1998 (which deals with the Greek Novel).
70 This also brings the study in line with modern studies of emotion.  See Damasio 1995, 56: ‘it is the 
inevitable nature of syndromes to have a matrix, a shared essence of symptoms, and to have symptom 
variance  around  the  edges  of  that  essence.’   Konstan  2009,  1,  also  approaches  ἔρως with  this 
terminology:  ‘we know its symptoms, for example: dry tongue, a hot  flame in the marrow, ringing 
ears, clouded vision. Sappho's description of the syndrome…set the pattern for all of Greek and Latin 
literature.’ 
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(synecdoche).71  Both  of  these  points  can  be  illustrated  with  the  blush.72  The 
significance  of  the  blush  is  that  the  subject  is  experiencing  αἰδώς (shame). 
Therefore the blush is not a direct erotic symptom, although it is indicative of the 
erotic experience, but a signal of αἰδώς the emotion which is itself a constituent of 
the erotic scenario.  Thus the blush is metonymous for  αἰδώς, which itself can be 
constitutive of the erotic experience.            
The  symptoms  analysed  here  can  be  roughly divided  into  two categories: 
physiological  and  behavioural.   Physiological  symptoms  relate  to  processes  or 
descriptions of the body, and behavioural  symptoms relate to external interaction, 
such as actions or inactions.73  In some ways this division is artificial,  but it  will 
suffice as a structuring device.  For the first part of this chapter I will concentrate on 
Longus’  Daphnis  and  Chloe,  which  invokes  many  erotic  symptoms,  before 
broadening the scope to the rest of the novels.  
One of the stock features  of  ἔρως in Longus is  an association with heat. 
When Daphnis  and Chloe  kiss  and  embrace  one  another  they  ‘become warmer’: 
θερμότεροι γενόμενοι (Longus 2.39.1).  This is not necessarily a symptom of 
ἔρως (the increase in temperature could be due to the embrace) but the association of 
ἔρως with  heat  (or  fire)  is  consistent  (see  below  and  the  following  chapter). 
Therefore the physiological reaction is coherent with the erotic syndrome.  Here the 
two young lovers  are ‘experimenting’  with love,  and have also taken some wine 
mixed with their milk.  Alcohol is also involved with heat and  ἔρως in Chariton’s 
novel.  While speaking about (and remembering) Callirhoe the satrap Mithridates is 
‘heated  up  by  wine  and  ἔρως’:  θερμανθεὶς  Μιθριδάτης  οἴνῳ  καὶ  ἔρωτι.74 
However, the physiological symptom cannot quite free itself from metaphor.  The 
dative form indicates the instrument by which the reaction is achieved, and pairs a 
71 See Averill  1990, 119: ‘still, through the use of metonymy in common speech, we often allow 
presumed  physiological  responses  to  stand  for  the  whole…in  the  process  of  abstraction  and 
generalisation, we tend to forget that we are dealing with only a part, and we assume that what is true 
of certain physiological responses (e.g.visceral change) is also true of whole emotional syndromes.’
72 On blushing in Greek literature see Lateiner 1998.
73 It is important to note here that a behavioural symptom does not assume intention on the part of the 
subject.  So I count sleeplessness and not eating as both behavioural symptoms, despite the fact that 
both  can  be  ambiguous  in  terms  of  whether  they  are  intended  or  not.   So  there  is  no  absolute 
dichotomy between physiology as unintended reaction and behaviour as intended response.     
74 Chariton 4.3.8.
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concrete substance, wine, with an abstract one, ἔρως.  Ἔρως is therefore concretised 
as an instrument.  Both ἔρως and alcohol cause the same type of reaction, and in turn 
reinforce one another.  In the first example Daphnis and Chloe embraced and kissed. 
Earlier in the novel Daphnis and Dorcon compete in a debate for a kiss from Chloe. 
Daphnis wins and receives the kiss, and we are told that it is one which can warm up 
even the ψυχή:  πάνυ δὲ ψυχὴν θερμᾶναι δυνάμενον (Longus 1.17.1).75  This 
time we have a metaphorical description of the emotional effect of the kiss.  Gill 
translates this as ‘quite capable of setting a heart on fire’ and takes it as a reference to 
the conceptualisation of  ἔρως as fire (see next chapter).76  It certainly evokes this 
concept, but the specificity of the ψυχή as locus evokes a Platonic correspondence. 
In the  Phaedrus the lover viewing the beloved is described as becoming ‘warm’, 
θερμότης/ἐθερμάνθη, and sweating before his soul sprouts feathers (251b).  The 
close proximity of warmth and the  ψυχή in Plato’s dialogue lends an intertextual 
resonance to the passage in Longus.                  
  The  kiss  and  heat  also  occur  in  Heliodorus.   Cnemon  realises  that  his 
stepmother Demaenete’s affection is inappropriate when he perceives her kisses are 
‘warmer  than  is  fitting’:  θερμότερα  ἦν  τὰ  φιλήματα τοῦ  πρέποντος 
(Hld.1.9.3).77  Whether  the warmth  here  is  literal  or  metaphorical  (indicating  the 
intensity of the kisses) is difficult to say, and there is probably an element of both 
present.  However, the significance of the description is that it is metonymous.  The 
increased  warmth  of  the  kisses  indicates  ἔρως rather  than  motherly  affection. 
Therefore there exists an ambiguity about whether the description of ‘heating’ refers 
to body temperature or is metaphorical of the intensity of the emotion: or it could 
refer to both simultaneously.78  
75 It suffices here to say that the heating of the body is moved specifically to the entity most associated 
with  the  emotion,  the  soul  or  ψυχή:  synecdoche.   A  later  chapter  will  explore  more  fully  the 
significance of the different internal organs and entities which erotic sensations are attributed to.
76 See Reardon 1989, 296.
77 The story of Demaenete and Cnemon conforms to the Hippolytean paradigm, or more famously the 
Potiphar’s wife paradigm.  
78 This heating is paralleled by some examples from emotion in English.  Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, 
196–7, note that  the folk model  of anger  in American English involves an increase  in heat,  with 
intensity of heat mapping onto intensity of the emotion.  They also note that results from experiments 
in psychology show that when people experience anger their temperature and pulse rate both rise 
(Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, 219).  This evidence comes from Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen 1983.
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There are two interesting references in Longus which appear to run contrary 
to the association of ἔρως and heat.  At 1.17.1 Chloe’s kiss was capable of raising 
the temperature of the ψυχή but also had the opposite effect on Daphnis.  He reacts 
not as if kissed but bitten, δηχθείς, and σκυθρωπός (looking sad) he feels cold and 
has  a  palpitating  καρδία:  καὶ  πολλάκις  ἐψύχετο  καὶ  τὴν  καρδίαν 
παλλομένην κατεῖχε (Longus 1.17.2).  The striking word here is  ἐψύχετο: ‘to 
utter a breath’ or ‘be cold’.  This is not consistent with the notion of  ἔρως being 
warmth.  However, this image can still fit in with the schema advanced above in a 
certain way.  Πολλάκις indicates to us that this affliction occupies a certain period 
of time after the kiss.  The description is not of the instantaneous occurrence of the 
kiss but the aftermath.  It is as if the instant warmth of the kiss creates a necessary 
absence in which Daphnis feels cold.  This same image is brought up when Philetas 
lists the effects of his desire for Amaryllis.  He felt pain in his  ψυχή, his  καρδία 
palpitated  and  his  body  felt  cold: ῎Ηλγουν  τὴν  ψυχήν͵  τὴν  καρδίαν 
ἐπαλλόμην, τὸ σῶμα ἐψυχόμην (Longus 2.7.5).  If this effect refers to a surge of 
cold which follows the initial sensation of heat, then Longus is adding a subtlety to 
the  erotic  syndrome  not  seen  in  the  other  Greek  Novelists.   As  the  heat  of  the 
summer and ἔρως enflames Daphnis he keeps plunging into rivers to cool himself 
down (the implication is that it is to no avail).79  This is different, however, in the 
sense that he is trying to cool his internal heat, not experiencing an internal drop in 
temperature itself.  
This  concept  occurs  in  several  famous  passages  from  previous  Greek 
literature.80  In Sappho 31 the first person narrator obliquely describes the effects of 
sitting close to the object of their desire, by stating what would be the result of close 
proximity.  The narrator feels a hot flush (10), and then cold sweat runs down them, 
μ΄  ἴδρως  ψῦχρος  κακχέεται (31.13).81  The  order  of  reaction  in  Longus  is 
consistent with Sappho, where an initial flush is followed by a cooler sensation.  This 
79 Longus 1.23.2.
80 The literary influences  on Longus’  erotic  portrayal  have been well  documented elsewhere:  see 
particularly Bowie 2004, Chalk 1960 and Hunter 1983, 73–5.
81 The hot flush is actually described metaphorically as fire running underneath the skin,  χρῶι πῦρ 
ὐπαδεδρόμηκεν.
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means that although Longus does not mention sweat, it could be understood as being 
present.   The regulation of the body reacts  to the heat of  ἔρως by sweating and 
causing a subsequent cooling.82  Theocritus’ Simaetha reacts to the appearance of her 
lover in the same way.  She feels colder than snow in her whole body as the sweat 
drips from her: πᾶσα μὲν ἐψύχθην χιόνος πλέον (2.106).83  Both these prior 
passages contain the same concept as in Longus, a cold sensation inside, and so it 
would not be unreasonable to understand sweat as causing internal cooling.   The 
physiological reaction is of interest here.  The heating up of the body due to ἔρως is 
cooled in turn by sweating.84  Both references explicitly connect coolness and sweat, 
and as literary forebears they may influence the entries in Longus, but it is important 
that  this  concept  is  used  alongside  and  is  complementary  to  the  heat  imagery 
discussed above.  There is a slightly different effect generated by Pindar’s famous 
verses on Theoxenus.  Anyone who does not melt with warmth when looking at the 
youth has a  καρδία  fashioned out of adamant or iron with a ‘cold flame’:  ὃς μὴ 
πόθῳ  κυμαίνεται͵  ἐξ  ἀδάμαντος  ἢ  σιδάρου  κεχάλκευται  μέλαιναν 
καρδίαν  ψυχρᾷ  φλογί (fr.123.5-6).85  The  flame  is  ostensibly  part  of  the 
blacksmith metaphor, yet its designation as ‘cold’ draws it into antithesis with the 
notion of heat  associated  with someone who ‘swells  with desire’  (4).   The point 
Pindar  is  making  is  that  lack  of  passion  is  a  cold  flame,  one  that  lacks  the 
physiological effects.  The concept of fire is not used only because it supports the 
82 Clerk 2008, 266, claims that sweat results from internal fire in her study of Greek and Latin erotic 
poetry:  ‘it  is  this internal  fire  that  generates  the sweat  that  betrays  erotic  emotion to an external 
observer’.  She finds sweat as a common indicator of amor in Latin elegy but maintains that heat is the 
pervasive  internal  sensation,  not  coolness  (266-7).   She  connects  this  with  the  heat  of  sexual 
excitement.     
83 For a selection of other references to sweating in erotic contexts see Pl.Phdr.251b, 254c; Sappho 
31.13; Thgn.1017.
84 Sweat can be generally indicative of an emotional state.  At A.R.1.1261-2 Heracles sweats and the 
black blood boils within him, when he finds out that his ‘close friend’ Hylas is missing.  The next line 
confirms the fact that he is angry, χωόμενος, but we cannot rule out the sweat also signifying general 
anxiety.  In the Greek Anthology sweat accompanies shaking through fear (14.92.9), and we cannot 
rule out that Heracles might also feel fear on behalf of his companion.  Physiological symptoms are 
terse  ways  of  indicating  complex  emotional  responses.   When  Calasiris  talks  to  Chariclea  about 
converting her ‘malady’ into matrimony (translation by Morgan in Reardon 1989, 435), she begins to 
perspire (Hld.4.11.1).  The narrator then goes on to tell us that she was feeling multiple emotions – 
specifically joy, anguish, and shame.  These emotions are all elicited because of her erotic state.  Later 
on in the novel there are multiple emotions associated with sweat in a non-erotic context.  Persinna 
reads the band revealing that Chariclea is her daughter, and she trembles and sweats, feeling joy at her 
return and fear for her husband’s reaction (Hld.10.13.1).    
85 On this verse see especially Hubbard 2002.
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image of blacksmithery,  but because it  also evokes the very intensity of emotion 
which  is  absent  from the  ‘hard  hearted’.   In  Pindar  heat  corresponds  to  a  high 
intensity of emotion and cold to a low level.  
It  seems  that  in  Longus  heat  and  coolness  indicate  different  parts  of  the 
emotional  process.   Heat  is  most  commonly  associated  with  ἔρως,  but  Longus 
utilises coolness to create a paradoxical  experience.   Pindar is utilising a polarity 
between heat and coolness, each signifying respectively desire and lack of.  Longus, 
in line with precedents like Sappho, evokes a more complex physiological process by 
adding in the subsequent cooling to the heat.  If we were to go further we might say 
that sweat provides the physiological role in the change of state, as it cools the body 
down in reaction to the heat.  Heat corresponds to a sudden increase in intensity of 
ἔρως and the coolness is dependant upon the initial heat.  Coolness is often achieved 
by sweating, which the Greeks knew was related to thermoregulation.86  
From internal sensation we may now turn to external skin complexion.  An 
increased flow of blood to the skin causes redness, or blushing.87  Although skin 
colour is a physical symptom it can also be metonymous, since it is an external signal 
of an internal feeling.88  The blush is primarily a signal of αἰδώς, as when Daphnis 
stands embarrassed in front of his master.89  When Daphnis is near Chloe he wants to 
look, but blushes every time he does so: ἐρυθήματι ἐπίμπλατο (Longus 1.17.2). 
Blushing is described metaphorically here (filled with redness).  Daphnis is feeling 
αἰδώς, but the only reason he is feeling it is because he is in a state of  ἔρως for 
Chloe.   This  symptom  represents  one  emotion  as  part  of  the  overall  emotional 
experience of another.  Two emotions converge in erotic  αἰδώς, and so an erotic 
86 Theophrastus  says  that  sweating occurs  because of  an increase  in body temperature (On Sweat 
36.226-30 F). 
87 See Damasio 1995, 135: ‘the baseline activity of smooth muscles in artery walls may increase, and 
produce contraction and thinning of blood vessels (the result is pallor); or decrease, in which case the 
smooth muscle would relax and blood vessels dilate (the result is flushing).’  See also Lateiner 1998, 
165-7, who distinguishes the flush, which is the rush of blood to the head and limbs, and the blush, 
which  is  a  flush  triggered  by specific  contexts.   He points  out  that  ἐρυθρός indicates  only the 
observable colour without determining the cause (166).  I will use the term ‘blush’ in this study since 
my references involve αἰδώς.  
88 Colour is a complicated notion, and no part of my argument rests on the words used signifying a 
particular  hue.   See Lloyd  2007, 9-22 for  a  good summary of current  issues pertaining to colour 
perception.  Lateiner 1998, 174, says that ‘blushing is one mode of accidental self-declaration’.  
89 Longus 4.14.2: he does not speak, is filled with ‘red’, i.e. blushes, and looks down.  All these are 
prototypical examples of αἰδώς.
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symptom is not necessarily only an erotic symptom.  Later on in the novel Daphnis is 
required to stand in front of his master, Dionysophanes, and his awareness of the 
social  disparity between them causes him to blush and look down:  ἐρυθήματος 
πλησθεὶς  ἔνευσε  κάτω (Longus  4.14.2).90  What  is  interesting  about  the  two 
Longus examples above is that they contrast in terms of the social context.  Daphnis 
is embarrassed in front of his master because he is aware of the disparity in status.91 
However,  this  disparity  in  status  is  lacking  when he  is  alone  with Chloe.   Also 
lacking is any consciousness that there might be social obstacles to their ἔρως or that 
ἔρως is something to feel  αἰδώς about.  Daphnis has no reason to feel  αἰδώς in 
front of Chloe other than because of awareness of his own ἔρως.      
If blushing prototypically designates αἰδώς then perhaps pallor is erotic.  In 
Longus the colour of someone affected by ἔρως is pale green/yellow: χλωρός.  This 
can be a successful signal of internal ἔρως.  Dionysophanes apprehends that his son 
Daphins  feels  ἔρως,  because  of  his  pale  colour.92  Chloe’s  name  evokes  this 
description, and also perhaps her freshness or greenness.  Daphnis is also pale earlier 
in the novel through his feelings for Chloe, ‘paler than grass’, a phrase which recalls 
Sappho’s description from poem 31.93  Previously the colour is used in relation to 
fear.  Aristotle says that the blush is prototypical of shame and pallor of fear.94  In 
Homer’s Iliad characters turn χλωρός through fear.95  
We know that pallor is seen in some way as an opposite to blushing, because 
the two are deliberately contrasted in Longus.  Chloe alternates between turning pale, 
ὠχρία, and blushing in her love for Daphnis.96  The verb  ὠχριάω means ‘to turn 
pale’  and  is  cognate  with  the  adjective  ὠχρός.  This  is  not  the  same  term  as 
90 Lateiner 1998, 176, states that shame is often indicated by the lowering of the eyes.
91 See Lateiner 1998, 167, that shame involves ‘an awareness of exposure to social censure’.   
92 Longus 4.31.1: ὁρῶν αὐτὸν χλωριῶντα.  Of course context always helps!  
93 Longus 1.17.4:  χλωρότερον τὸ πρόσωπον ἦν πόας.  Sappho’s narrator turns more  χλωρός 
than grass: χλωροτέρα δὲ ποίας (31.14).
94 Aristotle EN 1128b10-35. 
95 Il.10.376, 15.4.  Fear itself, δέος, is χλωρός at Il.7.479.  See also the English expression ‘pale with 
fright’. 
96 Longus 1.13.6: ὠχρία τὸ πρόσωπον, ἐρυθήματι αὖθις ἐφλέγετο. 
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χλωρός, but it too denotes a pale complexion.97  We can link it with the former hue 
by noting that it too can be used to denote fear.98  If we relate this change in skin 
colour  to  the  aspects  of  process  and state,  and the  notions  of  hot  and cold seen 
before,  the symptoms become coherent.   Ἔρως can lead to a blush; a temporary 
signal in the face of the emotion.  Subsequently the subject may turn pale as with 
Chloe’s  alternating  between  pallor  and  redness  in  Longus.   Sappho  listed  her 
(potential)  symptoms as  blushing  before trembling  and turning  pale.   Pallor  can, 
however, be of what seems like a longer duration.  For instance in Chariton’s novel 
Mithridates,  the  Persian satrap,  returns  home pale  (ὠχρός)  and  thin after  seeing 
Callirhoe.99  This implies a state he has settled into: that of lovesickness.  Hippocrates 
associates the colour with illness.  The skin of children with a fever, πυρετός, often 
changes complexion to  χλωρός.100  The colour is linked to emotion in a negative 
way,  representing  the  physiological  effects  of  fear  or  debilitating  conditions. 
Although it functions as a successful communicator of ἔρως in Longus, it is far from 
being an ἔρως-specific indicator.  It is a signal of an internal debilitation, and covers 
a larger category of which ἔρως is a part.       
In Sappho 31 heart palpitations is one of the erotic symptoms.101    Philetas 
describes  one  of  his  erotic  symptoms  as  ‘heart  palpitations’:  τὴν  καρδίαν 
ἐπαλλόμην.102  The καρδία is the heart, and the description seems to be referring 
to  the  increased  pumping  of  the  heart  under  emotional  duress.   It  can  also  be 
metonymous of  ἔρως.   The pervasiveness of this appearance of metaphor can be 
97 The adjectival form ὠχρός is used of a frog at Batr.81.  This is also assumed to be a sign of ἔρως 
at Theocr.14.6.  There does not seem to be a significant distinction between χλωρός and ὠχρός.    
98 Il.3.35 has a description of the effects of fear on skin hue: ὦχρός τέ μιν εἷλε παρειάς.
99 Chariton 4.2.4: ὠχρός τε καὶ λεπτός.
100 Hp.Prog.24.
101 The verb used of the heart  shaking,  ἐπτόαισεν,  means ‘to scare’  or ‘to cause to flutter’,  and 
implies personification or beastification of the organ (Sappho 31.5-6).  Later authors use this as one of 
the  symptoms  of  ἔρως.   See  especially  Anac.346  (1).  12;  A.R.1.1232;  E.IA.586;  Call.1.c; 
Pl.Phdr.255c–d; Sappho 31.5; Thgn.1018.
102 Longus 2.7.5.  Chloe’s kiss causes Daphnis’ heart to palpitate (Longus 1.17.2).  It is the anatomical 
depiction which can represent  ἔρως.  The trembling/swaying of the body in general represents fear: 
see for example Ach.Tat.2.23.3; 2.23.5; Hld.4.18.1.  Perhaps the ‘swaying’ of the καρδία indicates 
fear as a momentary emotion experienced under the state of ἔρως, but it could be merely a general 
indicator of emotional duress.  The description denotes fear at  Il.22.452, referring to the  ἦτορ, the 
κῆρ (κέαρ) at A.Ch.410, and the καρδία (κραδίη) at Il.22.461.            
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seen in another symptom experienced under ἔρως: breathlessness.  Daphnis’ breath 
leaps out at Chloe’s kiss: ἐκπηδᾷ μου τὸ πνεῦμα (Longus 1.18.1).103  His breath is 
personified and again the symptom is described metaphorically.         
The most prevalent physiological effect of ἔρως in the Greek Novel is pain. 
Pain has a significance which goes beyond most of the other symptoms in that it 
appears in one of the most influential  accounts of how the emotions operate in a 
social context: Aristotle’s  Rhetorica.  His postulation there is that the emotions, or 
rather πάθη, are accompanied by pain and pleasure: λύπη and ἡδονή (Rh.1378a20-
3).104  In the introduction I listed cases where ἔρως in the Greek Novel is classified 
as a πάθος, and it can be accompanied by pleasure and pain also.  The pleasure of 
ἔρως is an actuality in the Greek Novel, but a rarer one, because although the most 
important  ἔρως thematically  is  the  fulfilled  ἔρως of  the  main  couple,  the  most 
frequent paradigm is that  of frustrated  ἔρως.105  Therefore pain appears far more 
often.  In this case it fits quite well into an Aristotelian model: you are pained at 
unfulfilled ἔρως and pleased by fulfilled ἔρως.  However, there is a complication, in 
that  λύπη is  often  translated  as  grief  and used in  contexts  of  grief.   There  is  a 
conceptual continuity between the two emotions.  When one has frustrated ἔρως one 
does not have possession of the beloved.  This is true of grief also, and we often see 
erotically motivated instances of grief such as when Chaereas laments his (believed) 
dead wife (Chariton 1.6).   
In  Daphnis and Chloe two Greek terms are used of emotional pain:  ἄλγος 
and  λύπη.   The  first  term  denotes  primarily  a  physical  sensation.106  Chloe 
conceptualises the first pangs of ἔρως as an ἄλγος, but is perplexed that she has no 
103 Also at Longus 1.32.4: καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ πνεῦμα ποτὲ μὲν λάβρον ἐξέπνει.  Blushing similarly 
involves the metaphor of ‘filling’ (Longus 1.17.2).  
104 Fortenbaugh 2007 notes that hate, μῖσος, occurs without pain in Aristotle’s analysis (33). 
105 I do not use the word unrequited because the emotional response of the object of desire is not 
always required.  See the numerous pirates, who would quite happily fulfil their  ἔρως without the 
consent of the object of their affection.
106 Konstan  2006,  245-6:  ‘words  based  on  the  root  alg-,  such  as  algos  and  algēdōn  (cf.  English 
‘analgesic’), refer principally to physical pain, and indeed the Epicureans and Stoics, in the generation 
after Aristotle, adopted algēdōn rather than lupē as the term for the strictly corporeal sensation’.    
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wound causing  it:  ἀλγῶ͵  καὶ  ἕλκος οὐκ ἔστι  μοι (Longus 1.14.1).107  In  this 
example the pain is a state and constant, as one would expect from a wound.  Λύπη, 
on the other hand, has a more emotional register.   Chloe conceptualises it  as the 
feeling she would get from losing one of her flock:  λυποῦμαι͵ καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν 
προβάτων ἀπόλωλέ μοι (Longus 1.14.1).  Here λύπη is the grief of (permanent) 
separation.  However, she feels λύπη for Daphnis, who is there, and so it cannot just 
refer to grief in terms of the separation of lovers.  She feels the kind of pain for 
Daphnis that would normally be there for the separation implied by grief.  Ἄλγος 
can also be a subsection of the emotion grief.  Daphnis and Chloe both feel ἄλγος at 
being apart, ἀπαλλαγέντες ἤλγουν (Longus 1.22.4).  Pain is a commonplace for 
unfulfilled  ἔρως, of whatever kind, whether it is Daphnis and Chloe’s inability to 
consummate their love or Dorcon’s pain at his rejection (Longus 1.17.2).108  Λύπη is 
also an aspect of jealousy, erotic or otherwise.  When the other men pay attention to 
Chloe Daphnis is ‘hurt’: Δάφνις δὲ ἐλυπεῖτο (Longus 2.2.2).109  One final point of 
interest is that λύπη can be chronic rather than merely acute.  The two young lovers 
feel  grief  throughout  the  night:  νύκτας τε  ἀγρύπνους  διῆγον  καὶ  λυπηράς 
(Longus 3.4.2).  
We can  label  ἄλγος and  λύπη as  pain  with  the  physical  and emotional 
resonances of the English term.  Pain can be caused by an external concrete object 
such as a thorn, or it can be emotionally caused, e.g. ‘a pain in my heart’, but the 
distinction between the two in terms of sensation is blurred.  In Longus the similes 
107 It is expressed as a common place by Daphnis and Chloe at Longus 2.8.2: ἀλγοῦσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες͵ 
καὶ ἡμεῖς.  ‘Lovers feel pain, and so do we’.  Other references to ἄλγος as erotic pain are Longus 
2.7.5 and 2.8.3. 
108 Pain can be felt by both parties at the same time.  Daphnis and  Chloe’s  ψυχαί are ‘contracted’ 
through  λύπη:  τάς  τε  ψυχὰς  συνεστάλησαν  ὑπὸ  λύπης  (Longus  2.8.1).   Lycaenon,  the 
seductress of Daphnis, feels sympathetic pain with the two lovers over their plight: Συναλγήσασα 
δὴ τοῖς ἀθλίοις (Longus 3.15.5).  The erotic connotations of this concept hint at Lycaenion’s own 
‘love pangs’ for Daphnis.  An opinion expressed in Heliodorus (by Arsace) states that the lover feels 
the beloved’s pain more keenly than their own (Hld.8.9.21).    
109 As Chloe was before him (Longus 2.2.1).  Four of the instances of the λύπη of jealousy are erotic 
(the two examples above and Longus 3.25.4; 3.24.4).  The final example is not, where Dionysophanes 
asks his son Astylus not to be ‘aggrieved’ at his new found brother Daphnis:  μήτε σὺ λυπηθῇς 
(Longus 4.24.3).  I feel that the best emotional interpretation of this verb is as the (potential) jealousy 
of siblings. 
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Chloe uses are ‘natural’ ones.  They are the basic experiences with which she wishes 
to compare her emotional pain. For her ἄλγος is the pain of being bitten and λύπη 
that of losing someone/thing.  She is mapping the concrete onto the abstract in order 
to understand her emotional experience.    
Behaviour  is  also  something  to  be  considered.   The  primary  behavioural 
indicator of ἔρως is inactivity.  Daphnis provides us with a set of examples.  He sits 
around, is lazy and idle (ἀργός), and does not weave nor play his pipe.110  This is 
what we would recognise as melancholy behaviour.111  However, lack of action is 
again  subsumed  within  the  Greek  love  for  paradox.   Chloe  also  suffers  from 
sluggishness, but she alternates this with bursts of energy.  Now she lies down, now 
she leaps up: εἶτα ἐκάθευδεν͵ εἶτα ἀνεπήδα (Longus 1.13.6).  In fact this leaping 
up probably signifies joy as a momentary emotion motivated by ἔρως.  Elsewhere 
Daphnis leaps up for joy: ἀναπηδήσας ὁ Δάφνις περιχαρὴς (Longus 3.28.1).112 
The  description  of  Chloe  seems  to  be  almost  that  of  a  manic  depressive;  she 
alternates between motionless lying and hyperactivity.  There is a complication with 
Daphnis and Chloe’s situation in that they spend all their time together (not a usual 
scenario  with  young  lovers  in  the  Greek  Novel).   Therefore  their  proxemic 
circumstance is akin to that of Sappho’s narrator and as we have seen above they 
share some of the acute symptoms with her.  They merely lack the expertise to fulfil 
their  ἔρως.  Chloe’s contrasting reactions reveal a behavioural symptom which is 
consistent in the depiction of ἔρως.  Lovers are listless and inactive, but where the 
object  of  their  affection  is  concerned,  they  have  a  high  level  of  concentration. 
Daphnis, once under the thrall of emotion, stares at Chloe as if he has been given 
eyes for the first time:  ὥσπερ τότε πρῶτον ὀφθαλμοὺς κτησάμενος (Longus 
1.17.3).113  So Chloe is sad because of her longing, her ἔρως, but she also has fits of 
joy because of her proximity to the object of her affection.  Daphnis and Chloe’s 
reaction is presented as natural (despite the obvious artistry behind it).  Other Greek 
110 At Longus 1.17.4 and 1.18.2.   
111 They also have no concern for their daily tasks: Chloe neglects her flock (Longus 1.13.6) and both 
admit that lovers are traditionally without concern: ἀμελοῦσιν (Longus 2.8.2).    
112 Compare the English expression ‘jumping for joy’.  
113 Daphnis is also talkative only to Chloe (Longus 1.17.4.).
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Novels can show a more complex social interaction.  At Hld.3.10.4 we are told (in 
Calasiris’ narrative) that an ἔρως-afflicted Theagenes forces himself to be cheerful 
and sociable in front of his public, but then he looses concentration, stares into space 
and is gloomy before recollecting himself.114  He attempts to save social face, but is 
unable to completely master the leakage of his feelings.115        
One reaction to ἔρως which is not momentary but a state is a lack of appetite. 
Chloe and Daphnis are unable to eat due to their emotional state.116  Philetas cannot 
eat, drink, nor sleep (Longus 2.7.4).  Lovers are wont to lie around inactively, but 
they do not get proper rest,  as their  emotional state prevents them from sleeping. 
These symptoms are caused by  ἔρως, but they are not  ἔρως-specific, and can be 
more widely seen as general signs of duress.
We can  illustrate  the  conventionality  and also  the  indirect  relationship  to 
ἔρως of  these  symptoms  by  a  look  at  those  which  appear  in  the  other  novels. 
Sleeplessness  and speechlessness  are  common erotic  side affects  in  the  novels.117 
Blushing is really a signal of αἰδώς.118  Heliodorus tells us gnomically that blushing 
is one of the usual signs of lovers who are not yet ‘caught’ (Hld.8.5.1).  This is still, 
however, a sign of  αἰδώς stimulated by  ἔρως.  It  also displays  the introspective 
notion of αἰδώς more akin to our guilt than shame.  At Chariton 4.2.13 Mithridates 
hears  the  name  of  Callirhoe  mentioned  and  blushes.   This  is  explicable  on  the 
grounds of Heliodorus’ gnome.  His desire for Callirhoe is secret and therefore he 
blushes with knowledge of what we might call inner guilt.  
As  was  stated  above  pallor  is  the  opposite  of  blushing,  or  at  least  in 
opposition to it, and often alternates with it.  Achilles Tatius’ hero Clitophon turns 
alternately pale and red because of the proximity of the object of his desire, Leucippe 
114 Calasiris  says  that  he  appeared  to  be  full  of  ‘anguished  gapping’:  ὡς  δὲ  καὶ  χάσμης 
ἀδημονούσης ἀνάπλεως ἐφαίνετο (Hld.3.11.1).
115 Therefore  Heliodorus (or  rather  Calasiris) states that  the mind of the lover  is  like a drunkard: 
emotional and unstable (Hld.3.10.5).
116 Longus 1.13.6, 1.17.4.    
117 Sleeplessness: Chariton 2.4.6; 4.2.8; 6.1.8 all of males.  At Hld.3.7.1 Chariclea is in bed but tossing 
restlessly.  At a loss for words: Chariton 2.5.4; 4.1.9; 5.5.9.  Again this is an erotic association which 
is based on other emotions.  Callirhoe is speechless from αἰδώς at 8.1.15 and Clinias from grief at 
Ach.Tat.1.1.2.   
118 Bushing as a sign of αἰδώς in the novels: Chariton 2.5.5; 2.7.5; 3.2.3; 5.3.8; 6.3.1; Ach.Tat.1.10.4; 
4.17.5; 5.19.6; Hld.2.7.1; 3.17.1; 4.10.4; 4.18.2; 5.34.2; 6.9.4; 10.18.2; 10.24.2. 
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(Ach.Tat.2.6.1).  In terms of skin colour this swift alteration is the surest signal of 
ἔρως in the novels.  Mithridates provides the unambiguous example as he turns pale 
through ἔρως for Callirhoe, and his pallor and loss of weight is obviously an ἔρως-
induced state in the absence of the object of his desire (Chariton 4.2.4).  However, 
like  most  other  erotic  symptoms  pallor  is  used  of  other  emotions  in  non-erotic 
situations.  Chaereas is ὠχρός from grief at Chariton 3.4.4, and the depiction of the 
girls in the painting at the beginning of Achilles Tatius shows them as pale in regard 
to their faces, πρόσωπον, with the emotional label of a mixture of joy and fear: χαρά 
and φόβος (Ach.Tat.1.1.7).119  It is even more difficult to distinguish the emotions 
indicated by Clitophon turning pale and blushing when he reads Leucippe’s letter, 
revealing to him that she is not dead but very much alive (Ach.Tat.5.19.1).120   The 
narrator claims it is the simultaneous result of surprise, disbelief, joy and sadness.121 
Pallor then seems to be an indicator  of a negative emotion:  grief,  fear,  or  ἔρως. 
Sweat is of course not an exclusive indicator of emotion, but when it is emotionally 
motivated, it is predominantly used of  ἔρως.  Once again Mithridates provides the 
prototypical case.  When he hears Callirhoe’s name mentioned he blushes, breaks 
into a sweat and sheds a tear (Chariton 4.2.13).  These multiple symptoms almost 
certainly  indicate  multiple  emotions:  αἰδώς and  perhaps  fear  and  grief.   When 
Chariclea sweats at Hld.4.11.1, we cannot restrict her emotional reaction to  ἔρως. 
Calasiris interprets her emotions as joy, anguish, and shame.122  Despite the potential 
unreliability of the narrator I feel that there is no reason to mistrust his attribution to 
Chariclea of a complex emotional experience.  Sweat also appears connected with 
multiple emotions later  on in the same novel, when Persinna recognises the band 
119 Clinias is pale, perhaps from grief, when his beloved informs him that his father intends to marry 
him off (Ach.Tat.1.8.1).   Callirhoe is pale at Chariton 6.7.6 when she realises what the eunuch is 
taking  her  aside  for  (to  inform her  of  the  Persian  King’s  desire).   The  ekphrastic  description  of 
Andromeda in a painting at Ach.Tat.3.7.3 shows her turning pale and red from fear and beauty, so it is 
difficult to assign specific emotions to the change in colour.  
120 It is not even clear if there is blushing in the example.  The narrator Clitophon says that he ‘flared 
up’:  ἀνεφλεγόμην.   For  numerous examples  that  this  metaphor refers  to internal  psychological 
sensation, see the following section on Fire imagery.  Perhaps, however, its combination with pallor, 
ὠχρίων, means that it is to be taken as referring to complexion.    
121 Ἐθαύμαζον, ἠπίστουν, ἔχαιρον, ἠχθόμην.
122 The terms are  χαίρουσα,  ἀγωνιῶσα and  ἐρυθριῶσα respectively.   The second participle is 
metaphorical—emotion as an ἀγών or internal contest—and the third is a metonymical description of 
shame: turning red.   
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which reveals Chariclea as her long lost daughter (Hld.10.13.1).  She trembles and 
sweats and the narrator ascribes her reaction to joy, perplexity and fear.123  
As in Longus emotional pain is rife throughout the other novels, and the most 
prominent instantiation of erotic pain is λύπη.  At Chariton 2.4.9 Leonas tells his 
master Dionysius not to feel λύπη as if he were lacking the ability to achieve ἔρως: 
μὴ ἔχε λύπην <ὡς> ἀποτυγχάνων ἐν ἔρωτος ἐξουσίᾳ.  The point is that he 
should not feel λύπη as if the object of his desire is unattainable.  The meaning here 
is actually cognate with grief,  and is based around a shared notion of separation, 
permanent or otherwise.  All other instances of λύπη are part of the experience of 
unfulfilled  ἔρως.124  It  can also be extended to erotic jealousy,  where jealousy is 
proleptic of the loss of the attention of one’s object of desire.  Dionysius is in pain, 
λύπη, at the mass celebration of Callirhoe’s beauty as he knows that  Ἔρως likes 
novelty: φιλόκαινος (Chariton 4.7.6-7).  He is worried at the thought of her leaving 
him or being taken away (jealous).125  When this worry about the object of affection 
is not seen, a different word is used.  Xenophon of Ephesus’s Habrocomes is trying 
to fend off  ἔρως, but the god causes him pain unwillingly:  ὠδύνα μὴ θέλοντα 
(X.Eph.1.4.4).126  Habrocomes does not want to be in love, and so cannot be worried 
about any loss or absence of the affection of the object.  When Xenophon does refer 
to  λύπη it is explicitly in terms of Habrocomes and Anthia’s unwillingness to be 
separated:  καὶ τότε μὲν θύσαντες ἀπηλλάττοντο λυπούμενοι (X.Eph.1.3.3). 
The  use  of  two  different  terms  for  emotional  pain  within  a  few  paragraphs  in 
Xenophon might reveal different nuances.  The same emotional implication can be 
mapped onto examples from Heliodorus, such as when Demaenete feels pain (λύπη) 
at  the  exile  of  Cnemon,  the  object  of  her  ἔρως (Hld.1.15.2).   Calasiris  tries  to 
convince Chariclea to confess the source of her λύπη, which, as he well knows, is 
her ἔρως for Theagenes, who for the time being is separated from her (Hld.4.5.7).127 
123 The terms are χαίρουσα, ἀμηχανοῦσα and δεδοικυῖα. 
124 Chariton 2.7.4; 6.1.10; 6.6.8.
125 See also X.Eph.1.5.2-5, where Anthia’s jealousy over Habrocomes involves feeling λύπη.   
126 Also at X.Eph.1.4.6.  The word ὀδύνη can denote grief for someone (Il.15.25).   
127 And she feels λύπη proper later on in the novel.  When she is separated from Theagenes (fearing 
that he is dead or forever gone) a mist of λύπη comes over her (Hld.6.9.1).
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Ἄλγος on the other hand denotes emotional pain which can be metonymous of grief 
but  does  not  always  entail  it.   Demaenete  explains  to  Thisbe  that  only  once 
something is beyond hope can the heart cease to feel the pain (of regret).
Τὸ  γὰρ  ἀπελπισθὲν  ἅπαξ  ἐξῄρηται  τῆς  ψυχῆς  καὶ  τὸ  μηδαμόθεν  ἔτι 
προσδοκώμενον ἀπαλγεῖν παρασκευάζει τοὺς κάμνοντας (Hld.1.15.3). 
Whether we believe her gnomic utterance or not her assertion requires believability 
in its social context to be effective.  Her pain is allegedly based on the premise that 
she still hopes for what she desires.  Therefore she adds nuance to the conventional 
connection  between pain and unfulfilled  ἔρως:  her  ἔρως would have (allegedly) 
ceased  if  she  could  no  longer  obtain  it.   This  assertion  perhaps  highlights  a 
distinction between her ἔρως and that of the main couple, which would not end with 
the death of the beloved.128
Ἀνία also represents, like  ἄλγος and  ὀδύνη, the emotional pain of  ἔρως. 
Thus Clitophon says to his friend Clinias that he cannot ‘bear the pain’ of having 
ἔρως for Leucippe, using the same metaphor as is common in English: ‘οὐ φέρω,’ 
λέγων,  ‘Κλεινία,  τὴν  ἀνίαν’ (Ach.Tat.1.9.1).129  However,  its  complementary 
verb,  ἀνιάω,  designates  an emotional  experience  in  its  own right:  that  of  being 
aggrieved  or  distressed.130  It  seems  that  like  λύπη,  ἀνία can  be  an  emotional 
experience in its own right, that of distress.  
In summary:  many of these symptoms are obvious and clichéd, but I have 
taken the time to list them in full in order to make an important point.  None of the 
symptoms of ἔρως listed above is only a symptom of ἔρως.  Every symptom can be 
seen as something else, and many of these are obviously not reducible to ἔρως.  But 
even the most direct signals we have signify ἔρως indirectly, by the medium of other 
emotions, such as blushing for αἰδώς or crying for grief.  The only symptom which 
128 On Theagenes and Chariclea’s love being different from the norm see Morgan 1989 and 1998.  See 
also a discussion at greater length in the conclusion of this thesis.
129 Melite says similarly to him later on that she is ‘pained’ at Clitophon’s refusal to spend the night 
with her (Ach.Tat.5.14.1).  For ἀνία as erotic pain see Hld.7.23.1. 
130 Thus Clitophon is ‘pained’, ἀνιώμενος, when his and Leucippe’s rendezvous is interrupted by a 
noise (Ach.Tat.2.10.4).  For this meaning with the verb, which indicates distress, see also Hld.1.17.5; 
3.15.3; 8.12.1; 10.9.5.   
47
seems to be exclusively erotic is concentration on the object of affection, but this is 
compatible with the wider schema of concentration upon the object of desire: if I 
desire a loaf of bread, then I might be expected to concentrate my attention upon it.131 
Ἔρως as  a  state  is  made  up  of  various  components,  in  particular  various  other 
emotional components.  It is not merely a case of saying that the person is feeling 
another emotion while in the state of  ἔρως: this is a common enough occurrence. 
Daphnis and Chloe are in close proximity with one another constantly, and so it is 
the emotional state of ἔρως which triggers their blushing, signal of erotic αἰδώς, as 
a sort of ‘natural’ reaction.  Physiological and behavioural symptoms of ἔρως only 
allow us to study a segment of the emotional matrix.  They underdetermine  ἔρως 
because they are symptoms not  merely of  ἔρως but  of other emotions  and even 
debilitating conditions in general.        
131 At  Hld.3.10.4  Theagenes  pretends  to  be  happy  amongst  his  guests  but  cannot  stop  himself 
periodically being preoccupied:  he changes mood quickly and his mind is  unstable like that  of a 
drunkard (see chapter on ontology).  Eventually the company detect that he is unwell: οὐχ ὑγιαίνων 
(see  chapter  on disease).   Theagenes’  characterisation  is  more  interesting  because  he  attempts  to 
control the symptoms of his ἔρως for Chariclea but unsuccessfully.  There is therefore ‘slippage’ and 
the emotion is signalled to his audience.  
48
Chapter 2 - Fire
One of the most common metaphors for  ἔρως throughout the Greek Novel is fire. 
Erotic  desire is  conceptualised as an internal  flame which burns and torments  its 
victim.  This metaphor also fits in with our own conceptualisation of love or lust as 
an internal fire.132  The emotion as fire image in the Greek Novel is overwhelmingly 
constitutive of ἔρως, but there are several other emotions which use it.  I will look at 
these  in  order  to  see  how the  image  of  fire  is  distributed  and  used  for  various 
emotions and how this relates to ἔρως.  When an emotion is conceptualised as a fire 
there  is  not  merely  a  representation  of  one  image  in  terms  of  another,  but  the 
mapping of a process.  The experiential knowledge of a fire, which can be started, 
flare  up,  slow  down,  or  be  extinguished,  is  mapped  onto  the  experience  of  an 
emotion.   It  is  perhaps  not  surprising  that  such  a  common  metaphor  is  used 
universally.  Everyone feels the fire of lust in the Greek Novel regardless of gender, 
race or character.  That is not to say that everyone reacts in the same way, but that 
this particular conceptualisation of the emotion is consistent.  Perhaps the heat of 
ἔρως provided the original  basis  for the metaphorical  conceptualisation  of erotic 
passion as fire, but the imagery of fire is well established by the time of the Greek 
Novel.133  At the same time fire is not merely a metonym for heat, but adds additional 
conceptual material.  If a fire is burning in someone, then they necessarily feel hot, 
but if someone is hot, there is not necessarily a fire burning in them.  Therefore the 
metaphor of a flame encompasses the notion of heat but is not a simple substitution 
for it.  
The image of the flame in the Greek Novel is  prolific  and commonplace. 
When someone feels  ἔρως then there is a sudden burst of flame inside them and 
132 See Kövecses 2000, 26: LOVE IS FIRE—e.g. I am burning with love.  He also identifies the same 
metaphor in Hungarian: Idővel majd elválik, hogy mi volt ez, fellángolás, vagy olyan érzelem, amire 
tartós kapcsolatot építhetnek—‘With time we will see what this was; a flare-up, or a feeling on which 
a lasting relationship can be built (140).  This is an interesting correspondence as Hungarian belongs 
to the Finish-Ugrian family rather than the Indo-European.  This example is the fire of lust rather than 
the love associated with a lasting relationship.
133 The  references  are  numerous  but  for  some  examples  see  Ar.Lys.9,  κάομαι  τὴν  καρδίαν; 
Hermesian.7.37,  καίεσθαί  τινος;  Pi.P.4.219,  ἐν  φρασὶ  καιομένα;  Pl.Lg.783a,  ἔρως…ὕβρει 
καόμενος; Sappho 48.2, ἔμαν φρένα καιομέναν πόθωι. 
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ἔρως is  ‘kindled  up’:  ἔτι  μᾶλλον  ὁ  ἔρως  ἀνεκαίετο (X.Eph.1.5.8).134  The 
container  metaphor  can  also  be  used  in  conjunction  with  this  image,  where  the 
burning  is  ‘in’  Habrocomes  and  Anthia:  ὁ  ἔρως  ἐν  αὐτοῖς  ἀνεκαίετο 
(X.Eph.1.3.4).135  The flame is psychological and therefore conceived as internal to 
the person affected.  The prefix ἀνά evokes the upwards direction of the flame as it 
comes into existence.136  This image can either denote the first experience of ἔρως, 
or a surge in the emotion during the state of experiencing it.  Artaxerxes, the Persian 
King in  Chariton’s  novel,  flares  up in  the  middle  of  the  night  at  the thought  of 
Callirhoe:  ἀνεκάετο  (Chariton 6.7.1).   This is also the meaning when Chariclea 
makes Theagenes promise not to make any advances upon her.  The young couple 
are about to be left alone and she is worried that he might ‘flare up’ suddenly and 
make advances on her out of lust,  as young men are wont to do:  ἀναφλέγεται 
(Hld.4.18.5).  The prefixes used add subtlety and nuance to the depiction of ἔρως as 
fire.  Pelorus, a bandit,  is burnt ‘through’ or ‘to excess’ at the sight of Chariclea, 
διακαίεται (Hld.5.31.2), and Demaenete is kindled ‘out from below’:  ὑπεκκαίει 
(Hld.1.15.4).  Ἐκ indicates the intensive burning of a flame, whether in the sense of 
‘kindling  up’  or  ‘burning  out’.   There  is  certainly  the  idea  of  progressive 
intensification in Xenophon, where habitual exposure to the boy Habrocomes burns 
Corymbus steadily more and more: αὐτὸν ἡ πρὸς τὸ μειράκιον συνήθεια ἐπὶ 
134 The verb denoting ‘kindling’  is  καίω.   The verb is  in  the passive with the person feeling the 
emotion as the subject: e.g. αὐτὸς ἐκάετο (Chariton 4.6.2); κάομαι (Longus 1.14.1).    
135 For an extended discussion of the container metaphor see chapter 7 on the ontology of ἔρως.
136 Other examples of a verb denoting fire with the prefix ἀνά are: μᾶλλον ἀνεκαίετο (Xen.Eph. 
2.3.3);  ἀνακαόμενον  (Hld.7.9.2);  ἀνεφλεγόμην (Ach.Tat.5.19.1);  ἀνεφλέγη  τὴν  ψυχήν 
(Ach.Tat.6.18.1); ἀναφλέγει (Hld.4.4.4).  
50
πλέον ἐξέκαιε (X.Eph.1.14.7). 137  The  lecherous  Gnathon  is  kindled  ‘out  and 
besides’ with lust for Daphnis: προσεκκαυθείς (Longus 4.16.1).138  
There is a distinction between the two verbs seen above in that καίω means 
‘to kindle’ and  φλέγω means ‘to burn’.  The verb  φλέγω without any prefix is 
always used to indicate a state.  When Dionysius returns home after seeing Callirhoe 
for the first time we are told that he is ‘already burning’:  φλεγόμενος ἤδη τῷ 
ἔρωτι (Chariton 2.3.8).  The fire of ἔρως is already lit and φλέγω denotes the state 
of burning.139  This verb is used consistently to represent the state of the emotion. 
Καίω can be used at any stage but with the prefix  ἐκ indicates an increase in the 
amount of fire.  This increase in volume is mapped onto intensity, and indicates that 
the internal flame is burning more fiercely.      
These verbs mostly indicate the process of the emotion or rather the action. 
Other uses, of verbs or nouns, can emphasise something about the subject or object 
of the emotion.  An example above from Xenophon of Ephesus specified the location 
of the fire by using the container metaphor (X.Eph.1.3.4).  The prefix  ἐν and the 
verb  πίμπρημι,  ‘to  kindle’,  also  imply  the  container  metaphor:  τότ΄  ἤδη  καὶ 
137 With  καίω this  is  the  standard  form in  Chariton:  τὸ γὰρ πῦρ ἐξεκαίετο (Chariton  1.1.8); 
ἐξέκαυσε  (Chariton  1.3.7);  ἐξέκαε (Chariton  2.4.4);  ἐξέκαυσε (Chariton  3.1.8);  ἐξεκάετο 
(Chariton  5.9.9).   We also  see  in  Achilles  Tatius  and  Heliodorus:  ἐξέκαυσεν (Ach.Tat.  1.5.5); 
ἐξέκαε (Hld. 8.2.1).  A less straightforward example involves Dionysius.  When he sees Callirhoe 
weeping we are told that her tears ‘kindled his passion’: ἐξέκαε δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ δάκρυα (Chariton 
2.4.4).  If the tears are metonyms for grief, as they so often are in the novels, then we are left with the 
scenario of grief exciting lust in Dionysius.  The other option is an extension of the concept of ἔρως 
to sympathy for one’s ‘beloved’, which could conceivably be true.  If it is the character of Dionysius 
which prevents us from seeing this as lust, then I believe there is less of a problem.  At 2.8 Chariton 
tells us that when Dionysius is struck by passion after Callirhoe’s kiss, he is frustrated, for ‘he could 
not use threats or force, since he was sure that she would prefer death to being violated’ (Goold). 
Hardly the sympathetic lover at this stage.  Achilles Tatius has a digression on the attractiveness of 
tears in the eye at 6.7, but does continue to say that the person who feels ἔρως naturally feels pity at 
the tears of the beloved.  Therefore we are left with a choice as to the interpretation of the passage.  I 
would incline to treat Dionysius’ response as sexual excitement (lust), although the non-prototypical 
extension of the fire metaphor to sympathy is not out of the question.       
138 This is also used of ἔρως at Plu.Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur 60f5. 
139 All other uses of φλέγω in the novels show a state and not either an initiation of the emotion or an 
intense flaring up of it.  In Achilles Tatius Satyrus asks Clitophon to give in to a Melite (already) 
burning for him,  ἐλεῆσαι ψυχὴν ἐπὶ σοὶ φλεγομένην (Ach.Tat.5.11.4), and Melite herself asks 
Leucippe for a love philtre because she is burning: ἐμοὶ τοῦτο͵ ὦ φιλτάτη͵ φλεγομένῃ πάρασχε 
φάρμακον (Ach.Tat.5.22.3).  In Chariton the Persian King lusts after Callirhoe, ἔρωτι Καλλιρόης 
φλεγόμενος  (Chariton 8.8.8), and in Heliodorus a symptom of Theagenes’  state is burning with 
desire: ὑπὸ τοῦ πόθου φλέγεσθαι (Hld.3.17.3).  
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μᾶλλον ἐνεπίμπρατο (Chariton  5.2.7).   In  all  the examples  above the verb is 
passive when the person feeling the emotion is the subject.   This fits in with the 
general scheme of an emotion as something which happens to one, not something 
which is done by one.  
Chariton elaborates this basic schema.  Dionysius is trying to struggle against 
his feelings for Callirhoe and thereby angers a theomorphised ἔρως.  He brooks no 
opposition  and  kindles  Dionysius’  ψυχή more  violently  because  he  is  trying  to 
philosophise against him: διὰ τοῦτο ἐπυρφόρει σφοδρότερον ψυχὴν ἐν ἔρωτι 
φιλοσοφοῦσαν (Chariton  2.4.5-2.4.6).   Ἐν marks  ἔρως as  the  container  and 
signifies the circumstances of Dionysius’ philosophising.140  Above ἔρως was seen 
in the dative denoting ‘agency’.  This image retains the same concept but brings the 
personified emotion to the fore.  The object on the other hand is specified as the 
person’s ψυχή.  When Arsace uses the same verb in Heliodorus ἔρως itself is the 
fire.  It is as if ἔρως is lit furiously from underneath with fresh wood: Ὁ μὲν ἔρως 
οὐκ  ἀνίησιν  ἀλλ΄  ἐπιτείνει  πλέον,  ὥσπερ  ὕλῃ  τῷ  νέῳ  λάβρως 
ὑποπιμπράμενος (Hld.8.5.6).141  She cannot resist the flames when more and more 
fuel is being added to the emotion.142    The first part of this sentence describes the 
flames in terms of intensity:  ἔρως does not relax but intensifies even more.  The 
140 This also has the emotion as the container rather than the person afflicted.  These issues, and how 
they relate to state and inception, will be explored more in the chapter on ontology.  
141 This is paralleled by a description of Theagenes and Chariclea earlier in the novel.  When they set 
eyes upon one another their passion is renewed and the sight becomes as if wood for the fire: ἡ γὰρ 
τῶν  ἐρωτικῶν  ἀντίβλεψις  ὑπόμνησις  τοῦ  πάσχοντος  γίνεται  καὶ  ἀναφλέγει  τὴν 
διάνοιαν ἡ θέα καθάπερ ὕλη πυρὶ γινομένη (Hld.4.4.4).  The difference with Theagenes and 
Chariclea’s passion is that it is mutual.  Another passage compares the person affected to a burning 
piece  of  wood  see  the  following:  θρέψας  γὰρ  ὅλης  τῆς  νυκτὸς  τὸ  πῦρ,  ὅσον  χρόνον 
ἀπελείφθη τῆς κόρης, ἀνεζωπύρησεν ἐξαίφνης ὕλην λαβὼν εἰς τὴν φλόγα τὴν θέαν, καὶ 
μικροῦ μὲν προσπεσὼν περιεχύθη τῇ κόρῃ (Ach.Tat.6.18.2).  It describes Thersander who was 
nourishing the fire through the night and rekindles it with more wood when he sees Leucippe.  This 
shows the process of the slow burning and sudden flare up of the emotion clearly.  A recent fragment 
of  Lollianus  (P.Oxy.4945)  speaks  of ἔρως  in  terms  of  adding  fuel  to  the  flames:  ἔρωτος 
ὑπέκκαυμα.            
142 If Arsace is in this situation then she is less to blame for her own emotions.  She is emphasising the 
overwhelming power of the emotion: he is even using fresh wood to fan the flames.  The concept is 
the same, but rhetorical strategy often determines which areas of the image are emphasised, in order to 
suit the person’s personal agenda.  
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increase  in  intensity  of  flame  is  mapped  onto  the  increase  in  intensity  of  the 
emotion.143  See  Pl.Lg.645d  where  the  drinking  of  wine  ‘intensifies’,  ἐπιτείνει, 
passions such as ἔρως.  However, the first part of this sentence manages to maintain 
the  possibility  of  personification  of  the  emotion.   Demosthenes  uses  the  verb 
ἐπιτείνω to mean someone insisting: ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπέτεινεν (56.13.1).144  So the 
verb used allows ἔρως to be both a person and a fire.  
This leads us to images which emphasise the emotion as entity rather than the 
action of the emotion.  Dionysius rather weakly tells Leonas that he has brought fire 
into his house, but more so into his ψυχή: πῦρ ἐκόμισας εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν͵ μᾶλλον 
δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν (Chariton 2.4.7).145  Here ἔρως is not kindling the fire, but 
is the fire itself.  The image of the fire can also be extended to represent the person 
who causes the emotion.  The servant of the Great King in Chariton’s novel advises 
him to go off hunting,  as it  is  better  to be away than ‘near the fire (Callirhoe)’: 
ἐγγὺς εἶναι τοῦ πυρός (Chariton 6.3.9).146  So  ἔρως can be the fire lighter, the 
heat of an internal fire, or the heat from the object of affection, who is a source of 
fire.  
There are several further variants among metaphors for fire.  First we get a 
specification of the locus of ἔρως in Longus.  Fire burns in Daphnis’ καρδία: ὡς τὸ 
κᾶον πῦρ τὴν καρδίαν τὴν ἐμήν (Longus 3.10.4).147  Next we get an extension of 
143 Jealousy or rather ζηλοτυπία, an emotion which has a close proximity to ἔρως, is also stretched 
at Hld.8.7.1: ἐπιτείνασα.
144 See also Aristotle where the two verbs appear.  There is a a target towards which one looks and , 
having a purpose, tenses and relaxes: ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων 
ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν (Arist.EN 1138b23).  Here the person is metaphorically seen as a substance 
stretching and relaxing. 
145 Another example is the erotic fire in Xenophon of Ephesus: παρέπεμπεν ἡμᾶς πῦρ ἐρωτικόν 
(X.Eph. 3.6.2).
146 The idea of going hunting as a cure for love is an established one: e.g. see E.Hipp.215.  There is, 
however, a certain irony about using this as a cure for love, as it is also a well established literary 
motif that love is hunting.  See the chapter on vision for an extensive discussion.  In this case going 
hunting only causes the King greater emotional turmoil, as he depicts her in his mind’s eye (Chariton 
6.4.5):  εἰς  τοὐναντίον  τὴν  τέχνην  περιέτρεψεν  αὐτῷ  καὶ  δι'  αὐτῆς  τῆς  θεραπείας 
ἐξέκαυσε τὴν ψυχήν.
147 See also: τὸ πῦρ (Ach.Tat.5.25.6); πῦρ (Ach.Tat.5.26.10); θλιβόμενος τῷ πυρί (Ach.Tat.4.6.1). 
For the cognate verb ἐκ-πυρσεύω see Longus 1.15.1: μᾶλλον τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξεπυρσεύθη.  Melite 
uses extended fire imagery to try and solicit Clitophon (Ach.Tat.5.15.5-5.15.6).  She calls her fire a 
mystical one, ὢ πυρὸς μυστικοῦ, that is to say one pertaining to the mysteries of Aphrodite: τὰ τῆς 
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the  range  of  objects  of  the  emotion,  as  Clitophon  imputes  the  fire  of  ἔρως to 
animals:  Ἦ γὰρ  ὁ  Ἔρως,  ἔφη,  τοσαύτην ἔχει  τὴν  ἰσχύν,  ὡς  καὶ  μέχρις 
ὀρνίθων πέμπειν τὸ πῦρ (Ach.Tat.1.17.1).  He goes on to add reptiles, plants and 
even stones to the list.  Clitophon is musing about ἔρως in order to make Leucippe 
‘hot under the collar’, and his examples from the natural world are designed to show 
the all powerful nature of love.  In another section Clitophon brings us back to the 
common  association  of  ἔρως and  wine,  by  explaining  that  the  gods  Eros  and 
Dionysus  work  together  to  inflame  the  individual:  ὁ  μὲν  καίων  αὐτὴν  τῷ 
συνήθει πυρί͵ ὁ δὲ τὸν οἶνον ὑπέκκαυμα φέρων (Ach.Tat.2.3.3).148  Wine is 
the fuel for Eros’ lighter.  The imagery remains coherent, but contextual elaboration 
can emphasise or diminish different aspects of the metaphorical schema.  In the last 
few examples the object of the emotion has been emphasised over the action of the 
fire.      
At this point we can begin to form a prototype for the metaphor of ἔρως as 
fire. The process of ἔρως as fire begins with the lighting or kindling of the human 
body, often by a personified ἔρως.  Fuel is there already or can be added onto the 
pile,  while  the  fire  proceeds  as  a  steady  process  (state)  or  flares  up  to  greater 
intensity from time to time.  It remains to discuss two entailments of the metaphor: 
the burning of the emotion at a low intensity and the extinguishing of the emotion. 
Both contingencies are provided for by metaphors in the Greek Novels. 
The smouldering of emotion is not so common in the Greek Novel since for 
the most part passion flares up intensely.  The most effective part of the image is that 
we know that smouldering embers are still  very much active,  and can potentially 
break out into a conflagration.  In Chariton the Great King is one such person, in 
whom the  fire  of  ἔρως slowly  burns  away:  τυφομένου τοῦ  πυρός (Chariton 
6.3.3).  This image fits the narrative at this point, as Callirhoe is not present, and the 
King is  revealing  his  state  to  his  servant  (flare  ups  are  more  likely to  be in  the 
proximity  of  the  beloved).   Dorcon,  having  been  fatally  injured  by  the  pirates, 
Ἀφροδίτης μυστήρια.      
148 Eros personified who sets people on fire with his arrows is a stock image from earlier literature.  In 
Apollonius  Rhodius  his  missile  lights  up  a  fire  under  Medea’s  κραδίη like  a  flame: βέλος  δ΄ 
ἐνεδαίετο κούρῃ νέρθεν ὑπὸ κραδίῃ φλογὶ εἴκελον (3.286-7).     
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revives a little of his former passion when he sees Chloe: ὀλίγον ἐκ τοῦ πρότερον 
ἔρωτος ἐμπύρευμα λαβὼν (Longus 1.29.1).  He revives a small ἐμπύρευμα (a 
live  coal  covered  with ashes)  of  his  former  desire.   The  flame  does  not  rear  up 
intensely,  but  nevertheless  it  is  still  burning.   The  final  part  of  our  schema  is 
extinguishing the flame.  We have far fewer examples of this than for the flaring up 
or kindling of ἔρως.  This is probably due to the narrative context of the novels.  The 
majority  of  characters  in  the  Greek  Novel  experience  unfulfilled  ἔρως,  either 
temporarily as one of the main couple or permanently as a love rival.  Quenching the 
fire is an action associated with the fulfilment of  ἔρως, and so a general  lack of 
fulfilment gives rise to a general absence of this part of the metaphorical schema. 
When we get an image of extinguishing fire, it is potential and often propositional. 
Thisbe  informs  Demaenete  that  desire  is  ‘quenched’  at  its  first  consummation: 
πολλαῖς  γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην πεῖραν ἐναπεσβέσθη τὰ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας 
(Hld.1.15.8).  This is in order to convince her to go ahead with her plan for wooing 
Cnemon (in reality it is a trap).  Whether this is true or not this metaphor must be 
plausible  for  Demaenete,  and  so  it  is  a  valid  way  of  conceptualising  the  erotic 
experience.  If they cease to feel  ἔρως, then they will feel that the ‘fire’ has been 
‘quenched’.  It is in this respect that the general Charmides in Achilles Tatius, who 
has  fallen  for  Leucippe,  asks  Menelaus  to  extinguish  the  fire  (an  illocution  for 
‘procure  Leucippe  for  me’):  ἅψω πῦρ ἐπὶ  τοὺς πολεμίους·  ἄλλας δᾷδας ὁ 
Ἔρως  ἀνῆψε  κατ΄  ἐμοῦ·  τοῦτο  πρῶτον,  Μενέλαε,  σβέσον  τὸ  πῦρ 
(Ach.Tat.4.7.4).149  Extinguishing the fire is intrinsically linked to the consummation 
of desire.  This image also brings us to another aspect of the metaphorisation of the 
object of the emotion.  Charmides claims that Eros has used a torch as his instrument 
to set him on fire.  Related to this is the view of the subject of the emotion as a lamp. 
149 Heliodorus  manipulates  the image further  when Chariclea  is  at  home lovesick for  Theagenes. 
Grief is one of the standard symptoms of lovesickness and Calasiris notes that the fire in her look was 
being extinguished by her  tears  as if  by water:  τὸ φλέγον τοῦ βλέμματος καθάπερ ὕδασιν 
ἐῴκει τοῖς δάκρυσιν ἀποσβεννύμενον  (Hld.3.19.1).  The fire in her eyes  represents emotion, 
perhaps determination, and as always with metaphors of emotion it is probably multivalent.  This 
determination in her eyes could reflect her pride which is being overcome by her grief.  However, 
since fire is so prevalently an indicator of  ἔρως, the author must at least be alluding to her state of 
internal  passion.   Thus  Heliodorus  cleverly  manipulates  the  relationship  between  the  physical 
properties of fire and water and the metaphorical nature of grief (tears) and ἔρως (fire).     
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In  an  example  which  highlights  a  process,  Callirhoe  recognises  her  beloved 
Chaereas, and she lights up more strongly as if she were an extinguished lamp which 
has had oil poured upon it: Καλλιρόη δὲ γνωρίσασα τὸν ἐρώμενον, ὥσπερ τι 
λύχνου φῶς ἤδη σβεννύμενον ἐπιχυθέντος ἐλαίου πάλιν ἀνέλαμψε καὶ 
μείζων ἐγένετο καὶ κρείττων (Chariton 1.1.15-1.1.16).150  This imagery relates 
forward to when Dionysius will refer to Callirhoe as a source of heat (see above).  It 
also perhaps draws upon a tradition from erotic epigram which associates ἔρως and 
lamps.151  
We can see that many aspects of a fire are mapped onto the emotion ἔρως. 
Like  the  fire  the  emotion  can  be  kindled,  flare  up,  die  down,  slow burn,  or  be 
extinguished completely.  This image of ἔρως as a fire is one of the most persistent 
and  consistent  in  the  Greek  Novel.   It  may  be  that  the  image  is  linked  to 
physiological symptoms, such as the heat felt by characters seen at the start of this 
section.152  However, the metaphorical mapping of fire onto ἔρως provides us with a 
way of understanding the process of an emotion, and different parts of the process of 
150 In a reference which mixes abstract and concrete there is a light burning in Arsace’s room which 
also lights her ἔρως: ἅτε λύχνου φαίνοντος καὶ οἷον συνεξάπτοντος τῇ Ἀρσάκῃ τὸν ἔρωτα 
(Hld.7.9.4).   This  night  time  lamp image  has  the  additional  benefit  of  context,  as  night  time  is 
particularly associated with the symptoms of ἔρως in the novels. 
151 These instances can refer to a lamp at night by which the lover seduced the beloved in the past (AP 
5.197=23G-P) or sits and wonders where the beloved is (AP 5.150=10G-P;  AP 5.191=73G-P;  AP 
5.8=69G-P).  The lamp can also be deified and requested to be a guardian or not to shed any light on 
the unfaithful  beloved’s antics (AP 5.166=52G-P;  AP 5.7=9G-P).  In  Aristophanes’  Ecclesiazusae 
Praxagora’s lamp is her confidant (7-18).  
152 Longus often playfully contrasts external and internal conditions.  First is the apparent paradox of a 
heat  which emanates from inside the body and is not due to external  factors  (obviously meant to 
emphasise Chloe’s naivety).  Thus Chloe is confused that she is at the same time burning and sitting in 
the shade: κάομαι͵ καὶ ἐν σκιᾷ τοσαύτῃ κάθημαι (Longus 1.14.1).  In a similar way Daphnis and 
Chloe run into the river to stop their burning, unaware that it will do them no good: εἰς ποταμοὺς 
ἐνέβαινον ὡς καόμενος (Longus 2.7.5).  This can be paralleled with the claim that Daphnis and 
Chloe are also enflamed by the season of year (as well as ἔρως of course): ἐξέκαε δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἡ 
ὥρα τοῦ ἔτους (Longus 1.23.1).  External conditions can either paralleled with internal feelings or 
be antithetical to them.  In terms of metaphors of emotion this reflects a common theme in Daphnis 
and  Chloe,  that  they  conceptualise  their  emotions  in  terms  of  their  own experiences.   The  later 
example of the reinforcement of sensation is the easiest to understand: the heat of the season works 
alongside  the internal  sensation of  heat  they feel  due  to  ἔρως.   In  the antithetical  examples  the 
emphasis is not on the paradoxicality of the experience of ἔρως itself, although this can certainly be 
found  elsewhere.   It  is  on  a  development  in  Daphnis  and  Chloe's  recognition  of  themselves  as 
emotional subjects.  It is as if prior to ἔρως their body temperature was contingent upon the external 
environment: the sun heated them and the river cooled them.  Now, however, their bodies are being 
regulated by emotion, and, due to their lack of understanding of emotion, they are confused by the 
whole process.      
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a fire burning are used to conceptualise the experience of the emotion.  This process 
of kindling, burning and extinguishing represents the various stages of feeling the 
emotion and forms the prototypical scenario for this metaphor.   
Ἔρως is not the only emotion to utilise the concept of fire.  We have at least 
two  other  emotions  which  are  used  of  fire.   The  first  one  is  jealousy  or 
ζηλοτυπία.153  A man in prison tells Clitophon the false story that Melite has had 
Leucippe murdered because she was ‘aflame’ with jealousy: ἡ δὲ ὑπὸ ζηλοτυπίας 
πεφλεγμένη (Ach.Tat.7.3.7.3).  It is probable that the close conceptual proximity 
of ζηλοτυπία to ἔρως— characters in the Greek Novel who lust after someone are 
usually intensely jealous of any rivals—allows it to partake of the same conceptual 
metaphor.  The second emotion which is conceived of as fire is anger: ὀργή.  Melite 
says  in  a  gnome  that  the  fire  of  ὀργή is  lit  by  rumour:  ὀργῆς  αὐτῷ  πῦρ 
ἐξάπτεται (Ach.Tat.6.10.5.3).  The only extended section on the fire of ὀργή is the 
twin torches of  θυμός and  ἔρως (Ach.Tat.6.19.1-6.19.7).  Leucippe, a captive of 
Thersander, has rejected him and taunted him by saying that he can never have her 
unless he becomes her beloved Clitophon.  The narrator then digresses to explain 
Thesander’s  emotional  reaction:  he  feels  ἔρως and  ὀργή,  ἤρα  καὶ  ὠργίζετο 
(Ach.Tat.6.19.1).   This passage is  a philosophical  explanation  of psychology and 
involves a complex reaction featuring multiple emotions.154  However, it is important 
that this passage utilises the common folk model of fire, in the form of torches, as a 
basis for its psychology.  Expert models often build upon folk models of emotion.   
In light of previous Greek literature, it is surprising that there are not more 
references to the fire of anger in the novels.  Most of the verbs we have seen above 
occur  at  one time or other  as metaphors  for  ὀργή.155  This  is  also interesting  in 
relation to English, where Lakoff and Kövecses have shown that the American folk 
model of anger makes use of the anger is fire metaphor.156        
153 On this concept see particularly Konstan 2003.
154 This passage will be discussed at length in the chapter on the ψυχή and the καρδία. 
155 Ἀνακαίω: Hdt.5.19.11; ἀναφλέγω: Pl.Ep.349a; Plu.Praecepta gerendae reipublicae 798f6.  See 
also Padel 1992, 116-117 on the numerous emotions in Tragedy which are conceptualised in terms of 
fire.  These include in addition to the ones in the Greek Novel fear, A.Th.289-90, and hope, S.El.888. 
She claims that it is ‘supremely anger’ which fire denotes in tragedy.  
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There are two final examples of metaphorical fire in the Greek Novels which 
are  not  erotic,  although they are  certainly emotional,  and both are  found only in 
Heliodorus.  The verb σμύχομαι denotes ‘smouldering’ and emphasises the state of 
the  person  afflicted.   Cnemon’s  father  Aristippus  tells  Thisbe  that  he  has  been 
‘smouldering away’ in the country and been suspicious of the matter  for a while 
now: ὡς πάλαι γε σμύχομαι ἐν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα δι’ ὑποψίας ἔχων 
(Hld. 1.16.5.3-5).  The verb is telling us something about his emotional state, and not 
just reinforcing the notion of suspicion seen in the conjoined clause.157  It can denote 
grief,  as  at  A.R.3.762,  where  Medea  is  feeling  the  sadness  symptomatic  of 
lovesickness when deciding whether to help Jason with the contest or not.158  In fact 
the smouldering fire also implies pain, and this pain is a standard attribute of grief in 
the Greek Novel.  So a quite plausible explanation is that  Aristippus is ‘grieving 
away’ in the fields.159  Yet the suspicion would perhaps also incite anger, and this 
would be passable  along conceptual  lines.   One thing it  certainly is  not is  erotic 
desire.   For  grief  we  have  previous  evidence  and  also  a  further  example  in 
Heliodorus.  Towards the end of the novel, after Chariclea has been revealed as his 
daughter,  Hydaspes  leads  her  to  the  sacrificial  altar  smouldering  in  his  καρδία: 
πλείονι δὲ αὐτὸς πυρὶ τῷ πάθε τὴν καρδίαν σμυχόμενος (Hld.10.17.1).  The 
156 See Lakoff  and  Kövecses  1987,  202-203.   The following are  some of  their  examples  for  the 
ANGER IS FIRE (their capitals) metaphor in American English: ‘those are inflammatory remarks’; 
‘after the argument, Dave was smouldering for days’; ‘that kindled my ire’; ‘he was consumed by his 
anger’.  They also note that the presumed physiological reaction to anger in English is a raise in body 
temperature, and that this can be seen in the common metaphor which sees anger as a hot fluid in a 
container (201).  In the Greek Novel the verbs denoting heat are instead used for ἔρως, but this does 
not mean that they could not be used for anger.  Of course in English love or lust can be a fire as well, 
and so we have the same conceptual overlap as the ancient Greeks.            
157 LSJ take it as denoting ‘suspicion’ and Morgan’s translation is ‘for a long time now I have nursed 
smouldering suspicions’ (Reardon 1989, 367).
158 It  also indicates the pain of passion when Medea sees Jason earlier  on:  κῆρ ἄχεϊ σμύχουσα 
(3.446).  Apollonios masterfully takes advantage of the ambiguity of fire – grief or ἔρως – when he 
compares Medea to a bride grieving for her dead husband.  The bride sits on her own burning inside: 
ἡ δ΄ ἔνδοθι δαιομένη κῆρ (3.661).  Both are burning from grief, but Medea is also feeling ἔρως, 
and so the metaphor acts as a bridge between the narrative and simile.  To add a further level to the 
image, it is explicitly stated that the bride has been deprived of the pleasure of her marriage, and so 
there is an erotic sense on her part as well.                     
159 As also in Theocritus, where the loser of the singing contest ‘smoulders’: ὡς δὲ κατεσμύχθη καὶ 
ἀνετράπετο φρένα λύπᾳ (Theoc.8.90).  He uses the same verb of love at 3.17.  Cairns 2001, 23, 
says that emotions such as grief, anger and  αἰδώς (not applicable here) can often be elements in a 
single emotional experience.
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Ethiopian  king  Hydaspes  is  feeling  grief  at  the  immanent  (although  soon  to  be 
averted) death of his daughter.  Both men are grieving away for their sorrows.    
Grief  thus  completes  our  list  of  fire-related  emotions  in  the  novel.   It  is 
important to note that the conceptualisation of the emotion is related to its general 
effect.  Grief is a slow and painful affliction and thus it smoulders away like internal 
embers.160  Ἔρως can burn as well, but it is far more likely to flare up like a violent 
emotion.  Anger is also the kind of emotion which ‘flares up’, given its long standing 
association with violent action.  This is also perhaps why anger has such a heritage in 
Greek literature of being the burning of fire.  It is perhaps the case that by the time of 
the Greek Novel the balance has shifted to the overwhelming prevalence of erotic 
fire imagery, although this could be contingent on the plot.
 I  would  like  to  emphasise  a  few important  aspects  of  the  ἔρως as  fire 
metaphor.  It is not merely imagery but gives structure to the emotion.  The various 
nuances of this structure are not just seen in ἔρως but in other emotions as well.  In 
fact it provides so much conceptual structure that it has important consequences for 
how we view the structure of emotions in general.  The fire metaphor might entail a 
certain type of  ἔρως,  which due to its frequency in the Greek Novel is certainly 
prototypical.  That is to say different metaphorical conceptualisations might denote 
not just different aspects of ἔρως but different types: the fire of lust rather than love. 
I will return to this aspect of metaphor in the conclusion.      
160 It is certainly true that grief at bereavement can have violent reactions in Greek culture, such as the 
tearing of hair and beating of breasts, but in the Greek Novel there is also a longer state of sadness 
which the smouldering metaphor picks up.  
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Chapter 3 - Disease and Madness in the Greek Novel
Disease is one of the most important paradigms for  ἔρως in the Greek Novel, and 
indeed in subsequent language and literature.161  Madness has received less attention, 
but it too plays a significant role in the Greek Novel’s presentation of psychology. 
Indeed emotions, diseases and madness could all be considered as members of the 
genus πάθος in ancient Greek thought, and so conceptualising ἔρως as a disease or 
madness is to some extent mapping within the same domain.162  It  has long been 
stated that erotic affairs in the Greek Novel are more passive (in terms of the central 
characters at least),  and do not descend into violence like the tragic depictions of 
classical Athens.  With this in mind Toohey has made an important claim concerning 
ἔρως in ancient  Greece.   He divides lovesickness into two types,  depressive and 
manic, and argues that the latter waned as the former waxed by the time of the Greek 
Novel.163  The problem with this definition is that it treats lovesickness and madness 
as merely symptoms of ἔρως, rather than metaphors, and correlates these metaphors 
with passivity and violence respectively.  We can illustrate the limitations of this by 
looking at various characters in Greek Tragedy and the Greek Novel.  Phaedra is one 
of the most striking examples of a woman affected by ἔρως in Greek literature, and 
161 See Averill 1990 on the conception of emotions as diseases of the mind in the English language and 
psychology.  For more references see the upcoming section on disease.  Of course the English word 
disease originally had an emotional  register,  being formed from the old French des and aise and 
indicating discomfort or uneasiness.  On ἔρως as a νόσος in the Greek Novel see Miralles 1977.   
162 See the introduction on domain mapping and metaphor and metonymy as a continuum.
163 Toohey 2004, 61.  Later on he cites the Ps.Aristotelian Problema 30.1 (Toohey 2004, 89).  This 
states that melancholy is the product of black bile.  When black bile is hot, it produces mania, and 
when cold,  depression.   Modern science  also understands  these  as  fundamentally  different  states. 
Damasio 1995, 147: ‘along with negative body states, the generation of images is slow, their diversity 
small, and reasoning inefficient; along with positive body states the generation of images is rapid, 
their diversity wide, and reasoning may be fast though not necessarily efficient’; ‘when negative body 
states recur frequently, or when there is a sustained negative body state, as happens in a depression, 
the proportion of thoughts  which are likely to be associated with negative situations does increase, 
and the style and efficiency of reasoning suffer.   The sustained elation of manic states produces the 
opposite result.’    
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her condition is described as both a disease and as madness.164  Both descriptions can 
aptly be applied to her at the same time because of two features: first, that madness 
itself  is  often  conceived  of  as  a  νόσος (see  below),  but  second,  and  more 
importantly, that both are metaphorical (or metonymical) of ἔρως: the concepts are 
mapped onto the emotion.  Phaedra seems sick because she is showing behavioural 
symptoms similar to those of an ill person.165  In terms of madness, however, her 
behaviour is not consistent.  Her nurse reveals her illicit passion to Hippolytus, who 
in turn is disgusted at his stepmother.   Phaedra is therefore forced into action by 
others,  and  proceeds  to  hang  herself  from  shame,  leaving  a  note  to  ensure 
Hippolytus’  death  and  her  children’s  future  security.   Her  actions  have  violent 
outcomes, but they are certainly not what we would consider as insane.  Rational 
decision-making was not attributed to someone afflicted by madness in antiquity, as 
we  can  see  by  the  Athenian  law  which  allowed  a  male  relative  to  take  over 
someone’s estate if they were ‘mad’.166  Her reaction is not only conditioned by the 
emotion, or even by rejection, but by very specific circumstances, under which she 
has no positive options.  If we compare her taking command over the situation to 
madness  proper  we  see  a  large  difference.   Heracles  does  not  slay  his  children 
voluntarily,  and Io does not wander the earth by her own will.   We see a similar 
distinction in Apollonius’  Argonautica.  Medea is not driven literally mad by her 
passion and she is aware of the conflict between emotional and social pressures.167 
Her violent actions afterwards are rational (if cruel) once she has made the decision 
to leave with Jason.  Madness is a danger to social norms, and it is used as a source 
domain for emotion, which can also lead people to disregard social boundaries, none 
more so than ἔρως.
Madness is by and large not a symptom of  ἔρως, in which case the person 
affected by  ἔρως would turn mad, but a metaphor, which highlights the similarity 
involved in the psychological loss of control associated with both conditions.  The 
reciprocated affections of the main couples do not require a strategy for frustrated 
164 Νόσος: E.Hipp.40; 131; 269; 279; 283; 394.  Mania: E.Hipp.214; 248; 1274.
165 She  is  wasting  away  (E.Hipp.131),  not  eating  (E.Hipp.136-8)  and  her  strength  is  gone 
(E.Hipp.199).  
166 See Dover 1974, 127.  On madness in general in antiquity and ancient literature see Mattes 1970, 
Padel 1995 and Hershkowitz 1998. 
167 See A.R.3.766ff.
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love, unlike most of the other characters who feel ἔρως in the Greek Novel.  Other 
characters cause violence because of  ἔρως and circumstance.   Arsace, the lustful 
Persian Queen, is involved in the torture of her beloved Theagenes and the attempted 
murder of Chariclea, because she cannot have Theagenes.168  In this chapter I will 
explore  the  importance  of  the  fact  that  disease  and  madness  involve  domain 
mapping, and hence metaphor and metonymy, in the Greek Novel.                
168 In Heliodorus there is also a moral point to this.  See the concluding section on this element.  
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I Disease
This section will explore the metaphorical  conceptualisation of  ἔρως as a disease 
(νόσος).  The image of the lover affected by disease is a standard one in Greek 
literature and also a prevalent feature of responses to ἔρως in the novels.169   As we 
saw in the sections on the erotic syndrome, the subject of ἔρως suffers debilitating 
symptoms.170  These are then interpreted as resulting from the ‘disease’ ἔρως.  This 
conceptualisation encompasses the physiology of the emotions, folk models of the 
physiology as expressed in metaphor,  and scientific  models based upon the same 
physiology.  Disease in antiquity was seen at its most basic as commencing, existing 
and then ceasing to exist.  However, there are some culturally salient factors involved 
in each of these parts.  Nutton identifies two general strands running through ancient 
medicine.171  Disease could be either theologically or physiologically caused (and of 
course the two categories are not exclusive).  In the first book of the  Iliad, where 
Apollo strikes the Achaeans down with a  νόσος,  he both causes the disease and 
heals  the  soldiers:  there  is  no  role  for  the  doctor.172  However,  there  were  also 
numerous explanations of disease in antiquity, especially expert, which saw them ‘in 
terms of pathological processes taking place within the body over time’.173  As we 
will see in the coming chapter, we will not merely see ἔρως as a disease in the Greek 
Novel, but as both a divinely caused disease and as a pathological process.  On a 
169 As we see in  the philosophical  discussion of  ἔρως in Plato’s  Phaedrus.   The person in love 
confesses that they themselves are ill (231d); the person affected by ἔρως is said to be more ill than 
the person who is not (236b); the man who is in love is νοσοῦντι (238e).  See also 244d and 255d. 
170 For a brief and simple example we may look to Mithridates in Chariton’s novel.  When he displays 
the symptoms of his desire for Callirhoe he becomes pale and thin, ὠχρός τε καὶ λεπτός, just as we 
would expect of the effects of an illness (Chariton 4.2.4).  
171 See Nutton 2004, 40.
172 Contrast the medic Machaon who heals the soldier’s wounds (Il.11.514-15).
173 Nutton 2004, 28.  See also Nutton 2004, 38, where he notes that Odysseus juxtaposes a non-
religious and religious cause of disease when he asks his mother if she died after a lengthly sickness 
or by the arrows of Artemis (Od.11.171-3).  One only has to look at the Hippocratic corpus to see that 
Greek  medicine  was  seeking  physiological  explanations  for  disease.   See  Hart  2000,  138:  ‘the 
Hippocratic school divided a disease course into three stages.  First, an imbalance of body humours 
(liquids) caused by internal or external factors.  Second, the reaction of the body to the altered balance 
by producing a fusion (coction) such that none of the humours are left in excess and the pain and 
symptoms are relieved.  This process was accompanied by heat production…The final phase was a 
resultant ‘crisis’ with discharge of the residual excessive humour (via blood, phlegm, vomit, faeces, 
urine or sweat).’    
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more  universal  note  the  metaphor  of  ἔρως as  disease  is  strongly  evaluative:  it 
portrays the emotion as ‘unhealthy’.174      
When Chloe’s feelings for Daphnis awaken she acknowledges that now she is 
sick:  νῦν ἐγὼ νοσῶ,  τί δὲ ἡ νόσος ἀγνοῶ (Longus 1.14.1).175  However, it is 
clear that this is like no νόσος she has had before, and she does not know what it is. 
Her ignorance is designed to display her naivety, but it also broaches an important 
theme in the novel.  Ἔρως is a different kind of  νόσος.  Daphnis feels symptoms 
which result from ἔρως, and complains that it is a new illness of which he does not 
know  the  name:  ὢ νόσου  καινῆς͵  ἧς  οὐδὲ  εἰπεῖν  οἶδα  τὸ  ὄνομα (Longus 
1.18.2).  He conceives of it as a νόσος, but he also realises that it is not the same as 
any illness he has experienced before.  These extracts draw a parallel between the 
respective  experience  of  the  young  lovers,  but  according  to  the  conventional 
metaphor of lovesickness.            
Daphnis and Chloe reason within their own experience and sickness is one of 
the metaphors they choose to conceptualise their new feelings.  Yet they are not fully 
aware of what type their νόσος is, as both claim ignorance.  The scenario is one of 
deception where neither party realises that it is not a νόσος per se with which they 
are afflicted, but rather ἔρως.  Deception constantly marks the topos of lovesickness 
in  the  Greek  Novel,  and  utilises  the  naivety  and  ignorance  of  both  the  lovers 
themselves and others.  Daphnis and Chloe only believe that their affliction might be 
a real νόσος because of their naivety.  It is not illogical for them to do so, however, 
for the symptoms of lovesickness are so close to those of a  νόσος in general that 
they cause much confusion.  Xenophon of Ephesus presents us with a prototypical 
example, where the symptoms of erotic desire are so similar to sickness that they 
give rise to misunderstanding.  When Habrocomes and Anthia become attracted to 
174 Averill  1990, 106: ‘consider,  for example, the characterisation of emotions as ‘diseases of the 
mind’…this is one of the major metaphors of emotion, historically speaking.  It has an explanatory 
function (e.g.,  emotions can disturb orderly thought processes,  just as diseases can disturb orderly 
physiological processes).  However, the metaphor is also clearly evaluative.  Emotions are unhealthy.’
175 At the start of Chariton’s novel both lovers waste away in bed after a chance meeting, as they are 
suffering from lovesickness:  τῆς νόσου (Chariton 1.1.10).  It is Chaereas’s body,  σώμα, which is 
definitely wasting away:  ἤδη τοῦ σώματος αὐτῷ φθίνοντος (Chariton 1.1.8).   Debilitation is 
itself seen in metaphorical terms here, that of an entity decaying or perishing: φθίνοντος.  
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one  another  they  spend  their  time  lying  down  ill:  ἔκειντο  μὲν  δὴ  ἑκάτεροι 
νοσοῦντες (X.Eph.1.5.9).  The symptoms are an important device for prolonging 
the revelation of the young couple’s ἔρως.  They are looking for a cure, but do not 
realise  what  the  correct  one  is:  Τέλος πέμπουσιν οἱ  πατέρες ἑκατέρων εἰς 
θεοῦ  μαντευσόμενοι  τήν  τε  αἰτίαν  τῆς  νόσου  καὶ  τὴν  ἀπαλλαγήν 
(X.Eph.1.5.9.3-5).   They  then  send  away  for  an  oracle  in  a  passage  where  the 
ambiguity of the notion is exploited to its fullest.  This echoes the model of a νόσος 
caused and cured by divine means.  The oracle asks them why they wish to know the 
cause  of  the  illness,  when  the  same  one  grips  both  of  the  two  children:  τίπτε 
ποθεῖτε μαθεῖν νούσου τέλος ἠδὲ καὶ ἀρχήν; Ἀμφοτέρους μία νοῦσος ἔχε 
(X.Eph.1.6.2).  Even after the oracle we are told that the parents still cannot work out 
what the νόσος is (X.Eph.1.7.1).  They both have the same νόσος, and, of course, it 
is mutually curable.  This emotional disease can be as deadly as any other.  When 
Chaereas is sick at the start of Chariton’s novel we are told that his peers are worried 
that he might die:  τὴν  αἰτίαν ἔμαθον τῆς νόσου,  καὶ ἔλεος πάντας εἰσῄει 
μειρακίου καλοῦ κινδυνεύοντος ἀπολέσθαι διὰ πάθος ψυχῆς εὐφυοῦς 
(Chariton 1.1.10).176  
The parents are deceived by the symptoms and do not realise that  ἔρως is 
responsible.  In Heliodorus the same thing happens to Chariclea when she sees her 
future partner Theagenes.  She falls ill, and her father calls in the priest Calasiris to 
examine her.  In fact Calasiris will effect a cure by uniting the couple, but it is one 
which  can  only  be  achieved  with  the  ignorance  of  the  father,  and  so  Calasiris 
deceives  him  as  to  her  condition.   Calasiris’  diagnosis  contains  much  technical 
language relating to scientific and philosophical theories, but Heliodorus reflects the 
theme of deception found in Xenophon of Ephesus, albeit in a more developed and 
nuanced way.177  
176 Emotional duress can in fact be deadly and is not merely a literary conceit.  See Damasio 1995, 
120: ‘there are other examples of mind-body interaction…Bereavement, again a state dependent on 
brainwide processing, leads to a depression of the immune system such that individuals are more 
prone to infection and, whether as a direct result or not, more likely to develop certain types of cancer. 
One can die of a broken heart.’  For the evidence see Calabrese et al. 1987.
177 The science of this passage will be discussed in more detail in the section on the anatomy of ἔρως.
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There is an interesting relationship between this passage from Heliodorus and 
one from the medical writer Galen concerning the symptoms of ἔρως.178  The initial 
diagnosis  of Calasiris  is  that  Chariclea is  ill  because of the evil  eye.179  She has 
contracted  a  νόσος through  the  envious  intention  of  another  (Hld.3.7).   This 
explanation diverts Charicles from the real reason, which is that she is feeling ἔρως 
for Theagenes.  Chariclea knows of course that this is not the case, and implies so 
much  to  Calasiris:  νοσῶ γὰρ οὐ  βασκανίαν,  ἀλλ΄  ἑτέραν τινά,  ὡς  ἔοικε, 
νόσον (Hld. 4.5.6).  She has not been affected by a disease causd by the malice of 
someone’s envy.  It is some other kind of  νόσος which is affecting her.  Calasiris 
explains the working of the disease to Charicles in terms of expert models of the evil 
eye and ἔρως.180  Calasiris explains the mechanism whereby people contract diseases 
without touching.
Many people contract ophthalmia or some other infectious disease without having touched 
the patient at all or shared a bed with him, merely by breathing the same air.  Conclusive 
proof  of  my  point  is  furnished  by  the  genesis  of  love,  which  originates  from visually 
perceived objects, which, if you will excuse the metaphor, shoot arrows of passion, swifter 
than the wind, into the soul by way of the eyes.181
The element of pastiche in this passage is seen in the fact that Calasiris’ explanation 
moves inconsistently from the evil eye, which is an airborne contagion (‘breathing 
the same air’),  to  ἔρως which is  transmitted  by sight.182  The genesis  of love is 
created by particles through the eyes:  τὰ ὁρώμενα (Hld.3.7.5).  The irony is that 
Calasiris  has  convinced  Charicles  that  Chariclea  is  ill  with  an  analogy  to  the 
condition  of  ἔρως,  when in reality it  is  ἔρως she is  feeling.   Later  on a doctor 
confirms this when he makes a diagnosis with her pulse.183  He reports the diagnosis 
to Calasiris at Hld.4.7.4–7.  The doctor, Acesinus, says that there is nothing he can 
178 Galen of Pergamum’s dates are CE129–c.216.  This almost certainly places him prior to 
Heliodorus, who probably dates from the 3rd century CE.  On the dating of Heliodorus see Bowie 
2008, 32– 5 and Morgan 2003, 418–9. 
179 The Evil Eye was a widespread folk belief in antiquity.  On Heliodorus see Dickie 1991 and in 
general Rakoczy 1996.  
180 This complex passage will be discussed at length in the chapter on vision.  
181 Hld.3.7.5. Translation by Morgan in Reardon 1989, 416.
182 In ancient Greece illness was often explained in terms of the model of ‘an individual’s interaction 
with the surrounding air’ (Nutton 2004, 26).  See for instance Herodianus 6.6.2.  On this particular 
passage Dickie 1991 provides an excellent comparison with Plutarch.
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do for her.  Hers is not a νόσος of the body (σώμα), τὸ δὲ τῆς κόρης νόσος μέν͵ 
ἀλλ΄ οὐ σώματος (Hld.4.7.6), because there is nothing physically wrong with her: 
οὐκ ἄλλο τι τοῦ σώματος͵ οὐ μέρος͵ οὐχ ὅλον νοσεῖ που (Hld.4.7.6).184  Her 
condition is clearly one of the  ψυχή and she is afflicted by lovesickness: ψυχῆς 
εἶναι τὸ πάθος καὶ τὴν νόσον ἔρωτα λαμπρόν (Hld.4.7.7).  This revelation lets 
the cat out of the bag, so to speak, as it reveals the very thing which Calasiris sought 
to keep hidden from Charicles.  However, their cover is not completely blown, as 
Charicles  is  unaware  that  it  is  Theagenes  whom she  loves.   He  has  also  asked 
Calasiris  to  help  him make  her  fall  in  love,  in  order  to  get  her  married,  and so 
assumes that Calasiris has helped him in this respect.  This story conveniently leads 
to Calasiris being even more involved with the girl.  With this access to her, he sets 
up the night time raid in which Theagenes will spirit her away with a gang of youths. 
Later on in book four Chariclea confesses her feelings to Calasiris.   
Although I am caused great pain by the malady which is now at its height, I am caused even 
more pain by not having overcome that malady at the outset, but having instead succumbed 
to a passion whose temptations I had hitherto always resisted, and the very mention of which 
is an affront to the august name of virginity.185 
Chariclea confesses to the social pressures affecting her conception of the emotion. 
Emotion is conflicting with her beliefs concerning virginity.  The metaphors she uses 
to describe the malady are ones from the concept of emotion as a conflict between 
the person affected and the emotion (see the chapter on ἔρως as an opponent).  She 
is disappointed that she did not ‘master’ the malady,  κρατῆσαι, and that she was 
‘defeated by it’: ἡττηθῆναι.  This represents an active portrayal of her in relation to 
the disease, in that she feels that she could fight against it, but is not strong enough. 
Additional emotional pain is caused by her knowledge that she has been ‘defeated’ 
183 Ἀνακρίνειν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρτηρίας (Hld. 4.7.4).  This is because it indicates the movement of the 
heart:  τὰ καρδίας κινήματα (Hld.4.7.4).
184 The doctor says  that there are in fact  no physical  symptoms.  She does not have an excess of 
humour, a headache, nor a burning fever: οὐ γὰρ χυμῶν τις περιττεύει͵ οὐ κεφαλῆς ἄλγημα 
βαρύνει͵ οὐ πυρετὸς ἀναφλέγει (Hld.4.7.6).   He goes on to say that the only person who can 
‘cure’ her is the one she desires: ζητητέος σοί͵ Χαρίκλεις͵ ὁ ἰασόμενος· γένοιτο δ΄ ἂν μόνος ὁ 
ποθούμενος (Hld. 4.7.7).  
185 Hld.4.10.2.  Translation by Morgan in Reardon 1989, 434.
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by the emotion, as well as that which is standard of ἔρως.  Another social spin on the 
concept is provided by Charicles in a further extension of the whole episode’s irony. 
He professes his hope that one day Chariclea will feel  ἔρως.  On that day he will 
proclaim her healthy and not ill.186  Charicles inverts the mappings of healthy and 
diseased states because his agenda is to get Chariclea married.  Therefore he wants 
her to feel ἔρως and denotes it instead as a healthy state.  This is rooted in the fact 
that  the  whole  scenario  of  ἔρως is  not  usually  conceptualised  as  a  νόσος,  but 
specifically  the  frustration  stage.   These  examples  indicate  the  individual 
manipulation of metaphor as a result of social pressure and personal agenda. 
The model of ἔρως as a νόσος in the Greek Novel is metaphorical because it 
involves domain mapping from the (more) concrete domain of disease to the (more) 
abstract domain of  ἔρως.  Opinions on the relationship of diseases to emotions in 
antiquity could vary.  Cicero presents the stoic theory that the diseases of the body 
are analogous to those of the soul, not the same as.187  A passage from Galen’s  De 
Praecognitione shows the same opinion from an expert point of view.  Iustus’ wife 
was wasting away without appearing to be suffering in any part of her body.188  Galen 
concludes  that  she  is  either  suffering  from  a  depression  caused  by  black  bile, 
μελαγχολικῶς δυσθυμεῖν, or is experiencing emotional pain,  λυπουμένην.189 
His second guess is correct, and her body is experiencing no physical illness but a 
psychological one, τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθος ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ ψυχικῆς 
τινος  ἀηδίας.   This  description  mirrors  the  distinction  made  by  the  doctor  in 
Heliodorus.190  In fact she is in love, and when the name of the pantomime dancer 
Pylades is mentioned her expression and facial colour change, and her pulse beats 
irregularly.   The  disease  does  have  somatic  effects  but  is  psychological.   Galen 
186 Εἴθε δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ πόθου ποτὲ καὶ ἔρωτος αἴσθοιτο· τότε ἂν ὑγιαίνειν αὐτὴν οὐ νοσεῖν 
ὑπέλαβον (Hld.3.9.1).
187 Cicero Tusc.3.7.8–15: num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines iracundiae? 
haec enim fere sunt eius modi, quae Graeci πάθη appellant; ego poteram 'morbos', et id verbum esset e 
verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia 
morbos  Graeci  appellant,  motus  animi  rationi  non  obtemperantis,  nos  autem  hos  eosdem  motus 
concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, nisi quid 
aliud tibi videtur.  
188 Galen De Praecognitione 5.6-7, Nutton 95.  
189 For this and the coming descriptions see Galen De Praecognitione 6.4-8, Nutton 103.
190 For a comparison of Heliodorus and Galen’s portrayal of medicine in terms of narrative levels see 
Robiano 2003.
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underlines this later on in the same treatise when he states that a man worried about 
money entrusted to him which has gone missing seems sick, but is not experiencing a 
physical  problem.191  Contemporary  scientific  models,  like  those  parodied  by 
Heliodorus  and  cited  in  Galen,  are  also  concerned  with  the  correct  reading  of 
symptoms and the relationship between emotion and diseases.  Heliodorus reflects 
Galen  and  the  medical  writers  in  interpreting  (or  for  Heliodorus  mocking  the 
interpretation of) the disease as a pathological process, unlike Xenophon of Ephesus 
who presents or implies a model of divine causation.                     
Achilles Tatius features philosophising on the experience of the erotic state as 
a  νόσος.   At  1.6  he describes  the way that  afflictions  and physical  wounds,  τὰ 
ἄλλα  νοσήματα  καὶ  τὰ  τοῦ  σώματος  τραύματα,  are  worse  at  night 
(Ach.Tat.1.6.2).   Clitophon  is  feeling  ἔρως,  and  by  logical  implication  if  it  is 
νοσήματα which agitate people at night, then  ἔρως is a member of the class of 
νοσήματα.   Achilles Tatius combines the concepts of illness and wounds.  It is 
νοσήματα and τραύματα which aggravate the body at night.  This contrasts with 
the daytime when the eyes and ears are heavily loaded with work, and therefore the 
intensity  (ἀκμή)  of  the  νόσος is  lightened  (Ach.Tat.1.6.3).192  This  grouping of 
wounds and illness presents another physiological and metaphorical correspondence. 
Illness or disease can result from a wound and so the two concepts are grounded in 
experience.  Metaphorical wounds are also part of the erotic experience as we shall 
see in the section on  ἔρως as an opponent.  Metaphors can be used coherently in 
multiple metaphorical networks at once.  That is to say the image of the wounded 
lover is not used only as part of the network seeing  ἔρως as an opponent, but can 
also be associated with seeing ἔρως as a νόσος.  Metaphor displays flexibility and a 
multivalent nature which arises from empirical knowledge.    
In  a  later  section  of  book one Achilles  Tatius’  hero Clitophon is  making 
suggestive comments to Leucippe in order to gauge her interest (Ach.Tat.1.17).  One 
191 Galen  De Praecognitione 6.11ff.,  Nutton 103.  Galen also notes that there is no specific erotic 
pulse, but that the pulse changes under all psychological disturbances: 6.16, Nutton 105.  
192 Ach.Tat.1.6.2; 1.6.3; 1.6.3.  In a manipulation of the theme of lovesickness as deception, Achilles 
Tatius has Leukippe pretend to be ill, so that Clitophon can meet her in secret (Ach.Tat.2.16.1).  Thus 
a false sickness enables an erotic rendezvous.  Later on Clitophon avoids being intimate with Melite 
by feigning sickness (Ach.Tat.5.21.6).    
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of the examples he uses is that of plants.  Even plants fall in love with one another 
and the phoinix is  especially  susceptible  to this.193  If  the female  is  planted at  a 
considerable distance from the male then the male begins to wither away (Ach.Tat. 
1.17.4).  The only cure for the νόσος of the plant is to take a piece of the female and 
put it beside the male’s heart,  καρδία, which refreshes its  ψυχή, and causes it to 
rejoice in the ‘embrace’: συμπλοκή (Ach.Tat.1.17.4-5).194  This example is used for 
rhetorical purposes: i.e. to convince Leucippe that ἔρως (and therefore sex) is a good 
thing.  It grounds the act of ἔρως in nature and presents us with an analogy of the 
erotic process.  It is the lack/absence of the lover which results in illness.   
Ἔρως as  a  νόσος imposes  a structure on the experience of  ἔρως.   This 
relates  to the process of the emotion.   The young lovers lay eyes  on each other, 
contract an illness because of it and are cured when they obtain the beloved.195  The 
process of an illness with contraction, debilitation and a treatment or cure is mapped 
onto the process of  ἔρως, with desire, debilitation because of that desire and then 
fulfilment of the desire.  If ἔρως is unfulfilled then it is uncured.  This differs from 
the Hippocratic account of stages of a νόσος with regard to its inception—divine or 
visual causation instead of imbalance—and its conclusion in obtaining the beloved: 
the cure does not come about with a natural resolution such as a discharge of humour 
(see introduction to this section). 
Metaphors of ἔρως as a νόσος in the Greek Novel often emphasise the start 
or the end of the process.  The question of a cure, a φάρμακον, is essential to the 
wellbeing of the person affected, although the term itself is laced with ambiguity.  It 
can denote a drug which either cures or creates  ἔρως.  Actual love potions appear 
only a couple of times in Achilles Tatius.  In the first instance Leucippe suddenly 
193 This word can indicate many different  things but for the plant  LSJ refer  to the date-palm: the 
Phoenix dactylifera.       
194 Συμπλοκή, a weaving together, can denote a sexual embrace or sexual intercourse for humans in 
ancient Greek literature.  See Pl.Symp.191c, Arist.HA 540b21, Corn.ND 24, Sor.1.31.  
195 Heliodorus seems to be more concerned with the theme of marriage and chastity than most of the 
other novelists.  Calasiris tells Chariclea to convert her νόσος into marriage: γάμος (Hld.4.10.6).  In 
the other novels Callirhoe sleeps with Dionysius, Chloe has pre-marital ‘experiences’ with Daphnis, 
and Clitophon is quite happy to have sex with Leucippe before they are married (as is she!), even 
though they are thwarted in their plans.  Only in Xenophon of Ephesus is Anthia kept married and 
chaste the whole time, although the marriage is at the start, and so there is not the same tension which 
Heliodorus maintains by holding off the marriage until the end of the book.     
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starts  behaving  strangely;  she  falls  down  and  her  eyes  roll  in  their  sockets 
(Ach.Tat.4.9).196  When Clitophon approaches her she hits him in the face and needs 
to be restrained.  The bystanders have decided that it is some madness which has 
taken hold of her, μανία εἴη τις (Ach.Tat.4.9.2), but later on at 4.15.4 we find out 
that  she  has  in  fact  been  the  victim  of  a  love  potion:  τι  φάρμακον  ἔρωτος. 
Gorgias,  an Egyptian  soldier,  fell  in  love with Leucippe  and administered  a love 
potion to her, but at an undiluted strength.  Instead of working it caused Leucippe to 
go  mad  (the  reader  is  left  to  wonder  whether  it  would  have  worked if  properly 
applied).  Love charms have a habit of going wrong, as one sees from the example of 
Deianira’s failed attempt to regain Heracles’ love in Sophocles’ Trachiniae.  Achilles 
Tatius’ description of Leucippe’s madness and treatment is typical of the period and 
has parallels with the first-century doctor Celsus.197  The φάρμακον can be used to 
cause ἔρως, and this puts passion firmly within the realms of physiology.  There is a 
fine line between ἔρως and madness, as these two concepts are intrinsically linked 
(see next section on madness).198  The psychological debilitation associated with the 
emotion is maintained here as is the theme of deception.  The bystanders think she is 
mad, because her symptoms seem appropriate.  However, they are being deceived, 
because it is actually an excess of a love potion, and therefore they must wait for a 
specific cure from the person who made it.  The only other mention of a love potion 
occurs  later  in  the  novel  when  Melite  asks  Leucippe  to  prepare  one  for  her 
(Ach.Tat.5.22.6).  Leucippe pretends to be of Thessalian origin, and Melite’s request 
is based on the reputation Thessalians enjoyed for magic.199  There is irony in the fact 
that Leucippe has in the past fallen victim to a love potion, and that Melite is asking 
her to engineer a potion for Clitophon, Leucippe’s partner, and furthermore it is not a 
proposition that Leucippe has any plans of fulfilling.   Potions are unsuccessful in 
196 τὼ  ὀφθαλμὼ  διαστρέφειν (Ach.Tat.  4.9.1).   When  Clitophon  approaches  her  eyes  are 
bloodshot: ὕφαιμον βλέπουσα (Ach.Tat. 4.9.2).  
197 On this whole episode and the medical context see McLeod 1969, who argues that everything in 
Leucippe’s treatment by the doctor is endorsed by Celsus.
198 This madness is also connected with a lack of αἰδώς.  Out of her mind she has no thought for the 
body parts which she should keep hidden: οὐδὲν φροντίζουσα κρύπτειν ὅσα γυνὴ μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι 
θέλει (Ach.Tat.4.9.2).  McLeod 1969, 105, says of this passage that ‘the symptoms of her madness 
are selected for their poignant effect in the novel’, but I suspect that this description is probably erotic. 
199 Melite tells Leucippe that she has that Thessalian women are able to use magic for erotic purposes 
(Ach.Tat.5.22.2).  See also the setting of magical Thessaly in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses.  
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Achilles Tatius.  The former potion is not effective, the later is not made, and each 
one is targeted at one of the main lovers respectively.                        
Most references to  φάρμακα in the Greek Novel are metaphorical.  The 
crossover from literal to metaphorical is nicely encapsulated by Daphnis in Longus’ 
novel.  When Chloe kisses him he feels pangs of love and wonders if she put any 
potion on her lips:  Ἆρα φαρμάκων ἐγεύσατο ἡ Χλόη μέλλουσά με φιλεῖν 
(Longus 1.18.2).  Since the kiss has pained Daphnis he tries to explain the effect as 
some sort  of poison.  It can also mean a cure,  and can be a literal  cure like the 
antidote for Leucippe above or a metaphorical one.  Philetas tells them that there is 
no cure for ἔρως, nothing to imbibe, eat or chant.  The only thing they can do is to 
lie together naked and embrace:  ἔρωτος γὰρ οὐδὲν φάρμακον, οὐ πινόμενον, 
οὐκ ἐσθιόμενον, οὐκ ἐν ᾠδαῖς λαλούμενον, ὅτι μὴ φίλημα καὶ περιβολὴ 
καὶ συγκατακλιθῆναι γυμνοῖς σώμασι (Longus 2.7.7).  It takes Daphnis and 
Chloe the whole novel to work out exactly what he means.200  They decide to try the 
cures  he  mentioned:  ὅσα  εἶπεν  ἄρα  φάρμακα (Longus  2.8.5).   Philetas  is 
rejecting literal potions for love and conceiving sex metaphorically as a cure.  
Both  aspects  of  the  dual  nature  of  φάρμακα,  cause  and cure,  appear  as 
metaphors  in  the  novels.   The  cause  of  the  emotion  can  often  have  a  negative 
connotation.  In Longus the sight of Chloe naked has a strong effect on Daphnis.  He 
feels pain in his heart, καρδία, as if it is being eaten away by φάρμακα: ἤλγει τὴν 
καρδίαν ὡς ἐσθιομένην ὑπὸ φαρμάκων (Longus  1.32.4).   We find  a  more 
explicit image of poison when Callirhoe kisses Dionysius in Chariton.  It sinks down 
into his σπλάγχνα like a poison: τὸ δὲ φίλημα Διονυσίῳ καθάπερ ἰὸς εἰς τὰ 
σπλάγχνα κατεδύετο (Chariton 2.8.1).201  This is a very visceral  simile  and it 
coheres conceptually with the notion of a drug.  The usual entities affected by ἔρως 
are the ψυχή and καρδία.  Although the ‘σπλάγχνα’ are not as such part of the 
simile, the choice of them as the destination of the kiss in this context is probably due 
200 Whitmarsh 2005 discusses  the name of Philetas,  which corresponds  to  a  Hellenistic  poet,  and 
argues  that  Daphnis  and  Chloe  lack  a  definition  of  ἔρως which  they  can  use  for  their  own 
circumstances. 
201 Alternatively it could mean ‘like an arrow sinking into his guts’.
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to the simile of a kiss as poison.  The guts are the proper location for a poison and so 
the kiss is seen as sinking down into them rather that the soul or heart.    That is to 
say the anatomical reference is part of the vehicle or source domain rather than the 
tenor or target, and this explains its unusual usage with regard to ἔρως in the novels. 
It is more common for a metaphorical  φάρμακον to be seen as a cure.  In 
this case it appears at a different point of the emotional process, at the end rather than 
the beginning.  We have already seen Philetas speak of the cure for  ἔρως, which 
happens to be sex.  In this case it is the only possible cure: τὸ μόνον ἔρωτα παῦον 
φάρμακον (Longus  3.14.1).202  For  Daphnis  and  Chloe  toiling  distracts  them 
(‘soothes’ them) from the erotic  pain,  λύπη:  τῆς ἐρωτικῆς λύπης φάρμακον 
τὸν κάματον ἔσχον (Longus 1.22.3).   Here the  φάρμακον is  temporary,  and 
refers to the process of the emotion during specific conditions.  In the Greek Novel 
the  two  lovers  generally  remain  loyal  to  one  another  and  surmount  even  such 
apparently impossible challenges to their chastity as working in a brothel.  However, 
there are a few notable exceptions.  In Achilles Tatius, Melite is the ‘other woman’ to 
whom Clitophon is betrothed after the apparent death of Leucippe.  Unfortunately for 
Melite not only is Leucippe still  alive, but also her husband Thersander,  likewise 
thought  dead,  and  her  planned  marriage  to  Clitophon  falls  through.   Given  the 
circumstances she asks Clitophon to ‘perform’ a favour for her, in order to ‘cure’ her 
lovesickness  for  him: μικροῦ  δέομαι  φαρμάκου  πρὸς  τηλικαύτην  νόσον 
(Ach.Tat.5.26.2).   Sex  will  relieve  her  frustration  and  allow her  to  get  over  the 
disappointment of not marrying Clitophon.  Clitophon, who at  this point requires 
Melite’s  help  to  regain  Leucippe,  magnanimously  consents  in  the  interest  of  all 
parties involved.  He points out to the reader that all he is doing is providing a cure 
for an ill  ψυχή:  ἀλλὰ φάρμακον ὥσπερ ψυχῆς νοσούσης (Ach.Tat.5.27.2). 
202 See also Longus 2.9.2: τὸ οὖν συγκατακλιθῆναι μόνον φάρμακον ἔρωτος.  In Chariton the 
Persian King asks his servant for a φάρμακον for his desire for Callirhoe.  He replies that the only 
cure for  ἔρως is the person you  have  ἔρως for:  φάρμακον γὰρ ἕτερον Ἔρωτος οὐδέν ἐστι 
πλὴν αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρώμενος (Chariton 6.3.7).  However, since the Persian King is greater than other 
men,  he  recommends  not  to  use  the  same  remedy  as  them  but  to  strive  to  battle  with  it: 
ἀνταγωνίζομαι (Chariton 6.3.8).  As always in the Greek Novel this conflict of reason and emotion 
will not be successful.  In Longus this remedy is subdivided into three parts.  At Longus 2.9 Daphnis 
and Chloe try out the first two remedies, kissing and embracing, but delay the third remedy, which is 
lying naked together, out of a sense of shame (Longus 2.10.3).  
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This metaphor allows Clitophon a witty justification of his misdeed.203  Leucippe of 
course would not condone this indiscretion, but since he is ‘curing’ Melite he may 
(jokingly) justify it to himself and the reader.  In Achilles Tatius the metaphor of ‘a 
cure’ for ἔρως works well for both parties.                                              
All references to metaphorical νόσος in Xenophon of Ephesus and Longus 
are used of  ἔρως.  In Chariton there is only one reference to lovesickness, when 
Chariton’s peers seek the cause of his illness (Chariton 1.1.10).204  This is another 
example  of  the  deception  motif  as  no  one  realises  the  real  cause  of  his  illness 
immediately.  In Xenophon of Ephesus we also only see the lovesickness motif at the 
beginning,  when  the  two  lovers  are  affected,  and  all  references  in  Longus  are 
likewise from the first book.205  In these three novelists it is not the most popular 
metaphor for erotic passion (fire is).  The whole schema, however, is still present 
extensively  in  terms  of  the interpretation  of  the symptoms  of  ἔρως (see  above), 
which  parallel  those  of  a  sick  person and enable  the  deception  motif,  and  other 
aspects of the emotional process such as cause or cure.          
In Heliodorus we see several interesting features which arise from this basic 
schema.  Emotional  νόσος is not merely restricted to  ἔρως, but in fact covers the 
closely  associated  notion  of  jealousy:  ζηλοτυπία.   At  the  beginning  of  the 
Aethiopica  we  are  presented  with  the  bandit  leader  Thyamis,  an  Egyptian  from 
Memphis.  We do not learn until later in the novel that he was driven to a life of 
banditry as a result of the machinations of his brother, Petosiris, who subsequently 
took  over  Thyamis’  office  as  chief  priest.   Petosiris  acted  because  he  coveted 
Thyamis’ position, and we learn that he had been ‘ill’ with  ζηλοτυπία for a long 
time:  ὅ γε μὴν ἀδελφὸς αὐτῷ Πετόσιρις καὶ πάλαι ζηλοτυπίαν ἐπ΄ αὐτῷ 
νοσῶν (Hld.7.2.4).206  As we see from this example,  the metaphor of illness can 
even  be  applied  to  non-erotic  ζηλοτυπία (leaving  aside  psychoanalytic 
interpretations).   It  can  be  used  outright  of  envy  or  the  coveting  of  another’s 
203 As  Clitophon  says  himself  in  the  same  chapter,  ‘ἔρως teaches  argument  (λόγος)’ 
(Ach.Tat.5.27.1).    
204 Another reference which does not refer to a nosos but implies the same schema of sickness is when 
the Great King’s servant tells him there is no ‘cure’ for ἔρως (Chariton 6.3.7).  
205 X.Eph.1.6.2; 1.6.2; 1.5.9; 1.5.9; 1.7.1.  Longus p.1.3; 1.14.1 (referenced twice); 1.18.2.
206 Morgan 1989 translates ‘in whom had been festering for many years’.
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possession in a non-erotic way.207  Later on in the same book we see the metaphor 
applied to erotic jealousy.  Arsace, the Persian satrap’s wife, enlists her maidservant 
in helping her to achieve the object of her desire, the youth Theagenes.  Theagenes 
associates with his betrothed Chariclea, and this sparks jealousy in Arsace.  In asking 
her maid to solicit Theagenes for her she is making a double request.                     
Δυεῖν δι' ἑνός μοι γενήσῃ νόσων ἰατρός, ἔρωτός τε καὶ ζηλοτυπίας, τὸν μὲν 
ἐμπλήσασα τῆς δὲ ἀπαλλάξασα (Hld.7.10.6).
Ἔρως and  ζηλοτυπία are  the two diseases here.   The  same metaphor  is  used to 
conceptualise the two related emotions, and can even be extended to envy itself as 
seen in the previous example.  In all the novels previous to Heliodorus we saw that it 
was by and large used only of the main couple’s lovesickness.  
Heliodorus gives us several passages which posit the νόσος of  ζηλοτυπία 
as  a  gendered  attribute.   In  terms  of  the level  of  narration  they are  all  opinions 
expressed by characters, but the views themselves do not conflict with anything else 
in Heliodorus.  While Chariclea and Theagenes are prisoners of Arsace she urges 
him to pretend to give in to the Persian’s advances, in order to allow them time to 
escape their situation.  However, she begs him not to actually commit the physical 
act with her (Hld.7.21).  He replies teasingly that despite the danger of the situation, 
she is  not  immune to  that  jealousy innate  to  females:  τὴν γυναικῶν ἔμφυτον 
νόσον ζηλοτυπίαν (Hld.7.21.5).  Theagenes complains that his chastity is not an 
issue, and by implication her ζηλοτυπία is a redundant emotion.208  Jealousy is also 
attributed to eunuchs.  Arsace’s chief eunuch is only too happy to torture Theagenes 
on the orders of his mistress, because he has nursed a hatred for him for a long time. 
This hatred is due to ζηλοτυπία, which is innate for him as a eunuch.209  He envies 
207 See Cairns 2003, 239, who distinguishes jealousy and envy as to their object.  Jealousy is directed 
at what is one’s own, and envy at what belongs to another.  I will not delve into the thorny issue of the 
distinction between  φθόνος and  ζηλοτυπία here,  the two Greek words commonly translated as 
envy and jealousy.  See Konstan and Rutter 2003 for the relevant issues and opinions.
208 Earlier  on  in  the  novel  Theagenes  mistakenly  kisses  a  woman  believing  it  to  be  Chariclea. 
Chariclea is a little bemused at this and asks the name of the girl, but adds as a disclaimer that she is 
not feeling ζηλοτυπία (Hld.2.8).  
209 Ὁ  δὲ  καὶ  φύσει  μὲν  τὴν  εὐνούχων  ζηλοτυπίαν  νοσῶν:  he  is  by  nature  ill  with  the 
ζηλοτυπία of eunuchs (Hld. 8.6.2).
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Theagenes his position.  Later on the Ethiopian king Hydaspes leaves the beautiful 
young Chariclea in the hands of the eunuch Bagoas, since he knows that as a eunuch 
he would jealously keep her away from anyone who wanted to force her.210  So envy, 
begrudging  another’s  possession,  is  the  natural  disposition  of  eunuchs,  while 
jealousy, closely guarding one’s own possession, is innate for women.  The metaphor 
is manipulated to support existing social prejudices.  The only other character to feel 
jealous  is  the  barbarian  Achaemenes,  servant  of  Arsace:  νοσοῦντι  (Hld.7.23.5). 
Therefore ζηλοτυπία as a disease is used in occurrent and potential senses.  It can be 
innate  in  the  sense  that  someone  is  disposed  towards  feeling  that  emotion,  and 
occurrent when one contracts it.                                                
The  other  emotion  conceptualised  as  sickness  is  grief,  albeit  an  erotically 
motivated one.  In book 6 of Heliodorus’ novel Cnemon, Calasiris and Nausicles 
return to Chariclea without Theagenes.  Her reaction is to scream and ask them to 
remove her doubt  by telling her  whether  he is  dead or alive (Hld.6.5).   Cnemon 
reprimands her for her pessimistic outlook, and this draws a further rebuke for him 
from Calasiris.  He explains that Chariclea is in love, and this leads to her excessive 
fear  for  Theagenes’  safety:  Χαρικλείᾳ  μὲν  ξυγγινώσκωμεν εὖ  τὰ  ἐρώτων 
πάθη καὶ ἀκριβῶς νοσούσῃ (Hld.6.5.4).   Lovesickness is  conceptualised as a 
long-term state, and this state of  ἔρως gives rise to other emotions, here grief for 
Theagenes.   Interestingly the most prototypical occurrence of as a disease is as a 
marker of the emotion frustrated.  This is why we get so many references to cures of 
the  emotion.   Here,  however,  there  is  a  slight  difference  which  emphasises  the 
coherence of the model.  Frustrated ἔρως is grounded in the fact that one is denied 
and therefore separated from the beloved.  Chariclea is separated from Theagenes, 
and therefore her erotically motivated grief can be termed a disease, which will be 
cured when they are reunited.  
As  with  the  fire  metaphor  disease  has  a  wider  emotional  range  than  just 
ἔρως.  It can also be used of jealousy and grief.  Lovers can become ill and almost 
die through lovesickness, but this does not conflict with it also being metaphorical 
and metonymous.  It also has implications which are specifically part of the ἔρως as 
210 Hld.9.25.5.
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disease model.  Ἔρως does not pass after a certain period of time, as some diseases 
or ailments might be expected to do, but exists until a ‘cure’ is obtained: possession 
of  the  beloved.   It  therefore  not  only  structures  ἔρως but  actually  structures  an 
important subsection of it: frustrated ἔρως.  Jealousy and grief are also similar in the 
way that the possession of the object of emotional attention is threatened or gone. 
Frustrated ἔρως arises from not possessing the beloved.  Therefore the distribution 
of  the  disease  metaphor  among  these  three  emotions  is  not  arbitrary:  there  is  a 
conceptual coherence.  Metaphors do not necessarily cover the whole of an emotion. 
In the Greek Novel ἔρως seems to last beyond the obtaining of the beloved (see final 
chapter for more).  Lovesickness is not merely a response to ἔρως but a labelling and 
structuring of that response.              
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II Madness
Madness,  ancient  and  modern,  has  received  deserved  attention  in  recent 
scholarship.211  Like lovesickness, it straddles the related spheres of folk and expert 
models, and it favours a historicist approach: in some sense madness must be defined 
relative  to  any  specific  society.   Ancient  Greece  shared  with  us  the  concept  of 
madness as a disordered state of mind, and this view permeated folk and scientific 
models in antiquity.212  This chapter seeks to redress the lack of attention madness in 
the  Greek  Novel  has  received.   I  will  argue  that  previous  Greek  literature—in 
particular tragedy—is the basis for madness and emotion in the novels, and that in 
this  respect  the  Greek  Novel  should  be  seen  as  reflecting  long  established  folk 
models where it is not deliberately archaising.      
This  thesis  concerns  ἔρως,  and  the  primary  focus  of  this  study is  erotic 
madness.  I must, however, look at the wider depiction of madness and emotion to 
get  a broader  perspective on what erotic  madness  actually is,  since madness  is  a 
concept deeply associated with emotion in general.  The Greek genre which evokes 
madness and emotion to the greatest extent is Tragedy.  One can mention Pentheus, 
driven  mad  by  the  god  Dionysus,  and  the  same  god’s  bacchic  revels  which 
represented such a menace to him.  Another famous example is Heracles’ madness 
inflicted by Hera, which occurs in several sources.  Orestes is driven mad by the 
Furies  for  the  murder  of  his  mother  and  Io,  the  lover  of  Zeus,  is  stung  by  a 
maddening gadfly sent by Hera.  Madness is also connected with the divine, as with 
the  examples  of  Pentheus  and  Heracles  above,  and  its  ‘cure’  often  involved 
purification.213  Padel argues that madness in Tragedy is never innate in character but 
a  temporary  state,  and  gives  two  reasons  for  this:  first,  madness  is  often 
conceptualised as a disease, and second, there is a narrative function attached to it, in 
that once madness accomplishes its purpose (i.e. Heracles killing his family) then it 
211 See  Matttes  1970,  Padel  1992,  162–3,  175–81,  1995 and  Hershkowitz  1998.   Foucault  1971 
provides a historicist approach to madness from the middle ages onwards.  
212 Madness is still a difficult concept to define, even for modern scientific models: Hershkowitz 1998, 
12,  cites  the  American  Psychiatric  Association’s  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  
Disorders,  which  notes  in  its  introduction  that  ‘although this  manual  provides  a  classification  of 
mental disorders, it must be admitted that no definition adequately specifies precise boundaries for the 
concept of “mental disorder”’ (p.xxi, DSM IV, 1994, Washington, DC).
213 Parker 1983, 221.  
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is no longer needed.214  The first model is present in the novels, but not the second 
narrative device of divinely enforced manic rage.  The extreme reactions of madness 
proper  have  subsided  by  the  time  of  the  Greek  Novel,  but  the  psychological 
operation of madness and emotions has, I believe, essentially stayed the same.  
Madness has a long standing association with emotion in the philosophical 
and medical tradition.  Aristotle compares the condition of someone feeling a passion 
to someone asleep, drunk or ‘raving’ (μαινόμενον), and says that it is clear that 
anger (θυμοί) and sexual passion (ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων) can alter the body and 
even  cause  mania.215  This  model  of  emotions  causing  mania  makes  madness 
symptomatic of the emotion, yet madness may be seen more broadly as metonymic 
of emotion.   In orthodox Stoic  thought the experience of the passions,  πάθη,  is 
conceptualised  as  madness.216  And  finally  madness  becomes  causative:  Caelius 
Aurelianus  recognises  that  mania  produces  different  emotions,  among  them 
irascibility,  cheerfulness  and sadness.217  This  assertion  highlights  a  key point  of 
inquiry: does madness produce emotion, or emotion produce madness in the Greek 
Novel, or both?  It is the second model which the Greek Novel utilises, but this is 
probably  due  to  the  fact  that  the  thematic  concern  of  the  novel  is  emotion,  not 
madness.  Emotions can produce mania and thereby mad behaviour.  Therefore using 
the metaphorical conception of a part standing for the whole, synecdoche, madness 
becomes  metonymical  for  the  emotional  experience,  without  necessarily  being  a 
symptom.   The  reason  it  is  primarily  metonymical  rather  than  metaphorical  is 
because of its association as a symptom; madness can be seen as being in the same 
domain as emotion rather than being a cross domain mapping.      
Madness  has  also  been  connected  with  melancholy  and  the  physiological 
theory  of  black  bile.   In  the  Hippocratic  writings  moisture  in  the  brain  causes 
madness: phlegm results in quiet madness and bile noisy.218  It is black bile which 
later  emerges  as  the  dominant  physiological  explanation  of  madness,  and  this  is 
214 Padel 1995, 42–3.  
215 Arist.EN 1147a12–8.  
216 See Gill 1996a.
217 De morb.chron.1.150: iracundia,  hilaritas and maestitudo.  Seneca says  that those whom anger 




reflected in the appearance of the verb for madness  μελαγχολάω, ‘to be full of 
black bile’, which emerges later in the fifth century.219  The Hippocratic treatise De 
morbis explains  that  bile  gets  into  the  blood,  heats  it,  and  causes  the  patient  to 
become mad (1.30).  Depictions in literature retain the inner blackness associated 
with bile.  Agamemnon in the Iliad has ‘black phrenes’, φρένες ἀμφιμέλαιναι, in 
his  rage  (1.103).   In  Apollonius  Rhodius’  Argonautica Heracles  rushes  around 
frenzied with his black blood boiling, enraged that his favourite Hylas has vanished 
(1.1261-4).  Heracles’ madness is caused by emotion.  It must be noted that the fifth-
century CE physician Caelius  Aurelianus  distinguishes madness from melancholy 
(1.183), but in general the two notions are related across folk and scientific models.  
Erotic madness is a logical development of the connection of madness and 
emotion.  Madness, however, can be a symptom of ἔρως or metonymous, as with the 
other emotions.  Longinus’ De sublimitate 10.1 considers Sappho 31.9-15 (LP) to be 
a treatment of the sufferings of erotic madness:  ταῖς ἐρωτικαῖς μανίαις.220  With 
this  assertion he is  mapping madness  onto  ἔρως,  making it  metonymical  for the 
whole experience, and not a symptom.  Similarly Plato says that ἔρως is a kind of 
madness, and one that is divinely inspired (Phdr.244a).221  Later on he qualifies this 
by stating  that  Eros  and Aphrodite  are  the  fourth  and  greatest  form of  madness 
(Pl.Phdr.265a).  Prodicus posits that  ἔρως is an intense desire, and that an intense 
ἔρως causes mania.222  Mania represents an intense form of ἔρως.    
Madness proper appears most in the novels themselves.223  Of course defining 
references to ‘madness proper’, which for the purposes of this study means madness 
219 See Padel 1995, 48: Ar.Av.14; Pl.12, 364–66, 903.
220 For  other  references  to  erotic  madness  see  Anac.398,  428,  Ibyc.286.10-11,  Sappho  1.18, 
Thgn.1231.
221 See also Pl.Phdr.240d; 244a-245c; 249d–e; 251e; 253c; 256b; 265a–c.  
222 Prodicus fr.7 DK.
223 The following are references to madness proper in the Greek Novel including rhetorical usages 
(with  the  term  used):  Ach.Tat.4.9.2  (μανία);  Ach.Tat.4.9.5  (μανία);  Ach.Tat.4.9.6  (μανία); 
Ach.Tat.4.15.1  (μανία);  Ach.Tat.4.15.1  (μαίνομαι);  Ach.Tat.4.15.4  (μανία);  Ach.Tat.4.15.6 
(μαίνεται);  Ach.Tat.4.17.3  (μανία);  Ach.Tat.6.13.1  (μανία);  Ach.Tat.6.13.1  (μαίνεσθαι); 
Chariton  3.2.2  (μανία);  Chariton  6.5.9  (μαινοίμην);  Chariton  6.7.7  (μανία);  Chariton  7.1.2 
(ἐμμανής); Chariton 8.3.2 (μανία); Hld.1.2.6 (ἐκμεμηνυῖαν); Hld.2.34.8 (μανικῶς); Hld.5.2.2 
(μανῶ);  Hld.5.24.5  (μαίνεσθε);  Hld.7.7.2.  (μανία);  Hld.9.17.2  (μανία);  Hld.10.12.2  (μανία); 
Hld.10.38.1 (ἐμμανές); Longus 3.23.3 (μανία); Longus 2.27.1 (μαινομέναις φρεσὶν); Longus 
3.31.2 (μαινοίμην).
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which is not caused by emotion, is a difficult task.  At Hld.7.7.2 Calasiris asks his 
sons Thyamis and Petosiris to cease fighting and refrain from their madness: μανία. 
We certainly cannot rule out stimulating factors such as anger or jealousy as motives 
which drive them towards strife and thereby madness.  Leucippe’s excess dosage of 
love potion involves madness in terms of her physical behaviour, but also links her 
state  to  erotic  passion.   These  examples  are  not  collated  on  the  basis  that  they 
exclude  emotional  involvement,  but on the grounds that  they do not  characterise 
emotion directly.  Other instances of references to madness in the novels involve the 
rhetorical formula of ‘I would be mad to…’, such as when Callirhoe declines the 
Persian King’s advances by professing that she is of too lowly a station to mingle 
with the king (Chariton 6.5.9).  There are also intertextual references such as when 
Callirhoe,  who  is  contemplating  killing  herself  in  order  to  avoid  remarriage, 
compares herself to Medea, since suicide would involve ending the life of her unborn 
child (Chariton 2.9.3).224  This is one of a number of references which specifically 
engage  with the literary heritage  of tragedy.   Finally we have divine  inspiration, 
where the bandits  riding down to the beach at  the start  of  Heliodorus’ novel see 
Chariclea armed and godlike, and some assume that she has been ‘inspired’ by a god: 
ἐκμεμηνυῖαν (Hld.1.2.6).      
Erotic madness is the next largest category in the novels, and this shows that 
it  is  an  important  element  thematically  and  emotionally.225  There  are  twenty 
occurrences over all the novels and roughly half of them refer to women.226  They are 
also distributed evenly over different types of character, with Anthia and Daphnis 
224 Μηδείας λαμβάνεις λογισμούς.
225 Approaching the notion of erotic madness is madness as a metaphor for desire generally, which we 
see at Hld.2.34.8 and Hld.7.4.3.  At Chariton 5.2.6 the word γυναιμανές refers to desire generally as 
the Persian crowd are eager to see the beauty of Callirhoe as a spectacle.  It is used in a sexual way in 
the  Iliad, however, when Hector upbraids Paris for being ‘woman-mad’, obviously referring to his 
relationship with Helen (Il.3.39).  Women can also be lustful and ‘mad for’,  ἐπιμανής, men: see 
Ach.Tat.8.1.2
226 Examples of erotic madness with gender of person affected indicated in brackets (m/f).  A gnomic 
reference can refer to either sex if gender is not specified.  Ach.Tat.2.3.3: (gnomic)  ἐκμαίνουσιν; 
Ach.Tat.2.37.8:  (f)  μαίνεται;  Ach.Tat.5.19.4:  (f)  μαινομένην;  Ach.Tat.5.26.2:  (f)  μαίνεται; 
Ach.Tat.6.11.3: (f)  μαίνεται; Hld.1.14.6: (f)  μανικώτερον; Hld.1.15.4: (f)  ἐκμαίνει; Hld 2.14.3: 
(m)  μανικῶς;  Hld  4.2.3:  (m)  μανικῶς;  Hld 5.20.6:  (m)  μανικῶς;  Hld  5.29.5:  (m)  μανιώδη; 
Hld.5.31.2:  (m)  ἐμμανής;  Hld.7.7.5:  (f)  ἐμμανής;  Hld.7.9.4:  (f)  μανία;  Hld.7.20.5:  (f) 
ἐκμεμηνυῖαν;  Hld.7.23.1:  (f)  μανία;  Longus  1.25.2:  (m)  μαίνεσθαι;  Longus  2.2.2:  (m) 
μανικώτερον; X.Eph.1.4.6: (f) μαίνομαι.        
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feeling  the  same  emotion  as  pirates  like  Trachinus  and  wicked  women  such  as 
Arsace.227  Where  we do  see  more  interesting  results  is  in  the  authorial  variety. 
Heliodorus  has  more  references  to  erotic  madness  than any other  novelist,  while 
Chariton  lacks  any.228  The  distribution  of  examples  in  Heliodorus  is  also  more 
revealing.  Theagenes and Chariclea feel erotic madness once each, Hld.4.2.3 and 
Hld.7.7.5 respectively,  while the remaining nine examples are spread out amongst 
the unsavoury characters Demaenete, Thermouthis, Trachinus, Pelorus and Arsace: 
bandits and loose women.  Since this concept is used of the two main characters it is 
not  intrinsically  negative,  but  it  is  appropriately  used  more  often  of  pirates  and 
Phaedric  women  because  it  denotes  a  lack  of  control.   It  is  these  people  who 
Heliodorus understands as most likely to give in to uncontrolled lust, and therefore 
they are characterised accordingly.  On the other hand results across the other novels 
show that generally this metaphor does not imply anything as regards character or 
gender.  One explanation for the absence of this metaphor in Chariton is the ‘moral 
uprightness’ of his story.   His world is one of pirates and Persian tyrants but the 
behaviour is for the most part honourably Greek.  The only thought of the pirate 
Thero  is  to  sell  the heroine  Callirhoe,  despite  the fact  that  the author  repeatedly 
maintains that she is the most attractive woman in the world.  All her suitors are rich 
or powerful men and Chariton’s main rivals, Dionysius and the Persian Great King, 
are both conspicuous for the ‘educated’ way in which they attempt to fight against 
ἔρως.229  Chariton’s world is one in which people fall under a debilitating ἔρως but 
not a manic one.
Other  emotions  are  represented  as  mad  at  some  point  in  the  novels. 
Specifically they are surprise, joy, anger and grief.230  Anger has the most references, 
227 References  repeated  from  previous  footnote.   Anthia:  X.Eph.1.4.6;  Daphnis:  Longus  1.25.2; 
Trachinus: Hld 5.20.6; Arsace: Hld.7.9.4.
228 Over half of the references in total (eleven) quoted in the above footnote.  This does not quite 
match up with the lengths  of  the novels proportionally.   In  the translations in  Reardon 1989 the 
respective lengths (to within an error of one page) of all the novels are Achilles Tatius, 109; Chariton, 
103; Longus, 60; Heliodorus, 235; Xenophon of Ephesus, 42.  
229 Dionysius struggles against his emotion at Chariton 2.4.4 and the Great King at Chariton 6.3ff..
230 Surprise  (or  perhaps  shock):  Chariton  3.9.2.   Joy:  Ach.Tat.7.15.4.   See  below for  discussion. 
Anger (ὀργή/θυμός): Ach.Tat.2.29.2; Ach.Tat.4.10.6; Ach.Tat.5.5.8; Ach.Tat.6.9.1; Ach.Tat.6.10.5; 
Ach.Tat.6.22.2;  Hld.1.16.3;  Hld.1.29.4;  Hld.6.15.5.   Grief:  Ach.Tat.7.9.14;  Ach.Tat.7.9.14;  Hld 
10.19.1; Hld 6.9.2.     
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and is also paired with ἔρως three times in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus.231  Anger 
and ἔρως in particular can lead to uncontrolled reactions.    
One of  the  most  noticeable  themes  in  the  Greek Novel  concerning  erotic 
madness is the influence, implicit and explicit, of Greek Tragedy.  First of all there 
are characters connected with the violence of erotic madness in tragedy.   Arsace, 
Heliodorus’ wicked and lustful Persian, views the two men Thyamis and Theagenes, 
the  former  and  future  objects  of  her  attention  respectively,  from afar  during  the 
aborted  mortal  combat  between  Thyamis  and  his  brother  Petosiris  (Hld.7.7–9). 
When  she  retires  to  her  room she  tosses  and  turns  and  cannot  sleep,  while  she 
experiences lovesickness for Theagenes.  Morgan translates that ‘in short, her desire 
was  degenerating  imperceptibly  into  insanity’:  καὶ  ἁπλῶς εἰς  μανίαν λοιπὸν 
ἐλάνθανεν  ὁ ἔρως ὑποφερόμενος (Hld.7.9.4).232  Her  future  actions  will  be 
those of uninhibited passion, and so she will exemplify the manic aspects of ἔρως. 
This is in stark contrast to the chaste  ἔρως of Chariclea and Theagenes.233  Mania 
here  plays  an  important  narrative  role,  as  it  signifies  that  Arsace’s  passive 
lovesickness will turn into violent revenge.  It also indicates a specific emotional 
scenario, where ἔρως, if left unfulfilled for too long, leads to manic action.  In this 
case it is not simply metonymous for  ἔρως,  but designates a specific part  of the 
scenario: extended frustration.  Arsace is more active than Phaedra (in Euripides), 
since Phaedra only acts once the nurse has unwillingly revealed her secret, whereas 
Arsace shamelessly progresses with her seduction of Theagenes under no necessity 
of circumstance.  Despite the fact that she is in a position of power to effect this, 
unlike  Phaedra,  her  character  seems  fundamentally  different  from  Phaedra’s. 
Demaenete is similar in her active pursuit of her quarry Cnemon earlier in the same 
novel.  When madness is erotic, it highlights the lack of control associated with the 
emotion.      
231 Ach.Tat.6.22.2; Hld. 1.15.2; Hld. 1.30.5. 
232 Reardon 1989, 496.  At Ach.Tat.5.26.2 Melite argues to Clitophon that an unsuccessful ἔρως turns 
one mad:  ἔρως ἀτυχῶν καὶ μαίνεται.  She is using the model for persuasive purposes, but her 
conceptualisaiton coheres with the example of Arsace in Heliodorus, in that the continued frustration 
of the subject causes madness in them.  
233 See Morgan 1998 who contrasts the erotic experiences of Chariclea and Arsace.  He argues that 
Chariclea is sick with shame, whereas Arsace is sick from sexual frustration (66).  For more on this 
see the conclusion.
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The tragic paradigm is a literary influence that the text often cites explicitly. 
We saw above that Callirhoe compared herself to Medea in her soliloquy (Chariton 
2.9.3).  In Heliodorus we get an interesting agreement of narrator and character on a 
specific  model.   Demaenete,  who  has  formed  an  illicit  desire  for  her  stepson 
Cnemon, lusts after him ‘more madly’ than before, μανικώτερον, after he is exiled 
(Hld.1.14.6).  This is a tragic madness as we are told that the Furies are pursuing her 
(Hld.1.14.6).234  This is part of her general depiction in Heliodorus, as earlier in the 
novel she compares herself to Phaedra when she leaps upon Cnemon and calls him 
‘my Hippolytus’ (Hld.1.10.2).235  Cnemon reports her as being Phaedric, and she is 
seemingly complicit  in  this  portrayal,  if  we can  trust  Cnemon’s  reporting  of  her 
direct  speech.   Despite  the  complex  layers  of  narration,  I  do  not  think  we  can 
seriously doubt that Demaenete is an explicit tragic intertext.       
Another sense in which madness in the Greek Novel reflects standard earlier 
conceptions is in its status as a state rather than character trait.  In this it is in line 
with the general conception of madness as emotional, since emotions are not specific 
character traits.236  Only the barbarians are unfortunate enough to have the madness 
of emotion attached to them as a permanent aspect of their racial character.  When 
Callirhoe  reaches  the  outskirts  of  Babylon  there  is  intense  interest  over  such  a 
reportedly beautiful woman, because the barbarian is naturally ‘woman-mad’: φύσει 
δέ ἐστι τὸ βάρβαρον γυναιμανές (Chariton 5.2.6).  The context of this is not 
ostensibly erotic, as it is the masses, both male and female, who will wonder at the 
Greek woman who outshines even their own queen.237  However, we may see in this 
reference a hint of the as yet unawakened desire of the Persian King, which will be 
directed so disastrously at Callirhoe.  Erotic madness is in general a temporary state, 
and  not  an  aspect  of  character,  and  this  echoes  its  depiction  in  previous  Greek 
literature, especially Greek tragedy.  Even when it is an aspect of character it refers 
to a dispositonal sense: barbarians under erotic circumstances are likely to go ‘mad’. 
234 For the Furies, Erinyes, as a tragic component of epic see Hershkowitz 1998, 48ff.  For the Furies 
in epic and tragedy see Padel 1992, 164ff.  
235 Demaenete also confesses to being mad with passion, ἐκμαίνει, at Hld.1.15.4.
236 With a few exceptions.  See the passage on barbarians below and women’s ‘innate jealousy’ in the 
section above on lovesickness.  
237 For Callirhoe’s beauty as a visual phenomenon for the masses see Schmeling 2005.
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Another tragic element of madness which resurfaces in the Greek Novel is 
Dionysus and his revels.  In Longus we are told that at the festival of Dionysus the 
young  men  pressing  the  wine  jump  madly  around  Chloe  like  Satyrs  around  a 
Bacchant:  ὥσπερ ἐπί τινα Βάκχην Σάτυροι μανικώτερον ἐπήδων (Longus 
2.2.2).  The madness is erotic attraction, and it is enforced by the associate notions of 
wine and Dionysus.  Alcohol and madness both indicate lack of control.  In Achilles 
Tatius the same three elements are united in a description of internal emotion rather 
than interpersonal action.  Clitophon often digresses from the narrative to describe 
internal feelings, and one such occasion is the banquet where he and Leucippe are 
seated opposite  each other  at  a meal  for the first  time.   As Clitophon drinks,  he 
glances ever more boldly at the object of his desire, for Dionysus and Eros often 
operate together.
Ἔρως  δὲ  καὶ  Διόνυσος,  δύο  βίαιοι  θεοί,  ψυχὴν  κατασχόντες  ἐκμαίνουσιν  εἰς 
ἀναισχυντίαν.  ὁ μὲν καίων αὐτὴν τῷ συνήθει πυρί, ὁ δὲ τὸν οἶνον ὑπέκκαυμα 
φέρων· οἶνος γὰρ ἔρωτος τροφή (Ach.Tat.2.3.3). 
This passage invokes the concept of erotic madness,  ἐκμαίνουσιν, and the seat of 
the emotions, ψυχή.  It also sets the act of madness against social norms, where the 
societal  notion of restraint,  αἰςσχυντία,  is  overwhelmed by the irrationality  of the 
emotion,  conceptualised  as  madness.238  The  god which  binds  the  above  strands 
together is Dionysus, god of wine, who is also the god of divine madness.  Madness 
and  divine  inspiration  are  inexorably  entwined  in  the  portrayal  of  emotional 
responses.  When Chariclea behaves ‘madly’  after her father introduces the suitor 
Alcamenes to her, her father describes her as ‘enthused’: ἡ παῖς δαιμονᾶν ἔοικεν 
(Hld.4.7.10).  He has made an understandable conjecture based upon ancient Greek 
folk models.  She cannot bear the sight of him because she loves Theagenes, and 
therefore her mad behaviour has an erotic overtone.  Later on Arsace ‘feels like a 
238 See Konstan 2009, 1, on ἔρως as transgression of social boundaries: ‘Erôs is frequently perceived 
to  be  dangerous,  since  it  is  intense  and  tends  to  excess  (Plato  Laws 837A6-9),  and  it  is  often 
represented  as  transgressive,  insofar  as  it  tends  to  fixate  on an  object  without  regard  for  law or 
custom’. 
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Bacchant’  at  receiving  a  drink  from  Theagenes:  ἐξεβάκχευσεν (Hld.7.27.3).239 
This  passage  portrays  erotic  desire  as  divine  madness,  which  overrules  social 
conventions.  The lack of control implicit in mad emotions is defined socially.   
Madness  and  emotion  are  often  generally  associated  together,  without 
necessarily any reference to a specific emotion.  There are, however, different ways 
in  which they can be associated.   The first  of  these is  external,  where the facial 
expression  of  a  person  experiencing  emotion  is  like  that  of  a  mad  person.   In 
Chariton’s novel Callirhoe pines away in exile as the property of Dionysius.  Her 
former  husband  Chaereas  has  come  looking  for  her,  and  she  is  shocked  when 
Dionysius’  servant  Plangon  reveals  that  two  strangers  entered  the  temple  of 
Aphrodite, where there is a statue of Callirhoe herself, and that one of them fainted at 
the sight of it.   This raises Callirhoe’s suspicion that Chaereas himself  has come 
looking for her and she becomes like a mad person:  ὥσπερ ἐμμανὴς γενομένη 
(Chariton 3.9.2).  There is a previously existing erotic relationship between Callirhoe 
and Chaereas, but the situation evokes shock or surprise rather than any particular 
erotic  feeling,  although  the  extension  of  madness  to  include  desire  adds  subtle 
nuance  to  Callirhoe’s  depiction.   She  is  still  ‘in  love’  with  or  rather  erotically 
attached to Chaereas.  The description here owes a lot to her facial expression.  She 
cries out ‘staring with her eyes’:  στήσασα τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς (Chariton 3.9.2).240 
This body language is interpreted as a sign of an internal emotional experience.241 
The external expression is a sign of internal experience, and the eyes indicate manic 
emotion.   Although it  is a facial  expression, it  still  brings with it  an emphasis in 
cognitive content.  When emotions are labelled as ‘mad’ emotions, they highlight the 
loss of psychological and somatic control and imply that the emotion is irrational. 
There is also an associated notion of movement, displayed at both an experiential 
level and a metaphorical one.  Madmen and Bacchants move quickly and erratically, 
239 Near  the  end of  the  novel  Chariclea  runs ‘mad like  a  Bacchant’,  βάκχιόν τι  καὶ ἐμμανές, 
towards her adoptive father Charicles (Hld.10.38.1).  Of course this is not erotic madness but rather 
the madness of emotion.
240 I can find no exact parallels for this expression.  A TLG search brings up Leo Synadensis Epist., 
Epistulae 22.14 and Constantius Acropolites Rhet. et Hagiogr. Epistulae 92.14, but in neither of these 
references does στήσασα apply to the eyes.  It is possibly a new coinage for a standard piece of body 
language, where the eyes stand out or bulge in madness.  Rolling eyes are a long standing association 
of madness.  See n.241 below.
241 Pelorus the pirate displays his erotic madness on his face:  ἀπὸ τοῦ βλέμματος ἐμμανές τι 
διανοούμενος (Hld.5.31.2).
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and so does the emotion inside a person.  Thus the pirate Trachinus has an ‘insane 
motion’ for Chariclea: μανιώδη κίνησιν (Hld.5.29.5.5).242  Rather than seeing this 
connection of inside and outside as an early Greek feature, as Padel does, I would 
argue  that  this  is  a  standard  feature  of  metaphorical  reasoning.243  Metaphors 
embedded  in  experience  extrapolate  concepts  form  the  outside  to  the  inside. 
Metaphor is cognitive and reflects the way that people think.
There is an important scene in Achilles Tatius which portrays the relationship 
between emotion and madness physiologically.  Partway through book 4 of Achilles 
Tatius  his  heroine  Leucippe  has  a  fit,  whereupon  she  falls  down with  her  eyes 
‘rolling’:  τὼ ὀφθαλμὼ διαστρέφειν (Ach.Tat.4.9.1).  The signalling of madness 
in the eyes with  διαστρέφειν is standard.244  When Clitophon tries to run up and 
restrain  her  she  strikes  him,  her  eyes  bloodshot:  ὕφαιμον  βλέπουσα 
(Ach.Tat.4.9.2.).  Those standing around understand that she has been afflicted by 
some kind of mania (Ach.Tat.4.9.2).  She is restrained and Clitophon laments that 
they have come so far only for her to fall victim to this.245  They engage a doctor to 
treat her, as if the condition is an illness, and it emerges a short while later that the fit 
was brought on by a love potion administered at too great a strength.  So while the 
madness  was  induced  by  a  drug  there  is  a  correlation  between  the  intensity  of 
emotion and madness.  The love potion was designed to make her feel ἔρως, but too 
much was given, and an excess of chemical stimulation to ἔρως produced madness. 
This ‘scientific’ passage which refers to a drug reflects the folk model that excess 
emotion leads to madness.  It is this model which is engaged when people naturally 
242 Morgan translates it as ‘insane infatuation’ (Reardon, 1989).  The word κίνησις is used of human 
emotions in Arrian (Arr.Epict.2.20.19).  This metaphor also relies on the view of emotion itself as 
internal motion.  However, this does not diminish the suitability and consistency of its conjunction 
with madness.        
243 See Padel 1995, 120-130.
244 Διάστροφος is used of eyes signalling madness: see S.Aj.447.  See Padel 1995, 74, whirling eyes 
at Aesch.PV 882 (τροχοδινεῖται δ' ὄμμαθ' ἑλίγδην) and the parallel whirling of mad women at 
Eur.HF 868  (διαστρόφους  ἑλίσσει)  and  Eur.Ba.1123  (διαστρόφους  κόρας  ἑλίσσουσ'). 
Hp.Progn.7 states that if there is a throbbing in the hypochondrium then it indicates disturbance or 
wandering  of  mind:  εἰ  δὲ  καὶ  σφυγμὸς  ἐνείη  ἐν  τῷ  ὑποχονδρίῳ,  θόρυβον  σημαίνει,  ἢ 
παραφροσύνην.  
245 The narrator then turns to the personification of madness itself, as he bewails that fact that they are 
the playthings,  παιδιά, of μανία (Ach.Tat.4.9.5), and have been watched all the time by it: μανίᾳ 
γὰρ ἐτηρούμεθα (Ach.Tat.4.9.6).  His rhetoric seems more than a little comic (to the reader, not the 
narrator).  For comic elements in Achilles Tatius see Durham 1938 and Chew 2000.
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feel  the  mania  of  emotion.   They feel  it  in  an extreme form.   So mania  can  be 
metonymous for intensive emotion, not merely a metonym for emotion in general. 
This is illustrated by Prodicus’ dictum: ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν διπλασιασθεῖσαν ἔρωτα 
εἶναι,  ἔρωτα δὲ διπλασιασθέντα μανίαν γίγνεσθαι (fr.B 7DK).  Ἔρως is 
intense desire and mania is intense ἔρως.246 
The general model for emotion as madness is reflected throughout the novels. 
Yet there is not always so simple a correlation between the two domains.  Emotional 
madness is often seen in terms of another metaphor, and these metaphors provide 
additional cognitive structuring to the notion of emotion as madness.  One of the 
most longstanding associations of madness is as a disease.247  This can be seen in the 
common roots of both as caused by the divine.  The divine aspect of madness has 
already been discussed, and we can see a divine cause for disease in the outbreak of 
the plague upon the Achaeans in book one of the  Iliad, brought about by Apollo’s 
wrath.248  Madness and disease are themselves related, both in the way that madness 
is seen as a disease and the way that madness is structured partly by the disease 
metaphor, according to Padel.249  In emotion they too can be associated together or 
separately.   In Plato’s  Phaedrus there is a division of mania into the type  which 
results  from disease and that  which comes  from divine inspiration.250  Following 
Padel’s  point  I  would say that  the disease of  emotional  madness  adds  additional 
conceptual material.       
Madness and disease can be united when someone wishes to speak of an 
unhealthy desire.  At the approach of Thyamis with an armed band to the city of 
Memphis, the satrap’s wife Arsace asks the men what mania for war they have been 
infected  with:  πολέμου μέν ὦ βέλτιστοι,  ἔφη,  μανίαν ἐνοσήσατε πάντες 
(Hld.7.4.3).  It is a rhetorical use of the term, to try and discredit their will as a mania 
produced by a νόσος, but it must be culturally plausible.  This is an evaluative use of 
the metaphor.  At Ach.Tat.6.13.1 Sosthenes says to Leucippe that she is not just mad, 
246 Plato in the Philebus also talks of pleasure ‘to the verge of madness’ (45e).
247 Madness is conceived of as a νόσος at S.Aj.635.  
248 See introduction above.
249 Plato’s Timaeus uses a medical analogy in conceptualising madness (86b).  Padel 1995, 42 argues 
that  one of the reasons madness is  seen as a temporary state in Greek Tragedy is  because of the 
importance  of  the  disease  model.   Like  a  disease  madness  comes  and  goes  and is  not  innate  to 
character.    
250 Pl.Phdr.265a.
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μαίνεσθαι μανίαν, but ‘incurably’ so: ἀνήκεστον.  Again it is rhetorical: she is 
completely  mad  if  she  does  not  accept  Thersander  as  a  lover.   Earlier  on  when 
Leucippe displays symptoms of madness from the love potion the narrator tells us 
that  in ten days the  νόσος did not ease up (Ach.Tat.4.15.1).   The disease model 
coheres with the madness model as a temporary state, and it can be used to evaluate 
the  madness  model  in  a  negative  way,  although  not  in  terms  of  personal 
responsibility.  
There is a common metaphor for emotion which is consistently used in erotic 
imagery and is consistently associated with madness.  This is where the sensation of 
the emotion is compared to the sting of a gadfly.  The verbal form is  οἰστράω, to 
sting,  from the  word  for  the  gadfly,  οἶστρος,  and  in  previous  literature  it  often 
means ‘raging’, as it prototypically indicates the behaviour prompted by madness.251 
It is a metonym of cause for behaviour, as the reason someone is raging is because 
they  have  been  ‘stung’,  but  also  indicates  the  starting  point  of  the  emotion  and 
presents it as metaphorically as a sting.  The connection between the two concepts 
can  be  seen  clearly  at  Hld.7.7.5,  where  Chariclea  is  reunited  with  her  partner 
Theagenes after a short period of separation.  She is overcome by the sight of him 
and  runs  towards  him  manically  as  if  stung  by  the  sight  of  him:  ὥσπερ 
οἰστρηθεῖσα ὑπὸ ὄψεως ἐμμανής.252  The causal relationship between the two 
concepts is clear.  Stinging prompts madness, and she runs forward mad as if stung. 
In Longus Chloe is stung to erotic madness by her infatuation with Daphnis. 
The narrator tells us that no cow stuck by the gadfly acted in such a way: οὐδὲ βοὸς 
251 See S.Tr.653, where Ares the god of war is described as raging, οἰστρηθείς.  Also see E.Ba.119 
where  the  behaviour  of  the  women  in  a  Bacchic  revel  is  caused  by  the  stinging  of  Dionysus: 
οἰστρηθεὶς  Διονύσωι.   This  links  the  metaphor  of  the  sting  to  the  divine  inspiration  caused  by 
Dionysus, who instigates madness in the Greek Novel in our example from Achilles Tatius above 
(Ach.Tat.2.3.3).  Other famous examples are the simile of Heracles as a bull struck by the gadfly in 
Apollonios’  Argonautica (A.R.1265ff.)  and  οἶστρος as  a  metonym  for  madness  in  Euripides’ 
Heracles (1144).  Anacreontea 33.28 describes the arrows if ἔρως as like a οἶστρος.  Oppian speaks 
of the sweat gadfly of Aphrodite which comes in springtime (Halieutica 1.473).  On Io, who is stung 
by a gadfly sent by Hera, see n.250 below.  Due to Io’s paradigm the gadfly can be associated with the 
wandering caused by madness.  On madness and wandering un Greek culture see Montiglio 2005, 2, 
3, 16-18, 37-41, 65, 75-83, 104, 120-22.  At S.Ant.785-90 ἔρως wanders over the sea and maddens 
the person it possesses.  The daughters of Proteus run in the wild because Aphrodite has maddened 
them with erotic desire (Aelian Varia historia 3.4.2).       
252 There  may well  be erotic  overtones  in this description,  but  I  will  limit  the discussion here  to 
cultural models of madness.  
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οἴστρῳ πληγείσης τοσαῦτα ἔργα (Longus 1.13.6).  Gill translates this phrase as 
to ‘behave…madly’, thus bringing out the notion implicit in the metaphor.253  There 
are several variations on this theme in Longus.  In the subsequent passage Chloe 
ponders the physical nature of the emotion she is feeling: ‘how often did brambles 
scratch me, and I did not cry? How many bees stung me, and I did not cry out? But 
whatever stings my  καρδία now is more bitter than all those’ (Longus 1.14.2).254 
She feels  a  νύττον,  sharp  point,  in  her  καρδία which  is  comparable  but  more 
intense than her previous experiences.  The sharp point is cognate with the ontology 
of  a  sting.255  In  fact  the  metaphor  combines  the  two  previous  referents,  as  it 
encompasses the prick of the bramble and the sting of the bee.  This sharp point is 
also used in the image of the κέντρον.  When Chloe kisses Daphnis in book one it is 
‘more bitter’,  πικρότερον, than a κέντρον (Longus 1.18.1).256  This word denotes 
any ‘sharp point’, but significantly it is often used to mean ‘goad’.  The difference 
that  this  association  makes  is  that  it  potentially  steps  outside  the  realm  of 
animalification  to  personification  of  the  emotion.   In  the  sting  image,  there  is 
predominantly the notion of one animal, the cow, being stung by another, the gadfly, 
253 Reardon 1989, 294.  Gill states in footnote 9 that ‘Longus’ description of the symptoms of the 
“sickness”  of  love recalls  Greek  love poetry,  esp.  Sappho’.   While  this is  certainly the case,  the 
behaviour implied in the madness of love as opposed to the sickness of love makes an interesting 
contrast.  The lovesick person lies ill in bed, whereas the raging person moves quickly around like a 
stung cow.  Compare the well known myth of Io.  Zeus changes her into a cow in order to hide her 
from Hera, but his wife is not fooled and sends a gadfly to sting her, causing her to wander in distress. 
The madness of the sting necessitates motion.  For Io and the gadfly see Aesch.PV 567-8; Supp.308, 
540-1, 556-64, 573; Soph.El.5.  Also see Padel 1995, 14-17.  Obviously this gives the image a strong 
female connotation in tragedy.  See also the imagery of Medea struck by the gadfly in A.R.3.275-7. 
Hershkowitz 1998, 30 sees Apollonius’ comparison of Heracles to a bull as reshaping the female 
tragic image into an epic masculine one.  See also οἰστρημένος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔρωτος Iamb.VP 31.195 
254 The sting of the bee here is indicated by the word κέντρον which denotes a sharp point.  This term 
can also be a metaphor for ἔρως and will be discussed below.  In Xenophon of Ephesus the goad is 
used of Anthia’s ἔρως (1.9.7)    
255 The verb νύσσω is also used metaphorically of a sting at Luc.Herm.71.  See also the previous 
footnote.  
256 The  use  of  the  word  bitter,  πικρός,  is  the  same  as  in  the  previous  example,  and  it  is  the 
metaphorical usage of this word as ‘sharp’ which is being applied here.  In this concrete sense it fits 
well the image of the sting or the goad, as when it is use of the sharp point of an arrow at Il.4.118.  For 
the  erotic  sense  of  the  κέντρον  see  E.Hipp.39  and  that  of  Aphrodite  at  E.Hipp.1303,  and  also 
Pl.Phdr.251e.  It is really a metaphor for all kinds of desire, but has a strong erotic heritage.  In the 
previous sentence we have the description of her mouth as ‘sweeter’, γλυκύτερον, than honeycomb. 
This is therefore a play on the traditional conception of ἔρως as ‘bitter-sweet’.  See Pl.Phdr.251c–e; 
Sappho 130.2; Thgn.1353-6. and Carson 1998.      
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whereas in the image of the goad the emotion striking the beast must be a person.257 
In terms of the ontology of the emotion, both metaphors conceive the experience as a 
sharp prick, but both do not necessarily conceive the emotion as the same type of 
agent.   In Heliodorus Demaenete  makes  clever  use of the ambiguity  of the goad 
metaphor.   Her stepson Cnemon,  to whom she made inappropriate  advances à la 
Phaidra,  has  been  exiled  thanks  to  her  machinations.   Unfortunately,  it  has  not 
stopped the pangs of passion she feels for him.  When her friends come to visit they 
are astonished at her devotion to her disgraced stepson (unaware of her real feelings) 
and she tells them that she is in a bad way and that there is a sharp point in her 
καρδία: τῇ καρδίᾳ κέντρον (Hld 1.14.6).  The sharp sensations of grief can be a 
goad, and this is the assumption her friends make.  However, what she is referring to 
is the sharp pain of  ἔρως, and this coverage of both grief and  ἔρως suits well the 
negative and painful nature of both.258  It also corresponds to the use of the madness 
metaphor,  which  covers  the  negative  emotions  of  anger,  grief  and  ἔρως.   The 
metaphor is one of pain, and this can be used for many emotions.  It also indicates 
madness, and therefore intensity of emotion.  Considering the image of Io wandering 
distracted by the pain of the sting, we see that the metaphor involved is a correlation 
of  intensity  of  emotion  with  intensity  of  pain,  via  madness  as  metonymical  of 
emotional intensity.       
In terms of the imagery of the sting,  as with the ambiguous statement  of 
Demaenete,  grief  can  cause  a  deranged reaction.   In  book six  of  the  Aethiopica 
Chariclea is bereft of her partner Theagenes, who has been taken away as a slave by 
the Persians.  She is stung in a Bacchic way, unties her hair freely and tears at her 
dress: βάκχιόν τι οἰστρηθεῖσα τάς τε κόμας ἀφειδῶς λύεται καὶ θοιμάτιον 
περιρρηξαμένη (Hld.6.8.3).  There are several interesting points here.  First the 
sting  of  emotion  is  associated  with  Bacchic  revelry.   Second  the  behavioural 
257 Κέντρον can also denote a sting.  See LSJ s.v. κεντρόω.  
258 The image of the goad is also used of Arsace’s jealousy, ζηλοτυπία, at Hld.7.8.6.  This is another 
negative emotion, but it is interesting that the madness of jealousy per se does not appear in the Greek 
Novel.  The closest we have is a metonym when Achaemenes is ‘stung’ by ὀργή,  ζηλοτυπία and 
ἔρως (Hld.7.29.1).  The Ethiopian people are ‘bitten’, δηχθείς, by jealousy at Hld.10.30.7.  The verb 
is used elsewhere of ἔρως: δηχθεῖσα κέντροις…ἠράσθη (E.Hipp.1303).  See also Call.1.c: ἔρωτι 
δεδαγμένος.  The bite appears in Stoic theories of emotion.  See Sorabji 2000, 38, 40–1, 66–8, 70, 
120, 204. 
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response  to  the  emotion,  freeing  her  hair  and  tearing  her  dress,  conforms  to 
established cultural norms of expressing grief.  It also corresponds to the behaviour 
of Bacchants, who are possessed with divine madness, and these correspondences all 
depict the frenzy of grief.  Thus there is a direct link from behavioural/experiential 
cultural models to metaphors of emotion.  As this part of Heliodorus progresses we 
see another reference to the outward display of the emotion.  In her grief Chariclea’s 
eyes  still  indicate,  ἐπισημαῖνον,  the  madness  she  suffered  before  her  sleep 
(Hld.6.9.2).  This physiognomic description reads the madness of grief as an external 
sign visible in the eyes.  
Two examples from the Greek Novel involve animals.  In Longus a bull in 
love bellows as if stung by the  οἶστρος (Longus 2.7.4).  Achilles Tatius departs 
from the cow and gadfly imagery so often associated with this metaphor.  In his list 
of various animals and inanimate objects under  ἔρως’ domain, Clitophon cites the 
example of the viper, which ‘stings into’ the object of its passion, the eel:  ὁ ἔχις ὁ 
τῆς γῆς ὄφις εἰς τὴν σμύραιναν οἰστρεῖ (Ach.Tat.1.18.3).  The context makes it 
clear  that  the  sting  is  erotic.   Later  on  in  the  philosophical  argument  between 
Menelaus  and Clitophon  as  to  who make  the  better  lovers,  boys  or  women,  the 
narrator describes the culmination of the act of sex as a sting for the woman: ἐν δὲ 
τῇ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀκμῇ οἰστρεῖ μὲν ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς, περικέχηνε δὲ φιλοῦσα 
καὶ  μαίνεται (Ach.Tat.2.37.8).   In  this  context  it  is  explicitly  connected  with 
madness,  μαίνεται, and imbues  the notion with a physical  sensuality.   Both these 
incidences highlight the fact that when the verb or noun is used metaphorically of a 
person it has a strong association with the non-human or animal side of emotion. 
The metaphor of the bite shares the associations of the sting.  Chloe’s kiss 
bites  Daphnis’  heart,  καρδία,  and  maddens  him  like  fresh  honey:  δάκνει  τὸ 
φίλημα τὴν  καρδίαν,  καὶ  ὥσπερ  τὸ  νέον  μέλι  μαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ (Longus 
1.25.2).   The metaphor  of the bite  is  animalification  and denotes  the pain of the 
emotion,  just  as  the  sting.259  The  simile  introduces  a  new  concept,  that  of  the 
259 Pain and madness are often connected, especially when it is erotic madness.  In the  Aethiopica 
Cybele,  Arsace’s servant, says that her mistress is experiencing pain and madness, ἀνία καὶ μανία 
(Hld.7.23.1).  Heliodorus (or Cybele) seems to be making a play on the sound of both words—the 
repetition of ανία—which causes them to be seen more emphatically as a pair.  Perhaps one could say 
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sweetness of honey, which is like the kiss in its effect.  Finally Daphnis is maddened 
by the sensation.  The physical effect of the kiss was emphasised earlier by Daphnis 
at Longus 1.18.2, where he wonders if Chloe imbued her lips with poison before 
kissing him.  There is of course the logic in the metonymy of the organ of the kiss 
representing the kiss as a bite and this bite in turn metaphorically conceiving of the 
kisser as an animal.   
The  other  emotions  associated  with  the  ‘sting’  are  also  illuminating. 
Achaemenes is stung by  ἔρως, ὀργή, and ζηλοτυπία (Hld.7.29.1).260  These are 
the emotions  which can be conceptualised in the same way as  ἔρως,  as we saw 
above in the section on fire.  Jealousy and anger are also ‘raving’ emotions which 
can  cause  people  to  lose  control.   This  lack  of  control  is  seen in  the  two other 
emotions represented by the metaphor of the sting: grief and fear.261  This metaphor 
‘suits’ these emotions and is therefore mapped onto them.     
This conceptual proximity of emotions explains an interesting example from 
book two of Heliodorus.  Chariclea is a little put out at the news that Theagenes has 
kissed  another  girl  (the  dead  Thisbe)  and  asks  who  she  is.   She  qualifies  her 
statement by saying she hopes that they do not think her bitten by ἔρως: ἀλλ΄ εἰ μή 
τί με δακνομένην ἔρωτι ὑπονοεῖν μέλλετε (Hld.2.8.2).  Morgan’s translation
—‘please  do  not  suppose  that  love  is  making  me  feel  pangs  of  jealousy’—
summarises the emotional experience nicely, but the Greek makes no mention of a 
word for jealousy.  The context makes it clear that jealousy is at stake, as another 
(potential)  rival  for  Theagenes  is  involved.   What  we  have  here  is  ἔρως as  a 
metonym for  ζηλοτυπία.  The model of  ἔρως is superimposed onto or conflated 
with the model of jealousy.             
The  sting  or  bite  image  arises  from  the  physical  sensation  of  pain,  in 
particular  a  pain  which  impels  the  person  afflicted  towards  movement.   It  is 
the point is that one cannot have μανία without ἀνία (on a conceptual and written level).  If one were 
to deride the play on words one could go further and see it as reflecting upon Cybele’s status and 
character.    
260 Arsace is stung by ζηλοτυπία at Hld 7.8.6.
261 Chariclea is stung by grief at Hld.6.8.3.  I  have interpreted this experience as grief due to the 
context, where she is mourning her separation from Theagenes.   She unties her hair and tears her 
dress;  prototypical  behavioural  indicators  of grief  in ancient  Greece.   A horse is stung by fear  in 
Achilles Tatius: οἰστρηθεὶς τῷ φόβῳ (1.12.3).    
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particularly associated with madness and the motion implied by Bacchic inspiration, 
and  thereby  an  integral  part  of  erotic  madness.   An  interesting  feature  of  the 
occurrence of this metaphor is the gender/type distribution.  It is predominantly used 
of women, and the only exceptions we have are a couple of examples concerning 
animals,  the viper and a bull,  and a single instance of a non-Greek male.262  The 
image has a distinct  ‘otherness’ about it,  and Clitophon’s association of it  with a 
female’s  experience  of sex is  revealing.   I  would venture  that  the prototype  is  a 
female  being  ‘stung’,  with  an  extension  to  a  non-Greek  male,  and  the  strong 
connotations of bestial  nature seen in the examples used of animals.263  Bites and 
stings presuppose that one is the victim of the physical  attack of some animal or 
insect.  As with most metaphors it is not exclusive to ἔρως but represents a certain 
type of emotional experience, of which ἔρως is a common instantiation.  It also is a 
momentary sensation rather than a long term effect.  In all these aspects it reflects its 
portrayal in Greek Tragedy.264      
The model  of emotional  madness in the novels is coherent throughout the 
instances  of  the  words  and metaphors  representing  it.   However,  metaphors  add 
additional  conceptual  content,  such as the debilitation  of an illness  or the bestial 
implication of the sting.  The following are all prototypical aspects of the domain of 
emotional madness:  it represents an internal intensity,  which threatens to spill out 
into action by the person affected.  It stands for intense emotions, such as anger, 
passion and grief, and indicates the intensity of these emotions themselves.  
Anger is the prototypical emotion for ‘losing control’.  In Heliodorus we are 
told that Demaenete is raging because of ἔρως and θυμός: τῷ τε θυμῷ καὶ ἔρωτι 
περιμανῆ (Hld.1.15.2).  In context Thisbe, who tricked Cnemon on Demaenete’s 
orders  in  order to  have him exiled,  is  worried about  becoming the object  of her 
resentment.   Now that Cnemon is gone, Demaenete feels the pangs of  ἔρως like 
never before.  The image therefore displays the irrational and unpredictable side of 
these  two emotions,  and conceives  of  them as  ones  which  can  prompt  a  violent 
262 At Ach.Tat.1.18.3, Longus 2.7.4 and Hld.7.29.1 respectively. 
263 The goad of ἔρως, κέντρον, afflicts a Greek male, Daphnis (Longus 1.18.1), but this is a slightly 
different  metaphor,  as  the  person  affecting  him  must  be  a  person:  personification  rather  than 
animalification.  Demaenete feels the goad of ἔρως and grief (Hld.1.14.6) and Anthia that of ἔρως 
(X.Eph.1.9.7).           
264 See Padel 1995, 14-17.  
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reaction.265  The inconsistency of the emotion is seen in the fact that Demaenete’s 
feelings now override her earlier judgement, which was in turn emotionally based. 
Emotions are fickle in the way in which they direct action.  As a result of Thisbe’s 
apprehension she decides to anticipate her mistress’ revenge, and get her out of the 
way.  She visits Cnemon’s father in the country and tells him that Cnemon’s crime of 
attacking his father, which casued him to be exiled, was actually an attempt to catch 
an adulterer.  Tricked by Demaenete and Thisbe he burst into his father’s bedroom 
angry that his bed was being dishonoured.  Thisbe describes Cnemon’s state at this 
point as ‘raging’: ἐμμανής (Hld.1.16.3).  He was heedlessly charging into the room 
in a violent manner, and so the adjective nicely encapsulates the emotional response 
as being of a high intensity and liable to violence.  This propensity to violence is 
another aspect of the emotion as madness metaphor.     
Anger is associated with madness at a more philosophical level by Achilles 
Tatius.  Leucippe’s mother almost catches her and Clitophon together in the night, 
and scolds her daughter for, as she thinks, compromising her chastity.  Once she is 
left alone Leucippe reflects on events while three emotions - grief, shame and anger - 
take hold of her.  The narrator goes into great detail in describing her psychological 
state and explains that these three emotions are waves of the soul (ψυχή).  Of these 
anger roars around the heart and engulfs reason with the foam of madness:  ἡ δὲ 
ὀργὴ περιϋλακτοῦσα τὴν καρδίαν ἐπικλύζει τὸν λογισμὸν τῷ τῆς μανίας 
ἀφρῷ (Ach.Tat. 2.29.2).  Madness, in the form of foam (appropriately suiting the 
main  image  of  ‘waves’),  is  the  instrument  with  which  ὀργή submerges  reason 
(λογισμός).266  What  is  important  here  is  that  madness  represents  the 
uncontrolled/able aspect of anger, rage, which negates any effort at logical reasoning. 
In  a  later  passage  the  other  emotion  most  often  associated  with  madness  in  the 
265 We see a similar situation with Thyamis later on in book one.  The bandit leader is running back to 
find his betrothed Chariclea and kill her, and we are told that he is being held down by ἔρως, jealousy 
and anger (Hld.1.30.7).  It comes as no surprise then that he is ἐμμανής (Hld.1.30.5).
266 The foam of anger is a good example of the embodiment of metaphor (see introduction).  In the 
Iliad a lion produces foam at the mouth when he is speared by a hunter:  περί τ’ ἀφρὸς ὀδόντας 
γίγνεται (20.168).  This physiological reaction could easily indicate anger or perhaps the madness of 
anger  (compare the referent  of the simile,  Achilles,  who is also angrily hacking down the Trojan 
troops).  For a further discussion on this passage and the metaphors in it see the chapter on the ψυχή 
and καρδία.
95
novels,  ἔρως,  is  entrusted  with  its  own  metaphor  for  madness  imbedded  in  a 
philosophical passage.  Anger and  ἔρως are two torches,  λαμπάδες, whose fires 
engage one another in the inside of a person.  Ἔρως is the one which rages around 
the καρδία (Ach.Tat.6.19.1-7).267      
A further example from Achilles Tatius defines the role of anger and madness 
in the emotional scenario.  Thersander enters his house and rails against his wife 
Melite  for  letting  Clitophon  escape,  whom  Thersander  had  locked  up  on  the 
suspicion of being involved with his wife.  She claims in turn that she only gave him 
hospitality  as  a  result  of  sympathy,  because at  the  time he was an impoverished 
wanderer in the same way as she imagined Thersander to be, who was lost at sea. 
She persuades him to assuage his anger, first by denying the truth of his utterance, 
and  second  by  philosophising  about  the  damage  done  by  rumour  and  slander 
(Ach.Tat.6.10.3-6).  In the midst of this speech she tells him that slander shoots forth 
a lie against a person and wounds them even if they are not present.  For the hearer of 
the slander is quickly persuaded, the fire of their anger is lit, and they rage against 
the person struck by the slander: ὁ δὲ ἀκούων ταχὺ πείθεται, καὶ ὀργῆς αὐτῷ 
πῦρ ἐξάπτεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν βληθέντα μαίνεται (Ach.Tat.6.10.5).  The person 
that slander strikes, βληθέντα, corresponds to Melite and the person who is angry 
upon hearing it to Thersander.  The emotional response in the text specifies a chain 
of reaction.  First the fire of ὀργή is lit, and then the person rages, μαίνεται.  Here 
madness as a reaction is a result of an internal emotional state.  The angry person 
rages like a  madman because they are  angry.   Thersander  is  a character  with an 
explosive temper and portrays the maddening effects of anger very well.   A little 
earlier when he initially comes into the house and starts shouting at her, Melite tells 
him to ‘drop his mania’, τὴν μανίαν ἀφείς, and listen to her (Ach.Tat.6.9.1). 
Melite is using the association of anger with madness deliberately, in order to 
highlight the irrationality of Thersander’s behaviour.  In her rhetoric the metaphor of 
madness  negatively  evaluates  the  emotion.   This  is  not  an  evaluation  type 
267 Garnaud prefers the reading ὁ δὲ τῇ καρδίᾳ περιβέβληται to ὁ δὲ τῇ καρδίᾳ περιμαίνεται. 
As we can see from this chapter, the second reading is acceptable in terms of meaning, but entails 
personification of the emotion.  The former usage comes from another prevalent metaphor for ἔρως, 
that of combat.  See the following chapter on this.      
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consistently  used  in  the  novels.   With  seemingly  blissful  unawareness  of  his 
insensitivity  Sosthenes,  Thersander’s servant,  solicits  the captive  Leucippe on his 
master’s behalf.  Thersander is madly in love with her, ἐρᾷ σου καὶ μαίνεται, and 
is likely to make her his wife (Ach.Tat.6.11.3).  This proposal is doomed to failure, 
but it  is  interesting to note that  the erotic  metonym of madness  is not deemed a 
negative concept in the expression of one’s desire.  It is an acceptable profile of the 
emotion  for  rhetorical  persuasion.268  This  is  because  it  can  denote  the  lack  of 
responsibility someone takes for their emotions: they are passive and their actions are 
not voluntary.           
Madness can stand for or in relation to emotion, but it is not exactly the same 
as emotion.  Metaphors highlight certain aspects of the source and target domains, 
and therefore we must look to see whether madness denotes a certain form or type of 
these  emotions,  rather  than  being  merely  a  metonym.   One persuasive  argument 
Melite  makes  to  Clitophon  is  that  an  unsuccessful  desire  becomes  manic:  ἔρως 
ἀτυχῶν  καὶ  μαίνεται (Ach.Tat.5.26.2).269  The  rhetoric  of  emotion,  where 
conceptualisations  of  emotions  are  used  for  persuasive  purposes  (deliberative 
oratory),  allows  the  speaker  to  select  which  notions  are  most  beneficial  for  the 
purposes of persuasion.  In this case Melite needs to utilise metaphors and metonyms 
which are more likely to convince Clitophon to sleep with her, and she goes on to 
emphasise the suffering involved with the emotion.270  In an act of persuasion there 
are  two  parties  involved,  and  it  is  essential  in  order  to  be  persuasive  that  the 
metaphors  chosen  are  commonly  accepted  cultural  ones.   In  this  case  Clitophon 
accepts the premise of Melite’s argument—that she is suffering from the emotion—
and  therefore  agrees  to  her  demands  (rather  easily,  given  the  predominance  of 
chastity in the novel genre).  To return to our original point, the madness of  ἔρως 
268 This is in contrast to the negative portrayal of madness proper when shortly after Sosthenes calls 
Leucippe mad, μαίνεσθαι, for not wanting to marry Thersander (Ach.Tat.6.13.1).  
269 This example brings  together  several  clichés of erotic imagery for the purposes of persuasion. 
Melite claims that having sex with Clitophon once will suffice, ἀρκεῖ μοι κἂν μία συμπλοκή, and 
she  goes  on to  conceptualise  this  act  as  a  medicine,  something to  extinguish  her  inner  fire,  and 
something to ease her madness (Ach.Tat.5.26.2).
270 Her argument covers many aspects, changing from an emotional to legal form, where she claims 
that  they  swore  an  oath  to  one  another  earlier  in  the  novel  (Ach.Tat.5.26.4),  and  then  to  a 
moral/religious form, where she asks for the fulfilment of the mysteries of the god (Ach.Tat.5.26.10). 
I will discuss only the ones relevant to metaphors of ἔρως here.  
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here  denotes  the  internal  confusion  and  lack  of  rationality  which  results  from 
unfulfilled passion, and therefore occupies this position in the emotional scenario. 
There is an interesting passage in Achilles Tatius which analyses the way in 
which  grief  can  cause  erotic  madness.   In  book  six  Thersander,  the  husband  of 
Melite, has kidnapped Leucippe and is trying to force her to consent to his advances. 
The poor girl cannot help crying at her plight, and the narrator interrupts the narrative 
with  a  description  of  the  power  of  tears  to  enhance  beauty  (Ach.Tat.6.7.1-2). 
Leucippe’s  tears  cause  her  grief  to  be  overpowered  by  her  beauty,  αὐτὴν τὴν 
λύπην εἰς κάλλος νενικηκότα,  and thereby Thersander  is  struck silent  at  her 
beauty  and  is  driven  mad  at  her  grief:  πρὸς  δὲ  τὴν  λύπην  ἐξεμεμήνει 
(Ach.Tat.6.7.3).  The narrator goes on to say that beauty,  κάλλος, passes from eye 
to eye and draws tears from the person watching in sympathy for grief.  Therefore 
Thersander started to weep as well.  This passage relies on Achilles Tatius’ frequent 
use of the optical theory of κάλλος as an emission from one eye to another.  We will 
leave  aside  the  detailed  theory  for  now  (see  the  chapter  on  vision).   After  this 
digression in the narrative we return to Thersander’s internal state, and the narrator 
tells  us  that  he  wept  partly  because  he  was  affected  passively  by  the  emotion, 
παθὼν μέν τι, and partly to show that he was weeping because she was:  ὡς διὰ 
τοῦτο δεδακρυμένος, ὅτι κἀκείνη δακρύει (Ach.Tat.6.7.7).   This reveals two 
aspects of the emotions in Achilles Tatius.  The first is that the tears engendered by 
the vision of beauty are an instinctive response.  The second aspect is a cognitive 
evaluation  and  manipulation  of  his  emotion  by  Thersander,  for  the  purposes  of 
ingratiating himself with Leucippe.  The emotional madness he first felt upon seeing 
Leucippe  crying  was  an  emotional  reaction,  along  the  lines  of  the  physiological 
response,  not  an  evaluated  response.   This  is  the  basic  conceptualisation  of  the 
metaphor of madness as applied to emotions.                       
The court case in Achilles Tatius is another show piece where madness and 
emotion are connected.  Clitophon has falsely confessed to hiring the murderer of 
Leucippe, because he believes her dead and want to join her by being condemned by 
the  court.   This  suicidal  reaction  to  the  loss  of  the  beloved  or  the  loss  of  the 
affections  of  the  beloved  is  a  common  one  in  the  novels.   The  court  have  his 
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testimony for a conviction,  but  his  lawyer  argues the truth,  that  he only accused 
himself because of his madness brought about by grief: μαίνεται γὰρ ὑπὸ λύπης 
(Ach.Tat.7.9.14).  Clitophon’s confession cannot be accepted because it is untrue, 
brought about by a (temporary) irrationality caused by grief.  Madness is caused by 
grief rather than being a metonym for it.  
Madness is rarely symptomatic of  ἔρως in the Greek Novel.  For the most 
part it is metonymous for the emotion as a whole.  Like madness, the state of one’s 
mind  under  ἔρως involves  a  lack  of  control  and  a  threat  to  social  conventions. 
However, there are also some hints of the model being applied to a specific part of 
the emotional scenario: the result of frustrated ἔρως.  
Lovesickness  and  madness  are  not  only  symptomatic  but 
metaphorical/metonymical of ἔρως.  Furthermore neither is the dominant paradigm 
for ἔρως in the novel.  There are more examples of the fire of ἔρως and ἔρως as an 
opponent,  which  we  will  look  at  in  the  following  chapter.   Both  metaphors  are 
conceptual, in that they arise from the experience of emotions by the person affected 
and others.  A lovesick person shows symptoms which deceptively seem like those 
of a physical disease.  The debilitation of a person in love gives rise to the metaphor 
of disease, which in turn adds its own structure to the emotion.  The person affected 
contracts the emotion, suffers and requires a ‘cure’.  It also negatively evaluates the 
emotion, but not necessarily the person affected.  A disease is ‘unhealthy’, and so is a 
diseased  emotion,  yet  the  person  is  not  necessarily  to  be  held  responsible  for 
contracting  that  disease.   Madness,  or  mad  behaviour,  can  also  be  seen  as 
symptomatic of the emotion, and this gives rise to the conceptualisation of emotion 
as madness.   In this  it  is  the danger of trespassing social  boundaries  which both 
domains  share.   The  tragic  depiction  of  emotional  madness  is  still  present 
psychologically,  albeit  in  a  less  emphatic  form.   Both  metaphors  are  used  of 
emotions other than  ἔρως,  and it  is this commonality of conceptualisation which 
permeates ἔρως and makes it a firm member of the group of πάθη.               
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Chapter 4 – Ἔρως as an Opponent
The prototypical  model  of  ἔρως as an opponent in the novel  is  an asymmetrical 
power  struggle  between  the  emotion  personified  and  the  person  affected.   This 
imbalance  of  power  can  be  seen  as  a  psychological  parallel  of  the  much  touted 
pederastic paradigm, the disparity in status and power between the erastes (lover) and 
eromenos (beloved), as established by Dover and Foucault.271  Crucially, however, it 
features a power struggle between the person and the emotion rather than two people. 
Fusillo has argued in an excellent paper that the conflict of emotion is a salient factor 
in the Greek Novel’s portrayal of psychology.272  This is an internal psychological 
conflict between multiple emotions.  What Fusillo’s paper proves is that metaphors 
of conflict, opposition and domination do not merely occur between the two parties 
in an erotic relationship but between the emotion and the person.  This model has 
fundamental implications for how one views the self.  In Plato Socrates speaks of 
how strange  it  is  to  describe  the  control  of  desires  in  terms  of  being  ‘stronger’, 
κρείττω, than oneself.273   Metaphors of emotional conflict are a common feature of 
psychology  in  general.274  This  chapter  will  explore  the  dynamics  of  this  power 
differential between the emotion and the person.  While the relationships between 
main couple and love rivals can be intrinsically different, the model of the supremacy 
of the emotion is consistent for all the characters in the Greek Novel.275  The initial 
narrator in Achilles Tatius, after viewing the ecphrasis of Europa and Zeus as a bull, 
remarks  upon  how the  infant  (Ἔρως)  rules  over  the  sky,  earth  and  sea:  ἄρχει 
271 See Dover 1978, 135ff. and Foucault 1990a, 196.  Hubbard 2002 and Davidson 2007 argue that 
there were homoerotic relationships in the ancient world which do not conform to this paradigm.  See 
Davidson 2007, in particular 468, on variety among Greek culture concerning homosexual relations: 
what he calls Greek homosexualities.  However, Dover and Foucault are convincing in showing that 
the asymmetrical model is prototypical.  Goldhill 1995 provides a criticism of Foucault in that his 
discussion does not capture all of the nuances seen in the Greek literature of the Roman Empire. 
Since the vocabulary erastes/eromenos is now standard I will forego italicisation.    
272 See Fusillo 1990 and 1999. 
273 See Pl.R.430e6-8:  ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, ὥς 
φασι κρείττω δὴ αὑτοῦ ἀποφαίνοντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον.
274 See for  example Freud’s  definition of  repression.   He explains repression metaphorically as a 
lecture hall.  If a student misbehaves or is difficult in the lecture hall, they are ejected by the other 
students.  In the same way the ego ejects disturbing thoughts (see Billig 1999, 29).  This model of 
psychology utilises conflict based in a social situation.  Psychological conflict is seen in the broader 
category of desires.  See Foucault 1990a, 67. 
275 For more on relationships see the conclusion to this thesis.
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βρέφος  οὐρανοῦ  καὶ  γῆς  καὶ  θαλάσσης (Ach.Tat.1.2.1).   This  is  not  an 
innovation in Greek literature.   Hesiod in his  Theogonia states that  Ἔρως is the 
fairest  of  the immortal  gods,  the limb-loosener  (λυσιμελής),  and he has  power, 
δάμναται, over all gods and men (120-2).  However, the domination of ἔρως is a 
salient factor of psychology in the Greek Novel.        
The source domain is here called the opponent, but different sections of the 
domain of physical conflict can be used.  These range from interpersonal wrangling 
to the schema of war.  Conflict envisages a simple scenario: the cause and initiation 
of hostilities, the duration of conflict with any sub-events, and the outcome of the 
conflict.   This  abstract  scenario  is  rather  basic.   However,  the  events  and 
eventualities which the metaphors highlight reveal the conceptual underpinning of 
ἔρως in these works.  Metaphors of ἔρως as an opponent in the Greek Novel almost 
always highlight either events in the duration of conflict which are negative to the 
person,  such  as  wounds,  or  the  end  results  of  the  conflict,  which  involves  the 
supremacy of the emotion.  This depicts the emotion as ‘unbeatable’ and asserts that 
resistance to the emotion is futile, in contrast to certain schools of thought such as 
Platonism and Stoicism.276  This conceptualisation underlies any explicit  narrative 
events or descriptions which depict emotion as supreme.  
The Greek metaphorical  concept  fits  one in  American  English  quite  well. 
Lakoff and Kövecses say that STRUGGLE is a basic level concept used for emotion, 
and they outline its use in the concept of anger.277  ‘I was seized by anger’ and ‘I was 
overcome by anger’ are examples of the concept in American English.  They both, 
however,  differ  as to their  implications.   The former  allows successful  resistance 
against  the emotion whereas the latter  does not.  It  is the latter  type of metaphor 
which  dominates  in  the  novels  and  shows that  their  literary  version  of  emotion, 
grounded in folk psychology, conceptualises ἔρως not merely as an opponent, but as 
a victorious one.            
276 In Plato’s Respublica there is a tripartite soul within which appetites must be kept in check.  These 
parts are reason, appetite and spirit: τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμοειδής (Pl.R.434d2-
441c7).  Spirit should aid the rational part rather than the appetitive part (Pl.R.440e).  See further in 
the chapter on the ψυχή and καρδία.  Stoic philosophy is more fragmented, but there seems to be a 
consensus that excessive passion should be controlled.  See Stobaeus 2.88–90 SVF.  
277 Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, 205-6; 218-9.
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The concept of holding is a common one in the novels and shows variation in 
its application to the emotions.  In this model the suppression of the emotion maps 
onto  the  concept  of  an  entity  being  held  down.   This  is  most  likely  to  involve 
personification as what does the holding is a human, and what you hold down is a 
human or a beast.  Therefore in this sense it is part of a wider metaphorical network 
which views the relationship between a person and their  emotion as a contest  or 
struggle.  It can emphasise the action of the person or the emotion.  At X.Eph.1.3.4 
ἔρως ‘in’  both  Habrocomes  and  Anthia  ‘is  not  to  be  checked’:  ὁ  ἔρως  ἐν 
ἑκατέροις ἦν ἀκατάσχετος.  The example here combines the container metaphor 
with the concept of holding and releasing.278  It also emphasises the impossibility of 
action of the young couple.  They can try and hold down the emotion, but it will not 
be successful.  When Manto is rejected by Habrocomes she becomes uncontrollably 
angry:  ἡ Μαντὼ ἐν ὀργῇ ἀκατασχέτῳ γίνεται (X.Eph.2.5.5).  Ἀκατάσχετος 
remains attached to the emotion, whether the emotion or the person is the container, 
and so is used consistently.279  Λύπη is also used in the same way as being both a 
container and unholdable:  ἐν πολλῇ καὶ ἀκατασχέτῳ λύπῃ ἦν (X.Eph.3.9.1). 
The  two  metaphors  combined,  the  container  and  suppression,  each  highlight  a 
different aspect of the conceptualisation of the emotion.  The container represents a 
binary  state—the  choices  are  in/out  of  emotion—but  the  notion  of  suppression 
orients this in terms of a struggle with a personified emotion, which correlates with 
the degree of success with which the subject suppresses their emotion.  When the 
emotion is in the container, it is perfectly consistent to say that one keeps it down. 
This concept of a struggle seems to be the most pervasive aspect of the system of 
emotions.  The verb ἡσσάομαι signifies ‘being weaker than’ and a person affected 
by an emotion can be defeated by the emotion.  Both examples in Xenophon involve 
278 We see exactly the same concept of ‘unchecked’ ἔρως when Aristomachus cannot hold down his 
desire for Hyperanthes: ἐρασθεὶς δὲ οὐκέτι μετρίως κατεῖχε τὸν ἔρωτα͵ ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα 
τῷ μειρακίῳ προσέπεμπεν (X.Eph.3.2.7).  The adverb  μετρίως shows the ideal of a mean in 
terms of controlling emotions.  See the final chapter for more on the container metaphor.   
279 The adverbial form is also used in Xenophon of Ephesus.  At X.Eph.2.3.2 Manto is not in control 
of her passions:  αὕτη ἡ Μαντὼ ἐκ τῆς συνήθους μετὰ τοῦ Ἁβροκόμου διαίτης ἁλίσκεται 
καὶ ἀκατασχέτως εἶχε καὶ ἠπόρει ὅ τι ποιήσαι.  There is no mention of an emotion term here, 
but the presence of a conventional metaphor ἁλίσκεται, ‘to be captured’ (see below), indicates that 
she is feeling ἔρως.  It is Manto here who is ‘out of control’, ἀκατασχέτως εἶχε, and this is because 
she has already been ‘captured’ by the emotion.
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ἔρως and  the  submission  of  the  subject.   Habrocomes  is  weaker  than  ἔρως, 
ἡττᾶται δὲ ὑπὸ Ἔρωτος Ἁβροκόμης (X.Eph.1.3.1), and he finally admits that the 
god is a benefactor to one who submits to him, ἀλλ΄ εὐεργέτης ἡττωμένῳ θεός 
(X.Eph.1.4.5).280  This is conceptualisation of the state of an emotion in terms of a 
power dynamic, where the emotion is not merely an opponent in a struggle, but a 
victorious one.  This concept emphasises the result of the metaphorical struggle and 
implies that subsequent action will be dictated by the emotion.  It does indicate that a 
struggle has taken place, and that the person has actively tried to stop the emotion.  
Ἔρως as war is a conceptualisation which utilises other more basic ones such 
as the contest  metaphor  seen above.   First  I  will  briefly discuss the relevance of 
personification to this study before moving on to the analysis of the schema.  We can 
get a good overview of these personification metaphors by looking at a passage in 
the first  book of Xenophon of Ephesus.   Habrocomes is  a young man famed for 
being handsome, yet he is not interested in ἔρως and even refuses to recognise him 
as a god (X.Eph.1.1.5).  In this we see a well-established model used in many of the 
novels, which could be referred to as the Hippolytus model: refusal to recognise the 
power of erotic desire.  However,  ἔρως takes offence at this and contrives to do 
something.
Μηνιᾷ  πρὸς  ταῦτα  ὁ  Ἔρως·  φιλόνεικος  γὰρ  ὁ  θεὸς  καὶ  ὑπερηφάνοις 
ἀπαραίτητος·  ἐζήτει  δὲ  τέχνην  κατὰ  τοῦ  μειρακίου·  καὶ  γὰρ  καὶ  τῷ  θεῷ 
δυσάλωτος  ἐφαίνετο.  Ἐξοπλίσας  οὖν  ἑαυτὸν  καὶ  πᾶσαν  δύναμιν  ἐρωτικῶν 
φαρμάκων περιβαλόμενος ἐστράτευεν ἐφ΄ Ἁβροκόμην (X.Eph. 1.2.1.).
In this passage we can see the full range of Xenophon of Ephesus’s personificatory 
metaphors for ἔρως.  He is quarrelsome, φιλόνεικος, and this is a metaphor which 
conceptualises  ἔρως as an opponent to the person feeling the emotion.  All of the 
other metaphors are related to this basic notion in one way or another.  First of all, 
280 See Pl.Phdr.233c1–2 which contrasts being defeated by ἔρως with being master of oneself: οὐχ 
ὑπ' ἔρωτος ἡττώμενος ἀλλ'  ἐμαυτοῦ κρατῶν.   Earlier  Plato comments on how strange this 
metaphor is:  ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια,  ὥς φασι 
κρείττω δὴ αὑτοῦ ἀποφαίνοντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον (Pl.R.430e6-8).  Habrocomes vainly 
boasts that  ἔρως will never master him,  οὐκ ἂν Ἔρως ποτέ μου κρατήσαι (X.Eph.1.4.3), in an 
endeavour doomed to failure.  Both sides, the person and the emotion, are attempting to have mastery. 
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ἔρως attempts to contrive a cunning plan, a τέχνη, against his victim.  This plan is 
seen  in  terms  of  a  military  strategy,  as  he  will  arm  himself  with  weapons, 
ἐξοπλίσας,  equip  himself  with  erotic  drugs,  φαρμάκων,  and  conduct  a  war 
against  Habrocomes:  ἐστράτευεν  ἐφ΄  Ἁβροκόμην.   All  this  preparation  is 
necessary  because  the  end  result  of  the  war,  the  capture,  will  be  difficult: 
δυσάλωτος.  A φάρμακον can be a healing or a harmful drug, and here we see a 
conflation of the war metaphor with another schema.  As part of his military strategy 
ἔρως will try to drug Habrocomes, and this word is often used in other novels to 
designate the start of the disease-schema, poisoning someone to make them ill, or the 
end, as a healing drug to ‘cure’ the emotion.  It is also associated, however, with 
specific love potions, and with the label ἐρωτικῶν we have something different from 
the disease-schema outlined above.  It is neither a cure nor a conventional poison, but 
a philtre or charm.281  In terms of the military metaphor  this  passage describes a 
process.  The emotion equips itself with weapons in order to wage a war, in which 
the final act will be the capture of the person involved.  
War is struggle in terms of a larger social arena, and provides a ready made 
schema  for  understanding  the  emotion.   The  largest  emphasis  in  Xenophon  of 
Ephesus is upon the end point of the process.  There are nine references related to 
capture  throughout  the  novel  and  there  is  never  any  doubt  of  this  eventual 
consequence.  As we saw above ἔρως was concerned that Habrocomes was ‘difficult 
to  capture’,  δυσάλωτος (X.Eph.1.2.1),  and  so  he  takes  extra  precautions  in 
conducting  his  campaign.   Inevitably a  short  while  later  Habrocomes  becomes  a 
‘spear captive’ of the god, ἦν αἰχμάλωτος τοῦ θεοῦ (X.Eph.1.3.2), recognises the 
fact  and  regrets  abusing  the  god:  ὁ  τῷ  θεῷ  λοιδορούμενος  ἑάλωκα 
(X.Eph.1.4.1).  However, it is not only the emotion which is portrayed as capturing 
the  affected  person.   When  she  sees  him  Anthia  is  ‘captured’  by  Habrocomes 
(X.Eph.1.3.1),  in  the same way as later  on Manto is  ‘captured’  by him:  αὕτη ἡ 
Μαντὼ ἐκ τῆς συνήθους μετὰ τοῦ Ἁβροκόμου διαίτης ἁλίσκεται (X.Eph. 
281 For an erotic philtre see Theocr.2.15. 
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2.3.2).   Both  women  fall  victim to  the  influence  of  ἔρως and  are  conceived  as 
captives in the war.  This image evokes their helplessness in the situation.282 
If we continue a passage quoted above concerning ‘capture’ we notice a chain 
of events adding detail to the process of war: ὁ τῷ θεῷ λοιδορούμενος ἑάλωκα 
καὶ  νενίκημαι  καὶ  παρθένῳ  δουλεύειν  ἀναγκάζομαι (X.Eph.1.4.1). 
Habrocomes is describing himself as captured, conquered and forced into slavery by 
ἔρως.  A maiden,  παρθένος, (Anthia) is his conqueror and this conforms to the 
model seen above where capture is between two persons rather than the person and 
the emotion.   The arrogant Habrocomes even goes so far as to exhort himself  to 
‘conquer the god (ἔρως) who counts for nothing’: νῦν οὐδὲν ὄντα θεὸν νικῆσαί 
με δεῖ (X.Eph.1.4.2).  In fact it is the god who will conquer him, as we see a short 
while later:  οὐκέτι δὴ καρτερῶν,  ῥίψας ἑαυτὸν εἰς γῆν ‘νενίκηκας’, εἶπεν, 
‘Ἔρως’ (X.Eph.1.4.4).  He prostrates himself in order to make his capitulation more 
effective.  There are shades of a further metaphor here: ἔρως as a tyrant.  Throwing 
oneself to the ground in front of the victor evokes the submission acknowledged by 
proskynesis.283  
Conquering is part of the ἔρως as war schema, but its result can either be part 
of the war scenario (as an endpoint) or function on its own as a reflection of a social 
hierarchy.  This is the metaphor of the slave-master relationship.284  The final part of 
Habrocomes’ capitulation to the god involves his recognition of him as master: τὸν 
πάντων δεσπότην (X.Eph.1.4.5).  Again this term is not just used of the god, but 
can be used of a human partner, as when Anthia calls Habrocomes the master of her 
282 In the same way Perilaus and Amphinomus are captured by Anthia, and so both genders exert the 
same influence over people (X.Eph.2.13.6; 4.6.5).  Aristomachus is also captured by Hyperanthes as 
soon as he sees him, and so the metaphor also extends to the homoerotic realm (X.Eph.3.2.6).  There 
is an interesting contrast in the temporal aspect of this metaphor.  Perilaus is captured ‘gradually’, 
κατὰ μικρόν, while Aristomachus is captured ‘straightaway’,  εὐθέως.  This metaphor can refer to 
both instantaneous and gradual submission to the emotion.   
283 Herodotus provides the most famous explanation of the Persian custom, and would view a person 
throwing themselves to the floor before another as acknowledging a great  disparity between their 
respective  statuses:  ἢν  δὲ πολλῷ ᾖ οὕτερος ἀγεννέστερος,  προσπίπτων προσκυνέει τὸν 
ἕτερον (Hdt.1.134).  I would prefer taking the metaphor to refer to this rather than to wrestling, since 
wrestling would prototypically feature  the subject  being thrown to the ground rather  than casting 
themselves.  For more on the wrestling metaphor see further on in this chapter.
284 This is a very common model in previous Greek literature.  For example see Archil.196; Anac.346 
(2). 5-6, 357.1, 505 (d); Pl.Phdr.252a; Thgn.539–40, 1235, 1306–7, 1344, 1350, 1357–60.
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ψυχή (X.Eph.2.4.5; 5.14.2).  Since this slavery dynamic is so firmly rooted in the 
cultural environment of the ancient world, it is not surprising to see the boundaries 
between the literal and metaphorical blurred.285  When Anthia and Habrocomes are 
on  the  pirate  ship,  Euxinos  approaches  Habrocomes  in  order  to  give  him  a 
proposition  from Corymbus.   The  two pirates  are  in  love  with  Habrocomes  and 
Anthia  respectively,  and decide  that  soliciting  them would best  be done on each 
other’s behalf.  The offer to Habrocomes contains the promise that Corymbus will 
make him master of his possessions: ἕτοιμός ἐστι δεσπότην ποιεῖν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ 
(X.Eph.1.16.4).  Now this is obviously playing on the metaphor which sees the erotic 
relationship  as a master-slave one,  but it  is  an inversion of  the social  one,  since 
Corymbus will not in reality be the one in a lesser position of power.  In this sense it 
reflects  the emotional  emphasis  Corymbus claims he will  put  on Habrocomes by 
giving  him  increased  economic  power.   Its  main  purpose  is  to  be  a  rhetorical 
strategy, and by utilising this common conceptualisation of the erotic relationship it 
gains in persuasive power. 
The  metaphorical  schema  of  war  does  not  only  appear  in  Xenophon  of 
Ephesus but is pervasive throughout the Greek Novel.  I would not wish to argue that 
the  metaphors  which  structure  it  are  exclusive  to  it,  but  by analysing  the  larger 
schema in this way we can see the conceptual coherence of the whole.  The table 
below shows how the same metaphors of emotional conflict are repeated throughout 
Chariton’s novel.
Reason for Conflict Duration of Conflict Result of Conflict




285 On slavery in Roman civilisation see Bradley 1994 and Hopkins 1993.
286 Chariton 1.1.4: ἔρως is φιλόνεικος (‘likes a fight’). 
287 Chariton 2.8.1: ἐκπεπολιορκημένος (Dionysius).
288 Chariton 6.3.2: κρατεῖ πάντων τῶν θεῶν καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Διός (Artaxerxes); Chariton 6.3.8: 
ἑαλώκαμεν (Artaxerxes).  The first example echoes Menander, Heros fr.1 K. 
289 Chariton 2.4.4: ἀγῶνα (Dionysius); Chariton 6.3.8: ἀνταγωνιζόμενος σεαυτῷ (Artaxerxes). 
290 Chariton 1.1.10: ἀπολέσθαι (Chaereas); Chariton 2.4.7: ἀπόλωλά (Dionysius). 
291 Chariton 2.4.4: ἀντέχεσθαι (Dionysius).
292 Chariton 4.2.3: μὴ δουλεύων ἔρωτι (not Polycharmus, and by implication Chaereas). 
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The  whole  schema  of  ἔρως as  war  in  Chariton  is  not  seen  as  arbitrary,  but  as 
following a plan.  The god ἔρως and the person affected have a plot or strategy for 
the emotional conflict with which they are engaged.294  
In Chariton there is very little emphasis on the reason for the conflict.  This is 
because the onset of  ἔρως is seen as a passive effect,  and no explanation of the 
conflict is needed.  The only example above which tries to explain this is Chariton 
1.1.4, where a personified emotion considers it a triumph to unite two rival families 
by making two of their children fall in love with one another.  The domination of 
ἔρως, seen so heavily in the final part of the scenario, is no surprise either, given the 
model of the emotion as all-powerful in the Greek Novel.  The profusion of examples 
in the middle category show that resistance is possible, if futile, and that the conflict 
of  ἔρως is  a  proper  one,  and not  merely an idiomatic  way of  talking  about  the 
emotion.   The  conflict  itself,  and  the  results  of  the  conflict,  have  narrative 
significance for the development of the plot.       
The  metaphor  of  the  person  being  captured  by  the  emotion  shows  a 
conceptual link to the metaphor of love’s slave.  The second metaphor,  however, 
emphasises a social model of disparity of power while the first emphasises the result 
of a conflict.  At Chariton 4.2.3 Polycharmus is described as young, manly, and free 
from the tyrant ἔρως: ὁ δὲ Πολύχαρμος, οἷα δὴ νεανίας ἀνδρικὸς τὴν φύσιν 
καὶ μὴ δουλεύων ἔρωτι,  χαλεπῷ τυράννῳ.   The metaphor  here focuses  on 
disparity of power, contrasting the slavery of someone in love with the tyranny of 
ἔρως, and he is a difficult tyrant at that: χαλεπός.  This is therefore a social model 
for  the  emotion.295 This  instance  parallels  two  elements  of  the  narrative.   First, 
Polycharmus  is  not  enslaved  by  the  emotion,  and  this  description  is  an  oblique 
reference to Chaereas, who is wasting away beside him.  Second, at this point in the 
293 Chariton 1.1.7:  τραύματος (Chaereas);  Chariton 2.4.1:  ἐτέτρωτο (Dionysius); Chariton 4.1.9: 
βληθείς (Mithridates);  Chariton  6.3.3:  ἐτρώθη (Artaxerxes);  Chariton  8.5.6:  τραύματι 
(Artaxerxes)
294 Chariton  6.3.1:  ἐπιβουλὴν (Artaxerxes);  Chariton  6.4.4:  ἀντιταττόμενον  ἰδὼν  καὶ 
βεβουλευμένον (Artaxerxes).   In  the  second example  ἔρως is  countering  the  king’s  plans  and 
strategies against him.  In the former the king agrees with his servant that there is a ‘plot’ against him: 
an emotional one.       
295 As is Chariton 2.4.9, where Dionysius is in ἔρως’ power: ἐν ἔρωτος ἐξουσίᾳ. 
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plot,  Chaereas  and  Polycharmus  are  slaves  toiling  for  Mithridates,  and  so  the 
metaphor echoes the immediate context.  None of this is particularly nuanced literary 
manipulation,  but  it  does  lend  a  measure  of  physicality  to  the  metaphor  and 
highlights the narrator’s activation of a conventional meaning in context.     
This psychological conflict is mediated by cultural values and considerations. 
Chariton does seem to have a class bias.  All Callirhoe’s suitors are powerful men, 
and  at  the  start  the  author  emphasises  the two lovers’  good breeding:  εὐγένεια 
(Chariton  1.1.6).   Chaereas  and  Callirhoe  are  both  notable  for  their  passive 
acceptance of the emotion:  they do not fight  against  it.   This is  in  contrast  with 
Habrocomes (see above).  The other two most important characterisations of love’s 
effect in the novel show a completely different reaction.  Dionysius does not just 
passively give in to his emotions, but tries to fight them, like a well educated Greek 
should.  His resistance is displayed via the conflict of reason and passion:  τότ’ ἦν 
ἰδεῖν  ἀγῶνα  λογισμοῦ καὶ  πάθους (Chariton  2.4.4).   His  ‘philosophizing’ 
against  ἔρως is  mistaken,  but  at  least  he attempts  it:  φιλοσοφοῦσαν (Chariton 
2.4.5).296  He is fighting against his emotions because he is educated and someone 
who makes a claim to excellence:  οἷα δὴ πεπαιδευμένος ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐξαιρέτως 
ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιούμενος (Chariton 2.4.1).297  The second point is interesting as it 
shows a reflexive awareness of the emotion.  Dionysius is fighting the emotion not 
only because he has been taught to, but because he also has an image of his own 
excellence to live up to, one grounded in social and cultural norms and expectations. 
Shortly after  Dionysius asks himself  whether he is not ashamed to be feeling the 
passion of a boy in  his  social  position (Chariton 2.4.4).   The reference to a  boy 
illuminates the lack of resistance seen by Chaereas earlier in the novel.  The force of 
the statement is that if Dionysius is conquered by the emotion, then anyone can be. 
This is all consistent with the initial portrayal of Chaereas and Callirhoe if we take 
age and social position into account.  The former couple have good breeding, but due 
296 Repath 2008, 63: ‘Yet in fact the fundamental polarisation between reason and desire forms the 
basis  of  what  the  novelists  do’.   I  am  taking  this  as  an  established  folk  model  which  has  a 
philosophical basis.   
297 This notion of παιδεία was very important in the cultural context of the novel.  See Barton 1994, 
Gleason 1995 and Goldhill 2001, 157.  Contrast Chaereas at Chariton 4.4.2.  He wishes to rush off and 
demand Callirhoe from Dionysius, but Mithridates warns that he is acting though passion rather than 
logic: σπεύδεις πάθει μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ.  He must try a more subtle plan.   
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to  their  age  they  do  not  have  the  social  expectations  fostered  upon  Dionysius. 
Therefore their respective reactions reflect a combination of age and position.    
Later on in the novel Artaxerxes the Persian King falls in love with Callirhoe. 
There are subtle  differences between his  depiction and Dionysius’.298  Artaxerxes 
confides in his servant that he has been defeated by the emotion.  It is more powerful 
than him: δυνατώτερος (Chariton 6.3.2).  Yet we do not receive a description of his 
inner struggle, as with Dionysius; we merely get his word for it that there has been a 
struggle.  When his servant provides the generic advice that the only cure for love is 
the beloved, the King rebukes him.  He is mindful of the laws which he has set and 
the  righteousness,  δικαιοσύνη,  he  practises  constantly  (Chariton  6.3.8).   The 
servant then recommends the distraction of a hunt, which does not turn out to be 
successful.  We have no proof that the King is serious about fighting the emotion 
internally, but we see the same concern with social propriety that Dionysius showed. 
These men both ostensibly have a desire to live up to their own images.  In both 
cases, however, the emotion is too strong.  The ‘barbarian’ king is treated differently, 
in  that  he relies  on the sycophancy of  his  servant  and has a  higher  valuation  of 
himself than Dionysius.  
The portrayal of love is thus consistent in terms of age and social position. 
By comparing these factors we see that these both outweigh ethnicity, since there are 
remarkable similarities in the way in which the Greek and the Persian react.  There is 
more  evidence  that  Artaxerxes’  resistance  should  be  seen  in  a  positive  light. 
Mithridates, the Persian satrap, does not attempt to resist the onset of the emotion 
(Chariton  4.1.9).   Since Mithridates  is  older  and in  a  higher  social  position,  like 
Dionysius and Artaxerxes, and is Persian, like Artaxerxes, we cannot ascribe his lack 
of resistance to  age,  class,  or  race.   Therefore his  emotional  reaction  is  down to 
character,  even  if  his  character  is  only  briefly  sketched.   This  shows that  while 
cultural notions permeate Chariton’s novel, he is capable of depicting emotion at a 
personal level.                           
Daphnis and Chloe features fewer metaphors of conflict and none of them 
refer directly to psychological conflict.  Daphnis and Chloe are both ‘taken’ by the 
vision  of  one another:  ἐγίνετο ἤδη τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἅλωσις αὐτοῖς (Longus 
298 Toohey 1999 contrasts the love of Artaxerxes with that of Chariton and Callirhoe.
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1.24.1).299  The word ἅλωσις can refer to the capture of animals (Arist.HA 593a20, 
600a3),  but  equally  it  can  refer  to  an  individual  or  a  city  being  captured  by  an 
enemy.300  A  related  metaphor  is  that  of  the  piracy  of  ἔρως,  which  Daphnis  is 
ignorant of: ἔτι ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἔρωτος λῃστήριον (Longus 1.32.4.9).  This metaphor 
reflects  a  development  in  the  plot:  Daphnis  has  just  returned  safely  from being 
kidnapped  by  pirates.   The  psychological  implications  of  the  metaphor  are  that 
conflict with the emotion is less possible, since piracy takes one suddenly.  Chloe is 
soon to ask herself why she feels pain, yet is not wounded: ἀλγῶ͵ καὶ ἕλκος οὐκ 
ἔστι  μοι (Longus  1.14.1).   She  compares  her  experience  to  being  struck  by 
something,  perhaps  a  weapon,  which  would  cause  a  wound.   Gnatho,  Astylus’ 
lecherous associate,  claims that whichever body,  σῶμα,  someone finds beautiful, 
with  that  they  are  ‘taken’:  ἀλλ΄  ἐν  οἵῳ  ποτε  ἂν  σώματι  εὕρῃ  τὸ  κάλλος 
ἑάλωκε (Longus 4.17.3).  The other metaphors which denote conquering do not 
refer to the emotion’s power over the person, but the person’s attempted power over 
the emotion.  Daphnis reasons that the rams and ewes, he-goats and she-goats, are 
contented after the act of sex, and that this must be something sweet which conquers 
the bitterness of  ἔρως:  νικᾷ τὸ ἔρωτος πικρόν (Longus 3.14.3).  This metaphor 
places the finality of the process at a different point, where the conquering proper 
only emerges once ἔρως is cured.  Gnatho also refers to this consummation when he 
asks Asylus to grant him Daphnis and thereby conquer his unmasterable ἔρως: τὸν 
ἀήττητον Ἔρωτα νίκησον (Longus 4.16.3).  The adjective ἀήττητον reflects the 
metaphors seen above in the other novelists where the person is defeated by ἔρως. 
Daphnis and Chloe does not feature any references to the mental struggle against the 
emotion and contrasts with Chariton and Xenophon of Ephesus in this respect.  The 
few metaphors which do appear indicate either the result of the conflict or potential 
cures for ἔρως, and do not question at all the emotion’s ability to take control.  It is 
also a question of theme.  Daphnis and Chloe are seeking love.  It makes no sense for 
them to consciously fight against it. 
299 Similarly at Longus 1.13.5 Chloe cannot prevent her eyes from wandering towards Daphnis: τῶν 
ὀφθαλμῶν οὐκ ἐκράτει.
300 See Hdt.1.5.1 on the capture of a city, τὴν Ἰλίου ἅλωσιν, and P.O.10.42 of a human: ἁλώσιος.
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Our final two novelists  are Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus,  and they both 
show the  same  emphasis  upon the  final  part  of  the  process.   In  some  ways  the 
separation between the two sections of duration and result is artificial.  The wound 
could conceivably lead to the end of combat, but again it is a question of emphasis. 
Defeat refers specifically to the result  of conflict,  whereas the wound might  only 
suggest it.  Below is a table of conflict metaphors related to ἔρως in Achilles Tatius. 






In some of the references above there are further descriptions of the conflict of ἔρως, 
but the table makes the general trend clear.  Some elements have greater or lesser 
extensions.   The  wound  is  an  instantaneous  event,  where  as  the  term  πόλεμος 
evokes  a  conflict  of  a  larger  scale  and  duration.   As  Clitophon  confesses  at 
Ach.Tat.1.9.1, all of  Ἔρως has attacked him and driven sleep from his eyes:  ὅλος 
γάρ  μοι  προσέπεσεν  ὁἜρως  καὶ  αὐτόν  μου  διώκει  τὸν  ὕπνον  τῶν 
ὀμμάτων.  The emotion is so overwhelming that any resistance is futile.  The model 
in Achilles Tatius thus echoes those used in Chariton and Xenophon of Ephesus. 
The second metaphor in this sentence is that of the hunt, where the emotion plays the 
role  of  hunter.   It  is  transferred  here  to  denote  the  prototypical  symptom  of 
sleeplessness,  and  to  sustain  the  personification.   The  usual  model  is  that  of  the 
emotion affecting the person, but when Charmides confides in Menelaus, he tells him 
that it is Leucippe who has destroyed him: ἀπολώλεκε (Ach.Tat.4.6.2).  Leucippe 
301 Ach.Tat.1.9.1: προσέπεσεν (Clitophon). 
302 Act.Tat.4.7.4: νενίκημαι (Charmides). 
303 Ach.Tat.4.7.3: πόλεμος (Charmides).
304 Ach.Tat.4.3.1: ἑαλώκει (Charmides).
305 Ach.Tat.1.4.4 :  τραύματι (Clitophon);  Ach.Tat.2.7.6 :  τέτρωμαι…τραῦμα…τιτρώσκει 
(Clitophon); Ach.Tat.4.6.1 : τρωθεὶς (gnomic); Ach.Tat.4.7.4 : τραῦμα (Charmides).
306 Ach.Tat.1.4.4 : ἀπωλώλειν (Clitophon); Ach.Tat.4.6.2 : ἀπολώλεκε (Charmides).
307 Ach.Tat.1.7.2 : δοῦλός (Clinias); Ach.Tat.5.25.6 : δοῦλος (Melite and Clitophon).
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can be conceived as the person doing the destroying, even though she is a passive 
object of his gaze.308  
Heliodorus displays the same concepts once again, but with more variation 
than the other novelists.  He has the standard process of duration of conflict followed 
by submission to the emotion.  Ἔρως can be an arrow striking the afflicted person, 
an enslavement, mastery or capture.309  Charicles rejoices that his stubborn daughter 
is finally in love:  ἑάλωκεν ἡ δυσάλωτος καὶ νενίκηται ἡ δυσκαταμάχητος· 
ἐρᾷ Χαρίκλεια (Hld.4.7.1).  She has fought hard against emotion, but like everyone 
else  is  overcome in  the  end.   Arsace  parallels  the  war,  πόλεμος,  which  almost 
occurred outside the walls, between Thyamis and Petosiris, with the one going on 
inside her:  ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀρχή τις ἀληθεστέρου πολέμου καὶ τραῦμα οὐ μέρους 
μόνον ἢ μέλους ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῆς γέγονε (Hld.7.10.2).         
Cnemon  states  that  anyone  would  find  Theagenes’  behaviour  admirable, 
anyone who had been defeated by ἔρως in the past: ὅστις ἔρωτι προσπαλαίσας 
ἡττήθη  τε  τὴν  μάχην  ἡδέως  καὶ τὰ  ἐκείνου  σωφρόνως  ἔγνωκεν 
ἀπαραίτητα πτώματα (Hld.2.7.1).  The combination of the verb ἡσσάομαι with 
wrestling  brings  out  the  physical  sense  of  the  word.310  In  a  wrestling  bout  the 
defeated person is inferior to the other and it  may be that  in the other examples 
featuring this verb there is a hint of the struggle involved with wrestling against the 
emotion, although the verb is used of contests in general.  Wrestling has an extensive 
pedigree in earlier  Greek literature.311  The Heliodorean love of apparent paradox 
308 This will be discussed more at length in the section on vision.  
309 Arrow:  Hld.7.10.1:  βέβλημαι (Arsace);  Hld.7.10.3:  βέλος (Arsace).   Enslaved:  Hld.3.19.1: 
δεδούλωτο (Chariclea); Hld.4.4.4: δεδούλωτο (Chariclea); Hld.5.2.10: ἀδούλωτον πλὴν ἔρωτος 
φρόνημα (Chariclea).   Capture:  Hld.4.11.2:  ἑάλωκεν (Theagenes).   Conquered:  Hld.7.21.1: 
νενίκηται (Arsace).  In the power of: Hld.4.18.4: ἐγκρατὴς (Theagenes).
310 Other  uses  of  this  metaphor  in  Heliodorus  are  as  follows:  Hld.3.17.4:  ἥττηται (Theagenes); 
Hld.4.4.4: ἥττητο (Chariclea); Hld.4.10.3: ἡττηθῆναι (Chariclea); Hld.5.30.2: ἡττήθη (Chariclea, 
but insincerely); Hld.7.9.5: ἡττῆσθαι (Arsace); Hld.7.21.1: ἥττων (Arsace).    
311 See cf.A.Ag.1206; Ar.Ach.273–6, Pax 896–9, Eccl.259-61, 964-6; Pl.Phdr.236be, 256b; S.frr.618, 
941.13.  One element of conflict between two people is a height difference between the winner and 
the  loser.   This  is  based  on  experiential  considerations  that  if  the  defeated  is  knocked  down or 
enslaved then they are lower than the victor.  The preposition ὑπό means ‘from under’.  When it is 
used with emotion terms in the genitive case it provides a strong connotation of agency.  This is used 
of the broader category of desires.  We are told that Thyamis acts through his desire for Chariclea:  
ὑπὸ μὲν τῆς περὶ τὴν Χαρίκλειαν ἐπιθυμίας (Hld.1.23.1).  The emotion acts upon him as an 
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emerges through the use of the adverb ‘sensibly’:  σωφρόνως.   Sensible or self-
controlled is normally the term used for those who do not give in to emotion, yet here 
the trick is for someone to sensibly capitulate.312  Theagenes begs Calasiris to aid him 
and Chariclea in their predicament later on, and he claims that they are captives of a 
sensible  ἔρως:  σωφρονοῦντος  ἔρωτος  αἰχμάλωτα (Hld.4.18.2).   Heliodorus 
differentiates  between  two types  of  ἔρως,  controlled  and lustful.   This  does  not 
denote a difference in the emotion, but a difference in reaction to it.  Thus Chariclea 
still requires Theagenes to swear not to ‘try it on’ with her, despite the fact that he is 
committed to ‘chaste’ ἔρως, as he retorts (Hld.4.18).  As a female she does not trust 
the  imbalance  of  power  which  lies  in  the  male’s  hand,  and  the  imbalance  of 
psychological  power  which  lies  in  ἔρως’  hands.   Ἔρως cannot  be  resisted  in 
Heliodorus, but a moral distinction is made between the chaste ‘irresistible’ ἔρως of 
the main couple and the lustful passion of other characters, such as Arsace.313  There 
is not therefore a distinction in terms of the emotion, but a distinction in terms of 
character and behaviour.  It is how you react to the emotion which counts, but react 
you must.  Chariclea, like Dionysius and Habrocomes, fights against the emotion, but 
to no avail.  She is unable to gain mastery over it: τὸ μὴ κρατῆσαι τῆς νόσου τὴν 
ἀρχὴν (Hld.4.10.3).  This is the conflation of the disease and opponent metaphor: 
fighting ἔρως as a disease.  Elsewhere we are told that Chariclea is hostile to ἔρως: 
πρὸς ἔρωτα δύσμαχος (Hld.3.17.4).  
The  psychological  conflict  involved with  ἔρως is  pervasive  in  the  Greek 
Novel, and its most common form is that of the emotion as victorious opponent.  It is 
not only ἔρως which is conceptualised as an opponent.  Chariclea struggles to fight 
against  her  πάθος (Hld.4.9.3)  and this  model  extends  to  the  passions  generally. 
Thus although Theagenes and Chariclea both experience internal conflict in an erotic 
agent.   Chariclea says  that  Arsace  should never  have submitted,  ‘stood under’  (ὑποστῆναι),  her 
passion for Theagenes.  ‘Crouching down’ can also be metaphorically used of the level or intensity of 
desire.  Chariclea throws her arms around Theagenes and tells him that she is glad their misfortunes 
have not caused him to ‘make to squat’ (ὀκλάζω), i.e. diminish, his longing for her:  μὴ ὀκλάσας 
τὸν ἐπ' ἐμοὶ πόθον (Hld.1.23.2).  
312 For more on the element of self-control in relation to ἔρως see the conclusion of this thesis.
313 See Morgan 1989, 107 and 1998.
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context,  ἀγωνιῶ, at Hld.3.17.1 and Hld.4.11.1 respectively,  the term has a wider 
range  and  denotes  mental  anxiety  in  general,  although  it  utilises  the  conflict 
metaphor.314              
Psychological conflict is a certainty for the characters in the Greek Novel, but 
erotic conflict can emerge on a literal level as well.  The first correspondence is that 
between  the  endangerment  of  life  on  a  metaphorical  and  literal  level.   When 
Chaereas pines away for the girl he has just met we are told he is in danger of dying 
from this  affliction: κινδυνεύοντος ἀπολέσθαι  διὰ  πάθος  ψυχῆς  εὐφυοῦς 
(Chariton 1.1.10).  So the emotion can be dangerous.315  The most common form in 
which the conflict model is reflected in terms of relationships is erotic rivalry.  At 
Chariton 1.2.5 the son of the tyrant of Acragas says he will equip jealousy and ἔρως 
as allies in his rivalry with Chaereas for Callirhoe.  Mithridates exhorts himself not to 
‘surrender’ Callirhoe when he is forced to travel to Babylon to defend himself and 
Dionysius regrets  that  he has made his  master,  the Persian King,  a rival  in ἔρως 
(Chariton  4.7.2  and  6.2.7).   The  mode  of  interaction  between  the  lover  and the 
beloved can also be conceptualised in terms of an asymmetrical power divide.  In 
Heliodorus Demaenete laments that she behaved towards Cnemon not as a lover, but 
as a ruler (Hld.1.15.5).  This is clever rhetorical manipulation of the cultural power 
dynamic.  She has nothing against asymmetry of power per se, but only regrets it 
because it was unsuccessful for her.  She should have behaved as a lover, someone 
who is  equal,  in order to persuade Cnemon gently rather than force him.316  The 
opposite of this relationship is seen between the principal couple, where we are told 
that Theagenes has ‘captured’ Chariclea: ᾕρηκε (Hld.4.10.5).  Finally, Theagenes is 
described  as  ‘marshalling  an  erotic  war’  when  he  abducts  Chariclea.   This  is 
metaphorical in the sense that there is a domain mapping.  It conceptualises a low-
level struggle in terms of a broader one and there is no desire to defeat Chariclea, 
which would be the prototypical purpose of a war featuring two sides (Hld.4.17.3). 
314 At Ach.Tat.2.35.1 Clitophon decides to cheer up Menelaus and Clinias with an argument which 
has an erotic ‘draw’: ἐμβάλλω λόγον ἐρωτικῆς ἐχόμενον ψυχαγωγίας.  The term ψυχαγωγία 
indicates drawing the attention of the  ψυχή to something.  For more on the  ψυχή as the focus of 
erotic attention see the chapter on the ψυχή and καρδία.  
315 See chapter on the Erotic Syndrome.
316 This is delusional.  At first she approached Cnemon subtly and only became forceful when she 
failed to get her way.
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The conflict  can also be between the lovers themselves.   When Habrocomes and 
Anthia are finally united in marriage they contest with each other all night, as to who 
can  appear  more  erotically  devoted:  ἐφιλονείκουν  δὲ  δι΄  ὅλης  νυκτὸς  πρὸς 
ἀλλήλους͵ φιλοτιμούμενοι τίς φανεῖται μᾶλλον ἐρῶν (X.Eph.1.9.9).  It is not 
the  usual  erotic  rivalry between two parties,  but  rivalry of  devotion  between the 
lovers (really sex).  It is also the same word used of  ἔρως himself when he takes 
offence  at  Habrocomes’  recalcitrance  (see  above  X.Eph.1.2.1),  and  so  the  same 
concept is used of the relationship between the emotion and the person affected and 
between the two people affected. 
These  instantiations  of  interpersonal  rivalry  parallel  the  psychological 
metaphors, but there is one final element of the psychological conflict of ἔρως which 
informs the novels.  This is the matter of social constraints.  Achilles Tatius provides 
us with some concise examples.
Ἐν  μεθορίῳ  κεῖμαι  δύο  ἐναντίων·  Ἔρως  ἀνταγωνίζεται  καὶ  πατήρ.   ὁ  μὲν 
ἕστηκεν αἰδοῖ κρατῶν, ὁ δὲ κάθηται πυρπολῶν. πῶς κρίνω τὴν δίκην; ἀνάγκη 
μάχεται  καὶ  φύσις.  καὶ  θέλω  μὲν  σοὶ  δικάσαι, πάτερ,  ἀλλ’  ἀντίδικον  ἔχω 
χαλεπώτερον.  βασανίζει  τὸν  δικαστήν, ἕστηκε  μετὰ  βελῶν,  κρίνεται  μετὰ 
πυρός. ἂν ἀπειθήσω, πάτερ αὐτῷ καίομαι τῷ πυρί (Ach.Tat.1.11.3).
Within Clitophon there is a conflict of emotion and social pressure.  His father wants 
him to marry someone else  but  he desires  Leucippe.   A battle  and law case are 
conceptualised between ἔρως and his father.  Clitophon lies on the border between 
two adverseries: ἐν μεθορίῳ…δύο ἐναντίων.  It is not a fair case, since ἔρως brings 
violence  and torture  to  the  proceedings,  and therefore  will  win  out.   Within  the 
source domain, that of the law court, ἔρως uses behaviour which contrasts with the 
expected scenario: he tortures the judge (βασανίζει τὸν δικαστήν).  Therefore it is 
probable that ἔρως is placed in the position of a tyrant, who has supreme power over 
legal  proceedings,  the whole of which is  mapped onto the pscyhologcial  conflict 
within  Clitophon.   Erotic  psychological  conflict  is  between  the  person  and  the 
emotion,  but  this  passage brings  out  the modality  of  this  conflict,  or  how social 
pressures condition  the conflict  itself.   It  is  not  just  a matter  of not  giving in  to 
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emotion but one of considering your own specific circumstances: how the emotion 
will affect your relationships.  Giving in to ἔρως will damage his relationship with 
his  father  and  hence  his  familial  and  social  position,  and  resisiting  ἔρως is 
impossible, because it is not a law case which is fair.  
Another aspect of the conflict  between emotion and shame is seen a little 
earlier.  Clinias provides advice on seduction to the inexperienced Clitophon and the 
best way to approach the beloved.  He recommends a subtle approach that avoids 
speaking directly of one’s desire.   
Παῖς γὰρ καὶ παρθένος ὅμοιοι μέν εἰσιν εἰς αἰδῶ· πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης 
χάριν κἂν γνώμης ἔχωσιν, ἃ πάσχουσιν ἀκούειν οὐ θέλουσι· τὴν γὰρ αἰσχύνην 
κεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασι (Ach.Tat.1.10.3).
      
Αἰδώς,  ‘shame’,  is  an emotion which prototypically  arises from a keen sense of 
one’s own social positioning.  The boy or the girl, even if they are willing, does not 
want  to  hear  their  desire,  ἃ  πάσχουσιν,  spoken  of,  because  erotic  conversation 
provokes shame.  There is a subtle implication here.  It is not merely a case of the act 
being socially disapproved of, nor of desire overriding the cultural protocol, but of a 
more complex interaction between the two.  The act of seduction is acceptable to the 
seducee if the seducer does not verbalise the seduction explicity and thereby overstep 
the boundaries set by the seducee.  It is a tentative game which involves showing 
enough respect to the seducee in order to obtain one’s goal.  The Greek Novel can 
display  a  sophisticated  understanding  that  the  attitude  of  the  beloved  is  also 
important.  Chariton 1.4.2 states gnomically that a woman is easier to ‘capture’ if she 
believes she is loved.  The context is the seduction of a maidservant, but the gnome 
is applied generally to women.  It is not really concerned with the emotional well-
being of the woman, but merely with increasing the odds of achieving success, and 
thereby  ‘capturing’  them,  as  is  the  Achilles  Tatius  passage.   Therefore  these 
examples do not overturn the active-passive dynamic of the erastes and eromenos 
relationship,  but  do  add  nuances  and  the  subjective  manipulation  of  the  models 
typically involved in the complexities of social interaction.
I  will  conclude  this  section  by  briefly  considering  some  metaphors  for 
relationships.   The  same  metaphorical  schema  can  be  applied  to  relationships 
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between lovers and love rivals.   In Heliodorus Theagenes breaks down and cries 
because he has been defeated by a girl:  καὶ ταῦτα λέγων ἐπεδάκρυεν  ὥσπερ 
ὅτι πρὸς βίαν ἥττηται κόρης ἐνδεικνύμενος (Hld.3.17.4).   The verbal  form 
ἥττηται is that same as that used of the emotion  ἔρως (see above).  There is an 
important  distinction  here.   The  description  of  the  relationship  between  the  two 
lovers  is  metonymous  for  the  emotion  which  affects  them.   This  ambivalence 
concerning power and responsibility will be explored at greater length in the next 
chapter  on  vision.   The  reference  does  conceal  a  tripartite  dynamic  under  its 
presentation of a bipartite one.  When Theagenes is conquered by Chariclea ἔρως is 
the  means.   The  same  conceptualisation  underlies  the  topos  of  the  beloved  as 
‘master’ or ‘mistress’ of the lover.317  
This  is  not  to  say  that  relationships  between  the  two  lovers  and  other 
characters  in  the  novel  are  all  the  same.   For  instance  Morgan  contrasts  the 
relationship between an acquaintance of Nausicles in Heliodorus and his mistress 
Isias and that of the main couple.  He serves her,  ὑπηρετέω, and works night and 
day to appease her (Hld.6.3).318  The relationship of Theagenes and Chariclea, on the 
other hand, is a mutual slavery.   In book eight they are eager to endure the same 
hardship, since if one of them was punished less they would consider themselves 
conquered by the other and to have too little of ‘things related to ἔρως’: εἰ ἔλαττον 
αὐτῶν τις  κολασθήσεται  νενικῆσθαι  ὑπὸ  θατέρου καὶ μειονεκτεῖν τῶν 
ἐρωτικῶν οἰόμενος (Hld.8.9.22).   They  conceptualise  their  relationship  as  a 
competition of devotion.  The same model can be used in significantly different ways 
of emotion and relationships.             
317 See for example Chariton 8.7.10 where Chaereas says that Dionysius did not enslave Callirhoe but 
made her his ‘mistress’: δέσποινα.  See more refs in the chapter on the ψυχή and καρδία.
318 Morgan 1989, 107: ‘we are dealing here with the erotic trope familiar to us from Latin love elegy 
as the servitium amoris, where it crystallises in the ambiguity of the word domina. The selfish and 
degrading materialism, the irresponsibility and absence of any basis for permanence in Isias’ love are 
opposed to and illuminate the earnestness, the reciprocity, the spirituality, the life-long commitment 
and life-enhancing quality of the true love of Theagenes and Charikleia.’  At Hld.6.7.8 we are told that 
Chariclea notices Knemon’s feelings for Nausicles’ daughter because a lover is quick to spot others 
mastered  by  the  same  passion:  ὀξὺς  γὰρ  ὁ  ἐρῶν  φωράσαι  τὸν  ἀπὸ  τῶν  ἴσων  παθῶν 
κεκρατημένον.  Therefore although in some respects Theagenes and Chariclea’s love is unique, they 
still share significant parts of their experience with others.
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There  are  also  opponent  metaphors  which  conceptualise  the  relationships 
between  love  rivals.   In  Chariton  Mithridates  hopes  to  sit  as  a  bystander  before 
entering  the  competition  to  take  away  Callirhoe  as  the  prize:  ἔφεδρος  μένων 
μεταξὺ  Χαιρέου  τε  καὶ  Διονυσίου  αὐτὸς  ἀκονιτὶ  τὸ  ἆθλον  Καλλιρόην 
ἀποίσεται (Chariton 4.4.1).  The word ἔφεδρος is a technical term which refers to 
the third party in wrestling who waits to take on the victor of the first bout.319  This is 
the wrestling metaphor  seen of  ἔρως above.  In Heliodorus Cybele criticises her 
mistress Arsace for having too ‘supine’,  ὑπτίως,  and soft  an approach to  ἔρως: 
αὐτὴ  δὲ  οὕτως  ὑπτίως  προσιοῦσα  τῷ  σαυτῆς  ἔρωτι  καὶ  τῷ  ὄντι 
μαλακιζομένη (Hld.8.5.9).  She is not pursuing Theagenes vigorously enough and 
letting him get away.    
One  final  example  will  illustrate  why  the  model  of  the  emotion  as  an 
opponent has implications for how one perceives selfhood and responsibility.   In 
Achilles Tatius Melite loses her temper at Clitophon and then changes tact.  
Ἃ μὲν εἶπον, ὦ φίλτατε, θυμὸς ἔλεγε καὶ λύπη· ἃ δὲ νῦν μέλλω λέγειν, ἔρως 
λέγει. κἂν ὀργίζωμαι, καίομαι· κἂν ὑβρίζωμαι, φιλῶ (Ach.Tat.5.26.1). 
What she said to him just now her anger and grief, θυμὸς καὶ λύπη, spoke.  Now it 
is ἔρως which is speaking.  If she is angry it is because she has a burning passion for 
him.  If she causes offence it is because she loves him.  Melite’s rhetoric is built upon 
a model of emotional agency pervasive in the Greek Novel.  The emotion obtains 
mastery  of  the  subject  and  speaks  through  them.   She  conceptualises  herself  as 
merely a vessel for the agency of emotion.  This is almost certainly short of the truth, 
but  this  model  needs  cultural  credibility  for her rhetoric  to  be persuasive.  In  the 
Greek  Novel  emotions  do  dominate  characters  and  the  opponent  metaphor  is  a 
fundamental way of characterising them.         
Therefore the model of conflict or opposition can be used of the relationship 
between the emotion and the person, two lovers in a relationship and love rivals. 
What is significant in terms of psychological metaphor in the Greek Novel is that the 
319 See Ar.Ra.792, E.Rh.119, Pi.N.4.96.
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majority of instances depict the mastery of the emotion.320  The opposition metaphor 
predominantly conceptualises the first part of the emotional scenario, the inception of 
ἔρως, and thus is usually prior to the part of the scenario which the metaphors of 
disease and madness structure.  In the next chapter on vision I will now proceed to 
argue why the bipartite model of the lover and beloved is not sufficient to capture the 
nuances of what is actually a tripartite opposition: opposition between the two lovers 
and the emotion. 
320 Alexander 2006 argues that ἔρως is all powerful in the Greek Novel.  She is certainly correct in 
this but she perhaps underestimates how dominant many emotions are in the novels.
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Chapter 5 - Vision and Ἔρως
Ἔρως in the Greek Novel is an intensely visual phenomenon.321  This emphasis on 
the visual is a feature which is generally applicable to emotions in Greek societies, 
rather  than  applying  specifically  to  ἔρως.322  In  fact,  as  Ekman  has  shown, 
interpreting  faces  and  expressions  is  a  pervasive  and  universal  aspect  of  human 
interaction (see introduction).  In the Greek Novel the vision of a beautiful person 
almost always triggers ἔρως in the viewer, and this means that the beautiful (those 
who possess  κάλλος)  are the objects  of attention more than they would wish.323 
Aristotle states that  ἔρως,  τοῦ ἐρᾶν, begins from the pleasure that comes through 
sight: ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή (Arist.EN 1167a3–4).  Achilles Tatius goes so far as 
to  say  that  looking  at  the  beloved  is  a  pleasure  greater  than  ‘the  act  itself’ 
(Ach.Tat.1.9.4).324  There  are  many  interesting  nuances  in  the  Greek  Novel’s 
description of vision, ranging from gnomai reflecting social prejudices to instances 
of the technical language of philosophy and medicine.  This chapter will argue that 
one metaphorical  concept is prototypical  of vision and erotic  vision in the Greek 
Novel.   This is  the conduit  metaphor  where vision (and sometimes  the emotion) 
travels  as  an  entity  between  two  points,  or  more  usually,  two  human  bodies 
321 As it is in previous Greek literature.  For a selection of examples of vision both expressing and 
causing ἔρως see Alcm.1.21–1, 3. fr. 3. col.ii.62; Anac.360.1; Hes.Th.910–11, Scut.7–8; Ibyc.287.1; 
Pi.fr.123.3–4; Pl.Phdr.247ce, 248bc, 249-251a, 251c, 251e, 253a, 253e, 254b, 255cd; Sappho 138.2; 
Sim.fr.22.12 W.
322 Looking is involved in the expression and provocation of emotion, ranging from direct looks which 
‘can  indicate  aggression  or  lack  of  respect’  (Cairns  2005,  129),  to  direct  looks  indicating 
shamelessness and averted glances displaying a sense of shame or αἰδώς (Cairns 2005, 130ff.).  See 
Cairns 2005 in general for the complex dynamics of viewing and emotion.  This emphasis upon the 
visual  is  probably  not,  as  some  scholars  have  claimed,  peculiar  to  the  ancient  Greeks 
(Augenmenschen), or at least distinct among them in contrast to ourselves, but a prominent feature in 
Greek and English.  For the theory that the Ancient Greeks were Augenmenschen see Malten 1961 
and Luther 1966.  For a sceptical view of this see Cairns 2005, 126.  The Greek verb ‘to know’ is a 
past tense of the verb ‘to see’, but we can also say ‘I see that’ to indicate comprehension and utilise a 
common folk belief in our expression ‘seeing is believing’.   Heraclitus B101a DK and Herodotus 
1.8.1 both testify to the same notion in ancient Greece that seeing is more believable than hearing. 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 48, state that UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING is a pervasive metaphorical 
concept in English.  
323 In  an internal  dialogue Dionysius  upbraids himself for giving in to emotion.  One of his self-
criticisms is that he has fallen in love at first sight: ἅπαξ ἰδὼν ἐρᾷς (Chariton 2.4.4).  
324 In actual fact this is Clitophon’s friend Clinias’ opinion.  
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conceptualised  as  containers.325  In  erotic  vision  the  entity  is  beauty,  κάλλος, 
although it can be metonymically referred to as  ἔρως, part of the process standing 
for the whole, and beauty itself is most commonly described as an effluence.  The 
receptacle  of  this  effluence  is  the soul  or  ψυχή,  which  the effluence reaches  by 
means of the eyes.   This is a folk model  in the Greek Novel and is consistently 
maintained even in the passages which deal with scientific material.  Furthermore it 
is important  that  as far as erotic vision is concerned,  this  conduit  is a conduit  of 
constraint,  in  that  the  effluences  are  sent  and  received  passively,  and  thus  the 
individual party has no control over this process.326  
This chapter will trace the workings of erotic vision in the Greek Novel.  It 
will discuss metaphors of erotic vision, metaphors and the entities involved in erotic 
vision such as beauty and the eyes, and finish by looking at expert (pseudo-scientific) 
models of vision, imagination and memory.                
325 See Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 11.  
326 This is perhaps a general feature of vision (the initial formation of images).  See Averill 1990, 108: 
‘sensory experiences are also passions of the soul, broadly speaking.  For example, when I look upon 
an object under normal lighting conditions, I cannot help but see the object.  It is as though the image 
has been impressed upon my mind.’
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I Cultural Models and Metaphors of Erotic Vision
Initially we may state three features of erotic vision in general in the Greek Novel.  It 
is a passive effect upon the person experiencing the emotion, it is consciously felt by 
that  same person, and it  is  conceptualised prototypically by metaphors which are 
used of  ἔρως.  Anthia and Habrocomes both perceive the sight of one another at 
their  first  meeting: καὶ  ἔννοια  ἐκείνους  ὑπῄει  τῆς  ὄψεως  θατέρου 
(X.Eph.1.3.4).  However, just because one is conscious of the erotic effect, this does 
not mean one has power over it.   It  is simultaneously a conscious and a passive 
experience,  not  a  subconscious  effect.   Conventional  metaphors  for  ἔρως and 
emotion  permeate  the  visual  dynamics.   The  bandit  Anchialus  falls  in  love  with 
Anthia, and the daily sight of her sets him on fire,  ὄψις ἐξέκαεν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν 
ἔρωτα (X.Eph.4.5.4).  The Indian merchant in book three of Xenophon of Ephesus’s 
novel is captured by Anthia as soon as he sees her: ἰδὼν ἁλίσκεται (X.Eph.3.11.3). 
If someone is captured then they can potentially be released.  When Habrocomes 
sees Anthia he cannot look away,  even though he wants to:  ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῆς 
ὄψεως ἐθέλων οὐκ ἐδύνατο (X.Eph.1.3.1).  The passivity of erotic vision denies 
the  possibility  of  release.   In  the  same  way habitual  exposure  to  Anthia  ‘leads’ 
Perilaus towards ἔρως: ὄψις εἰς ἔρωτα ἤγαγε (X.Eph.2.13.6).  He is forcibly led 
along a path ‘into’ the emotion as destination or goal.  On the other hand looking can 
involve complicity.  Habrocomes gives himself over towards staring at Anthia: ὁ δὲ 
αὑτὸν ἐδεδώκει πρὸς τὴν θέαν  (X.Eph.1.3.2).  It is voluntary donation on his 
part, but the notion that a viewer can voluntarily avoid looking is not entertained.   
The viewer is a passive victim of erotic vision but this affect is not confined 
to  erotic  vision.   Beauty can  have  an  influence  upon people  without  necessarily 
engendering  ἔρως.   In Xenophon of Ephesus the Rhodians are astonished at  the 
beauty of Habrocomes and Anthia:  τὸ κάλλος τῶν παίδων καταπεπληγότες 
(X.Eph.1.12.1).  They are ‘struck down’ by the couple’s beauty, and there may be a 
slight  element  of  eroticism,  but  this  is  not  the  term’s  primary  meaning.   The 
metaphorical  description refers to surprise,  on its  own or as part  of a strong and 
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startling emotional reaction, and this can be a component of the erotic process, an 
emotion felt at the very start when one receives the effluences of beauty for the first 
time.327  When  Apsyrtus  is  astonished  at  Habrocomes’  looks,  κατεπλάγη 
(X.Eph.2.2.1), it is his experience of surprise as a part of the erotic experience which 
is emphasised.  In these examples the image of an emotion striking someone with 
force is consistent with the notion of a struggle between two opponents.  Metaphors 
of vision frequently utilise or interact with other metaphorical conceptualisations of 
emotion.   
Common metaphors used of emotion are often transferred onto descriptions 
of vision.  The following passage from Xenophon of Ephesus shows this in a self-
conscious manner. 
       
Φιλοῦσα δὲ αὐτοῦ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς “ὦ” φησὶ “πολλάκις με λυπήσαντες ὑμεῖς͵ ὦ 
τὸ πρῶτον ἐνθέντες τῇ ἐμῇ κέντρον ψυχῇ͵ οἱ τότε μὲν σοβαροί͵ νῦν δὲ ἐρωτικοί͵ 
καλῶς  μοι  διηκονήσατε͵  καὶ  τὸν  ἔρωτα  τὸν  ἐμὸν  καλῶς  εἰς  τὴν  Ἁβροκόμου 
ψυχὴν ὡδηγήσατε.” (X.Eph.1.9.7).
There are many metaphors at play here.  Anthia and Habrocomes are together 
for the first time,  and she addresses his eyes  as she kisses them.  She begins by 
ascribing two common descriptions of ἔρως to the eyes, those of ‘pain’, λύπη, and 
the ‘goad’,  κέντρον.  As we move on through the passage we see a metaphor for 
serving, διηκονήσατε, again coherent with the master-slave dynamic (see opponent 
chapter), and one of leading along a path,  ὡδηγήσατε.  Ἐρως is an entity which 
Habrocomes’  eyes  have conducted down to his  ψυχή.   This  metaphor  of a  path 
between souls through the eyes is an essential part of the mechanics of erotic vision 
in the Greek Novel.  What is notable in this excerpt is that the eyes seemingly play a 
dual role.  Habrocomes’ eyes ‘served’ Anthia by carrying her beauty into his soul, 
metonymically called her ἔρως here.  However, initially she playfully rebukes them 
for hurting her and goading her, i.e.  causing  ἔρως in her.  The focus here is not 
327 This force of emotion can be seen in common metonyms for surprise, which are forms of the verb 
πλήσσω with  ἐκ or  κατά as a prefix.  Other examples, all denoting surprise or astonishment, are 
X.Eph.1.2.8; 1.13.5; 3.7.1; 5.12.6 (with ἐκ) and X.Eph.2.2.1 (with κατά).  See also Chariton 1.14.1; 
2.2.2; 2.3.6; 2.5.4; 3.3.2; 3.4.1; 3.6.4; 4.2.11; 4.3.8.
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merely upon the eyes as receivers, but as projectors of beauty.  The eyes in fact are 
often seen as a  particularly prominent  aspect  of one’s  κάλλος (see below).   By 
addressing the eyes here the passivity of the folk model is maintained.  Habrocomes’ 
eyes did send out  κάλλος into Anthia and thereby  ἔρως,  but the whole process 
carries on regardless of his intention, i.e. he himself did not intend to emit ἔρως.      
Metaphors used of erotic vision are for the most part standard and can be seen 
in the other chapters on concepts such as fire, the opponent and sickness.  However, 
several  metaphors  do  stand  out  as  being  particularly  associated  with  vision.   In 
Achilles Tatius vision can be seen as consumption.  This metaphorical construction 
features  prominently  in  a  banquet  scene  in  book  one.   There  Clitophon  gazes 
‘greedily’ across the table at Leucippe, the object of his desire.  He departs having 
dined metaphorically on the sight of the girl.
Ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν εὐωχίαν ἐν τοῖς  ὀφθαλμοῖς φέρων τῶν τε  τῆς κόρης προσώπων 
γεμισθεὶς  καὶ  ἀκράτῳ  θεάματι  καὶ  μέχρι  κόρου  προελθὼν  ἀπῆλθον μεθύων 
ἔρωτι (Ach.Tat.1.6.1).
The concrete absorption of food and drink by everyone at the feast is paralleled by 
the  abstract  consumption  of  the  vision  of  Leucippe.   Drinking  is  commonly 
associated with  ἔρως and it is the image of food which really strikes the reader.328 
Morales discusses the consumptive gaze and clams that it is a male metaphor.329  This 
may be so, but the erotic element does not lie only in the metaphor of eating, but in 
the  description  of  excessive  consumption.   He is  ‘stuffed’,  γεμισθεὶς,  with  the 
vision of her undiluted, ἀκράτῳ (the metaphor of vision as wine), and he continues 
until satiety, μέχρι κόρου.  The erotic viewer is consumed by his appetite, and this 
relates to the motif of emotion as a lack of control.  It not just eating or drinking, but 
excessive eating and drinking.330  
328 See Ach.Tat.2.3.3 and Hld. 3.10.5; 7.27.3.  This metaphor is probably connected with notions of 
satiety, koros, of emotion.  See the following chapter for more on this metaphor.  
329 Morales 2004, 165ff. and 2005, 11.  
330 This element of excess is missed by Morales (2005, 11–2).  She quotes two further metaphors 
which display the woman taking on the role of visual consumer; Ach.Tat.5.13.5 where Melite says 
that  being  with  Clitophon is  her  ‘nourishment’,  τροφή,  and  Hld.7.8.6  where  Arsace  looks  upon 
Theagenes hungrily: πλέον τῶν ἄλλων τῆς ἐκείνου θέας ἐμφορουμένη.  She also neglects to 
mention the metaphorical  nature of  ἐμφορουμένη, which first indicates the load of emotion (see 
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Another metaphor peculiar to vision is that of lightning, which conceptualises 
erotic vision as a force.  In Heliodorus Chariclea looks straight at the former priest 
Thyamis with her face and strikes him with her beauty as if lightning,  αὐτὸν τῷ 
κάλλει  καταστράψασα.331  Later  on  Mitranes  is  ‘struck  out’  at  Chariclea’s 
youthfulness,  τῆς ὥρας, although she is in rough garments, as she shines like the 
rays  of  the  moon  from  behind  a  cloud:  ἐξεπέπληκτο  μὲν  τῆς  ὥρας,  ἀπ’ 
εὐτελοῦς  γὰρ  καὶ  ταῦτα  τῆς  ἐσθῆτος  οἷον  νέφους  αὐγὴ  σεληναίας 
διεξέλαμπεν (Hld.5.8.5).  The brightness of light is mapped onto the intensity of 
beauty,  and vision exerts a force on the viewer.  In fact  the vision of Theagenes 
which  Arsace  receives  is  ‘irresistible’:  ὑπὸ  θέας  ἀμάχου (Hld.7.9.2).   The 
ambiguity  of  the  expression,  whether  it  indicates  that  Theagenes’  beauty  is 
unconquerable by Arsace or by rivals for his beauty,  can be exploited both ways, 
since  both  translations  are  complementary.   In  context  the  former  meaning  is 
emphasised, since Arsace is passively taken by the emotion, although as Heliodorus 
repeatedly emphasises, the beauty of his main couple surpasses that of others.          
Metaphors of vision are forceful ones, but this force is translated within the 
power dynamics  of  relationships.332  One metaphorical  concept  highlights  several 
issues germane to gender and power relations.  This is the model of love as hunting. 
Put simply we have a model of two parties—the hunter and prey—being mapped 
onto dynamics between three parties: the erastes, eromenos and the emotion.333  I will 
argue  that  the  force  of  emotion  plays  a  major  role  in  creating  consistency  and 
meaning within this metaphorical schema.  I will also use the study of this metaphor 
to show that the model of erotic vision in the Greek Novel is consistent with much of 
previous Greek literature.  
final chapter), and only secondarily indicates someone being filled with food by means of the same 
metaphor.  This verb means ‘to be borne about in or on’ and is used only metaphorically of being 
filled with food: see Hdn.4.11.3.  Therefore unlike the other examples the metaphor of consumption 
here is a secondary meaning.  
331 Hld.1.21.3.  Chariclea’s beauty is also like lightning at Hld.7.10.3.
332 Goldhill 1998, 122: ‘In the field of eros above all, the gaze necessarily invokes the categories of 
power and gender’.  The former part of this sentence is misleading.  All aspects of vision in society 
take account of power and gender dynamics, and it is difficult to argue that love involves power and 
gender to a greater extent than other emotions such as shame: see Cairns 2005.  
333 For the standard work on Greek homosexuality see Dover 1978 and for a more recent study see 
Davidson 2007. 
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To begin with it is best to return to archaic and classical Greece, where most 
of the research on hunting as an erotic metaphor has been done.  Barringer provides a 
good description of how hunting and  ἔρως functioned in ancient  Athens.334  She 
shows that  hunting  was firmly  embedded  as  an  aristocratic  value  in  archaic  and 
classical Greek culture, and that the usual model of erotic hunting involves an older 
male,  the  erastes,  and  a  younger  male,  eromenos,  each  of  whom has  power  on 
account of their social standing and beauty respectively.335  She notes that women can 
also  be  the  objects  of  the  hunt  and  that  the  power  dynamics  can  sometimes  be 
reversed, when the eromenos becomes the hunter and the erastes the prey. It seems to 
me,  however,  that  the  role  of  the  emotion  has  been  underestimated  in  these 
dynamics.  
The first element we must look at in this model is its evaluative function (see 
introduction).  Does conceiving of the erastes as a hunter present a good image, a bad 
image,  or an ambivalent  one?  Barringer’s  study shows that  hunting was viewed 
positively among the aristocracy, but she does not systematically explore whether the 
image was also used in a negative light.  Her evidence on the vases suggests that it 
was a popular topic for representation, and so the portrayal of the erastes as hunting 
the eromenos does not seem negative ipso facto, though of course negative exempla 
abound in ancient literature.  When Plato uses the image of the lover as being like the 
wolf after the lamb, it comes at the end of a criticism of the lover as an interested 
party wishing to fulfil his desire, not as an exponent of goodwill.336  He therefore 
uses the image in a negative sense.  When Aeschines speaks of lovers as hunters of 
young men,  θηρευτὰς, they appear in a list of negative examples.337  We do not 
have  space  here  to  explore  all  the  nuances  which  different  narrators  and  orators 
invest  the  hunting  metaphor  with.   Suffice  it  to  say that  the model  can  be used 
negatively depending on context.       
The  other  categories  which  are  prominent  in  the  model  are  women  and 
emotion.   Women can,  however,  take a  more  active  role.   Xenophon writes  that 
334 Barringer 2001, 70-124.
335 Theog.1278c-d and Pl.Chrm.155d-e compare the erastes to a lion and the eromenos to a fawn.  See 




Alcibiades was hunted by lustful women.338  Barringer describes it as ‘a play on the 
same idea to express the reversal of usual gender roles’.339  The gender distribution is 
reversed from the prototypical case and the point is that the women are not acting 
like they should.  Lovesick women proliferate throughout ancient myth and history. 
It  is  the taking  of  the  active  role  which  is  unsuitable,  against  normative  cultural 
values, and can often lead to a negative evaluation of the woman’s behaviour.         
In Xenophon’s  Memorabilia Socrates goes to gaze upon Theodote, who is 
reputed to be of great beauty and who is prepared to sleep with those who persuade 
her: καὶ οἵας συνεῖναι τῷ πείθοντι (Xen.Mem.3.11.1).  Socrates compares her to 
the spider who hunts and her prey to hares (Xen.Mem.3.11.6-8).  Theodote has just 
asked which approach she should use to hunt ‘friends’ (a euphemism).   This is a 
specifically  Athenian  example,  and  it  is  far  removed  from the  era  of  the  Greek 
Novel.  However, what is important is the association which can be attached to a 
woman who ‘hunts’ her prey.  Theodote is a prostitute, and therefore the model of 
hunting is suitable to her status and social role.  If other women are the active hunters 
in the hunting model they can be portrayed as a certain type of women.  The further 
they  are  from  the  status  which  allows  this—e.g.  married  woman—the  more 
reprehensible their conduct in the eyes of Greek norms and social values.  They are 
evaluated against the cultural background.     
In a fragment  Sophocles describes a woman struck with erotic  passion as 
being  caught  in  nets.340  This  introduces  the  third  element  of  our  schema:  the 
emotion.   The emotion can hunt the lover through the medium of the beloved.341 
This is what Ibycus is referring in his famous pederastic poem (Ibycus 287 P): 
Ἔρος αὖτέ με κυανέοισιν ὑπὸ
Βλεφάροις τακέρ’ ὄμμασι δερκόμενος
Κηλήμασι παντοδαποῑς ἐς ἄπει-
ρα δίκτυα Κύπριδος ἐσβάλλει.    
338 Xen.Mem.1.2.24.  
339 Barringer 2001, 86.
340 Soph.fr.932.
341 For imagery of the ‘beloved’—potentially also the emotion—hunting the lover see AP 12.101.1–3, 
12.109, 12.113.  On hunting in erotic philosophy and poetry see also Ibyc.287.4; Pl.Phdr.252e, 253c; 
Sappho 1.21; Thgn.1283–94, 1299–1304. 
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Davies claims that here ‘Eros symbolises or stands for the beloved’, and that this is a 
common image, but this misses the point somewhat.342  His explanation is still trying 
to  describe the triangulation  of  relations  between the emotion  and two parties  in 
terms of a dynamic between two parties.  The model underlying the metaphor is the 
same as the one from the Greek Novel, where the beauty of the beloved affects the 
lover regardless of the beloved’s will or intention.   This poem describes first and 
foremost the emotion hunting the erastes, because the emotion works via the beauty 
of the beloved, especially from the eyes (see below).  The visual evocation of the 
beloved’s  dark  eyes  blends  well  with  the  description  of  the  emotional  affect  as 
‘melting’, τακέρ’.  Therefore although the meltingly dark-eyed ἔρως is certainly to 
be identified with the boy, the active ἔρως throwing the net does not have to be seen 
as synonymous with the boy’s desire or intention.  The boy will cause ἔρως whether 
he desires to or not, and so the image of the net throwing is delightfully ambiguous: 
the boy could be glancing provocatively or not.  This incitation of ἔρως regardless of 
the intention of the beloved can be seen in the next passage we will discuss, which 
appears in Heliodorus’ Aethiopica.   
In book two the Egyptian priest Calasiris narrates the reason why he had to 
leave Egypt.  He was lured into temptation by a beautiful woman, Rhodopis, and 
therefore  voluntarily  went  into  exile.343  In  fact,  she  is  second in  beauty only to 
Chariclea:  τὸ κάλλος δεύτερον μετὰ Χαρίκλειαν ἔχουσα (Hld.2.25.1).  There 
is a great ambiguity as to whether she is the willing seductress or not.  She arrives 
touring Egypt and it is possible that a wandering and self-sufficient woman has a 
negative connotation.344            
342 Davies 1986, 405.  See also Davies 1980 who compares Propertius 1.1.1 and Philostr.Epist.56. 
Ἔρως is specifically the hunter at Pl.Symp.203d. 
343 There is a potential historical correspondence for the name Rhodopis.  Hdt.2.134–5 relates that she 
was involved with the brother of the poetess Sappho.  She is brought to Egypt originally as a slave and 
subsequently set free, and is famed for her ‘charms’: ἐπαφρόδιτος.  Achilles Tatius also features an 
erotic  story of  a  virgin  called  Rhodopis  (Ach.Tat.8.12).   She  was  a  huntress  with Artemis,  until 
Aphrodite grew angry at her disdain for sex and punished her by making her fall in love with a youth 
called Euthynicus.  When Artemis discovers the fact she turns Rhodopis into a spring which now 
functions as a test for those who make oaths related to Aphrodite.  When they first see one another 
their eyes ‘stand still’: ἔστησαν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἑκάτεροι (Ach.Tat.8.12.7).   
344 Demosthenes’ In Neaeram 108 speaks of the prostitute who wanders about the world to find new 
clients.  Goldhill 1998, 114, says that ‘the prostitute is distinctive because she is open to the gaze of 
men’ in his discussion of Socrates and Theodote in Xenophon’s Memorabilia.   
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Πᾶσι δ’ ἀφροδισίοις θηράτροις ἐξησκημένη· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐντυχόντα μὴ ἡλωκέναι, 
οὕτως  ἄφυκτόν  τινα  καὶ  ἀπρόσμαχον  ἑταιρίας  σαγήνην  ἐκ  τῶν  ὀφθαλμῶν 
ἐπεσύρετο (Hld.2.25.1).
The metaphor of the erotic hunt is extended.345  As she was prepared with erotic 
hunting equipment,  ἀφροδισίοις θηράτροις, it was not possible to avoid capture 
by her,  ἡλωκέναι, and she dangles a net from her eyes,  σαγήνην.  Although the 
syntax portrays Rhodopis as active, ἐξησκημένη, we are never told whether she is 
complicit  with  the  effect  she  generates.   Reading  in  the  model  of  overpowering 
κάλλος we can see that  vision functions regardless of the woman’s  intent.   She 
becomes a frequent visitor to his own temple of Isis and it is the constant sight of her 
which drives him into exile.346  
Γίνεται δὴ κἀμοῦ κρείττων ὀφθεῖσα πολλάκις,  ἐνίκα τὴν διὰ βίου μοι 
μελετηθεῖσαν ἐγκράτειαν,  ἐπὶ πολύ τε τοῖς σώματος ὀφθαλμοῖς τοὺς ψυχῆς 
ἀντιστήσας ἀπῆλθον τὸ τελευταῖον ἡττηθεὶς καὶ πάθος ἐρωτικὸν 
ἐπιφορτισάμενος (Hld.2.25.2).
Seeing her often is too much for him, κρείττων, and his self-control, ἐγκράτειαν, is 
conquered.  It is a less prototypical case in the sense that he is worn down over a 
period of time rather than ἔρως completely conquering him at once.  Here we still 
see the language reflecting the metaphor of ἔρως as an opponent.  The eyes of his 
soul fight against the eyes of his body—reason against passion—yet he is defeated, 
345 The motif of the erotic hunt, if not the metaphors, appears in Chariton.  At night the king recalls 
Callirhoe’s form, and the eyes are a prominent in the description (Chariton 6.7.1).  During a hunt, 
arranged to take his mind off his erotic torment, the king can only see Callirhoe as if she was on the 
hunt (Chariton 6.4.5).  Her dress is tucked up to her knees and her face red.  The correspondences here 
are manifold.  First there is the erotic connotation of the hunt.  The king is hunting animals but also in 
fact ‘hunting’ Callirhoe.  Yet the king’s visualisation of Callirhoe is accompanied by a simile taken 
from the Odyssey (6.102-4).  Callirhoe hunting would have looked just like Artemis.  This image 
complicates matters.  Artemis is of course famously virginal and this pictures a chaste Callirhoe, in 
the same way as the comparison with Penelope above.  The huntress Artemis is directly relevant to the 
image of a beautiful woman hunting.  If, however, hunting is a dynamic parallel to that of ἔρως then 
this could imply that Callirhoe is herself hunting the king in the same way as he is her.  This notion is 
supported by the fact  that the Odyssey quote is taken from a description of Nausikaa.   She is an 
example of a woman who was interested in Odysseus,  a potential suitor and her theme is one of 
attempted marriage.      
346 She  also  made  expensive  sacrifices  and  dedications:  θυσίαις  τε  καὶ  ἀναθήμασι 
πολυταλάντοις (Hld.2.25.2).
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ἡττηθεὶς,  and  loads  erotic  passion  upon  himself:  ἐπιφορτισάμενος.   His  action 
promoted by reason is not resisting the emotion, which is impossible, but by leaving 
the country and not actively pursuing the object of desire.  He uses reason as his 
judge:  δικαστὴν  ἐμαυτῷ  τὸν  λογισμὸν  ἀναδείξας (Hld.2.25.4).347  The 
language of mastery as with the metaphor of the hunt promotes the passivity of the 
subject’s  emotional  response to  ἔρως.   However,  they may still  take an aversive 
course of action.     
It is difficult to say whether Rhodopis is complicit or not.  Calasiris indeed 
never mentions her motives, or even speaks to her.  This passage is also explained 
astrologically  by  Calasiris.348  He  says  that  whoever  came  into  contact  with  the 
woman had a bad fate, κακῇ μοίρᾳ τῶν ἐγνωκότων (Hld.2.25.1), and that she is 
to be averted,  τὴν ἀποτρόπαιον (Hld.2.25.4).   He also, however,  attributes  the 
whole episode to a ruling star:  τοῦ τότε ἐπικρατοῦντος ἀστέρος (Hld.2.25.5). 
This implies that both Calasiris and the women are pawns of a larger cosmic game. 
He compares her to an actor playing a part in a drama: ὑπόκρισις καὶ ὡς ὁ τότε 
εἰληχὼς δαίμων οἱονεὶ προσωπεῖον αὐτὴν ὑπῆλθε (Hld.2.25.3).   The 
malicious daemon is using her as a mask:  προσωπεῖον.  She therefore becomes a 
cipher for a greater power, which increases her passivity.      
We can not say for certain whether she is a temptress in the mould of Arsace, 
who does take the active role of ‘hunting’ Theagenes, which is inappropriate for both 
her gender and status as wife of the satrap.  As Morgan notes there is an art, τέχνη, 
to  seduction and the terminology is  used of Demaenete  and Thisbe:  the negative 
Athenian  version  of  love.349  However,  we  cannot  assume  the  activeness  of  the 
beloved based only on metaphors of the force of emotion.  The irrelevance of the 
beloved’s intention reveals that the metaphor of the emotion as hunting should be 
taken seriously as a third part of the erastes-eromenos dynamic.350  This tripartite 
347 Contrast the passage from Achilles Tatius in the previous passage where ἔρως tortures the judges.
348 On this passage and astrology in general in Heliodorus see Liviabella Furiani 1979.
349 See Morgan 1989, 109 and Hld.1.9.2; 1.15.7.
350 There is an example of the emotion as hunter in Achilles Tatius, but he does not hunt the person as 
such.  Clitophon tells us that as a whole fell upon him and chased sleep from his eyes: ὅλος γάρ μοι 
προσέπεσεν ὁ Ἔρως καὶ αὐτόν μου διώκει τὸν ὕπνον τῶν ὀμμάτων (Ach.Tat.1.9.1).  The 
verbal form διώκει, ‘he pursues’, personifies the emotion as a hunter.   
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model shows that the traditional bipartite model of the erastes-eromenos should be 
seen in a more complex light.    
It is the action of the emotion, the third party, which offers the choice of a 
hunting model based not on the intention of the lover or beloved but on the force of 
the emotion.  If we go further and look at where these metaphors are applied in the 
process or scenario of the emotion, we see that the emotion as hunter is prior to the 
erastes as hunter.  Conquered by the emotion, the erastes then tries to hunt down the 
eromenos.   Furthermore  the metaphor  of  the  hunt  can  be used in  less  emotional 
contexts, such as with Theodote in Xenophon’s  Memorabilia, where it is explicitly 
‘friends’ she is hunting.  The importance of tracing this model from previous Greek 
literature down to the Greek Novel, where it appears rarely in the specific form of the 
hunting metaphor, is that we can trace the same operation of the force of emotion 
upon the erastes throughout the metaphors and models used.  Therefore the dynamics 
of force and passivity seen in erotic vision above are not only present in previous 
Greek  literature,  but  even  in  metaphors  which  emphasise  the  homosexual 
relationship between the erastes and eromenos such as the hunting model.   
There are therefore two prototypical models which involve the imagery of the 
hunt.   The  first  is  the  likening  of  the  relationship  between  the  erastes  and  the 
eromenos to the former hunting the other.  The other prototype involves the master 
metaphorical conception of emotion as force, and indicates the emotional effect, or 
beauty, hunting the person feeling the emotion.351  Barringer claims that ‘although 
both  women  and  boys  are  pursued,  only  the  male  can  become  the  hunter  in 
heterosexual relationships’.352  Now this is prima facie not true (see the example from 
Xenophon above),  but she does qualify her statement  by adding the proviso that 
when women do become the hunter, disaster results.353  There are implications for the 
female of taking the role of the hunter in the first prototypical model, that of one 
person as the hunter and the other as the hunted.  It is not so much a gender reversal, 
but an attempted power reversal, and this is significant in itself.  Morales states that 
in Achilles Tatius women use male metaphors when they are taking the male role. 
351 In Sappho fr.1.21 the ‘I am currently pursuing you, but soon you will pursue me’ motif cleverly 
combines the change of force of the emotion, the person who is in love will switch, with the change in 
the actual pursuit, where the person in love will pursue the object of affection.       
352 Barringer 2001, 123.
353 Barringer 2001, 124.  She provides the standard mythical examples, such as Phaedra.
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She is correct when she notes that ‘women use ‘male’ metaphors…when they are 
seducing’. 354  
The roles which an actor plays in the power dynamics of erotic vision have 
consequences for social expectations and protocols.  In this sense it is impossible to 
divorce  erotic  vision  from  cultural  norms,  particularly  the  cultural  protocols 
involving shame and vision.355  Hubbard in his analysis of a Pindaric ode and Greek 
vase paintings states that  the convention is for the erastes to stare straight  at  the 
eromenos and for the eromenos to look down.356  I will term this the prototypical 
scenario.  Hubbard’s subsequent conclusions, however, are less justified.  He argues 
that a number of vases show the eromenos looking straight at the erastes, and that 
this reverses the power dynamic of the relationship.  He compares this with Pindar’s 
ode on Theoxenus, where he claims that ‘what is significant in Pindar’s text is that 
beautiful boys are accorded power over their lovers in their capacities as both visual 
subjects (2-3) and objects (10-12)’.357  The lines in question are illuminated by the 
discussion upon the hunting metaphor above.  
Τὰς δὲ Θεοξένου ἀκτῖνας πρὸς ὄσσων (3)
μαρμαρυζοίσας δρακείς 
ὃς μὴ πόθῳ κυμαίνεται, ἐξ ἀδάμαντος
ἢ σιδάρου κεχάλκευται μέλαιναν καρδίαν
ψυχρᾷ φλογί
…
ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ τᾶς ἕκατι κηρὸς ὣς δαχθεὶς ἕλᾳ (10)
ἱρᾶν μελισσᾶν τάκομαι.
A distinction must be made between the force of the emotion and the intention of the 
object of viewing.  It is more correct to say not that the boy is given power over the 
older man, but that his beauty, via the emotion, exerts some power over the man. 
These are not the same things.  For instance his beauty exerts an emotional power 
regardless of his own intention, and so he cannot decide not to use it.  The narrator 
melts like wax (10) because of the force of the emotion.   Furthermore it is not a 
354 Morales 2005, 12.
355 For anger, the veil and visual aspects of shame see Cairns 1993 and 2001.  See also A.R.3.444–5, 
1017–20, 1022–4, 1063–8; E.Hipp.201–2, 239–49.
356 Hubbard 2002, 273.
357 Hubbard 2002, 283: numbers in brackets refer to line numbers in Pindar’s fr.123.
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simple power dynamic where the active and passive parties simply switch places, but 
the power struggle is an ongoing negotiation between the power (always actual) of 
the socially superior and the power (always active) of the beauty of the boy (see 
Barringer above).  This power negotiation is conducted within social protocols of 
behaviour.   It  is  this  aspect  which  leads  us  into  our  next  consideration,  which 
mediates erotic vision.  This is the notion of  αἰδώς or shame which mediates, to 
oversimplify somewhat, who can look and who should avert their gaze within the 
cultural context.358  I would interpret the vase paintings discussed by Hubbard, where 
the boy is looking straight at the older man, as an indication of a lack of αἰδώς.  This 
allows him to utilise his beauty in the same way as Chariclea strikes Thyamis like 
lightning when addressing him (see below).  Hubbard claims his findings call into 
question the penetration-centred regimen of phallic subordination.359  However, we 
must specify which level of power we are talking about here.  As above with the 
hunting metaphor, the third dynamic of the force of emotion is all important.  The 
beauty of the beloved results in the force of emotion, which prototypically causes the 
socially superior male to pursue the socially inferior and younger boy.  The boy or 
woman cannot switch their beauty, and therefore its emotional effect, on or off, but 
they can choose to manipulate and exploit it.  Therefore the best interpretation of this 
dynamic is as a discourse between the erastes and eromenos, a discourse caused by 
the force of emotion.360 
There  are  also  other  emotional  and  social  issues  which  can  affect  this 
relationship  between  two  lovers.   Longus  gives  the  clearest  example  of  staring 
directly  as  erotic  vision,  and  the  averting  of  the  gaze  as  αἰδώς-mediated  erotic 
vision.  Daphnis stares at Chloe intensely, because he is not feeling αἰδώς: πᾶσαν 
αὐτὴν ἔβλεπεν ἀπλήστως͵ οἷα μηδὲν αἰδούμενος (Longus 1.25.1).  It is the 
kind of emotion which forces one to look and ignore the emotion which prompts a 
sense of social  propriety,  αἰδώς.361  In terms of the process of the emotion both 
358 See Cairns 2005, 126–7.  See also Cairns 1993.
359 Hubbard 2002, 288.
360 See also Foucault 1990a, 249ff. on the use of pleasure and its discourses within social strictures. 
361 At Ach.Tat.1.10.3 there is tension between shame and desire.  Αἰδώς is an integral part of the 
erotic  experience.   Ach.Tat.1.10.4  states  that  even  if  a  woman  does  desire  her  suitor,  a  verbal 
invitation may still provoke shame and therefore restraint.  Therefore do not speak directly about your 
wishes.   This example presents an interesting gauging of the simultaneous demands of desire and 
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elements are present: erotic vision urges one to look directly at the other’s face, but 
keeps  surfacing  and  temporarily  restraining  the  person  feeling  the  emotion.   In 
Apollonius’  Argonautica Jason  and  Medea  exchange  erotic  glances  before 
succumbing to the averted gaze of αἰδώς (A.R.3.1022-4 and 1063-8).362
One interesting scene in Heliodorus depicts the beautiful Chariclea having an 
erotic effect on Thyamis.363  She looks her adversary square in the face and gives a 
speech telling of their  travels  and circumstances (Hld.1.21–22).  After her speech 
Thyamis is set aflame (Hld.1.23), but concedes to her request to delay a wedding 
between the two of them.  It is the assumption of the role of speaker which portrays 
her in a prototypically masculine role, not the act of looking him square in the face, 
which would merely indicate a lack of αἰδώς.364  This certainly could be interpreted 
negatively in antiquity, as in the writings of the physiognomists failure to lower the 
eye in a woman is taken as a sign that she is a prostitute.365  Yet this is surely not true 
in the context since Chariclea is a chaste, probably ‘perfect’ woman in Heliodorus, 
and her direct and confident rhetoric aids the couple’s situation.  Her role is indeed 
like the male Odysseus’s connivance in disparate situations.  She looks him directly 
in the face in order to take advantage of her beauty, which has an emotional impact 
and aids her persuasive ability.366  The point is not that she has suddenly ‘switched’ 
social face by the individual (see chapter on opponent for more).    
362 When Jason and Hypsipyle are face to face she avoids looking at him, and blushes with  αἰδώς 
(A.R.1.790–1).  Medea looks Jason straight in the face at A.R.3.287 then later from behind her veil 
(A.R.3.444–5).  
363 Morgan 2004, 542, discusses this passage in a narratological context.
364 When Daphnis  feels  αἰδώς in  front  of  his  master  Dionysophanes  he  looks downward:  ἀλλὰ 
ἐρυθήματος πλησθεὶς ἔνευσε κάτω (Longus 4.14.2).  Αἰδώς can also be triggered by a direct 
look.  When Daphnis looks at Chloe he cannot help blushing: βλέπων δ΄ ἐρυθήματι ἐπίμπλατο 
(Longus 1.17.2). 
365 Ps.Polemo 81=i.430 Foerster.
366 Looking at someone is an action which can be evaluated differently depending upon who is doing 
the looking and the person judging the looking.   S.Aj.462–3 and  OT 528  both cite the notion of 
ἀναίδεια as  looking  at  someone  when  it  is  not  appropriate  to  do  so.   Cairns  2005,  131  cites 
Xenophon  Hell.7.1.30 for the idea of ‘being seen from all  sides’,  περίβλεπτος,  as a metonymous 
reference to others’ admiration, but this refers to men.  Certainly the visibility of Callirhoe in Chariton 
is not beneficial to the woman herself, and in fact causes most of her problems.  There is also an 
expectation for men to refrain from looking at women they are not supposed to.  Artaxerxes’ eyes 
‘steal’ a glance at Callirhoe, κλέπτοντας (Chariton 6.1.7), and this metaphor encapsulates nicely the 
social impropriety behind his act and intentions.  The metaphor of vision as ‘stealing’ is also used at 
Ach.Tat.1.5.3 and Leucippe is ashamed at being ‘caught in the act’ by her mother, πεφωραμένη, at 
Ach.Tat.2.29.1–2.  The verb ‘to be caught’ is cognate with the noun meaning ‘thief’, φώρ.  Leucippe 
is not stealing anything, and therefore the verb is metaphorically applies to the social impropriety of 
the action.      
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the power relationship, as many scholars seem to think in regards to narrow notions 
of active and passive, but negotiates against the existing power dynamic—Thyamis 
is a bandit chieftain, has captured her and can force her if he wishes—in order to 
further her own cause.367  A better way of regarding the relationship between erastes 
and eromenos,  or the lover and beloved,  is  as a discourse embedded in personal 
desires  and  cultural  protocols,  rather  than  a  simple  and  linear  active-passive 
relationship which merely switches one way and another. 
 
367 A similar but non-erotic example appears in Apollonius Rhodius, where Medea stares directly at 
the giant Talus and uses her magic to destroy him.  Buxton 2000, 272, claims that when Medea stares 
at Talus there is a reversal of sexual roles, as she is taking on a masculine role.  I would rather state 
that  she is  using the ability of her  direct  gaze,  which would not always  be appropriate  given the 
expectations of αἰδώς, for her own benefit.     
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II The Anatomy of Vision
The above section outlined the implications of the cultural models and metaphors 
used of erotic vision in the Greek Novel and previous literature.  I will now move on 
to specifically examine the entities involved in the visual dynamics.  In such a visual 
context the eye of course plays a major role.  However, there are several interesting 
features  in  erotic  descriptions  of  the  eye  which  are  not  reducible  to  the  trivial 
statement that the eye is the means and mechanism for vision.  Descriptions of the 
eye  reveal  cultural  notions  and  prejudices.   In  the  science  of  physiognomics 
contemporary to the novels, which tried to infer internal mental processes and states 
or character from external signs, the eye was the most discussed feature.368       
Erotic vision can sometimes be seen as ‘proper’ seeing, due to the increase in 
concentration upon the object of affection.  When  Daphnis first falls in love with 
Chloe, it is as if he has eyes for the first time: ὥσπερ τότε πρῶτον ὀφθαλμοὺς 
κτησάμενος (Longus 1.17.3).  As with other areas of vision, metaphors of force 
reveal  the  operation  of  the  emotion.   Chloe  cannot  master  her  eyes  (under  the 
influence of ἔρως) and both of the main couple’s eyes are captured.369  In the later 
example mutual capturing illustrates nicely the force of the emotion.   Each party 
projects  their  κάλλος and  each  party  is  forced  to  look  regardless  of  their  own 
intention.   Callirhoe can be described as ‘leading all  eyes  present’:  ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη 
μόνη  τοὺς  ἁπάντων  ἐδημαγώγησεν  ὀφθαλμούς (Chariton  4.1.10).370  In 
actual fact it is her  κάλλος which forces others’ eyes regardless of their (and her) 
will.   The  eyes  are  not  just  receptors  of  beauty  but  can  be  a  focal  point  of 
transmission.  The eyes of the beloved contain κάλλος.  It sits upon the eyes most of 
all: μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς κάθηται τὸ κάλλος (Ach.Tat.6.6.3). This 
368 Swain 2007, 12 says that a striking feature of the physiognomist Polemon’s work is the attention 
given to the eye: about 30 percent.  As a comparison the Ps.Aristotelian treatise on physiognomics 
makes little use of the eye, so in Polemon’s era this may reflect a culturally specific emphasis.  One 
reason for this could be that in contemporary rhetorical training the eye and the face are emphasised: 
see Gleason 1995, 57.  
369 Longus  1.13.5,  τῶν  ὀφθαλμῶν  οὐκ  ἐκράτει,  and  Longus  1.24.1,  ἐγίνετο  ἤδη  τῶν 
ὀφθαλμῶν ἅλωσις  αὐτοῖς.   Clitophon cannot  master  his  gaze  either  (Ach.Tat.2.1.1).   Arsace 
‘hangs’ her eye, ἀναρτήσασα, from Theagenes alone (Hld.7.8.6).
370 On Callirhoe as a visual object see Egger 1994a.
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implies  that  it  also  sits  elsewhere,  but  is  particularly  rooted  in  the  eyes.371  Its 
associate pleasure,  ἡδονή, also enters through the eyes and sits in the inside of the 
body:  ἡ  δὲ  τῆς  θέας ἡδονὴ  διὰ  τῶν  ὀμμάτων  εἰσρέουσα  τοῖς  στέρνοις 
ἐγκάθηται (Ach.Tat.5.13.4).372  The  eyes’  role  as  intermediary  is  nicely 
encapsulated by Achilles Tatius when he calls the eye the ‘ambassador’, πρόξενος, of 
φιλία (Ach.Tat.1.9.5).373  The context  is erotic where  φιλία,  friendship or being 
well disposed towards someone, is seen as a result of erotic attraction.  
We also encounter the physical properties of eyes.  When Calasiris beholds 
lovesick Chariclea he notes that her eyes are ‘moist’ with  ἔρως:  ὀφθαλμοὺς τῷ 
ἔρωτι διαβρόχους (Hld.3.7.1).  She is upset and it indicates that there are tears in 
her  eyes.   First  Calasiris  reads  the  eyes  as  revealing  inner  state,  which  is  not  a 
particularly remarkable  piece of inference given the common association  of tears 
with grief.  So wet eyes are symptomatic of grief, and grief is here metonymical of 
ἔρως, as grief is often part of the erotic experience.  Later on in the same chapter we 
are told that Chariclea, experiencing the symptoms of love, looked like she had the 
fire of her glance quenched by her tears as if by water: τὸ φλέγον τοῦ βλέμματος 
καθάπερ ὕδασιν ἐῴκει τοῖς δάκρυσιν ἀποσβεννύμενον (Hld.3.19.1).  Fire is 
another  common  metaphor  for  love,  and  the  narrator  is  conceptualising  her 
symptoms  with  the  metaphor  of  passion  being  doused  by  grief.   The  erotic 
experience  leads  to  multiple  emotions,  and  often  ones  which  pull  in  different 
directions.  This metaphor also conceptualises emotion as a process where passion is 
succeeded by grief,  a  sequence of  emotions  which is  contained  within the  erotic 
process.     
371 The painting of Andromeda also describes the κάλλος which ‘blooms’ out of the eyes: ἐκ δὲ τῶν 
ὀφθαλμῶν ἀνθεῖ τὸ κάλλος (Ach.Tat.3.7.3).  At Hld.7.8.6 Arsace ‘hangs’, ἀναρτάω, only upon 
the eye of Theagenes.
372 In the debate over which is better, pederasty or heterosexual love,  Ach.Tat.2.35.3 describes the 
beauty of boys as ‘more bitter in terms of pleasure’: τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῖς δριμύτερον εἰς ἡδονήν. 
The metaphor here is  in favour of pederasty,  and so not negative,  and the metaphor of bitterness 
represents intensity of feeling, sharpness.  
373 Clitophon also states that when he and Leucippe were staring at one another they were neither 
‘gaining nor daring more than the eyes:  καὶ πλέον τῶν ὀμμάτων ἐκερδαίνομεν ἢ ἐτολμῶμεν 
οὐδέν  (Ach.Tat.2.3.3).   The  eye  is  thus  the  middle  part  of  the  process,  before  the  couple  can 
metaphorically ‘gain’ the advantage of physical relations.  Daring refers to the subversion of social 
strictures by their actions.  
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In Heliodorus the eye does merely play the role of creating ἔρως in the two 
lovers,  but maintains its importance in their  continuing relationship.   Gazing into 
each other’s eyes creates a memory of their passion and vision makes their thought, 
διάνοια,  flare  up  like  burning  wood:  ἡ  γὰρ  τῶν  ἐρωτικῶν  ἀντίβλεψις 
ὑπόμνησις  τοῦ  πάσχοντος  γίνεται  καὶ  ἀναφλέγει  τὴν  διάνοιαν  ἡ  θέα 
καθάπερ ὕλη πυρὶ γινομένη (Hld.4.4.4).  Vision of one another reinforces and 
increases the intensity of their mutual ἔρως.
The  eyes  signal  love,  but  they  can  also  exert  an  influence  because  they 
project κάλλος, and possibly other emotional effects geared towards persuasion.  In 
book eight of Heliodorus Arsace is in despair because Achaemenes has left to tell her 
husband Oroondates of her attempted affair with Theagenes, but she claims that if 
she can see him then all will be well.  She will cry because the glance of a wife 
persuades like a love charm: μίαν θεραπείαν καὶ δάκρυον Ἀρσάκειον ἓν οὐχ 
ὑποστήσεται·  μεγάλην  εἰς  πειθὼ  κέκτηται  πρὸς  ἄνδρας ἴυγγα  τὰ 
γυναικεῖα καὶ σύνοικα βλέμματα (Hld.8.5.7).  It is possible that this is her own 
biased opinion, but we have parallels  for the attitude that a wife’s looks exert an 
influence  on  her  husband.   In  Tacitus,  one  critical  factor  in  getting  Claudius  to 
condemn Messalina is that he does not see her or hear her defence.374  Emotion and 
the display of emotion in the face can be used for persuasive purposes, especially in 
an erotic relationship.                    
Vision  is  communicative  body  language:  it  reveals  to  some  extent  the 
thoughts or intention of the person looking.  Cnemon tells us that his stepmother 
Demaenete’s  looks,  ‘separated  from  self-control’,  led  him  into  suspicion:  τὸ 
βλέμμα τοῦ σώφρονος ἐξιστάμενον πρὸς ὑπόνοιαν ἦγεν (Hld.1.9.3).  The 
nature of her look is not described.  We are merely told that it indicated her lustful 
thoughts.  The closest we get to a description of what a lustful gaze looks like is at 
Hld.7.12.7,  where  Theagenes  recalls  how  Arsace  stared  at  him  continuously, 
ἀτενές,  the previous day:  ὡς ἀτενὲς αὐτῷ καὶ ἰταμὸν συνεχές τε καὶ τῶν 
ἀπρεπεστέρων δηλωτικὸν προσέβλεπεν.  In addition her look was unseemly: 
374 Tac.Ann.11.28.
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ἀπρεπεστέρων.  Indeed self-control or a lack of can be seen in the way people 
look.   Arsace  cast  eyes  at  Theagenes  which  were  not  chaste:  ὀφθαλμούς  τε 
ἐπέβαλλεν οὐ σώφρονας (Hld.7.2.2).  A glance can indicate a lack of restraint, 
and staring can show the indifference to αἰδώς typical in a lover’s stare (see above). 
The power of vision also means that the effluences of beauty can provoke a lack of 
restraint.   Thyamis  stays  away from Chariclea because he cannot look at her and 
keep  control  of  himself  at  the  same  time:  οὐ  δυνατὸν  βλέπειν  τε  ἅμα καὶ 
σωφρονεῖν ἡγούμενος (Hld.1.24.3).  Thyamis is ostensibly in the same boat as 
the ‘wicked women’ in the novel, although the mark of his superior character is that 
he deliberately does not look at Chariclea.  Demaenete and Arsace do stare at the 
objects  of  their  affection,  and  this  leads  to  their  glances  becoming  unchaste,  or 
lustful.  This reading of the eyes, face and ‘look’ is not physiognomics proper but 
conforms to general folk models which posit that inner emotion can be seen upon the 
face.  Indeed as we have seen this is true to some extent.375  In English we have the 
same  notion,  as  with  the statement  ‘you can  see  the love  in  her  eyes’,  which  is 
perfectly acceptable to any fluent speaker. 
At  the  start  of  Heliodorus’  novel  Chariclea’s  glance,  in  interacting  with 
Thyamis,  becomes  ‘more  striking/imposing’:  τὸ  βλέμμα  κεκίνητο  πρὸς  τὸ 
γοργότερον (Hld.1.21.3).  This is part of the same passage discussed above, where 
Chariclea is looking Thyamis full in the face.  It is therefore the direct gaze which is 
having a particular effect.  Theagenes is also described by Arsace’s nurse Cybele as 
having  ‘an  expression  at  one  and  the  same  time  attractive  and  imposing’:  τὸ 
βλέμμα καὶ ἐραστὸν ἅμα καὶ γοργὸν προσβλέπων (Hld.7.10.4).376  Morgan’s 
translation as ‘imposing’ encapsulates the notion that their  gaze has an emotional 
effect: this seems to be the primary effect of the term.   So although the adjective 
γοργός often refers to the emotional effect one can have through one’s eyes, and 
this is a case of κάλλος causing others to stop and take notice.377  
375 See Introduction on Ekman.  
376 Morgan’s translation in Reardon 1989.
377 The adjective γοργός is difficult to translate: it can mean either ‘grim’ or ‘spirited’. At A.Th.537 it 
is  used of  Parthenopaeus,  who walks with a  grim look in his  eyes.   The comparative  is  used at 
X.Cyr.4.4.3:  καὶ  γὰρ  μείζους  φαίνεσθε  καὶ καλλίους  καὶ  γοργότεροι  ἢ  πρόσθεν  ἰδεῖν. 
139
The eyes more than any other body part project beauty, the  κάλλος of the 
beloved or object of affection.  Chloe, upon seeing Daphnis naked, can even fall into 
(his)  κάλλος:  ἡ  μὲν  γὰρ  γυμνὸν  ὁρῶσα  τὸν  Δάφνιν  ἐπ΄  ἄθρουν  καὶ 
ἐνέπιπτε τὸ κάλλος (Longus 1.24.1).  Falling into κάλλος here emphasizes the 
passivity of the emotional state (see more in chapter on ontology).  In Longus vision 
is, as elsewhere, the prerequisite for ἔρως.378  The lecherous Gnathon declares that in 
whichever body one finds κάλλος, with that one they are taken: ἀλλ΄ ἐν οἵῳ ποτε 
ἂν σώματι εὕρῃ τὸ κάλλος͵ ἑάλωκε (Longus 4.17.3).  This gnome is certainly 
true of the novels and recalls Sappho’s famous priamel.379  In Chariton’s novel we 
have perhaps the greatest emphasis on  κάλλος.  Callirhoe evokes admiration and 
ἔρως wherever she goes.380  It is difficult for crowds to tear themselves away from 
the sight of her: τὸ Καλλιρόης κάλλος δυσαπόσπαστον τοῖς ὁρῶσι (Chariton 
5.8.7).   In the court  room earlier  all  are  amazed at  the initial  sight of Callirhoe: 
ὀφθεῖσα δὲ θάμβος ἐποίησε (Chariton 5.5.9).381  Homer is quoted to provide an 
analogy  with  Penelope:  πάντες  δ’  ἠρήσαντο  παραὶ  λεχέεσσι  κλιθῆναι 
Cyrus is thanking the Median and Hyrcanian cavalrymen for doing a good job, and compliments them 
by saying that they seem larger, finer and more ‘terrible’ to look upon than before.  The attribute is 
seen as coexistent with but distinct from κάλλος, and of course is not here used in an erotic context. 
What is consistent across the examples is that someone with a  γοργός look causes an emotional 
reaction in the viewer.  It can also indicate character.  The physiognomicist  Adamantius refers to a 
brave person as having a moist and ‘striking’ gaze (2.44= i.409–10 Foerster).  There is of course a 
mythological connotation to the adjective: the Gorgon.  Lucian says he is struck by a beautiful woman 
like a gorgon.  Lucian  Imagines 1.1:  ἀλλ' ἦ τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπασχον οἱ τὴν Γοργὼ ἰδόντες οἷον 
ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἔπαθον, ὦ Πολύστρατε, παγκάλην τινὰ γυναῖκα ἰδών.  
378 At least most of the time.  In Achilles Tatius Callisthenes falls in love through rumour rather than 
direct observation, but the author presents it as deviant, and it is certainly deviant compared to the 
view of the novels in general (Ach.Tat.2.13.1).
379 Sappho 16, 1–4: the fairest thing is whatever one loves.
380 See Schmeling 2005 for the presentation of Callirhoe as a ‘celebrity’  in the mould of Helen of 
Troy.  See also Egger 1994.  Chariclea is a visual object at Hld.2.4 and 10.9 and ‘turns’ eyes towards 
herself at Hld.2.33.3.
381 For the metaphor of the ‘force of surprise’ see also Chariton 1.14.1; 1.14.2; 2.2.2; 2.5.4; 2.3.6; 
3.3.2; 3.4.1; 3.6.4; 4.2.11; 4.3.8.  When κάλλος strikes people it is this element which is emphasised. 
Chloe ‘knocks out’ those standing by with her beauty: Ἐξέπλησσε γὰρ κἀκείνας ἡ Χλόη κάλλος 
ἐκφέρουσα (4.33.4).  See also Longus 1.3.2; 4.8.2; 4.18.2.  Morales 2005, 6, states that ‘the novels 
reclaim for ‘real’ women what has previously been the privilege of a solitary figure from myth’.  This 
is a misleading statement however.  The Greek Novel is idealist rather than realist.  Their heroines, 
especially Callirhoe and Chariclea, are elevated nearer to the beauty of goddesses rather than being 
realist constructions.  The immaculate moral behaviour of the female main lover in the novels also 
points towards their status as a male fantasy, a view which would accord with the dominant view of 
the novel’s readership as educated and wealthy: see introduction.       
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(Chariton 5.5.9/Od.1.366; 18.213).382  Here amazement is not only amazement but 
reflects  the desire  of  those in  court  to have sex with Callirhoe.383  Chariton  also 
reflects social prejudices concerning beauty.  Dionysius reasons that Callirhoe cannot 
be a slave, for a body not born free cannot be beautiful (and she is!): ‘ἀδύνατον’ 
εἶπεν,  ‘ὦ  Λεωνᾶ,  καλὸν  εἶναι  σῶμα  μὴ  πεφυκὸς  ἐλεύθερον’ (Chariton 
2.1.5).  It is possible that this represents only Dionysius’ opinion as an educated and 
wealthy Ionian Greek.  If he desires Callirhoe for marriage, then it is not seemly for a 
man in his position to take a slave, and so his comment can be seen as excusing his 
desire.  However, he is speaking to Leonas, his servant, and his view must have some 
more general cultural credibility.   
Her  beauty  is  such  that  those  looking  upon  Callirhoe  are  ‘charmed’, 
κεκηλημένων (Chariton 2.3.10).384  The context is not ostensibly erotic, as it is the 
crowd which is  held enthralled  by the sight  of her.   However,  this  effect  shares 
something with the other metaphors used of visual beauty.  Erotic vision partakes of 
382 This is an important comparison.  The first point is that at the trial Callirhoe has several ‘suitors’. 
Ostensibly these are Chaereas and Dionysius, but there is also the king.  This passage looks ahead to 
the following plot twist: the king himself wants to sleep with Callirhoe.  This means that the inception 
of this desire, ἔρως for Callirhoe, is upon first beholding her at the trial.  If the Homeric verse refers 
to the king’s thought (as it surely must do), as an equal more important than others in this context, 
then the gaze is the inceptive factor.  Later on the king involves himself in an inner monologue.  In 
this dispute he argues that it will be enough for him merely to look upon Callirhoe, and so he will 
delay the trial: ἀρκεῖ σοι Καλλιρόην κἂν βλέπειν (Chariton 6.1.12).  This is the rhetoric of self-
denial as later on he will actively seek her bed.  See also Chaereas when he is shocked at seeing 
Callirhoe’s statue:  τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ (Chariton 3.6.3).  Vision has a 
physiological effect.  
383 Callirhoe is emphasised as a visual object throughout the novel (see above).  The boatmen who see 
Callirhoe at Chariton 3.2.14 react fearfully: δείματι κατεσχέθησαν.  The crowd at Chariton 3.2.16 
has only the desire to see Callirhoe: μία δὲ πάντων ἦν ἐπιθυμία Καλλιρόην θεάσασθαι.  Her 
effect on the crowd at Chariton 4.1.9 is so severe that we are told even the children were affected: 
ἔπαθόν τι καὶ παῖδες.  Her presence is like a ray of the sun,  ὡς ἀκτῖνος, and no-one there can 
endure the sight of her: ὑπήνεγκε.  She also exerts a sonic effect.  At Chariton 3.1.8 it is Callirhoe’s 
words  which  cause  Dionysius  to  burn  more  fiercely  with  desire.   It  is  the  rumour,  φήμη,  of 
Callirhoe’s beauty which first stimulates Artaxerxes (Chariton 4.6.7).  There is an element of mass 
visual eroticism at Chariton 5.5.9 when Callirhoe enters the court.  Chariton uses a Homeric quotation 
to assess her emotional impact.  Everyone in the room wishes to lie beside her: πάντες δ’ ἠρήσαντο 
παραὶ  λεχέεσσι  κλιθῆναι (see  Od.1.366;  18.213  and  above).   This  quotation  brings  her  into 
comparison with Penelope who also had multiple suitors.  By invoking a comparison with Penelope it 
actually not only avoids mentioning sex but also emphasises Callirhoe’s chastity, her lack of sexual 
activity (despite the fact she has already succumbed to Dionysius’ advances).  
384 At A.Supp.1003-5 the look of the lover seeks to bewitch its object.  Note that again it is the vision 
of the attractive party which bewitches, regardless of their intention.  See also the charms in Ibycus 
287 above.  
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mainly  conventional  metaphors  for  ἔρως,  and  these  are  forceful,  not  persuasive. 
However,  although  the  metaphor  of  bewitching  is  not  as  violent  as  those  of 
conquering and shooting, the element of compulsion remains present.  No one can 
‘bear’ Callirhoe’s flashing κάλλος:  τὴν μαρμαρυγὴν ὑπήνεγκε τοῦ κάλλους 
(Chariton 4.1.9).385  In the Greek Novel  κάλλος is the factor which creates  ἔρως. 
This does not necessarily lead to people refeeling ἔρως whenever they see someone 
else with  κάλλος.   Clitophon claims that now that he is blind to his betrothed’s 
beauty  and  can  only  see  Leucippe:  νῦν  δὲ  καὶ  πρὸς  τὸ  κάλλος  αὐτῆς 
τυφλώττω  καὶ  πρὸς  Λευκίππην  μόνην  τοὺς  ὀφθαλμοὺς  ἔχω 
(Ach.Tat.1.11.2).  Κάλλος creates ἔρως, but once it is created it cannot be undone 
in the Greek Novel.    
In Heliodorus as in Chariton beauty has a striking effect, but not necessarily 
an erotic one.  A gnomic assertion by the narrator at Hld.4.3.2 states that  κάλλος 
‘induces’  εὔνοια,  ‘good  intention’,  in  those  watching:  ἐπακτικὸν  γάρ  τι  καὶ 
πρῶτον  ὁρώντων  εἰς  εὔνοιαν  τὸ  κάλλος.   Κάλλος makes  people  benign 
towards  you,  and  does  not  automatically  provoke  ἔρως,  although  some  of  the 
passages quoted from the other novels might  give that  impression.   This excerpt 
coheres with the notion of ἔρως in one respect, in that beauty engenders good will 
regardless of your own intention.   The gnome does not say that  κάλλος induces 
favouritism if you are so disposed, merely that it induces favouritism full stop, via 
the  medium of  sight:  ὁρώντων.   This  aspect  relates  to  the  more  forceful  erotic 
notion of vision.  Arsace’s sycophantic servant Cybele asks her who would be crazy 
enough not to be ‘defeated’ by her beauty:  τίς  οὕτως ἀλαζὼν καὶ ἔκφρων ὡς 
τοῦ κατὰ σὲ τοσούτου κάλλους μὴ ἡττῆσθαι (Hld.7.9.5).  The verb ἡττῆσθαι 
(discussed  in  the  chapter  on  emotional  conflict)  indicates  the  metaphor  of  the 
conquest of beauty, or rather the erastes as passively affected by the object of their 
385 Κάλλος is also ‘flashing’ at Chariton 5.3.9.  The simile is of the beauty of Callirhoe as a blinding 
flash at night.  The metaphor in μαρμαρυγὴν comes from the root marmar-, indicating a sparkling 
rock or marble.  When Chaireas and Callirhoe finally return to Sicily dressed in Persian finery their 
effect upon the people is greater than lighting and thunder to the senses (Chariton 8.6.8).  In  Pindar 
fr.123.2-3 rays flash out from the eyes of Theoxenus    
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affection.   Cybele’s  rhetoric  inverts  the  norm  and  implies  that  someone  not 
dominated  by Arsace’s  beauty,  i.e.  not  feeling  ἔρως,  must  be out  of their  mind, 
ἔκφρων.  Ἀλαζὼν, ‘boaster’, adds the detail that the person who is not affected is 
either lying or mad.  As we have seen being out of your mind or mad is one of the 
very metaphors  used of  the  erotic  experience.   Here in  contrast  giving  in  to  the 
emotion  is  seen  as  the  rational  or  honest  option,  and  not  feeling  emotion  is  an 
aberration.   The  use  of  metaphors  varies  with  the  speaker’s  opinions  and 
requirements, but always utilises the same core concepts.  
The prevalent model of κάλλος as an entity in the Greek Novel conceives of 
it as an effluence which flows from the object and emanates towards and into the 
recipient.  Indeed the name of Chariton’s heroine, Callirhoe, is formed from the two 
word κάλλος and ῥοή, meaning ‘the flowing of beauty’.386  Xenophon of Ephesus 
provides us with an instance of the terminology in relation to sight.
Ὅλοις μὲν καὶ ἀναπεπταμένοις τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τὸ Ἁβροκόμου κάλλος εἰσρέον 
δεχομένη (X.Eph.1.3.2).
Eyes ‘wide open’,  ἀναπεπταμένοις, is a description of body language indicating 
the extent of her desire for the vision.  The wider her eyes are, the greater the amount 
of  κάλλος she can take into her body.387  The notion of effluences can be traced 
back to Greek philosophy, and perhaps the most famous instance of it lies in Plato’s 
works.  
Δεξάμενος  γὰρ  τοῦ  κάλλους  τὴν  ἀπορροὴν  διὰ  τῶν  ὀμμάτων  ἐθερμάνθη 
(Pl.Phdr.251b)
386 See Morales 2005, 7, and the etymological hypothesis of Plato’s Cratylus 439d-e which connects 
the word ἔρως with ῥέω (Calame 1992, 21).  The same conceptualisation appears in Achilles Tatius 
where  he  ‘sluices’  ἔρως at  the  sight  of  Leucippe:  ἐποχετευσάμενος  ἐκ  τῆς  θέας  ἔρωτα 
(Ach.Tat.1.6.6).  The emotion is conceived of as a liquid entity.   See also Morales 2004, 79.  At 
Ach.Tat.2.29.2  αἰδώς flows  through  the  eyes  and  takes  away  their  freedom:  αἰδὼς  διὰ  τῶν 
ὀμμάτων εἰσρέουσα τὴν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλευθερίαν καθαιρεῖ.  
387 The effluences of κάλλος being taken into the body could also have been chosen because of erotic 
connotations pertaining to sex.
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In his description of the soul ‘taking flight’ Plato recognises vision as the initial part 
of the erotic process.  Beauty is received as an effluence through the eyes.  This is a 
frequently used element of ancient Greek scientific theory on vision.388
Xenophon of Ephesus gives us the conception in its  most  basic form, but 
Achilles Tatius describes the psychological processes involved with  κάλλος in a 
more complex way.  At 1.4.4 in Achilles Tatius’ Leucippe and Clitophon we see a 
connection  made between the flight  of  an arrow and the effluences  of  sight:  the 
mixing of literary and scientific metaphor.
Κάλλος γὰρ ὀξύτερον τιτρώσκει βέλους καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν 
καταρρεῖ (Ach.Tat.1.4.4).   
A metaphor of wounding is introduced here,  τιτρώσκει, which is developed further 
in the sentence following it.  It explains that the eyes are in fact the passageway for 
erotic  wounding,  ὀφθαλμὸς γὰρ ὁδὸς ἐρωτικῷ τραύματι.   The metaphorical 
concept of the passageway of effluences in sight,  ὁδός,  has been linked with the 
metaphor  of  ἔρως as  a wound of the body.   The pithy statement  preceding this 
passage  encompasses  both  notions:  ὡς  δὲ  εἶδον,  εὐθὺς  ἀπωλώλειν 
(Ach.Tat.1.4.4).389  Sight, via effluences which are similar to missiles in that they fly 
through the air,  has the capacity to do physical  damage,  in terms of the missiles 
connected with ἔρως.390  The destination of these effluences is the ψυχή or soul.391 
This interlinking of metaphorical conceptions points in the direction of a network of 
correspondences rather than a simple pairing.           
388 See  Cairns  2005,  138-9.   See  also  Empedocles  89  DK:  πάντων  εἰσὶν  ἀπορροαί,  ὅσσ’ 
ἐγένοντο.   Alcmaon of Croton considered that the eye  contained fire and sent out beams which 
bounced  back  off  objects  to  form  mirror  images  in  the  eye  (Alcmaeon  a5  DK).   The  atomists 
Leucippus  and  Democritus  held  that  εἴδωλα streamed  off  objects  and  impinged  upon  the  eyes 
(Leucippus a29 DK).  This concept has a precedent  in Empedocles a92 DK where effluences  are 
received into the eye.  Stoic and Galenic theories involve the flow of passion from the brain via the 
eye to the object: see Chrysippus SVF 2.866; Galen, De Plac. Hippocr. Et Plat. 7.5 (5.618-28 K).
389 The meaning of the Greek would probably work in English as well: ‘as soon as I saw her, I was 
lost’.
390 The coherence of these images is a common one.  References to fire, rays or arrows which emanate 
from the eyes of the beloved can be seen in the following: A.Ag.742-3, S.fr.157 R, Anacreontea 26, 
AP 5.36.3-4, 12.63, 12.72, 12.93.9-10, 12.110, 12.144.  See also Cairns 2005, 139.
391 See Foucault  1990a, 40, who notes that the gaze is often thought to be an opening by which the 
soul is reached.  See X.Mem.1.3.12-13.
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The  most  discussed  pseudo-scientific  passage  in  the  novels  appears  in 
Heliodorus’  Aethiopica.392  Calasiris  is  initiating  the  process  of  helping  the  two 
young lovers escape from Greece.  Chariclea has just seen Theagenes in a public 
procession, fallen in love, and lies lovesick at home.  Her adopted father Charicles is 
disturbed  at  what  is  happening,  and  consults  the  Egyptian  priest  Calasiris,  since 
Egyptian priests have a reputation for arcane and powerful knowledge.393  Calasiris 
proceeds to diagnose the girl for her father.  His intention, which the reader is aware 
of, is to hide her condition from her father so that plans can be made for their escape 
more easily.  Instead of love he attributes her illness to an ancient superstition, the 
evil eye.  It is this malicious power which has confined her to her bed.
‘‘You must not be surprised,’ I replied, ‘if, by taking part in a procession before such a huge 
crowd of people, she has attracted the attention of an evil eye.’  ‘‘So,’ said Charikles, with a 
mocking laugh, ‘you share the vulgar belief that there is such a thing as the power of the evil 
eye?’  ‘‘Of course,’ I replied. ‘It is as real as it could be.  Let me explain.  We are completely 
enveloped in air, which permeates our bodies by way of our eyes, nose, respiratory tract, and 
other  channels,  bringing  with  it,  as  it  enters,  various  properties  from  outside,  thus 
engendering in those who take it  in an effect corresponding to the properties it  induces. 
Thus, when a man looks maliciously upon beauty, he imbues the air around him with the 
quality of malevolence, and disperses his own breath [πνεῦμα], charged as it is with spite, 
towards his neighbour.  Being composed of such fine particles, it penetrates to his bones, to 
his very marrow.  So in many cases disease is caused by malice, and this effect is quite 
properly spoken of as the power of an evil eye.’’394 
This passage describes the folk superstition of the evil eye, Baskania, common from 
ancient  Greek  times  up  to  the  present  day.   Its  status  as  a  folk  superstition  is 
exemplified by Charicles’ scorn of the idea.  In the Greek it is cited as a notion which 
‘ὁ πολὺς ὄχλος’ adheres to, a disparaging remark implying something like ‘the 
ignorant masses’.  It is most firmly within the realms of the ancient Greek folk model 
of  psychology,  where  the  malicious  eye  can  exert  an  evil  influence  on  the 
unsuspecting person.  What is striking about this passage is that Calasiris describes 
the phenomenon of the evil eye using scientific language.  In this first piece of proof 
for the existence of the evil eye Calasiris uses knowledge which bears similarity to a 
piece written by the 2nd century CE doctor Galen.395  Baskania is treated like a disease 
392 See Dickie 1991; Robiano 2003; Sandy 1982; Winkler 1982; Yatromanolakis 1988.
393 See Dickie 1991 and Levin 1992.
394 Heliodorus 3.7 (translation Morgan in Reardon 1989, 416).
395 Galen’s  dates  are  129-199/216 C.E.,  and  so  Heliodorus  is  most  likely  writing  after  him (see 
introduction and Robiano 2003).
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and is described in terms of an air–born contagion: πνεῦμα.396  Thus the folk belief 
of the evil eye is backed up with a scientific explanation of how the phenomenon 
works, and in using Galen Calasiris is invoking an expert model.  Calasiris goes on to 
provide additional proof to Charicles.  
‘‘Here is another instance, Charikles.  Many people contract ophthalmia or some infectious 
disease without having touched the patient at all or shared a bed or table with him, merely by 
breathing the same air.  Conclusive proof of my point is furnished by the genesis of love, 
which originates from visually perceived objects, which, if you will excuse the metaphor, 
shoot arrows of passion, swifter than the wind, into the soul by way of the eyes.  This is 
perfectly logical,  because,  of  all  our channels  of  perception,  sight  is  the least  static and 
contains the most heat, and so it is more receptive of such emanations [ἀπορροίας]; for the 
spirit  [πνεύματι]  which animates  it  is  akin to fire,  and so it  is  well  suited to absorb the 
transient and unstable impressions of love.’’397
This further proof is presented in the same way as the previous section, but it differs 
to such an extent as to be logically inconsistent with has gone before.  Rather than 
the malicious man imbuing the air with his envy and thereby transmitting the evil 
eye, this section gives the example of a passive reception of visual matter.  In the 
second section we see the use of the terminology for effluences,  τὰς ἀπορροίας, 
which is essentially a Platonic and Democritean model of vision (see above).  Dickie 
says that this passage is a pastiche based on Plutarch.398  A similar discussion of the 
evil eye appears in his  Moralia, and since Plutarch lived around 50 to 120 C.E. he 
could have been the inspiration for Heliodorus’ exposition.  Plutarch includes the 
same types of explanation as here, breath born contagion and effluences.399  Dickie 
argues that Heliodorus’ passage is deliberately inconsistent in order to let Calasiris 
mock the gullible Charicles.  Cairns has pointed out that part of the inconsistency in 
this passage can actually be explained by conflicting Greek folk models.400  The first 
factor  involved  in  this  is  the  difference  between  the  evil  eye  itself,  which  is 
associated with the notion of φθόνος or envy, and the example of passion used to 
back it up.  He has argued that the model of the emanation of the evil eye in the first 
396 Galen’s  De diff. febr. 7.279 K.  The visual theory of the Stoics and Galen involves the flow of 
πνεῦμα from the brain via the eyes to the object:  see Cairns 2005, 138; Chrysippus  SVF 2.866; 
Galen De Plac.Hippocr. et Plat. 5.618-28 K.   
397 Heliodorus 3.7 (translation Morgan in Reardon 1989, 416).
398 See Dickie 1991.
399 See Plut.Mor.681d. 
400 See Cairns 2005, 141.
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section is consistent with the active presentation of the evil eye in Greek models of 
thought—one feels envy towards another and affects them with one’s gaze—whereas 
the  reception  of  love  through  the  eyes  in  the  second  section  fits  the  passivity 
associated with the model of ἔρως in ancient Greece.  You can affect someone else 
by experiencing the emotional state of envy, but not by experiencing  ἔρως.  This 
means that the expert model presented here is consistent with the folk model of ἔρως 
seen throughout the novels, which is one of passivity.      
Erotic  vision is an essential  part  of erotic  cognition,  and it  also relates  to 
models of mental imagery and memory.  Achilles Tatius implies that the image must 
be present for ἔρως to take hold.  Callisthenes secretly descends into love, when he 
moulds and imagines the girl whom he has not seen: ἀναπλάττων γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τῆς 
παιδὸς  τὸ  κάλλος  καὶ  φανταζόμενος  τὰ  ἀόρατα ἔλαθε  σφόδρα κακῶς 
διακείμενος (Ach.Tat.2.13.2).   This  brings  the  deviant  Callisthenes,  who  is 
criticised for falling in love by hearsay, into line with the general model.  It is by 
forming a mental image of the beloved—ἀναπλάττων…τὸ κάλλος—that he falls 
into ἔρως.  Therefore a visual image of beauty is still a prerequisite.  When Anthia 
and Habrocomes see each other after a procession for a sacrifice they are so affected 
that they cannot sleep.  Instead they muse over their condition and ‘hold visions of 
each other before their eyes, and mould images, εἰκόνας, upon each other’s ψυχή’: 
εἶχον δὲ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὰς ὄψεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν, τὰς εἰκόνας ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς 
ἀλλήλων  ἀναπλάττοντες (X.Eph.1.5.1).   This  description  contains  two 
contrasting metaphors, the visions which are conceived as entities ‘in front of’, πρό, 
the eyes and the εἰκόνες which are actually ‘impressed’ onto the ψυχή.  Eroticism 
is so suffused with the visual that the emotion triggers a detailed visual image of the 
beloved, or vice versa.  Clitophon tells us that Leucippe leaves him having left a 
‘shape’  upon  his  eyes:  ἀπελθοῦσα  γὰρ  τὴν  μορφὴν  ἐπαφῆκέ  μου  τοῖς 
ὀφθαλμοῖς (Ach.Tat.1.19.2).  It is coherent to talk of the shape being left upon the 
eyes  just  as  the  ψυχή,  because  both  are  involved  in  the  process  of  ἔρως.401 
401 Clitophon  also  states  that  he  creates  an  image  of  Leucippe  everywhere:  φαντάζομαι 
(Ach.Tat.1.9.1). 
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Demaenete,  having secured Cnemon’s banishment through her wiles, laments that 
she sees and hears him in her mind’s eye: νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶν φαντάζομαι, παρόντος 
ἀκούειν  ἀπατῶμαι,  ὀνειδίζοντα  τὴν  ἄδικον  ἐπιβουλὴν  αἰσχύνομαι 
(Hld.1.15.4).   The  term  for  forming  a  mental  image  here  is  φαντάζομαι,  ‘to 
imagine’, but it is not only used in terms of memory.402  At the start of Heliodorus’ 
novel the bandit chieftain Thyamis claims Chariclea for himself, and argues that, as 
befits his former occupation as a priest, he wishes to marry her not out of lust but out 
of the desire to find a suitable partner to produce offspring with (Hld.1.19).  This is 
almost certainly short of the truth, but Thyamis does not merely see Chariclea as a 
sexual object.  He voices his reasoning to his fellow bandits.     
Ἔπειτα τὴν  ψυχὴν  ἀγαθήν  τε  καὶ  σώφρονα  στοχάζομαι·  εἰ  γὰρ  εὐμορφίᾳ 
νικῶσα τὰς πάσας αἰδοῖ τοῦ βλέμματος καὶ τοὺς ὁρῶντας καταστέλλει πρὸς τὸ 
σεμνότερον,  πῶς  οὐ τὴν  βελτίονα  περὶ  αὑτῆς  εἰκότως  παρίστησι  φαντασίαν 
(Hld.1.20.2).
It  is  her  spiritual  beauty  which  Thyamis  professes  to  be  attractive—τὴν  ψυχὴν 
ἀγαθήν τε καὶ σώφρονα—and one part of this is the sense of shame seen in her 
look:  αἰδοῖ  τοῦ  βλέμματος.   She  also  causes  in  her  viewers  (‘arranges  them 
towards’) that  which is revered,  τὸ σεμνότερον.   By this means  she provides a 
better  φαντασίαν about  herself.   Φαντασία is  here  not  merely  an  image  or 
likeness  but  a  more  developed model  hinting at  character.403  Although she does 
surpass other in looks, εὐμορφίᾳ, this part is the least stressed of Thyamis’ speech. 
Regardless of the truth of Thymais’ claims, his opinion must be culturally viable in 
order to function as convincing rhetoric.  Therefore this is a three tiered description. 
She is pretty, and this corresponds to other models of vision seen above, in that she 
‘conquers’ others  with her looks:  νικῶσα.   Her look communicates  a disposition 
towards αἰδώς, and commands respect, τὸ σεμνότερον, and this contributes to her 
overall image, φαντασία, as ‘the right sort of woman’.  This value laden description 
402 Goldhill 2001, 168, cites the contemporary stoic theories of φαντασία, where visual impressions 
are ‘productive of speech’.  It is a central term in stoic theories of vision.  
403 Arsace  refers  to  Chariclea  as  ‘forming  a  φαντασία of  herself  with  her  practised  beauty’: 
ἐπιτετηδευμένῳ κάλλει μέγα μὲν φανταζομένη (Hld.7.10.5).  The claim is that the φαντασία 
does not match up with reality.  This, however, is Arsace’s biased opinion.  
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of  erotic  vision  is  not  peculiar  to  Thyamis,  and  indeed  underlies  what  makes 
Chariclea  so  attractive  in  Heliodorus.   The  basic  model  of  κάλλος provoking 
attraction is not countermanded, but supplemented with moral concerns and tastes.  
Memory and idealising both utilise images of the beloved,  which are both 
(mainly) visually orientated.  The final part of this chain is recognition.  The lover is 
quick to recognise the form or φαντασία of the beloved.404  This description refers to 
sense perception, and as with the others is not exclusively erotic, although the lover 
is marked out by their speed.  What we can say is that the image of the lover in 
Heliodorus is used in different ways, from the realistic depiction of behaviour seen in 
Demaenete’s  memory to  the idealistic  depiction of a  good character  in Thyamis’ 
imagination.405  The image lies in the eye of the beholder, and in this respect vision is 
mediated by the person, although always in terms of the pervasive model of erotic 
vision as an influence which you receive passively.  Even though Thyamis constructs 
this image of her himself, he does so accurately, since Chariclea in the novel happens 
to be a chaste woman who commands respect.  Since communicative body language 
is  accurate  here,  we  can  place  some  faith  in  it,  although  it  is  communicative 
regardless of Chariclea’s actual intention.                
The erotic anatomy of vision also features prominently in Achilles Tatius’ 
work.  During book one Clinias gives this  eroticised explanation of vision to the 
protagonist Clitophon.
Ὀφθαλμοὶ γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντανακλώμενοι ἀπομάττουσιν ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ τῶν 
σωμάτων  τὰ  εἴδωλα·  ἡ  δὲ  τοῦ  κάλλους  ἀπορροή,  δι’  αὐτῶν εἰς  τὴν  ψυχὴν 
καταρρέουσα, ἔχει τινὰ μίξιν ἐν ἀποστάσει (Ach.Tat.1.9.4).
The second part of this description is consistent with the passage discussed above 
(Ach.Tat.1.4.4).  Beauty ‘flows’ through the eyes and into the ψυχή.  The first part 
(and the last phrase) adds an important new dimension to the concept of ἔρως.  The 
404 Ὀξὺ γάρ τι πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν ἐρωτικῶν ὄψις καὶ κίνημα πολλάκις καὶ σχῆμα μόνον κἂν 
πόρρωθεν ᾖ κἂν ἐκ νώτων τῆς ὁμοιότητος τὴν φαντασίαν παρέστησεν (Hld.7.7.5).  The 
eye is also quick to spot the beloved at Hld.4.1.2: ὀξὺς γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὁ ἐρῶν τὸ ποθούμενον.
405 Of course this is not only in Thyamis’ imagination.  His impression, although it is his own and suits 
his proposal, is quite correct, for Chariclea is marked by her chastity and unblemished character.  This 
is a major theme of the novel.  
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simile of a mirror is introduced; the εἴδωλα of the body are reflected back and forth 
by the eyes and thereby make an impression, ἀπομάττουσιν.406  The analogy of the 
mirror also appears in Plato’s  Phaedrus (255d):  ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ.  There 
the lover sees himself in his lover as in a mirror.  In fact the mirror is a cognate 
subject  since the entry of effluences  into pores was also used to account  for the 
mechanism of reflection.407  These  εἴδωλα,  ‘images’,  are a technical  term which 
earlier  philosophers  used  in  relation  to  sense  perception.408  This  ‘reflection  of 
εἴδωλα/effluences’ creates a ‘union in division’.  The Greek goes on to say that this 
μίξις is  a  new version  of  the corporeal  one:  ὀλίγον ἐστὶ  τῆς τῶν σωμάτων 
μίξεως·  καινὴ γάρ ἐστι  σωμάτων συμπλοκή (Ach.Tat.1.9.5).   This passage 
stresses  that  actual  physical  contact  is  made  through  images,  which  in  turn  are 
transmitted by effluences.  Bychkov states that Achilles Tatius’ description is more 
like an atomist one, and that this model is used because it provides a more sensuous 
and tangible account.409  The metaphors conform to a more general model prevalent 
in the Greek Novel, and, as we shall see, scientific consistency is not the foremost 
agenda of the novelist.  
The influences upon this passage (and others) have already been discussed by 
Morales.410  Morales notes that Aristotle criticises Democritus and other philosophers 
for  making  all  perception  haptic:  πάντα  γὰρ  τὰ  αἰσθητὰ  ἁπτὰ  ποιοῦσιν 
(Arist.de sensu. 442a30).411  She then argues that although the Platonic influence is 
present the vocabulary used replicates in fact the terminology of the atomists (see 
Bychkov above).  Ἀπορροή is a term used in Empedocles of the mechanics of the 
gaze (see above).  The words μίξις and εἴδωλα in our passage above also appear in 
connection with the atomists, as does  συμπλοκή.412  The passage thus alludes to 
406 See Goldhill 2001 170, who says that the verbal forms ἀντανακλώμενοι and ἀπομάττουσιν 
are technical terms from optics, and the vocabulary of flowing and mixing is familiar from science.  
407 See Long 1966, 260. 
408 See  Morales  2004,  133:  Democritus  and  the  Atomists  hold  that  the  eye  is  the  recipient  of 
impressions created by images (εἴδωλα): see above.
409 Bychkov 1999, 341.
410 Morales 2004, 130-5.  She states that ‘optical processes are endowed with haptic qualities to the 
extent that gazing upon the beloved can be described as a kind of bodily copulation’.
411 Morales 2004, 134.
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multiple expert models, such as those of Plato and the Atomists, rather than being 
reducible to one.  
There is certainly a strong presence of the Atomists’ technical terminology in 
this passage.  However, this is only one level of the semantics Achilles Tatius is 
playing with here.  Its significance in the present context lies in a different area.  The 
prominent  metaphor  at  work  is  one  of  erotic  sight  being  a  variation  on  erotic 
coupling.  This certainly plays on the physical notion of sight as erotic ‘emissions’. 
Therefore  it  is  truly a little  ‘copulation’,  μίξις,  of  two bodies.413  The notion of 
weaving is also compatible with this concept.414  Εἴδωλα are also associated with 
erotic contexts.415  The range of allusion embedded in these words creates a discourse 
between  scientific  and  erotic  language.416  Instead  of  pseudo-science  (since  this 
misses the point) we might rather call it erotic-science.   
  It is also important to note that the metaphors used here are not consistent. 
The flowing of sight is brought together with the concepts of mixing, weaving and 
imaging.   This  means  that  their  scientific  theory  also  lacked  consistency  in 
metaphorical  terms.   The  erotic  subtext  motivates  Achilles  Tatius’  mixing  of 
metaphors  but  not  of  the  Atomists.   Although  they  are  fundamentally  different 
metaphors they are coherent in terms of their semantic range.  Their established use 
in scientific discourse and literature creates a framework within which they are all 
valid:  the  erotic  context  allows  for  the  subtle  (or  not  so subtle)  manipulation  of 
vision.
These same metaphorical concepts reoccur later on in Achilles Tatius’ novel 
when similar language is used to describe the mechanics of the gaze in book five. 
This time Clitophon is the recipient of the erotic gaze and Melite the subject.    
412 See Theophrastus writing on Empedocles,  μίξις (de sensu 12), and the  εἴδωλα of Leucippus in 
Alexander (de sensu 24.14).  Συμπλοκή is used of the theories of Leucippus and Democritus in 
Aristotle (de caelo 303a7).
413 Μίξις is used of sexual intercourse: see Hdt.1.203, 4.172, Anacr.35.  Its cognate verb μείγνυμι is 
of course commonly used of sexual intercourse, both of the man and the woman: see LSJ B4.  Its base 
meaning of mixing two liquids (LSJ) also fits in nicely with our ‘flowing’ context.  
414 The verb συμπλέκω is used of sexual intercourse at S.fr.618 and Pl.Symp.191a.  
415 See Bettini 1999 20–3 who discusses erotic connections of εἴδωλα.  In Aristophanes’ Nubes (975-
6)  it  is  said  that  young  men  should  not  leave  their  εἴδωλον in  the  sand  for  admirers  to  see: 
προνοεῖσθαι εἴδωλον τοῖσιν ἐρασταῖσιν τῆς ἥβης μὴ καταλείπειν.  
416 See Goldhill, 2001, 170.
151
Ἡ  δὲ  τῆς  θέας ἡδονὴ διὰ  τῶν  ὀμμάτων  εἰσρέουσα  τοῖς  στέρνοις  ἐγκάθηται· 
ἕλκουσα δὲ  τοῦ  ἐρωμένου  τὸ  εἴδωλον  ἀεί,  ἐναπομάττεται  τῷ  τῆς  ψυχῆς 
κατόπτρῳ καὶ ἀναπλάττει τὴν μορφήν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ κάλλους ἀπορροὴ δι’ ἀφανῶν 
ἀκτίνων ἐπὶ τὴν ἐρωτικὴν ἑλκομένη καρδίαν ἐναποσφραγίζει κάτω τὴν σκιάν 
(Achilles Tatius 5.13.4).
The effluences (εἰσρέουσα,  ἀπορροὴ) flow through the eyes into the body (τοῖς 
στέρνοις,  τῆς  ψυχῆς,  καρδίαν).   The  analogy  of  the  mirror  is  reintroduced, 
κατόπτρῳ, and several verbal echoes resound:  εἴδωλον,  ἐναπομάττεται.  The 
mirror of the  ψυχή receives impressions of the lover.  This works upon the same 
lines as the previous imagery: the path is through the eyes to the ψυχή.  The mirror-
like  interaction  between  eyes  is  therefore  also  a  mirror-like  interaction  between 
souls.  The passage above stated that the eyes were like a mirror, whereas this second 
one  specifies  that  the  ψυχή is  the  location  of  the  mirror.   However,  this  is  not 
inconsistent.  Although these entities are seen as separate, it is clear that Clitophon's 
narration of the erotic process specifies a conduit going into the soul by means of the 
eyes.   Therefore  impressions  are  made  continually  along  the  route:  the  whole 
cognitive passage is like a mirror in its ability to receive impressions.417   
  There are several other metaphorical conceptions here.  There is the addition 
of the flowing of pleasure, ἡδονή, here, to the flowing of κάλλος.  This can be seen 
as an associate of κάλλος, since it is pleasure derived from κάλλος.  It functions in 
exactly the same way as beauty by flowing into the body through the eyes.  Pleasure, 
however, constantly drags, ἕλκουσα, the image of the beloved, makes an impression 
on the mirror of the soul and moulds its shape,  ἀναπλάττει τὴν μορφήν.  The 
flowing of κάλλος this time is dragged upon the ἔρως influenced heart by means of 
unseen rays and there marks its shadow:  δι’ ἀφανῶν ἀκτίνων.  These passages 
reveal  that  the  novelists  are  not  just  a  repository  of  models,  folk  and  scientific, 
concerning erotic  vision.  These scientific  models are subordinate  to the author’s 
aims and purpose.  However, the author must still use valid cultural models in order 
417 There is not even an inconsistency between the first passage claiming that κάλλος flows into the 
ψυχή and this second that it sits in the στέρνον. It could quite easily do both. 
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for them to be meaningful.  Expert models are, however, always subordinate to the 
erotic theme.      
What  I  hope  I  have  made  clear  is  that  despite  the  differing  authorial 
manipulation of similar cultural models concerning relationships and eroticism, the 
prototypical model of the emotion is essentially the same.  The model of erotic vision 
in the Greek Novel is a passive one which involves the effluences of vision passing 
from the object of affection through the eyes of the person feeling the emotion and 
down into their ψυχή.  This passivity is due to the triangulation of the relationship, 
the two lovers and the emotion, and means that the discourse between lovers must be 
seen in the light of an overpowering emotional force.  
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Chapter 6 - The Ψυχή and the Καρδία 
This chapter concerns the metaphorical conceptualisation of internal psychological 
entities, such as the ψυχή, used in relation to the psychology of ἔρως in the Greek 
Novel.  The previous chapter on vision approached beauty’s access to the ψυχή via 
the  eyes.   Since  these  internal  psychological  entities  play  a  vital  role  in  the 
functioning of the emotions, and are conceptualised as being inside the body, I refer 
to them as emotional ‘anatomy’.  Their role in the psychology of the individual is 
real and functional.  In the Greek Novel there are two internal entities associated with 
emotion: the soul and the heart, the ψυχή and the καρδία.  The use of these entities 
as the seat of emotion is neither an innovation nor unique, and presents a line of 
continuity with previous Greek literature.      
This section will outline the metaphors used to conceptualise the ψυχή  and 
καρδία, to ascertain if there are any distinctive attributes of either.  I will also look to 
see if there are any unique metaphors which apply to either the ψυχή or the καρδία 




The ψυχή has a long history in Greek literature of which it will only be possible to 
highlight certain aspects here.  The notion that it can survive the body can be seen 
from Homer onwards.418  It is often associated with  ἔρως both in art and when it 
involves the psychology of emotion.419  By the period of the Greek Novel the ψυχή 
has  been  analysed  by  philosophers  such  as  Plato,  Aristotle  and  the  Stoics,  and 
medical  writers  such  as  the  Hippocratic  corpus  and  Galen.   One  of  the  most 
influential views is Plato who sees it as the seat of psychological functioning, and in 
particular as the locus of differing psychological functions.420  We might compare 
this view of the ψυχή with faculty psychology: the division of the mind into parts 
which  perform different  mental  functions.421  Does  the  Greek  Novel  display  the 
ψυχή as performing differing psychological tasks and exhibiting different desires? 
What is its relation to the body?  One constant point of interest to ancient Greek 
philosophy was  the  precise  nature  of  the  connection  between  the  ψυχή and  the 
body.422  Galen in one of his later treatises wonders whether the  ψυχή is physical 
after all, since it is so affected by changes within the body.423  
Many occurrences of the word ψυχή in the Greek Novel are left out of this 
study because  they  are  not  instances  of  psychological  metaphor.   One  pervasive 
418 Clarke 1999 argues that in Homer the ψυχή’s most basic sense is as the cold breath expelled at 
death, and therefore is not so important for the psychology of the living person.  See Cairns 2003a for 
a sceptical review of Clarke.  On the Greek concept of the soul see Bremmer 1983 and 2009, Claus 
1981 and Rohde 1925. 
419 A personified ψυχή, depicted with butterfly wings and accompanied by ἔρως, can be seen often in 
late Classical and Hellenistic art.  See Maaskant-Kleibrink 1990.  See also the famous story of Amor 
and Psyche in Apuleius.     
420 See Pl.Ti.441e–f on the complexity of the soul and Pl.R.434d2–441c7 on the parts and functions of 
the soul.  Pl.Phdr.246a6–7 compares the dynamics of the soul to a charioteer and horse-drawn chariot. 
Plato will be discussed further later on in the chapter.
421 When discussing the ψυχή Aristotle also posits several faculties: parts for nourishment, appetite, 
sensation, movement in space, and thought (De.an.414a32-3).
422 For  Aristotle  most  functions of  the ψυχή are  related to  the body,  except  for  the intellect:  see 
De.an.412b and Long 1974, 50.  For the issue in Epicureanism and Stoicism see Long 1974 49ff. and 
171ff. respectively.  
423 Galen, Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur 4.767-817 K.  See Nutton 2004, 216-
47,  on Galen  and his  medicine.   The reification  of  the  ψυχή as  an entity is  at  the basis of  this 
conceptualisation and is certainly an element of its folk and expert models: see Cairns 2003a, 47, on 
the ψυχή and Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 25-40, on the reification of concepts.  
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usage is the ψυχή as a metonym for the life of a person when mortally threatened.424 
A few examples will serve to show that the image of the ψυχή as life and its role in 
psychological  metaphor  are  related.   In  Achilles  Tatius  Clinias’s  lover  Charicles 
bursts in and says he is lost to his friend (Ach.Tat.1.7.4).  Clinias then groans ‘as if 
his life depended upon that man’:  ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνου ψυχῆς κρεμάμενος 
(Ach.Tat.1.7.4).  A literal translation would be that he ‘hangs’, κρεμάμενος, from 
the ψυχή of his lover Charikles.  This is cognate with the idea of life above but is 
also psychological, because it is due to his erotic relationship that he hangs from the 
ψυχή of his lover.425  Related to the above example is the commonplace of the lover 
calling  the  beloved  ‘their  life/soul’,  as  Demaenete  does  in  Heliodorus:  ψυχὴν 
ἑαυτῆς ὀνομάζουσα (Hld.1.14.6).426  One’s ψυχή metonymically stands for one’s 
love,  since  not  only  are  both  precious,  but  both  are  involved  in  an  emotional 
experience.427  The ψυχή is also engaged in fainting, and fainting can be emotionally 
caused.   We may cite  the  instance  when Dionysius  faints  when  he  hears  that  a 
Syracusan  ship  has  arrived  to  demand  Callirhoe  back  from  him:  ἐξέθανεν  ὁ 
Διονύσιος  ἀκούσας  καὶ  νὺξ  αὐτοῦ  τῶν  ὀφθαλμῶν  κατεχύθη (Chariton 
3.9.10).428  He  almost  died,  ἐξέθανεν,  and  night  poured  down  over  his  eyes. 
However, the subsequent revelation that his love rival Chaereas is dead places his 
ψυχή (back) in him,  ἐνέθηκε,  and allows him to be within himself  once again: 
424 The following examples all refer to the entity ψυχή in the context of life under threat or in death, 
literal or rhetorical: Ach.Tat.1.7.4; 1.13.3; 1.13.4; 1.29.6; 2.30.2; 2.34.5; 3.11.2; 3.23.3; 4.6.2; 5.16.2; 
5.22.6;  7.4.1;  7.5.3;  7.9.1;  Hld.1.2.4;  1.9.4;  2.23.5;  2.31.1;  7.6.5;  9.3.8;  9.5.3;  10.10.2;  10.20.2; 
Longus 1.30.1; X.Eph.1.13.6.  This metonymical usage has a long history in Greek literature.  See 
Cairns 2003a, 48, on this usage in Homer.   In  Heliodorus we see clear evidence of the  ψυχή as 
immortal: Hld.1.2.4; 2.31.1; 2.23.5.               
425 See also Hld.1.29.3 on Chariclea: ὥσπερ ψυχῆς τοῦ Θεαγένους ἀφῃρημένην.
426 See Morgan 1989, 107:  ‘both Theagenes and Charikleia persistently refer to the other as their 
psuchē, an erotic commonplace founded on the metaphorical premise that lover and beloved between 
them constitute a single identity’.  He cites Hld.1.8.4; 2.5.2; 5.2.10; 8.6.4; 10.20.2.  One can also call 
the beloved ‘master’ or ‘mistress’ of one’s ψυχή: see Ach.Tat.5.26.7.
427 In erotic literature the beloved can also be valued as an ἄγαλμα, a glory or delight: see A.Ag.418-
19; Pl.Phdr.251a; 252d.
428 Earlier  Dionysius  seems  like  an  image  of  death:  παντάπασι  δὲ  ὢν ἀσθενὴς  φαντασίαν 
παρέσχε θανάτου (Chariton 3.1.3).   As we saw in the chapter  on symptoms  ἔρως can have a 
debilitating effect.  For  ἔρως as a near death experience see also Alcm.3.fr.3, col.ii.61; Archil.193; 
Pl.Phdr.254e; Sappho 31.15-16.
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ταῦτα  τὰ  ῥήματα  ψυχὴν  ἐνέθηκε  Διονυσίῳ,  καὶ  κατ'  ὀλίγον  πάλιν  ἐν 
ἑαυτῷ  γενόμενος  ἀκριβῶς  ἐπυνθάνετο  πάντα (Chariton  3.9.10-11).   The 
conceptual link with death is apparent.  Fainting is analogous to death in that the 
ψυχή leaves one, and it comes back upon gaining consciousness.  His fainting is 
caused by overwhelming emotion, perhaps grief that Callirhoe may be taken from 
him. 
In  Xenophon of  Ephesus  ψυχή is  the  only anatomical  entity  used  in  the 
description of emotions, unlike the other novelists, who also use καρδία.  His usage 
of  metaphor  indeed  highlights  many  prototypical  aspects  of  its  conceptualisation 
throughout the novels.  Its status as the seat of πάθη or emotions is confirmed by a 
description of Habrocomes’ suffering: ὁ δὲ ἔπαθε μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν (X.Eph.5.12.2). 
If we list  the metaphors involved with the  ψυχή we at  first  see conformity with 
metaphors used of the relevant emotion.  Anthia tells Habrocomes’ eyes to hold the 
ψυχάς which they ‘burnt’:  ἔχετε ψυχάς͵ ἃς αὐτοὶ ἐξεκαύσατε (X.Eph.1.9.8). 
We can recognise the common image of ἔρως as fire, with the object of its flames 
specified as the ψυχή.  Anthia also tells Habrocomes twice that he is the ‘master’ of 
her  ψυχή,  δέσποτα (X.Eph.2.4.5;  5.14.2),  which  conforms  to  the  metaphor  of 
master-slave seen in the chapter upon ἔρως as an opponent.  
The  ψυχή is conceived of as a concrete entity.  When Habrocomes falls in 
love  with  Anthia  his  ψυχή falls  down:  ἡ ψυχὴ καταπεπτώκει (X.Eph.1.5.5). 
This metaphor orients the entity of the ψυχή in terms of a position in space, internal 
to the human body, which is then mapped onto the existence of the emotion ἔρως. 
When Habrocomes is not feeling the emotion his ψυχή is in place, and when he does 
feel it his  ψυχή falls down into another location.429  The implication is that of an 
abnormal psychological condition, since an anatomical entity has moved out of its 
normal  position.   There  might  also  be  an  association  here  with  the  physical 
manifestation of the emotion: the lying down of an ill person.  As we saw above in 
the section on lovesickness, the effects of ἔρως in the Greek Novel can be like those 
429 In Homer this verb is used with the θυμός: πᾶσιν δὲ παραὶ ποσὶ κάππεσε θυμός (Il.15.280).
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of an illness.430  We also have several other metaphorical descriptions of the ψυχή 
which place alongside one another external and internal symptoms of the emotion. 
When Anthia and Habromomes are under the influence of  ἔρως their  bodies and 
their  ψυχαί ‘sway’  and  are  ‘agitated’:  ἐπάλλετο  δὲ  αὐτοῖς  τὰ  σώματα  καὶ 
ἐκραδαίνοντο αὐτοῖς αἱ ψυχαί (X.Eph.1.9.1).431  The motion of the external body 
is replicated in the motion of the internal seat of emotion.  432  Again when the effects 
of  desire  bring out tears  in  Anthia  it  is  her  ψυχή which  has  sent  them forth  as 
symbols  or  tokens  of  ἐπιθυμία:  ἡ δὲ  ἐδάκρυε  τῆς  ψυχῆς  αὐτῆς  σύμβολα 
προπεμπούσης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τὰ δάκρυα (X.Eph.1.9.2).   The source of the 
tears is the ψυχή and thus there is a correlation between internal and external state. 
Several lines later the ψυχή is the real connection point for their kisses rather than 
the lips:  τὰ χείλη τοῖς χείλεσι φιλοῦσα [sc.  Anthia] συνηρμόκει, καὶ ὅσα 
ἐνενόουν,  διὰ  τῶν  χειλέων  ἐκ  ψυχῆς  εἰς  τὴν  θατέρου  ψυχὴν  διὰ  τοῦ 
φιλήματος  παρεπέμπετο (X.Eph.1.9.6).433  This  is  an  interesting  example  of 
empathy.  The content of their thoughts,  ὅσα ἐνενόουν, is sent through their lips 
and kisses out of their  ψυχή into that of the other one:  παρεπέμπετο.  It is the 
working of the passive model of erotic reception into a mutual exchange of passions 
and forms the basis of how Xenophon of Ephesus sets apart his main couple from the 
love rivals.      
I  have listed all  the instances of  ψυχή being conceptualised in relation to 
ἔρως in table 1.1, and all the other clear emotional references in 1.2.  The purpose of 
430 Another emotion has the effect of causing Habrocomes to faint (fall down).  He hears the story of 
how Anthia poisoned herself rather than marry Perilaus: παρεῖτο δὲ ὑπὸ ἀθυμίας (X.Eph.3.9.7.1-
2).
431 They are alos experiencing multiple emotions such as pleasure, shame and fear:  ἔκειντο δὲ ὑφ' 
ἡδονῆς παρειμένοι, αἰδούμενοι, φοβούμενοι, πνευστιῶντες [ἡδόμενοι] (X.Eph.1.9.1).
432 The verb  κραδαίνω is used of a different emotion later on.  Anthia and Habrocomes both have 
heart palpitations when the pirates Corymbus and Euxinus approach them respectively: τοῖς δὲ αἵ τε 
ψυχαὶ ἐκραδαίνοντο (X.Eph.1.16.2.4).  This seems to be fear or apprehension, and again probably 
reflects external motion such as shaking or quivering.  It  is used of the  καρδία being agitiated in 
Galen (De utilitate respirationis liber 4.481 K) and of the ψυχή in Michael Attaliates Hist., Historia 
240.7:  κραδαινομένας  εἶχον  τὰς  οἰκείας  ψυχάς.   The  verb  πάλλω is  mostly  used  of  the 
καρδία: see for example παλλομένη κραδίην (Il.22.461) and later on in this chapter.
433 In retaining διὰ τοῦ φιλήματος I am following O’Sullivan’s edition (2005). 
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including both these tables is to show the coherence of all metaphors of emotion 




Affected ψυχῆς εἶναι τὸ πάθος Hld.4.7.7
Affected τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθος Hld.3.3.8
Arrow τὰ πάθη ταῖς ψυχαῖς εἰστοξεύοντα Hld.3.7.5
Bitten τὸ δεδηγμένον τῆς ψυχῆς Hld.7.28.1
Burnt ἔχετε ψυχάς, ἃς αὐτοὶ ἐξεκαύσατε X.Eph.1.9.8
Burnt τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξέκαυσεν Ach.Tat.1.5.5
Burnt ψυχὴν ἐπὶ σοὶ φλεγομένην Ach.Tat.5.11.4
Burnt ἀνεφλέγη τὴν ψυχήν Ach.Tat.6.18.1
Burnt ἐπυρπόλει σφοδρότερον ψυχήν Chariton 2.4.5
Burnt πῦρ… εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν Chariton 2.4.7
Burnt ἐξέκαυσε τὴν ψυχήν Chariton 6.4.5
Burnt τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξεπυρσεύθη Longus 1.15.1
Contest ἀγωνία ψυχαῖς ἐρωτικαῖς γίνεται Hld.6.5.4
Covered (mist/darkness)
καθάπερ οὖν νέφος ἢ σκότος ἀπεκάλυψε τῆς 
ψυχῆς Διονύσιος Chariton 3.9.11
Dipped τὴν ψυχὴν ἐβαπτίζετο Chariton 3.2.6
Disturbed ἐταράχθη τὴν ψυχὴν Chariton 8.1.7
Dragged ἕλκουσι τὰς ψυχάς Ach.Tat.2.8.2
Dragged ἀντιπεριάγοντα τὴν ψυχήν Ach.Tat.1.6.3
Dwelling (Eros) ἐνδεδήμηκεν εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν Chariton 6.3.2
Fallen down ἡ ψυχὴ καταπεπτώκει X.Eph.1.5.5
Feeds βόσκει τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ’ αὐτόν Ach.Tat.6.17.3
Fountain (in) ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστι πηγή Ach.Tat.4.8.3
Goad τῇ ἐμῇ κέντρον ψυχῇ X.Eph.1.9.7
Heated ψυχὴν θερμᾶναι Longus 1.17.1
Held in κατεῖχε δὲ ψυχαῖς X.Eph.5.13.3
Held in ψυχὴν κατασχόντες Ach.Tat.2.3.3
Held (badly) ἔχων τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς Ach.Tat.1.6.6
Held (into) τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ ἐρώμενον ἔχοντες Ach.Tat.6.18.3
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Into κάλλος εἰς τὴν ψυχήν Ach.Tat.6.7.5
Into εἰς τὴν θατέρου ψυχήν X.Eph.1.9.6
Into εἰς τὴν Ἁβροκόμου ψυχήν X.Eph.1.9.7
Into εἰς τὴν ψυχήν Ach.Tat.1.4.4
Into εἰς τὴν ψυχήν Ach.Tat.1.9.4
Into εἰς τὴν ψυχήν Ach.Tat.3.11.2
Left (not) τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπελθεῖν ἤθελεν ἡ κόρη Ach.Tat.1.6.5
Lifted τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ Θεαγένει συνεξαιρομένης Hld.4.3.3
Mastered τῆς σῆς κρατῆσαι, δέσποτα, ψυχῆς Chariton 6.3.4
Melted τήκεται ἡ ψυχή Longus 1.18.1
Moulded
τὰς εἰκόνας ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλήλων 
ἀναπλάττοντες X.Eph.1.5.1
Oscillating ἡ ψυχὴ γενομένη τῷ κακῷ κυμαίνεται Ach.Tat.1.6.3
Out of ἐκ ψυχῆς X.Eph.1.9.6
Pain ἄση δὲ αὐτῆς εἶχε τὴν ψυχήν Longus 1.13.5
Pain Ἤλγουν τὴν ψυχήν Longus 2.7.5
Persuasion Οὐ μὴν ὁ Δάφνις χαίρειν ἔπειθε τὴν ψυχήν Longus 1.32.4
Piracy ἐνόμιζε τὴν ψυχὴν ἔτι παρὰ τοῖς λῃσταῖς μένειν Longus 1.32.4
Recognition
τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ πρώτης ἐντεύξεως τὸ ὅμοιον 
ἐπιγνούσης Hld.3.5.4
Recognition τῶν ψυχῶν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ γνωρίσματα Hld.5.5.2
Send Away ἀφῆκε τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ’ αὐτήν Ach.Tat.6.6.3
Sends Forth (Symbols)
τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς σύμβολα προπεμπούσης τῆς 
ἐπιθυμίας τὰ δάκρυα X.Eph.1.9.2
Shame τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αἰδούμενον Hld.4.6.1
Sickness ψυχῆς νοσούσης Ach.Tat.5.27.2
Swinging ἐκραδαίνοντο αὐτοῖς αἱ ψυχαί X.Eph.1.9.1
Taking τὴν γὰρ ψυχὴν πᾶσαν ὁ ἔρως καταλαβὼν Ach.Tat.5.13.3
Thrown down τῇ ψυχῇ καταβαλλομένη Hld.7.4.2
War ἔνδον μου τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλλος πόλεμος κάθηται Ach.Tat.4.7.3
Wave τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν σάλον Hld.3.5.6
Wavering
ἅτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἀμφοτέροις ἐφ’ ὑγροῦ τοῦ πάθους 
σαλευούσης Hld.3.10.5
Will τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐβούλοντο αἱ ψυχαί X.Eph.5.13.3
Wings τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναπτεροῖ Longus 2.7.1
Wipes off τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπήλειψε Ach.Tat.6.17.4
Wound οἷα δὴ τραῦμα ἔχων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ θερμόν τε καὶ Chariton 4.2.4
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δριμύ
Wound τῇ ψυχῇ τρωθέντες Ach.Tat.2.13.1
Wound τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τραύματα Ach.Tat.1.6.3
Wound
τραῦμα οὐ μέρους μόνον ἢ μέλους ἀλλὰ καὶ 
ψυχῆς Hld.7.10.2
There are two consistent aspects in the conceptualisation of the ψυχή in the Greek 
Novel.  The first is that  the entity is primarily conceptualised as a location or an 
object.  Either  ἔρως or a concept/entity involved in the erotic process (e.g. beauty, 
κάλλος) goes into the ψυχή or the ψυχή is passively affected in some way, by the 
person or the emotion, such as in the examples Disturbed and Dragged.  In Chariton 
ἔρως has ‘set  up residence’  in  the  ψυχή:  ἐνδεδήμηκεν εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν 
(Chariton 6.3.2).434  
This presense of the beloved in the soul is one seen consistently.  Xenophon 
of  Ephesus  speaks  of  the  lovers  ‘moulding  images’,  τὰς  εἰκόνας…
ἀναπλάττοντες, upon one another’s  ψυχή (X.Eph.1.5.1).435  They have fallen in 
love with one another and are restless at night.  They are imagining the image of the 
beloved  in  their  souls:  ἐπὶ  τῆς ψυχῆς.   Clitophon,  feeling  ἔρως for  Leucippe, 
writes that ‘the girl was not willing to leave my ψυχή’:  ἀλλ΄ οὐδὲ τότε μου τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἀπελθεῖν ἤθελεν ἡ κόρη (Ach.Tat.1.6.5).  The presence of the beloved 
represents  the  emotional  memory  and  the  ψυχή the  location  of  the  memory. 
Another  variation  in  Achilles  Tatius  describes  a  woman  taking  a  new  lover  as 
‘wiping  the  old  one  from  her  ψυχή’:  τὸν  πρότερον  τῆς  ψυχῆς  ἀπήλειψε 
(Ach.Tat.6.17.4).436  Sosthenes  tells  his  master  Thersander  that  at  the  moment 
Leucippe still ‘feeds her soul’,  βόσκει τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ' αὐτόν, on Clitophon, but 
434 See  Dwelling metaphor in table 1.1.  Also at Chariton 6.3.4 the Persian King’s servant asks him 
what beauty has ‘mastered’ his soul: κάλλος δύναται τῆς σῆς κρατῆσαι, δέσποτα, ψυχῆς.  At 
Pl.R.573d ἔρως is described as the tyrant who directs affairs in one’s ψυχή.  
435 See also the chapter on vision on this passage.
436 See also the context: παλαιὸν γὰρ ἔρωτα μαραίνει νέος ἔρως· γυνὴ δὲ μάλιστα τὸ παρὸν 
φιλεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀπόντος, ἕως καινὸν οὐχ εὗρε, μνημονεύει· προσλαβοῦσα δὲ ἕτερον, τὸν 
πρότερον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπήλειψε.
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will forget him when she takes on Thersander as her new lover.437  Erotic attraction is 
seen as  located  in  the  ψυχή,  where the  beloved represents  the emotion,  and the 
continuing  representation  of  the  beloved  in  that  place  indicates  the  state  of  the 
emotion.  However, there is a further implication and that is that there is only room 
for one lover in the soul.  Despite the fact that Thersander and Sosthenes are negative 
characters,  they  both  assume  (by  being  complicit  in  the  conversation)  that 
Thersander  does  not  merely  want  to  take  advantage  of  Leucippe  but  desires  her 
emotional attachment to him.    
Not all imagery, however, involves the ψυχή as an internal location.  When 
Daphnis falls in love with Chloe he feels as if his  ψυχή is still among the pirates, 
who a short while earlier had attempted to carry him off: ἐνόμιζε τὴν ψυχὴν ἔτι 
παρὰ τοῖς λῃσταῖς μένειν (Longus 1.32.4).  This is because he is still young and 
ignorant  of  the  piracy  of  ἔρως:  οἷα  νέος καὶ  ἄγροικος  καὶ  ἔτι  ἀγνοῶν τὸ 
ἔρωτος λῃστήριον (Longus 1.32.).  This is not the directedness of attention: i.e. he 
is thinking about the pirates.  On the contrary he cannot stop thinking about Chloe 
naked and is pained at heart.  On a literary level the metaphor blends skilfully the 
action of the plot and the presentation of psychology.   In terms of metaphor  the 
ψυχή is  not an internal  location,  as Daphnis conceives  of it  as  away among the 
pirates.  We can see here the connection between the ψυχή associated with the loss 
of life and the departing of the soul (see above) and its role as a psychological entity. 
The image coheres with the master metaphor of the force of emotion, since Daphnis’ 
ψυχή,  his  emotional  response,  is  captured  by  the  pirates  and  therefore  forced 
regardless of his will.  Sending the ψυχή out can, however, refer to the direction of 
437 The speaker  here  is  Sosthenes,  and therefore  we can  expect  his description of  Clitophon and 
Leucippe's love to be unfavourable.  The first, and most obvious way to take this, is that she is just  
satifying a desire with Clitophon—her sexual desire is analogous to eating—and therefore there is 
nothing serious in the way of Thersander's passion.  The image of the soul as an animal, such as a 
sheep, feeding upon the beloved, presents the woman's desire as bestial and, perhaps, irrational or 
mindless.  We could take it in a more romantic vein, a pastoral image of the lover’s passion, and 
hypothesise that it represents the duration and proximity of a relationship.  However, this would lead 
to us attributing to Sosthenes gross incompetence in argument: he wishes to denigrate Clitophon and 
Leucippe’s  love.   The  point  must  surely  be  simpler:  Leucippe’s  erotic  passion,  located  in  and 
represented by her ψυχή, is a sheep to be fed, and we will soon be able to move her onto a new patch 
of grass.   
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attention.  When Thersander sees Leucippe’s beauty he ‘sends away his ψυχή upon 
her’: ἀφῆκε τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ’ αὐτήν (Ach.Tat.6.6.3).  This example is similar to the 
last one in that it implies the ψυχή leaving the body, and deals with motion rather 
than  location.438 Although  Thersander  is  the  subject  here,  there  is  again  no 
implication that his action, under the influence of the emotion, is controllable by him. 
This leads us onto the second common aspect of the portrayal of the ψυχή. 
This  is  that  metaphorical  conceptualisations  conventionally  used  of  the  erotic 
experience dominate in descriptions of the emotional effect upon the  ψυχή.  It is 
struck by arrows, burned by fire, and a location for contests.439  In this respect the 
ψυχή can be seen as a passive homunculus which reflects the whole person.  The 
ψυχή is  warmed  by  ἔρως just  as  the  person  is:  ψυχὴν  θερμᾶναι (Longus 
1.17.1).440  Ἔρως captures the ψυχή just as he takes the person:  τὴν γὰρ ψυχὴν 
πᾶσαν  ὁ  ἔρως  καταλαβὼν (Ach.Tat.5.13.3).441  These  two  factors  are  the 
prototypical ones we see when the ψυχή is subjected to emotional duress during the 
erotic experience.     
Some examples are not reducible to the above two factors, and it is necessary 
to  go  through  them  to  show  why  they  are  equally  valid  but  less  prototypical 
conceptualisations  of  the  ψυχή.   First  of  all  we  must  deal  with  an  important 
question: are there any metaphors which are used specifically of the ψυχή in terms 
of erotic psychology?  Above we saw that metaphors used of the erotic experience in 
general  dominate  the conceptualisation  of the  ψυχή.   There are some metaphors 
which appear to relate specifically to the ψυχή, but these are all coherent with the 
underlying metaphor viewing the emotions as a force.  Chariton speaks of Dionysius 
brightening up as if he was uncovering mist or darkness from his ψυχή: καθάπερ 
438 See also Ach.Tat.5.12.3, where Melite almost sends away her her  ψυχή through pleasure:  τὴν 
γυναῖκα ὑφ’  ἡδονῆς  παρὰ μικρὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀφεῖναι.   On  the  psychology  of  the  erotic 
wandering of the mind towards the beloved see Montiglio 2005, 234.  Phaedra’s thoughts wander to 
where Hippolytus is hunting in Euripides (E.Hipp.240).  
439 See the following metaphors from the table:  Affected; Arrow; Bitten; Burnt; Contest; Disturbed; 
Dragged;  Goad;  Heat;  Held  in;   Melted;  Oscillates;  Pain;  Shame;  Sickness;  Swaying;  Taking;  
Thrown Down; War; Wave; Wavering; Wound.       
440 See the Heat metaphor in table 1.1 and see the chapter on symptoms for further discussion.
441 See the Taking metaphor in the table 1.1 and the chapter on the opponent.  
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οὖν νέφος ἢ σκότος ἀπεκάλυψε τῆς ψυχῆς Διονύσιος (Chariton 3.9.11).  The 
text is corrupt here but there seems to be a correspondence with a phrase a few lines 
before which describes night pouring over his eyes:  νὺξ αὐτοῦ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν 
κατεχύθη (Chariton 3.9.10).442  Dionysius’ eyes darkened when he heard that his 
love rival Chaereas has arrived, and he comes to after learning that his ship has been 
destroyed.  There does therefore seem to be an intended antithesis between light and 
darkness,  despite  the  corruption.   There  could  also  be  an  intertextual  link  with 
Euripides’ Heracles or Orestes.443  This conceptualisation is cognate with the notion 
of  fainting  being  analogous  to  losing  one’s  life  (see  above),  and  displays  the 
emotional effect as forceful upon the subject, and so here the ψυχή is practically an 
homunculus.444  Another metaphor that stands out occurs in Chariton’s description of 
Dionysius’ psychological state is that of him being dipped ‘in regard to his ψυχή’: 
τὴν ψυχὴν ἐβαπτίζετο (Chariton 3.2.6).  It is used of his overwhelming passion 
once the wedding with Callirhoe has been agreed upon.445  The passage is suffused 
with storm imagery.   He is taken by a storm,  κατείληπτο μὲν ὑπὸ χειμῶνος, 
dipped in his  ψυχή and can only just force his head above the waves:  ὅμως δὲ 
ἀνακύπτειν ἐβιάζετο καθάπερ ἐκ τρικυμίας τοῦ πάθους (Chariton 3.2.7). 
The verb βαπτίζω means to dip or to plunge, and is often used in terms of an object 
entering the sea.446  However, the additional description of his head staying above the 
waves indicates that he is not wholly taken by passion.  This fits in well with the 
description of Dionysius used earlier at Chariton 2.4.4 where he is ‘submerged’ by 
442 This is the reading (of 3.9.11) which Reardon prefers.  The word σκότος can be neuter and indeed 
is always so in the New Testament.    
443 See E.Her.1216,  οὐδεὶς σκότος γὰρ ὧδ'  ἔχει μέλαν νέφος ὅστις κακῶν σῶν συμφορὰν 
κρύψειεν ἄν, where no darkness has a black cloud capable of hiding Heracles’ misfortune.  Also at 
E.Or.467-8 Orestes asks what darkness or cloud can he place in front of him to escape Tyndareus’ 
reproval:  τίνα  σκότον  λάβω  προσώπωι;  ποῖον  ἐπίπροσθεν  νέφος  θῶμαι…;   These  are 
slightly different from Dionysius’ case, as they concern darkness shielding one from social censure. 
Dionysius rather is close to fainting and despair.  
444 This metaphor is erotic, though it refers to Dionysius fainting when he hears that Callirhoe might 
be taken away from him.  It is erotically motivated, i.e. it depends upon a state of ἔρως, but we cannot 
rule out the instantaneous affect of other emotions.  See more on this below.
445 We are told that his erotic passion was eager for it:  οὖν ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἔσπευδε (Chariton 
3.2.6).
446 See Plut.De superstitione 166a.  In the passive it can mean to be drowned: Epict.Gnom.47.  See 
Ach.Tat.6.19.5  where  ἔρως itself  sinks  down  submerged  by  anger  (θυμός):  ὁ  δὲ  τῷ  θυμῷ 
βεβαπτισμένος καταδύεται.  At Lib.Or.64.115 the ψυχή is submerged by grief.
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desire, ἐπιθυμία, and he pokes his heads up just above the waves again: καθάπερ 
δὲ ἐκ κύματος ἀνέκυπτε.447  There seems to be a metaphorical contrast between 
reason and passion: his head represents rationality, of which he maintains some, but 
his ψυχή is totally overcome by emotion.     
Clitophon describes one part of the erotic experience, the kiss.  Charmides 
wishes to kiss Leucippe, but Clitophon is distraught at the prospect.  This is because 
he sees the kiss as the best part of a sexual relationship.  Although they kiss with the 
lips, it is a fountain of pleasure which springs up from the  ψυχή:  τοῖς μὲν γὰρ 
χείλεσιν ἀλλήλους φιλοῦμεν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστι πηγή 
(Ach.Tat.4.8.3).448  That is to say it is not merely a physical contact but an emotional 
reaction.  The ψυχή here represents emotion.    
I suggested above that it was possible to view the  ψυχή as a homunculus 
who is forcefully affected by the emotion.  One metaphor implies that the ψυχή can 
be conceptualised as an animal.  Sosthenes, Thersander’s servant, speaks of Leucippe 
nourishing  her  ψυχή upon Clitophon because  he  is  the  only  lover  she  has  ever 
known:  μέχρι μὲν αὐτὸν οἶδε μόνον καὶ οὐ κεκοινώνηκεν ἑτέρῳ, βόσκει 
τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ’ αὐτόν (Ach.Tat.6.17.3).   The  verb  βόσκω is  properly used of 
herdsmen feeding their flocks.449  It is also a description of one desire, ἐπιθυμία, in 
terms of another.  Since it is a habitual desire it seems that sex is the target domain: 
sex as feeding one’s soul.  Yet it is interesting that the ψυχή is conceptualised as a 
beast to be fed.  The connotations are of the bestiality of a woman’s sexual desire and 
of the blind emotional needs of her  ψυχή.  Metaphors which are less prototypical 
can often arise from the requirements of the speaker’s own strategy.  
The  ψυχή can  be  conceptualised  as  a  person interacting  with  the  subject. 
When Daphnis looks upon Chloe naked he is not able to persuade his ψυχή to feel 
happy:  οὐ μὴν ὁ Δάφνις χαίρειν ἔπειθε τὴν ψυχήν (Longus 1.32.4).  This is 
due to the pain of erotic πάθος.  Here we can see the emotion ἔρως being made up 
447 For imagery of the emotions in Greek Tragedy featuring waves see Padel 1992, 81-86.
448 In Plato’s Philebus Socrates is seeking after the source of pleasures: ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν πηγὴν 
ἰτέον (62d7).  
449 See Od.14.102; Arist.HA 540a18.
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of two sensations, pain and joy, one of which will give way to another depending 
upon consummation of the emotion.  This is analogous to Aristotle’s conception of 
emotions involving either pleasure and pain.450  This reference also personifies the 
psychological entity via the metaphor of persuading.  To follow the personification 
further, we see that the reason why Daphnis cannot persuade his soul to be happy is 
because it is too immersed in pain.  Thus his persuasion is unsuccessful, because the 
ψυχή is too much under the power of emotion.  In this metaphor we have a division 
between the ψυχή as an emotional person and Daphnis as the rational persuader: two 
personas.  This folk model contrasts with the philosophical partition of the ψυχή into 
rational and emotional (and potentially more) parts.       
We see similar motivation when we look at two personifications of the ψυχή 
in Heliodorus.  First we have the erotic ‘recognition’ of the ψυχή: τῶν ψυχῶν τὰ 
ἐρωτικὰ γνωρίσματα (Hld.5.5.2).451  Chariclea  and  Theagenes,  about  to  be 
separated, profess that if they are reunited, it will be enough for them to set eyes 
upon one another for the erotic recognition of their respective  souls to be enacted. 
The first element in this metaphor is that of the conduit between the eyes and the 
souls, which was discussed in the chapter on vision.  The pathway from the eyes to 
the inside of the body allows for the transmission of recognition.  I would argue here 
that because the recognition is ‘erotic’, i.e. heavily emotionally dependent, it is seen 
as  a  possession  of  the  ψυχή.452  There  is  also  philosophical  influence.   The 
description at Longus 2.7.1 where Daphnis and Chloe’s ψυχαί are ‘winged’, seems 
to be a metaphor derived originally from Plato.453     
In the Greek Novel the  ψυχή is prototypically seen as a location for  ἔρως 
and as an entity, sometimes personified, subject to the same metaphors as the person 
affected by the emotion.  Furthermore the ψυχή protoypically appears in emotional 
450 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1378a24.  See also the introduction.
451 Aristotle refers to knowing, τὸ γινώσκειν, as being of the ψυχή rather than in the ψυχή: i.e. an 
operation of it (De.an.411a27).    
452 In the same way at Hld.3.5.4 the ψυχή ‘recognises’ that which is similar to it and speeds to meet it. 
The  engagement  is  emotional.   Likewise  at  Hld.4.3.3  Chariclea’s  ψυχή is  as  if  ‘lifted  out’, 
συνεξαιρομένης, in order to accompany Theagenes running the race.  See the English phrase ‘my 
heart goes out to you’, also in an emotional context.  See also Morgan 1989, 107–8.       
453 Plato’s Phaedrus features many references to the ψυχή being ‘winged’, but see particularly 246c–e 
and 251a–b.  For further discussion see the chapter on ontology.  
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contexts and, as an internal psychological entity, can represent the emotion’s cause, 
due to the master metaphor of the force of emotion.  We may now look to the wider 
portrayal of the ψυχή in emotional, rather than ἔρως-specific, contexts.   Table 1.2 
provides a list of references to the ψυχή in other emotional contexts.  In this table 
are also included references where  ἔρως is one of multiple emotions.  The fourth 
column  is  a  suggestion  of  the  emotion(s)  in  English  which  correspond  to  the 
emotions described metaphorically in the Greek.  It is not meant to be a definitive 
labelling of these psychological metaphors.  What I am trying to indicate by means 
of the table is the coherence between metaphors of ἔρως and other emotions.
Table 1.2
Metaphor Greek Reference Emotion
Burning τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ζωπυροῦν Ach.Tat.2.29.2 Grief/lupe
Burnt ἡ ψυχὴ καίεται Ach.Tat.5.8.2 Grief
Desires ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ Hld.8.7.6 Desire  
Disturbed ταραχώδης παντάπασι τὴν ψυχήν Chariton 1.12.5 Emotional state
Disturbed ἔτι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχεις τεταραγμένην Chariton 5.9.3 Distress
Disturbed τὴν ψυχὴν ἐταράττετο Longus 4.6.3 Anxiety
Divided ἐμεμέριστο πολλοῖς ἅμα τὴν ψυχήν Ach.Tat.5.24.3
Shame, anger, love 
and jealousy
Drawn 
Together τάς τε ψυχὰς συνεστάλησαν ὑπὸ λύπης Longus 2.8.1 Grief
Extinguish τῆς ψυχῆς ἐμάρανε τὸ λυπούμενον Ach.Tat.2.29.4 Grief/lupe
Falling in ἐμπεσοῦσα ψυχῇ Ach.Tat.6.11.1 Jealousy
Falling towards τῇ ψυχῇ προσπεσόντα καθάπερ τοξεύματα Ach.Tat.7.4.6 Grief
Fill
μεστὸν ποιήσας ἐλπίδος καὶ φόβου καὶ 
πολυπραγμοσύνης Chariton 1.4.4 Hope, Fear and Curiosity
Fountain ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστι πηγή Ach.Tat.4.8.3 Pleasure
Held (badly) κακῶς εἶχε τὴν ψυχήν Ach.Tat.6.11.2 Grief/Upset
Held (badly) εἶχον τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς Ach.Tat.6.5.5 Fear
Held (good) ψυχὴν ἔχε ἀγαθήν Chariton 2.5.12 Good spirits
Held (good) ἀγαθὴν ἔχων ψυχὴν Chariton 4.7.4 Good spirits
Held (happy) ἡ δὲ αὐτομάτως ψυχὴν εἶχεν ἱλαράν Chariton 5.5.7 Cheerful
Holding  ψυχὴν ἔχειν Ach.Tat.2.34.5 Emotion
Holding 
(down) κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθρόα κατεχεῖτο ἡδονή Ach.Tat.3.23.1 Pleasure
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Hopes τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐλπίδας Ach.Tat.2.23.4 Hopes
Led
ἄπαγε δὴ τὴν σεαυτοῦ ψυχὴν εἰς πάσας 
ἡδονάς Chariton 6.3.9 Pleasure
Leisure σχολασάσης τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κακῷ Ach.Tat.7.4.6 Grief
Lightened
ἐπικουφιεῖ δέ μοι τὸ γυμνάσιον τῆς ψυχῆς 
τὸ λυπούμενον Ach.Tat.1.8.11 Grief
Lightened τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνακουφίσας Chariton 1.4.4 Attention
Mastery τῆς ψυχῆς κρατούσης Ach.Tat.8.8.2 Mastery of Emotions
Pain ὑπεραλγήσας τὴν ψυχὴν Ach.Tat.8.1.2 Upset
Person inside εἰμὶ γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ μετὰ σοῦ Chariton 8.4.5 Empathy
Poured διαχεομένης μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς Hld.4.9.1 Joy
Scales ἡ ψυχὴ τρυτάνη Ach.Tat.6.19.2 Anger and Eros
Scales (on) τὴν ψυχὴν εἶχον ἐπὶ τρυτάνης Ach.Tat.6.14.2 Hope and Fear
Sending Away
λέγων ἀκούσασαν τὴν γυναῖκα ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς 
παρὰ μικρὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀφεῖναι Ach.Tat.5.12.3 Pleasure
Shrieking (in) κωκύσας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βύθιον Ach.Tat.3.10.1 Grief
Soften
ἡ δὲ σὴ ψυχὴ πρὸς τοῦτο μόνον 
μαλακίζεται Ach.Tat.2.21.2 Fear
Soften ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ μαλαχθεῖσα Ach.Tat.3.14.3 Grief
Stretch τὰς ψυχὰς ἐξέτειναν Chariton 5.3.8 Desire of crowd
Struck ψυχὴ παταχθεῖσα Ach.Tat.7.4.5 Grief
Struck ἐκπλήσσει τὴν ψυχὴν Ach.Tat.1.3.3 Grief
Struck (sting) τὴν ψυχὴν ὥσπερ ὑπὸ μύωπος παταχθεὶς Ach.Tat.7.3.6 Grief
Suffered ὁ δὲ ἔπαθε μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν X.Eph.5.12.2 Grief/Anxiety
Swing Τοῖς δὲ αἵ τε ψυχαὶ ἐκραδαίνοντο X.Eph.1.16.2 Fear
Sympathy συμπαθεῖν μέ τι τὴν ψυχήν Ach.Tat.5.21.5 Sympathy
Taken Out ψυχὴν κατέλαβε Ach.Tat.6.10.6 Suspicion
Taken Out
τὸ γὰρ ἀπελπισθὲν ἅπαξ ἐξῄρηται τῆς 
ψυχῆς Hld.1.15.3 Hope
Tame ψυχῆς ἡμεροῖ τὸ θυμούμενον Ach.Tat.10.2.4 Anger  
Toiling τὸ γὰρ πονοῦν τῆς ψυχῆς Ach.Tat.10.2.4 Emotional suffering
Torn Apart τὴν οὖν ψυχὴν διασπώμενος Ach.Tat.7.1.1 Grief, Anger and Love
Trusts ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πιστεύειν φιλεῖ Hld.8.7.6 Trust
Waves
δοὺς δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ σχολὴν εἰς τὴν διάκρισιν 
τῆς τρικυμίας Ach.Tat.7.1.2 Multiple
Waves τρία τῆς ψυχῆς κύματα Ach.Tat.2.29.1 Shame, grief and anger
Wish τὸ κρυπτόμενον βούλημα τῆς ψυχῆς Hld.2.13.1 Wish/desire
Wound τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ ἕλκη Ach.Tat.5.8.2 Grief
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Wound δάκρυον γὰρ αἷμα τραύματος ψυχῆς Ach.Tat.7.4.5 Grief
There are many metaphors which are used both of ἔρως and the other emotions: for 
example  Waves,  Wound and  Burnt.   In  these  folk  models  of  the  ψυχή it  is 
prototypically  affected  by  emotion:  like  the  person  it  is  a  passive  pawn  of  the 
emotion.   The portrayal  of  the  ψυχή in  the Greek Novel  is  also conditioned by 
expert  models  of  psychology.   The  foremost  of  these  seems  to  be  Platonic 
psychology.  Plato’s division of the ψυχή into a rational part, an appetitive part and 
a spirited part, and subsequent interpretations of this in the second sophistic inform 
much  of  what  the  novelists  do,  especially  Achilles  Tatius  and  Heliodorus.454 
However, what I will argue here is that Platonic psychology is applied to different 
degrees and not always to its fullest form.455  This is because the novels use expert 
models for their own purposes, and therefore always rework as well as reflect ancient 
Greek psychology.    
There is plenty of contemporary evidence to show that the division of the 
ψυχή was a focal point of philosophical discussion (see introduction to this section). 
Plutarch speaks of rationality controlling the passionate part of the soul as a man 
controlling  an  animal,  which  is  reminiscent  of  the  famous  passage  from Plato’s 
Phaedrus.456  This is striking compared to the novel, where the victory of the emotion 
454 Repath  2007,  54.   See  Pl.R.434d2–441c7.   In  Greek  the  three  parts  respectively  are  τὸ 
λογιστικόν,  τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, and τὸ θυμοειδής.  Other evidence for the division of the ψυχή 
appears at Pl.Phdr.246a6–7 where the imagery of a two horses and a rider is used.  See also Repath 
2007, 56-7: ‘the changes of emphasis, purpose, and imagery in the different treatments of the division 
of the soul led to later Platonists, especially those of the so-called ‘Middle Platonic’ period (c.80 
B.C.E.–c.250 C.E.), attempting to reconcile perceived differences in the accounts by first dividing the 
soul  into  a  rational  (logistikon)  part  and  an  irrational  (pathētikon)  part  and  then  subdividing  the 
irrational part into the appetitive (epithymētikon) and spirited (thymoeides) parts which are found in 
the Republic’.  
455 Platonic psychology is not necessarily consistenly applied even in Plato.  See Gill 2006, 211-2: ‘in 
both Plato and Aristotle, we find various psychological models offered in different contexts without a 
clear attempt to define an ‘official’ position. For instance, although the tripartite psyche is introduced 
with  great  fanfare  in  Plato's  Republic,  subsequently  in  that  dialogue  Plato's  Socrates  deploys  a 
bipartite version and also sketches a further one, in which the disembodied rational mind constitutes 
our sole true or essential nature’.  He cites Pl.R.436a–441c; 602c–603b, 604b–605c; 611b–612a.
456 Repath 2007, 58-9, citing Plutarch 445b–c: ‘but the fact is that temperance belongs to the sphere 
where reason (ho logismos) guides (hēniochei) and manages the passionate part (to pathētikon), like a 
gentle animal obedient to the reins (euēnion), making it yielding in its desires (tas epithymias) and 
willingly receptive of moderation and propriety;  but the self-controlled man, while he does indeed 
direct his desire (tēn epithymian) by the strength and mastery of reason (tōi logismōi), yet does  so not 
without pain, nor by persuasion, but as it plunges sideways and resists, as though with blow and bit, 
he forcibly subdues it and holds it in, being the while himself full of internal struggle and turmoil.’  
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is the norm.  This is not to say that contests of will do not take place.  In Chariton 
there is a contest between rationality and passion, λογισμός against πάθος, within 
Dionysius, although passion emerges victorious.457  This passage does not specify the 
ψυχή as the locus of the struggle, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that the ψυχή 
is  understood  as  the  locus.458  Repath  has,  however,  noticed  some  interesting 
examples in Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus which imply a Platonic conception of the 
ψυχή.459  At Ach.Tat.6.14.2 there is a weighing of hope and fear in the ψυχή, and 
this shows partition of the ψυχή:  τὴν ψυχὴν εἶχον ἐπὶ τρυτάνης ἐλπίδου καὶ 
φόβου, καὶ ἐφοβεῖτό μου τὸ ἐλπίζον καὶ ἤλπιζε τὸ φοβούμενον.  The neuter 
article  with the participles  ἐλπίζον and  φοβούμενον implies  that  they refer  to 
different  desires  of  the  τὸ  ἐπιθυμητικόν respectively:  the  hoping  and  fearing 
parts.460 There is also a balance, τρυτάνη, at Ach.Tat.6.19.1-7 where it is ἔρως and 
anger  (θυμός)  which  are  weighed  in  the  ψυχή.   This  lengthy  description  of 
Thersander’s psychological reaction to Leucippe’s rejection begins with  ἔρως and 
θυμός as  two torches  of  the  ψυχή.   If  the  beloved  is  obtained,  ὅταν εἰς  τὴν 
ἐπιθυμίαν εὐτυχῇ,  then  ἔρως is victorious.   However,  if  the lover  is rejected, 
ἔρως calls θυμός as an ally.  This can lead to the θυμός obtaining the upper hand 
and driving out ἔρως from its place.  Eventually θυμός subsides and relaxes, but it 
can  be  roused  again  at  another  rejection.   The  passage  is  complicated  and 
metaphorically incoherent.  The emotions begin as torches but θυμός becomes water 
when  it  ‘submerges’  ἔρως:  ὁ  δὲ  τῷ  θυμῷ  βεβαπτισμένος  καταδύεται 
(Ach.Tat.6.19.5).   However,  the  scenario-based  approach,  reactions  based  on 
acceptance  or  rejection,  is  one  relevant  to  ἔρως.   At  Ach.Tat.6.19.5–7  ἔρως is 
personified in various ways:  ἀμύνεται καὶ ὁπλίζει/ὁρῶν/ἀλγεῖ/ἀπολογεῖται. 
457 Chariton 2.4.4.  See also chapter on the opponent. 
458 As Trapp 2007 shows, there were different levels of philosophy going on at this period in Greek 
history.  I take the distinction between reason and passion to be a folk model which has emerged out 
of previous philosophy.  Repath cites Chariton who refers to Dionysius as ‘philosophising in the love’ 
(Chariton  2.4.5).   By  describing  the  basic  conflict  of  emotions,  which  is  a  folk  model,  as 
‘philosophising’, the author is firmly within the realm of folk, and not expert, models.  
459 Repath 2007, 72.  I make extensive use of his excellent article in the current section.
460 I do not feel that the participles and the neuter singular article inevitably refer to parts rather than 
functions: i.e. the hoping of the soul, the fearing of the soul.  
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The emotion is a homunculus experiencing feelings within the ψυχή, which drives it 
to  action.   What  is  significant  here  is  that  the  ψυχή is  divided  up  among  the 
emotions and not between rational and non-rational parts.461  It may be an intentional 
satirizing  of  the  battle  between  reason and passion,  in  a  way which  reflects  the 
novel’s own emotional agenda.   So often there is a focus on the emotional operation 
of the ψυχή alone even when Platonic models are invoked.  We have much evidence 
for characters in the Greek Novel experiencing multiple and conflicting emotions, 
which can clearly be seen in Fusillo’s study.462   
A short while earlier Thersander enters the hut where he is keeping Leucippe 
and converses with her at random.  The narrator explains that lovers are liable to lack 
logic when they are focused upon the beloved.                
Τοιοῦτοι  γὰρ οἱ  ἐρῶντες,  ὅταν πρὸς  τὰς  ἐρωμένας  ζητήσωσι  λαλεῖν·  οὐ  γὰρ 
ἐπιστήσαντες  τὸν  λογισμὸν  τοῖς  λόγοις,  ἀλλὰ  τὴν  ψυχὴν  εἰς  τὸ  ἐρώμενον 
ἔχοντες, τῇ γλώττῃ μόνον χωρὶς ἡνιόχου τοῦ λογισμοῦ λαλοῦσιν (Ach.Tat.6.18.3).
Lovers do not place rationality upon their words, ἐπιστήσαντες τὸν λογισμὸν τοῖς 
λόγοις, but they hold their  ψυχή into the object of affection, chattering only with 
their  tongue and without  the charioteer  of reason.   The reference to  a  charioteer 
alludes to Plato’s famous model of the ψυχή as a charioteer and two horses.463  The 
desire for the beloved rules in the  ψυχή and therefore the charioteer representing 
reason does not have control.  This therefore primarily concerns two functions of the 
ψυχή, reason and appetite, and directly engages with a specific passage from Plato. 
Heliodorus  provides  more  example  of  Platonic  influenced  psychology. 
Theagenes,  Chariclea and Cnemon are overtaken by desperate circumstances,  and 
this lack of clarity concerning their situation ‘darkens’ the reasoning (part) of their 
ψυχή:  τὸ ἄδηλον ἐζόφου τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λογιζόμενον (Hld.2.15.1).  Therefore 
emotions other than ἔρως—presumably despair—can equally affect the operation of 
the rational part of the soul.  However, we may note that the metaphor is not one of a 
461 See for example Ach.Tat.5.24.3:  ἐμεμέριστο πολλοῖς ἅμα τὴν ψυχήν, αἰδοῖ καὶ ὀργῇ καὶ 
ἔρωτι καὶ ζηλοτυπίᾳ.  The ψυχή is ‘divided’ between multiple emotions.
462 Fusillo 1999.  On multiple emotions in the Greek Novel see also Kytzler 2003. 
463 Repath 2007, 73.
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lack of control.  Darkening connotes a looming presence of the appetitive part rather 
than its running loose.  They are then forced to give in to their fatigue and pain. 
Thus  we  are  told  that  even  the  thinking  or  purpose,  τὸ  νοερὸν,  of  the  ψυχή 
occasionally consents to go along with, συνομολογεῖν, physical affliction: οὕτως 
ἄρα  ποτὲ  σώματος  πάθει  καὶ  τὸ  νοερὸν  τῆς  ψυχῆς  συνομολογεῖν 
ἠνέσχετο (Hld.2.15.2).  This is again not the overriding of emotion.  It is a subtle 
Platonic depiction of the rational part of the soul consenting to go along with the 
appetitve part, not being taken over by it.   
There  are  another  two  examples  from  Heliodorus  which  imply  the 
partitioning of the ψυχή and they prove to be interesting.464  At Hld.4.6.1 Calasiris 
visits the lovesick Chariclea and departs, leaving her time to manage the part of her 
ψυχή which feels shame: διαιτῆσαι ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αἰδούμενον. 
Since ἔρως is associated with the τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν part this implies the tripartite 
model of the ψυχή.465  Her reason, διαιτῆσαι, is operating in conjunction with the 
αἰδώς from the spirited part of her ψυχή.  In context she is coming to terms with the 
sense of shame stopping her from following her ἔρως for Theagenes.  Her αἰδώς is 
appropriate but she must work with it to channel her ἔρως in the correct direction: 
betrothal and self-control rather than sex.               
We may compare a passage later on where Achaemenes desires to see his (as 
he believes) betrothed Chariclea.  He says that it is because he wants to manage the 
part of his  ψυχή which has been bitten:  τὸ δεδηγμένον τῆς ψυχῆς τῇ θέᾳ τῇ 
ἐκείνης διαιτῆσαι (Hld.7.28.1).  Here we have the same verb,  διαιτῆσαι, but a 
different  part  of  the  ψυχή.   The  bite  clearly  indicates  ἔρως and  therefore  the 
appetitive  part.466  Chariclea  and Achaemenes  contrast  in  their  reaction  to  ἔρως. 
Hers  is  a  tripartite  response  due  to  her  upright  character,  whereas  his  is  an 
unreflective acceptance of his desire.         
I will conclude that for the most part we may see the ψυχή as a homunculus, 
often representing emotion, in the folk model presented in the Greek Novel.  The 
464 Repath 2007, 80ff.
465 See Repath  2007, 80.
466 Bites are prominent in Stoic accounts of emotion.  See Sorabji 2000, 38, 40–1, 66–8, 70, 120, 204.
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bulk of the evidence surveyed above points to a folk model of the ψυχή as the locus 
of emotion, but there are significant reworkings of platonic models of psychology 
which  view  a  more  complex  partitioned  ψυχή,  either  bipartite  or  tripartite. 
Therefore the Greek Novel features an interaction of the more prolific folk models of 
the  ψυχή with the expert  models which use and rework these folk models.   The 
prototypically ψυχή represents emotion because the novels are fundamentally about 
emotion,  especially  dominant  emotion,  and  the  use  of  this  psychological  entity 
reflects this.  
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II The Καρδία
The anatomical entity καρδία, which is an organ, is used far less than ψυχή in the 
Greek Novel.  In total the word appears thirty four times.  The author distribution is 
also  uneven.   Xenophon never  uses  it,  Chariton  only  twice,  and  Achilles  Tatius 
dominates with nineteen references.467  In this section I will concentrate on the use of 
the entity in relation to psychological metaphors for  ἔρως, although I will include 
other references since they shed light on individual author preference and emotional 
continuity.468  
There are two tables below detailing metaphorical conceptualisations of the 
καρδία during  the psychological  state  of  ἔρως and  other  emotional  experiences 
(tables 2.1 and 2.2).469  The majority of references to the καρδία are psychological. 
In tables 2.1 and 2.2 below we see an interesting variety in the ways different authors 
use psychological metaphors featuring the καρδία.  Achilles Tatius uses the καρδία 
in twice as many references to ἔρως as to other emotions: eleven to six.  Heliodorus 
is  roughly  even  at  two  to  three.   Chariton  and  Longus  are  striking  in  their 
consistency.   Chariton uses  καρδία only twice and never of  ἔρως, while Longus 
uses it exclusively of ἔρως in all seven of his references.  These usages can be fitted 
roughly onto a chronological scale.  The earliest novelists Chariton and Xenophon of 
467 The numbers are as follows: Achilles Tatius: 19; Chariton: 2; Heliodorus: 6; Longus: 7; Xenophon: 
0. 
468 In previous Greek literature there are numerous instances of the καρδία as the locus of ἔρως.  See 
A.R.3.296-8; Oppian, Halieutica 4.10–2.  
469 Three references excerpted from the tables feature physical rather than psychological descriptions. 
In  Achilles  Tatius  the  narrator  Clitophon  describes  a  sword  sinking  into  a  καρδία during  the 
(apparent) human sacrifice of Leucippe.  I take this to be a metaphor referring to a concrete action, a 
sword passing into a human body, and not a psychological metaphor.  Likewise the inserting of a 
piece of one plant into the καρδία of another refers to botanical anatomy.  A more difficult example 
appears in Heliodorus where the doctor is diagnosing Chariclea’s lovesickness.  Charicles reports to 
Calasiris  that  the doctor took the girl’s  pulse in order  (he supposes) to check the motions of  the 
καρδία:  τὰ καρδίας κινήματα (Hld.4.7.4).  The first problem with this is the reliability of the 
narrator.  Charicles’ lack of scientific knowledge of the body has already been exposed by Calasiris 
(Hld.3.7), and we can hardly trust his assessment of the doctor’s intentions.  Despite this, however, his 
postulation is not unreasonable.  The beating of the καρδία, and therefore the pulse, is indeed a sign 
of  emotional  exertion,  and  it  can  often  be  a  symptom  of  ἔρως (see  below).   Therefore  this 
physiological description does verge on the psychological, without being specifically connected with 
emotion here, since the doctor is examining a sick girl.  At this point, pre-diagnosis, it is only the 
reader and Calasiris who are aware that the girl is in love.  
174
Ephesus have no references to  καρδία in an erotic context, while erotic instances 
predominate in Achilles Tatius and Longus, before easing slightly in Heliodorus.470 
The  reason  for  this  is  not  clear,  and  I  would  not  want  to  commit  myself  to  a 
definitive answer, since the dating of the novels is at best hazy.  The difference could 
also be explained by authorial choice.    
The metaphors used of the καρδία in an emotional state reflect metaphors of 
emotion.   Thus we see  the καρδία on fire,  hit  with  an arrow,  goaded,  bitten,  or 
wounded (see table 2.1).  In table 2.2 we see references to emotions other than ἔρως. 
The  reason I  have  not  stated  an emotion  for  each  column is  because  it  is  often 
difficult  to say which emotion or emotions  are involved when we receive only a 
metaphorical description of the καρδία.  Sometimes the emotion is specified.  We can 
see  that  Ach.Tat.2.29.4  and  Ach.Tat.2.29.2  refer  to  anger  (thumos and  orgē 
respectively).  With others it is more difficult to say.  At Hld.10.17.1 Hydaspes is 
leading his newly discovered daughter away to be sacrificed, and so ‘smouldering’ in 
his  καρδία probably refers to grief, although we cannot rule out other emotions. 
The reason for this is probably that the motion, or beating, of the καρδία is a generic 
indicator  of  emotional  response,  and  specific  emotions  have  to  be  specified  or 
inferred from the context.  This physiological symptom of emotion is at the heart of 
these psychological metaphors.   For instance, Chariton describes Callirhoe in two 
scenarios as being ‘struck’ in her καρδία.471  In the first instance she has just heard a 
report of her husband Chaereas, and in the second she has been solicited by a eunuch 
on behalf of the Persian King.  One label we can put upon this description is shock. 
If a  καρδία is struck, then it is potentially shaken.  In the same way the sob or 
hiccup metaphor  (ἔλυζε),  the loosening and the thrown metaphors indicate some 
sort of force exerted upon the καρδία (table 2.2).  The same conception of the forces 
upon the  καρδία can be seen in the erotic metaphors of  disturbance,  leaping out, 
swaying, trembling and throwing (table 2.1).  This metaphorical conceptualisation of 
the καρδία being forced into motion, based on the physiology of a beating heart, is 
prototypical  of  its  use  in  psychological  imagery.   The  καρδία can  also  be  the 
470 For the dating of the novels see the introduction.  
471 Chariton 3.9.2 and Chariton 6.5.6.
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container  of  emotion  (see  throwing  out  anger  from (table  2.2)).   The  other 
prototypical  feature  of  metaphors  of  the  καρδία is  that  the  force is  a  damaging 
one.472  This conception applies to metaphors of ἔρως and other emotions.  
There  are  two  final  points  which  I  wish  to  pick  up  concerning  these 
metaphors.   The  first  relates  to  how influential  literary  influences  are  upon this 
model.  It seems that literary influences are subsumed within the general models.  If a 
model is too common, such as the fire one, then it cannot on its own be an allusion. 
There are two references which possibly allude to previous literature.  The first is in 
Heliodorus, where Cnemon rhetorically asks Calasiris who could have a καρδία of 
adamant or iron that they would not be bewitched by the love story of Theagenes and 
Chariclea.473  This  statement  possibly  alludes  to  Pindar’s  famous  fragment  on 
Theoxenus (fr.127; see Chapter on vision).  The concept involves the supposition 
that the  καρδία which does not feel emotion is hard, like adamant and iron, and 
therefore does not  move and is  not  susceptible  to forces.   In Achilles  Tatius  the 
narrator describes anger as barking round the καρδία.474  This is not identical with 
but  coherent  with  the  image  in  Homer  where  Odysseus’  κραδίη barks  in  anger 
(Od.20.13).  In  both  references  the  καρδία is  disturbed  by either  its  own or  the 
emotion’s ‘barking’, which maps onto its movement under emotional pressure.  Of 
course there is an important difference that in the Odyssey the heart barks like a dog 
when Odysseus feels anger at the maids.  In Achilles Tatius the description is used of 
anger  as  part  of  a  complex  emotional  response  from  Leucippe  at  her  mother’s 
accusation of losing her virginity.  The imagery here portrays anger as a dog barking 
and overflowing,  ἐπικλύζω,  in the foam of madness:  τῷ τῆς μανίας ἀφρῷ.475 
The extended psychological imagery sees the three emotions Leucippe experiences—
αἰδὼς δὲ καὶ λύπη καὶ ὀργή—as waves of the soul.  The wave of anger is further 
conceptualised as a raving dog: foam,  ἀφρός, can refer to the sea (Il.18.403) or a 
472 See the metaphors of Arrow, Bite, Consumed, Fire, Goad, Sting, Wound (table 1.1) and Consume,  
Strike (table 1.2).
473 Τίς οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος ἢ σιδηροῦς τὴν καρδίαν ὡς μὴ θέλγεσθαι καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν 
ἀκούων (Hld.4.4.3).
474 ἡ δὲ ὀργὴ περιϋλακτοῦσα τὴν καρδίαν (Ach.Tat.2.29.2).  
475 For anger barking see also Od.20.13 and Opp.H.1.721.
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human or animal (Il.20.168).  Therefore  ἀφρός can refer to the wave in the target 
domain and the mad dog in the source domain.      
Most  of  the  references  to  the  καρδία are  folk  models  of  emotion.   At 
Achilles  Tatius  2.7.6,  when Clitophon claims  to  Leucippe  that  the  bee  sting  has 
caused a wound, we are told that the wound ‘flowed down’ upon the καρδία:  ἐπὶ 
γὰρ τὴν καρδίαν κατέρρευσε τὸ τραῦμα.  The whole passage involves kissing 
and seduction, and Clitophon is playing with the conventions.  The sting of the bee 
stands metaphorically for Leucippe’s emotional affect upon him (see the chapter on 
madness) and reaching the καρδία indicates the seat of that emotional response.  
Are there any  ἔρως specific images or conceptualisations of the  καρδία? 
The evidence says that there are ἔρως specific images which adhere to the general 
rule of a force.  Many metaphors, such as Arrow and Bite, appear in table 2.1 but not 
2.2,  which  means  that  specific  images  associated  with  ἔρως depict  that  emotion 
rather than others.  However, the underlying model of a force propelling the καρδία 
into motion is the most prevalent, and therefore probably prototypical.  
Table 2.1
Metaphor Greek Reference
Arrow τὸ βέλος, ἡ δὲ παρθένος εἰς τὴν καρδίαν Ach.Tat.8.12.6
Bite δάκνει τὸ φίλημα τὴν καρδίαν Longus 1.25.2
Carry towards τῇ καρδίᾳ προσέφερε Ach.Tat.5.27.1
Consumed Ἤλγει τὴν καρδίαν ὡς ἐσθιομένην ὑπὸ φαρμάκων Longus 1.32.4
Disturbed ἡ δὲ ταραχθεῖσα τῷ φιλήματι Ach.Tat.2.37.10
Eros speaks out of
κάτωθεν δὲ ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὁ Ἔρως 
ἀντεφθέγγετο Ach.Tat.2.5.2
Fire ὡς τὸ κᾶον πῦρ τὴν καρδίαν τὴν ἐμήν Longus 3.10.4
Goad οἷον ἐγκεῖσθαι τῇ καρδίᾳ κέντρον Hld.1.14.6
Happy ἡσθείσης τῆς καρδίας Ach.Tat.2.8.3
Leaps out ἐξάλλεται ἡ καρδία Longus 1.18.1
Passion runs upon τοῦ πάθους οἶμαι καὶ τὴν καρδίαν ἐπιδραμόντος Hld.3.5.6
Signs/Seals καρδίαν ἐναποσφραγίζει Ach.Tat.5.13.4
Sting/Prick τὸ νύττον μου τὴν καρδίαν Longus 1.14.2
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Swaying τὴν καρδίαν παλλομένην Longus 1.17.2
Swaying τὴν καρδίαν ἐπαλλόμην Longus 2.7.5
Sways Πάλλεται Ach.Tat.2.37.10
Thrown around ὁ δὲ τῇ καρδίᾳ περιβέβληται Ach.Tat.6.19.2
Throws βάλλει τὴν καρδίαν Ach.Tat.2.37.10
Tremble ἔτρεμον τὴν καρδίαν Ach.Tat.1.4.5




τίς οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος ἢ σιδηροῦς τὴν καρδίαν ὡς μὴ 
θέλγεσθαι καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἀκούων Hld.4.4.3
Anger as a property 
of τῆς καρδίας ἔπαυσε τὸ θυμούμενον Ach.Tat.2.29.4
Barks around ἡ δὲ ὀργὴ περιϋλακτοῦσα τὴν καρδίαν Ach.Tat.2.29.2
Consumes τὴν καρδίαν ἐκφάγῃ Ach.Tat.7.4.5
Loosen ἡ καρδία μου ἐλέλυτο Ach.Tat.7.4.1
Smouldering τὴν καρδίαν σμυχόμενος Hld.10.17.1
Sob or hiccup οἷον ἔλυζε τὴν καρδίαν στοχαζομένη Hld.7.19.8
Struck ἔπληξε τὴν καρδίαν Chariton 3.9.2
Struck τὴν καρδίαν ἐπλήγη καθάπερ ὑπὸ ξίφους τοῦ λόγου Chariton 6.5.6
Throwing out anger 
from ἐκβαλὼν δὲ τῆς καρδίας τὴν ὀργήν Ach.Tat.6.9.2
Thrown βάλλεται μὲν τὴν καρδίαν εὐθέως Ach.Tat.5.24.2
Comparing this with the examples of  ψυχή metaphors seen above, we see that a 
major difference between the two entities is that the καρδία is not personified to as 
great an extent.  An exception is Ach.Tat.2.8.3, where the καρδία feels happy within 
the state of ἔρως, ἡσθείσης τῆς καρδίας, although this is not the only reading.476 
In the examples taken from other emotions, the reference to the anger of the καρδία 
(θυμός) is interesting in regards to the partitioning of the  ψυχή discussed above: 
τῆς καρδίας ἔπαυσε τὸ θυμούμενον (Ach.Tat.2.29.4).  However, the  ψυχή is 
476 This is the reading preferred by Garnaud.  However, it is unusual in light of other metaphors used 
of the καρδία.
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the most popular psychological entity and the one which features in expert models of 
emotion.
The καρδία tends not to feature in reworkings of expert models such as the 
Platonic influence upon the divison of the  ψυχή we saw above.  However, in one 
passage it does.  The flowing of beauty is drawn upon the erotic καρδία and imprints 
down below a shadow:  ἡ δὲ τοῦ κάλλους ἀπορροὴ δι' ἀφανῶν ἀκτίνων ἐπὶ 
τὴν  ἐρωτικὴν  ἑλκομένη  καρδίαν ἐναποσφραγίζει κάτω τὴν σκιάν 
(Ach.Tat.5.13.4).  The verb ἐναποσφραγίζω is a technical term used of cognition 
by the stoics.477  It follows several verbs which are used in expert models of sight and 
cognition: ἐναπομάττεται/ἀναπλάττει.478  The context features pleasure through 
vision and the impressing of the εἴδωλον of the beloved inside the lover.  Locating 
the  καρδία as  where  the  effluences  of  beauty  create  a  shadow  emphasises  the 
emotional nature of the cognitive impression itself.       
The  Greek  Novel  features  the  ψυχή far  more  than  the  καρδία in 
psychological metaphor, yet  both are important within the folk psychology.   Both 
reinforce  the  portrayal  of  ἔρως as  a  passive  affect  and  the  imagery  of  both  is 
grounded in common folk metaphors of the emotion itself.  Their behaviour during 
emotional  experience  is  also  coherent,  being  mostly  conceptualised  as  a  force 
enacted upon them. 
477 At D.L.7.46.4 the cognitive is that which is sealed and impressed:  ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ 
ἐναπομεμαγμένην.  For an extended discussion see Goldhill 2001b and Morales 2004, 131–5.
478 For the influences see Morales 2004, 133.
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Chapter 7 - An Ontology of Ἔρως
This final section extends the discussion of the metaphorical conceptualisations of 
ἔρως seen in the chapters upon fire, sickness, madness and conflict.  Many instances 
of metaphor  referring to the psychology of  ἔρως in the Greek Novel fit  into the 
above four categories.  However, ἔρως can be conceptualised in other ways.  These 
metaphors range from ones used of emotion or abstract concepts in general to those 
used  specifically  of  ἔρως.   Therefore  this  chapter  will  expand  the  analysis  of 
metaphors of ἔρως both in the direction of the more general and the more specific. 
The title originates from Lakoff and Johnson’s category of ontological metaphors, 
which refers to the conceptualisation of abstract concepts in concrete terms such as 
entities and substances: hence an ontology.479  
479 See Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 25-32.  
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I The Container Metaphor
One of the most  pervasive metaphors  in  English is  that  which conceptualises  an 
abstract concept as a container.480  This metaphor is ontological in the sense that it 
reifies  an abstract  concept  as  a  concrete  container.   The entity  conceptualised  as 
being  in  a  container  can  be  put  into  the  container  or  taken  out:  therefore  this 
metaphor can structure relations between the entity and the container in terms of an 
in-out orientation.  With regard to metaphors of emotion this relationship can work in 
two  directions.   The  human  body  can  be  conceived  of  as  a  container  (an 
experientially based metaphor; looking out upon the world from a self perceived as 
internal to the physical shell) and the emotion is conceived of as an entity inside us. 
Having the emotion inside is feeling it, and not having it inside is not feeling it.  This 
is  possibly  a  universal  model  of  emotion  due  to  its  grounding  in  human 
physiology.481  However, there is a second usage of the container metaphor where the 
emotion itself is conceived of as the container.  The state of feeling the emotion is 
mapped onto the in-out orientation of the container, where being in the emotion is 
feeling it, and being outside of it is not feeling it.  Both these models appear in the 
Greek Novel, and highlight important distinctions in the way in which the emotional 
experience is conceptualised.   
I shall deal with the second model of emotion first.  The Greek preposition 
corresponding  to  our  ‘in’  is  ἐν,  and  we  often  see  the  conceptualisation  of  an 
emotional state in Xenophon of Ephesus referring to the person as an entity inside 
the container of the emotion.  Thus we get examples of people being ‘in’ ἀθυμία, 
φόβος, ὀργή, λύπη and  πένθος, in the same way as ‘I am in love’ is used in 
English.482  That is to say where being in the emotion indicates the state of feeling the 
480 See Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 29. 
481 See Kövecses 2000, 139-63.
482 Ἀθυμία:  X.Eph.1.5.5;  φόβος:  X.Eph.1.5.6;  ὀργή:  X.Eph.2.11.2,  3.12.6,  4.6.2;  λύπη: 
X.Eph.3.9.1;  πένθος:  X.Eph.5.6.2.   X.Eph.5.10.5  features  ἀθυμία in  the  dative  without  an  ἐν: 
ἀθυμίᾳ μὲν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀνθίαν͵ ἀπορίᾳ δὲ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων.  I am reading ἀθυμίᾳ rather 
than  ἀπορίᾳ here, in line with O’Sullivan (following Hemsterhuis), since otherwise the repetition 
would  be  banal.   We  also  have  other  examples  of  ἀθυμία and  ἀπορία being  a  pairing  (see 
X.Eph.3.2.14; 5.6.1).  There are interesting discrepancies between the use of these concepts in Greek 
and English.  For instance I cannot say *‘I am in anger’ or *‘I am in grief’, but I can say ‘I am in love’  
(* is used as the standard linguistic indicator of a sentence felt by a native speaker to be deviant). 
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emotion.  This can be paralleled in earlier literature, such as when Plato refers to 
being ‘in φόβος’ (Pl.R.578e).483           
In  the other  novels  we do not  get  the combination  of  ἐν and one of  the 
emotion terms above.484  However, we do get two examples from Chariton and one 
from Achilles Tatius of ἐν and ἔρως.  The Great King’s eunuch tells Callirhoe that 
his master will not tolerate being ‘surpassed in reputation in love’:  βασιλεὺς ἐν 
ἔρωτι  παρευδοκιμούμενος (Chariton  6.7.13).   The  relationship  of  the 
prepositional phrase to the verb highlights an important subtlety of the metaphor. 
According to the meaning of the other container metaphors used of emotion terms 
above we might take the prepositional phrase ἐν ἔρωτι as referring to the king: i.e. 
he  is  feeling  love.   However,  the  verb  accompanying  the  prepositional  phrase 
involves a kind of action different from merely being or becoming: the idea is ‘being 
bested in love’.  The former meaning primarily indicates psychological state as with 
the English ‘to be in love’.  The second primarily indicates the field within which 
one competes,  as ‘being surpassed in love’  emphasises  the interaction between a 
person and their love rival, and internal psychological repercussions, such as sadness 
or anger, can be understood to follow from it.  The only other reference to ἐν ἔρωτι 
in Chariton is similar.  Dionysius attempts to fight  ἔρως, combating  πάθος with 
λογισμός,  but  this  only makes  the god more  angry at  a  soul  philosophising ‘in 
love’:  ψυχὴν  ἐν ἔρωτι  φιλοσοφοῦσαν (Chariton  2.4.5).   Here  the  ψυχή is 
personified as philosophising and can be seen as a homunculus of Dionysius.  If we 
align this instance to the one above then we translate the phrase not as ‘a soul in love 
philosophising’, but ‘a soul philosophising in love’.   In both instances the container 
However, I can say that I ‘act in anger’.  The container metaphor perhaps requires the concept to be a 
passive state: acting or feeling implies the activeness of the subjet.     
483 Ἐν ποίῳ ἄν τινι καὶ ὁπόσῳ φόβῳ οἴει γενέσθαι αὐτὸν.  This refers to a man with his family 
and fifty slaves.  He is hypothetically put into a situation where no one could help him if his slaves 
decided to revolt.  Therefore it refers to the state of fear in which he is in due to the apprehension of 
potential events.    
484 In the other novels we do not get ἐν with the dative for either ἀθυμία, φόβος, ὀργή, λύπη or 
πένθος.  We do get φόβος and ὀργή in the dative, but not with ἐν.  For example in Heliodorus the 
Ethiopians ward off attacks ‘with anger’:  σὺν ὀργῇ τῶν Αἰθιόπων ἀμυνομένων (Hld.9.5.9).  A 
similar usage indicating means or manner occurs earlier in the novel, when Arsace ‘stretches’ her 
jealousy  with  her  ὀργή:  τὴν ἐκ  πολλοῦ  ζηλοτυπίαν  ὀργῇ  τῶν  εἰρημένων  ἐπιτείνασα 
(Hld.8.7.1).  
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metaphor  emphasises  ἔρως as  the  field  within  which  one  is  competing  or 
discoursing.        
In  Achilles  Tatius  we also  have  an  example  of  the  preposition  and noun 
pairing.   Melite  tells  Clitophon  how she  attempted  to  solicit  a  love  charm from 
Leucippe in order to make him fall in love with her. Her excuse is gnomic.  This 
course of action is the ‘refuge of unsuccessful lovers’:  αὕτη γὰρ τῶν ἐν ἔρωτι 
δυστυχούντων  ἡ  καταφυγή (Ach.Tat.5.26.12).   It  refers  to  people  who  are 
unsuccessful  within  the  field  of  love,  and  therefore  bears  similarity  to  the 
constructions taking ἐν ἔρωτι above.  
The metaphorical conception of the emotion as a container also appears with 
the preposition εἰς, ‘into’, and verbs of motion and force.  In Xenophon of Ephesus 
Anthia asks Habrocomes not to reject Manto’s proposition and thereby cast her into a 
barbaric ὀργή: μηδὲ εἰς ὀργὴν ἐμβάλῃς βαρβαρικήν (X.Eph.2.4.5).  In this case 
it  is  a  directional  metaphor  indicating  place  into which  relies  upon  a  common 
metaphor: that a change of state is a change of location.485  The youthful Chaereas 
can easily fall into erotic jealousy: ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς ἐρωτικὴν ζηλοτυπίαν (Chariton 
1.2.6).  The preposition  εἰς also appears with regard to  ἔρως itself.  Polycharmus 
urges Chaereas to visit the beautiful female captive they have taken (Callirhoe), since 
he wishes to throw him into a new ἔρως: βουλόμενος ἐμβαλεῖν αὐτόν, εἴ πως 
δύναιτο, εἰς ἔρωτα καινόν (Chariton 8.1.6).486  Thus while ἐν indicates a state εἰς 
gives directionality and implies a change of state.  In Achilles Tatius Clitophon tells 
us that he wishes to make a girl receptive (‘easily led’) to ἔρως: Βουλόμενος οὖν 
ἐγὼ εὐάγωγον τὴν κόρην εἰς ἔρωτα παρασκευάσαι (Ach.Tat.1.16.1).487  This 
485 See Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 31-2, with ‘he fell into depression’ given as an example.  
486 The  adjective  καινός does  not  merely  express  ‘newness’  but  also  ‘novelty’  or  ‘strangeness’. 
However, in context it represents the replacing of his ἔρως for Callirhoe with another one.  
487 For the active form of the verb used in the sense of making or rendering with a participle or 
adjective see X.Cyr.1.6.18 and Pl.Lg.803e. 
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is the language of seduction and the purpose here is sex.488  Leading her into ἔρως, 
εὐάγωγον…εἰς ἔρωτα, is a metaphor for a change of state as with the examples 
above: Leucippe will now feel ἔρως.  Leucippe experiencing the emotion is seen as 
a requisite of achieving sex.  However, it is a change of state induced by Clitophon 
and this  emphasises  the element  of seduction.   It  portrays  Leucippe as a  passive 
victim of Clitophon.  
Emotion, however, is not always a specific destination.  Often the effects of 
emotion cause one to wander in mind.489  I would label this as a specific kind of 
emotion, manic emotion, which perhaps occurs most famously in Greek tragedy.490 
In Sophocles’  Ajax the chorus say that Ajax is no longer steady in the ‘impulses’ 
with  which  he  grew  up,  συντρόφοις,  but  keeps  company  outside:  οὐκέτι 
συντρόφοις ὀργαῖς ἔμπεδος, ἀλλ' ἐκτὸς ὁμιλεῖ (S.Aj.639-40).  The implication 
is that he is consorting, ὁμιλεῖ, outside of his mind, and the notion of the mad being 
out of their minds is one as familiar to the English language as to Greek.  In the 
medical  writer  Hippocrates  ἔκτοσθεν  ἐγένετο means  ‘to  be  delirious 
(H.Epid.5.1.85).  This metaphor of being absent or outside of oneself, wandering in 
mind,  is  used  of  manic  emotion  in  Heliodorus.   When  the  wicked  stepmother 
Demaenete  can  no  longer  control  her  lust  for  Cnemon  she  becomes  ‘outside  of 
herself’:  ἡ  δὲ  ἐπειδὴ  τὸ  πρῶτον  εἶδεν  ἐκτὸς  ἑαυτῆς  γίνεται (Hld.1.10.2). 
There are several analogous expressions in English representing an out of body state, 
such as to be ‘beside oneself’ or ‘out of one’s mind’.  The metaphor here represents 
the  sudden  unleashing  of  her  self-control.   Demaenete,  an  Athenian  stepmother 
lusting after her son, and lacking any of the moral concerns of her archetype Phaedra, 
488 Another two examples in Achilles Tatius refer to the area of ἔρως: how one deals with ἔρως in a 
social context.  Clinias tells Clitophon that he is fortunate as regards ἔρως, because he has the object 
of his desire in close proximity:  οὕτως εἰς ἔρωτα εὐτυχῶν (Ach.Tat.1.9.2).  Later on Thersander 
also hopes to be fortunate in his erotic affairs because he has Leucippe in his power: εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα 
εὐτυχήσειν (Ach.Tat.6.20.1).   We  are  told  that  Callisthenes,  who  is  deviant  (according  to  the 
narrator) and falls in love from hearsay rather than sight, engages in softness as regards ἔρως through 
the ears: ὡς καὶ τοῖς ὠσὶν εἰς ἔρωτα τρυφᾶν καὶ ταῦτα πάσχειν ἀπὸ ῥημάτων, ἃ τῇ ψυχῇ 
τρωθέντες διακονοῦσιν ὀφθαλμοί (Ach.Tat.2.13.1).   The verb  τρυφᾶν evokes the notion of 
effeminate luxury (see Ar.Nu.48) and enforces the idea that his way of feeling ἔρως is perverse. 
489 Ἔρως and Wandering: see Montiglio 2005, 83-85, 169, 234-35.
490 See Padel 1992, 30, 43, 121, 129, 176 and Padel 1995 in general on Greek Tragedy.  Madness and 
Wandering in Greek culture: see Montiglio 2005, 2, 3, 16-18, 37-41, 65, 75-83, 104, 120-22.  
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provides us with a stereotype par excellence of the manically passionate ‘wicked’ 
woman.  The spatial notion of ‘out’,  ἐκ, is used in a similar way at Chariton 6.4.4. 
The king sets off on a hunt, and we are told that the noise would have driven Ἔρως 
himself out (of his senses): ἡ σπουδὴ καὶ ὁ θόρυβος ἐκεῖνος αὐτῶν ἐξέστησεν 
ἂν καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα.  The verb ἐξίστημι means ‘to displace’ and is often used of 
mental confusion (see E.Ba.850, E.Fr.265).491  The gist of the passage is that all the 
confusion and uproar would have driven Ἔρως out of his mind, i.e. distracted him, 
and  Ἔρως himself should be most proof to this effect,  since it is he who usually 
drives people out of their senses.  However, as it turns out, the King is not distracted 
from ἔρως by the hunt, but focuses on it even more.492  Daphnis becomes ἔκφρων 
and  outside  of  his  phrenes,  ἔξω τῶν φρενῶν γενόμενος,  when  suitors  make 
advances on Chloe and when she is kidnapped later on respectively (Longus 3.26.1; 
4.28.2).  The first instance describes erotic jealousy and the second ἔρως-motivated 
concern or distress.                                             
  What  is  interesting  about  these  examples  is  that  they  display  a  model 
different from the most prevalent inside-outside orientation of the emotions.  This 
model  is  one  of  displacement  (ἔκστασις)  coherent  with  the  English  expression 
‘beside oneself’, which conceptualises the emotion as external to oneself.  The more 
common  model  is  that  of  emotion  as  internal  to  the  person  experiencing  it 
(ἐνθουσιασμός).493  Internal emotion is related to the concept of divine possession, 
which is often associated with emotional affect.  Tragic madness and manic emotion 
can be divinely inspired.494  Satyrus tells Clitophon that he has the god Eros in him, 
491 See also the cognate noun ἔκστασις which can be used of a disturbed mental state 
(Arist.Cat.10a1).
492 An unavoidable result perhaps given the association of seduction and eroticism with hunting in 
antiquity: see the earlier chapter on vision.  
493 See Kövecses 2000, 146ff., who provides evidence for the container metaphor of emotion inside 
the human body from English, Chinese, Japanese and Hungarian.  See also Konstan 2006, 147–8 and 
Planalp 1997, 107, who refers to the metaphor of emotion as internal fluid: ‘the body is a container 
and emotions are fluids inside it’.  Ancient Greek humoral theory conceptualised physiology in terms 
of liquids: see Nutton 2004, 116, 121–2, 209, 241, 366, 367, 343.  For the flowing of emotion in 
Greek Tragedy see Padel 1992, 81–88.  There are many instances in Homer of emotion being a fluid: 
Il.6.264; 7.182; 9.362; 18.331, 9.454 (see Clarke 1999, 92).    
494 In the context of ἔρως see Phaedra’s doomed passion, which Aphrodite claims to have instilled in 
her: τοῖς ἐμοῖς βουλεύμασιν (E.Hipp.28).  On Greek tragedy see Padel 1992, 3–12, 129–32. 
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οὖν ἐν σεαυτῷ θεὸν (Ach.Tat.2.4.5), arguing that the presence of a god inside will 
make one brave.495  This is rhetoric, but rhetoric that is coherent with folk models of 
emotion.  When Habrocomes despairs of seeing Anthia or his homeland ever again 
ἀθυμία and ἀπορία ‘fall  into  him’:  ἐμπίπτει (X.Eph.5.6.1).496  This  model  is 
different from the one of these two emotions above, in that the person is now the 
container instead of the emotion.497  Habrocomes and Hippothous are both filled with 
anger  at  Leucon’s  words  and  a  love  rival  respectively:  εὐθὺς  μὲν  ὀργῆς 
ἐνεπλήσθη; ὀργῆς πλησθείς (X.Eph.2.4.3; 3.2.10).  The person as a container is 
filled with the emotion as with a substance and filling leads to the expression of the 
emotion.  Habrocomes retorts angrily, while Hippothous slays his love rival in his 
passion.   The adverb ‘straight  away’,  εὐθύς,  implies  that  the filling is  a  sudden 
emotional response: empty to full in a matter of seconds.  The filling of the container 
with ἔρως in Heliodorus is different from the anger example above.  The filling is 
not conceived of as leading to action straight away, but as being the fulfilment of an 
ἔρως-motivated goal: sex.  Arsace asks her servant to procure sex with Theagenes 
for her and thereby ‘fill her ἔρως’: τὸν μὲν ἐμπλήσασα (Hld.7.10.6).  Her ἔρως 
remains at a low level until it is sated, at which point she fills it and satisfies it.  The 
verb  ἐμπίμπλημι means  to ‘fill  in’, but can often refer to eating or drinking.498 
Therefore we have filling as metaphorical for the satisfying of hunger or thirst, and 
hunger or thirst as metaphorical for the satisfying of a desire such as sex.  Ἔρως is a 
person which requires feeding.   Likewise in the first chapter of the novel Thisbe 
makes Demaenete promise to ‘satisfy her desire’ (i.e. have sex) silently:  πληροῦν 
τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν (Hld.1.17.3).  It could be that this draws upon a metaphor for food 
495 Clitophon also explains the attraction of a magnetic stone and iron by ‘love’; they have erotic fire 
inside them: ὥσπερ ἐρωτικὸν ἔνδον ἔχουσα πῦρ (Ach.Tat.1.17.2). 
496 O’Sullivan uses a reading which conceptualises Anthia as a container for πένθος, ‘grief’: Ἀνθίᾳ 
δὲ πάντα πένθος ἦν (X.Eph.2.7.2).   This would make more sense than the reading of  Ἀνθία 
predicated with the emotion: Ἀνθία δὲ πάντα πένθος ἦν.    
497 The  image  of  falling  is  also  used  without  the  container  model,  as  when  Leucon  exhorts 
Habrocomes not to let them fall under Manto’s wrath:  σῶσον ἡμᾶς ἅπαντας καὶ μὴ περιίδῃς 
ὀργῇ δεσποτῶν ὑποπεσόντας (X.Eph.2.4.2).  498 The verb ἐμπίμπλημι takes an accusative of the container and a genitive of the contents. 
It often conceptualises eating (Il.21.311) or drinking (Od.17.503) as filling a container.
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(as with ἐμπίμπλημι).  Food is metaphorically seen as filling the body, and filling 
full,  πληρόω, is seen as satisfying oneself with food.499  This metonym of filling 
oneself  as  satisfying  oneself  (means  mapped  onto  the  purpose  within  the  same 
domain) is then metaphorically mapped onto the satisfaction of sex.  We will see 
further consumption metaphors  in a section below.  However,  again we have the 
differing models of either filling oneself with the emotion (ὀργή) or filling (feeding) 
the desire (ἐπιθυμία).500        
The container metaphor can portray a sudden burst and release of emotion, 
but it can also denote a long-term state.  In Achilles Tatius Clinias advises Clitophon 
on the technique or method of seduction, and informs him that it is self-taught.  He 
compares  it  with  the  natural  and  self-taught  process  of  giving  birth.   He  first 
describes the lover as a new-born baby who is not taught where to suckle.  This 
description bears erotic overtones.  Then he switches direction and strikingly speaks 
of young men bringing fourth their  ἔρως as if a baby,  ‘being first pregnant with 
ἔρως’: ἔρωτος πρωτοκύμων (Ach.Tat.1.10.1).  The adjective  πρωτοκύμων is 
formed  from  the  parts  πρῶτος (‘first’)  and  κῦμα (‘wave’).   It  is  therefore 
metaphorical of pregnancy, depicting the swelling of the woman’s body as a swelling 
wave.501  He proceeds to claim that the god himself  will  be the midwife.502  The 
gender reversal is interesting, but we can see a parallel in Plato.  In his Symposium 
Diotima  speaks  of  the  pregnancy of  the  soul  with  virtue  and the  search  for  the 
beautiful upon which one can finally give birth (209a–b).  Achilles Tatius’ imagery 
draws upon but reverses Plato’s idealism: Clitophon’s aim is seduction, and it may 
be that the pregnancy image also represents the act of sex.  It is possible that verb for 
499 This relationship goes full circle, because a prototypical example of an  ἐπιθυμία is eating.  In 
Plato’s  Gorgias Socrates  and  Callicles  speak  of  thirst  and  hunger  in  terms  of  satisfying  desires 
(Pl.Grg.494c).  Aphrodite satisfies her anger at E.Hipp.1328: πληροῦσα θυμόν.
500 Note that because  ἔρως can be metonymous for the desire for sex (since this is a subsection of 
ἔρως) this does not mean that it is not a  πάθος like  ὀργή.  This subject will be broached in the 
conclusion.
501 The noun κῦμα prototypically denotes waves of the sea or rivers, but it is cognate with κύω which 
means to conceive.
502 On  this  passage  see  Morales  2004,  154–5,  who  cites  Plato’s  Theaetetus (149a–151d)  where 
Socrates  compares  the  technique  of  philosophical  inquiry  to  midwifery,  delivering  wisdom from 
men’s souls.  See Morales 2004, 155: ‘the point of the comparison seems clear.  It is to communicate 
the natural inception of desire; there are few events that are, at least symbolically, more natural than 
childbirth.’  
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being pregnant, ‘first-swelling’, is a phallic joke.503  This imagery also plays on the 
iconographic  and  literary  motif  of  ἔρως as  a  small  boy,  who  is  the  potential 
offspring  of  the  desire,  and  perhaps  plays  a  narrative  role,  in  implying  that 
Clitophon’s courting will be lengthy and hard work, but will bear fruit.504  It also 
coheres with the folk model of the container metaphor beyond the simple fact of the 
emotion  being  internal.   This  container  does  not  necessarily  stay  static,  but  can 
increase in size due to the pressure of the force of the entity within.  As Clitophon’s 
ἔρως grows, it increases, like internal anger, but over a more protracted time period 
(at least compared with the examples above).  This passage is a clear example of folk 
and expert models of emotion being manipulated in intertextual and erotic ways to 
form a distinctive picture of emotion and seduction.    
This pressure upon the container can be seen clearly in Heliodorus.  When 
Cybele speaks of the proximity of Theagenes she ‘blows up’ or ‘inflates’ Arsace so 
that  she  can  hardly  stop  her  seeing  Theagenes  immediately: τὴν  Ἀρσάκην 
φυσήσασα μόλις  τε  ἐπειγομένην  πρὸς  τὴν  θέαν  τοῦ  Θεαγένους 
ἐπισχοῦσα (Hld.7.15.5).   The  verb  φυσάω is  derived  from  the  word  φῦσα 
meaning ‘bellows’ (see Il.18.372) and conceptualises the force of emotion inside her 
as air.505  The technical meaning here could be to blow up, i.e. kindle, a fire (seen at 
Pherecr.60.1—φυσῶν τὸ  πῦρ—and Dionys.Com.2.16—φυσᾶν τὸ  πῦρ),  if  we 
understand Arsace metonymically as a fire (due to her passion).  This is how Morgan 
translates  it:  ‘thus  fanning  the  flames  of  Arsace’s  passion’  (Reardon  1989). 
However, there is also the metaphorical meaning of puffing one up or making them 
vain (D.13.12, 59.38), so the verb can be used of emotion.  Morgan’s translation is 
attractive as the fire metaphor is so pervasive in the Greek Novel.    
This  study of  the  container  metaphor  shows that  the  conceptualisation  of 
ἔρως is grounded in that of other emotions, either in the model of being a container 
503 Morales 2004, 155, interprets the whole passage as ‘perversely Platonic; it invokes an important 
moment of philosophy, only to describe, with a comic juxtaposition of images and registers, erotic 
ejaculation’.  
504 Of course the narrative may undercut this notion, since his courting may seem fairly easy to the 
reader given Leucippe’s receptiveness.  The undercutting of expectation is completely in line with 
Achilles Tatius’ apparent agenda: see Bartsch 1989.
505 The noun can denote wind inside the body in a medical sense (Hp.VM 10.22).  The verb can also 
indicate the action of blowing up a bladder or a bagpipe (Ar.Nu.405, Ar.Ach.864), and is also used of 
swollen breasts (Paul.Aeg.6.46.1).
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or in the more common model of being a substance inside the container of the human 
body.506  
  
506 Perhaps  a  later  study  might  address  the  frequencies  with  which  the  different  emotions  are 
conceptualised in certain ways.  
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II The State of Emotion
One of the most common metaphors for emotion in Xenophon of Ephesus is that of 
‘state’,  κεῖμαι, and most of its occurrences are used of ἔρως.  It occurs in its root 
form  or  with  the  prefixes  ἐν or  διά.507  The  first  compound  form  utilises  the 
container metaphor, where an emotion is inside the container of the person.  Thus the 
god  Ἔρως lies  in  Habrocomes:  ὁ  θεὸς  σφοδρότερος  αὐτῷ  ἐνέκειτο 
(X.Eph.1.4.4).508  This is  the container  metaphor  used of divine inspiration.   The 
concept communicated by the verb διακεῖμαι is different, since the prefix denotes 
that  the emotion is ‘scattered throughout’  the person affected.   Aristotle uses the 
participle  to  indicate  disposition  in  his  Rhetorica,  ὡς  δὲ  διακείμενοι  αὐτοὶ 
φοβοῦνται (Arist.Rh.1382b28), and goes on to state what the disposition is of those 
who feel fear.509  Although it is used in Aristotle it does not seem to be an expert 
term, but rather a folk term used in an expert context.  It is used of disposition in 
Lysias, and, if we believe Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Lysias’ style is firmly plain 
and straightfoward.510  In the majority of cases in Xenophon of Ephesus it describes a 
depressive state when combined with the adverb πονήρως, which is metonymous for 
ἔρως:  διέκειτο δὲ καὶ Ἀνθία πονήρως (X.Eph.1.3.2).511  This can be seen in 
context with the object of ἔρως specified, such as Euxenus’ feelings for Anthia, καὶ 
γὰρ  αὐτὸς  ἐπ΄  Ἀνθίᾳ  διέκειτο  πονήρως (X.Eph.1.15.4),  and  when  Leucon 
reports Manto’s feelings for Habrocomes:  ἡ θυγάτηρ ἡ Ἀψύρτου πονήρως ἐπὶ 
507 There is one reference which occurs with the root form of κεῖμαι.  When Habrocomes and Anthia 
are imprisoned on the pirate ship they are lying in a state of despondency:  Ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ 
ἔκειντο ἄθυμοι (X.Eph.1.16.1).  However, Habrocomes and Anthia are the subjects and so the verb 
here is literal.  
508 Also at X.Eph.1.3.1, where this metaphor is combined with the ‘holding’ one: κατεῖχε δὲ αὐτὸν 
ἐγκείμενος ὁ θεός. 
509 Although Aristotle uses the cognate noun διάθεσις in a technical sense to indicate bodily state 
(Arist.GA778b34), the participle on its own or with an adverb seems to be a standard expression of 
emotional state in Greek.  See Pl.Symp.216d: ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν.  
510 Lysias De caede Eratosthenis 39.4: οἰκείως διακείμενος.  On Dionysius of Halicarnassus see 
Silk 1974 and D.H.de Demosthenis dictione 2.
511 Other examples are X.Eph.1.4.6; 1.15.4; 2.3.3; 2.4.2.  In the rest of the novels we see the participle 
used  with  πονήρως of  distress  (Chariton  5.9.6),  with  κακῶς of  ἔρως (Ach.Tat.2.13.2),  with 
ἐρωτικῶς of ἔρως (Chariton 2.10.1), and on its own of being disposed to kindness (Hld.1.11.1).  See 
also Dorcon in Longus: ἐρωτικῶς τῆς Χλόης διετέθη (1.15.1).       
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σοὶ διάκειται (Xenophon 2.4.2).  The adverb ἐρωτικῶς occurs with the verb and 
this  indicates  an  erotic  state  without  necessarily  the  negative  connotations  of 
πονήρως:  ἐρωτικῶς  διακείμενος (X.Eph.5.2.3).   The  use  of  the  adverb 
πονήρως is an evaluative one in that it portrays ἔρως as a negative experience.  As 
we have seen in previous chapters,  ἔρως causes a state of debilitation.  Therefore 
πονήρως and  the  verb  probably  indicate  a  debilitated  condition,  and  thus  by 
metonymy  ἔρως the  emotion,  or  rather  a  subsection  of  ἔρως:  frustrated  ἔρως. 
When Anthia and Habrocomes are in love they are both ‘very surely in an uncertain 
disposition’:  πάνυ  ἐπισφαλῶς  διακείμενοι (X.Eph.1.5.9).512  The  adverb 
ἐπισφαλῶς here emphasises the uncertainty of the state: ‘liable to fall’.  It is also 
used of despondency, ἀθυμία, outside of an erotic context.513
There  is  an  example  at  Hld.1.11.1  which  shows the  relationship  between 
being  in  a  state  and  disposition  towards  emotion  and  (possibly)  emotionally-
motivated  action.   Demaenete  tries  to  cover  up  her  failed  seduction  attempt  by 
claiming that Cnemon slandered her in response to fair criticism and kicked her in 
the  stomach.   Cnemon’s  father  does  not  believe  Cnemon’s  protestations  that 
Demaenete  is  lying  because  he  believes  she  is  (kindly)  disposed  towards  him 
(Cnemon), and therefore would not tell lies: πιστεύων μηδ' ἂν ψεύσασθαι κατ' 
ἐμοῦ τὴν οὕτω περὶ ἐμὲ διακειμένην.  Cnemon’s father is basing his judgement 
of  actions  upon  inferred  psychology.   He  believes  that  Demaenete  is  disposed 
towards Cnemon in a certain way: thereby likely to act kindly towards him as an 
external manifestation of internal state.   In Xenophon of Ephesus, however, the bulk 
of  examples  involve  a  disposition  towards  suffering,  πονήρως,  which  is 
metonymous for frustrated  ἔρως.514  It therefore conceptualises  ἔρως as a state of 
passive affliction.  
512 See also Chariton 2.10.1 for διακείμαι in an erotic context.  Callisthenes’ disposition is negative 
when Sostratus rejects his suit for his daughter’s hand: κακῶς διακείμενος (Ach.Tat.2.13.2). 
513 X.Eph.1.15.1: διάκειται μὲν ὑπὸ ἀθυμίας πονήρως; X.Eph.5.12.3: ἀθύμως ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς 
διακείμενον.514 See the Athenian general Nicias at Th.7.77 where he addresses the troops and asks them to look at 
what state he is in due to his illness: ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾶτε δὴ ὡς διάκειμαι ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου.  He is disposed 
in a certain way because of the presence of the sickness.  
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III Loading, Leading and Carrying
Metaphors of  ἔρως do not only indicate state but can detail a process, such as the 
one we saw above where the substance fills the container and prompts action.  Other 
metaphors conceptualise this internal process in various ways.  Ἔρως as an emotion 
can  be  conceptualised  as  a  load  to  be  carried  or  as  leading  the  subject  of  the 
emotion.515  Manto is in love with Habrocomes and can no longer ‘bear’ it: Μαντὼ 
ἐρᾷ  σου͵  μηκέτι  φέρειν  δυναμένη (X.Eph.2.5.1).516  She  cannot  endure  the 
weight of her passion anymore and this forces her into action.  When Chaereas is 
enslaved by the Persians he is weighed down by fatigue,  neglect,  his chains, and 
most of all his  ἔρως:  πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐβάρει, κόπος, ἀμέλεια, τὰ δεσμά, 
καὶ τούτων μᾶλλον ὁ ἔρως (Chariton 4.2.1).517  The list forms a crescendo of 
items  with  increasing  importance  and  compares  the  concrete  (chains)  with  the 
abstract  (ἔρως).   It  is  difficult  to read  ἔρως here as merely lust  or desire,  since 
Chariton is upset at failing to recover his wife, and these occurrences suggest that 
ἔρως, even if it is prototypically the initial burst of passion which couples feel, is 
naturally extended onto a long-term relationship, as the English emotion term love 
is.518  The  pressure  of  emotion  does  not  have  to  be  in  a  downwards  direction. 
Clitophon  tells  us  that  the  palm  is  particularly  crowded  by  ἔρως:  ἐνοχλεῖν 
(Ach.Tat.1.17.3).   The  word  ὄχλος refers  to  a  crowd  or  throng  and  thus  the 
515 In previous Greek literature see ἔρως as a burden: Anac.460; Pl.Phdr.252c; Thgn.1322.
516 This metaphor is completely uniform in Xenophon of Ephesus taking the participle of δύναμαι 
with the infinitive of φέρω.  See also X.Eph.1.4.6, καὶ οὐκέτι φέρειν δυναμένη, and X.Eph.4.5.4, 
καὶ οὐκέτι φέρειν δυναμένη, both of which refer to the state of ἔρως.  At the news that Callirhoe 
has arrived Dionysius can scarcely recover, ‘bear up’:  μόλις δὲ ἀνενεγκὼν (Chariton 2.7.4).  If 
Dionysius cannot have Callirhoe then he cannot bear it:  φέρων (Chariton 3.1.1).  The opposite of 
being unable to support the emotion is to bear it.  Other references to the bearing of  ἔρως (or the 
inability to bear it) are Hld.7.19.6: φέρειν τὸ πάθος; Hld.7.21.1: φέρειν τὸ πάθος; Hld.7.23.2: οὐ 
φορητόν.   At  Hld.7.8.6  Arsace  is  ‘burdened’  with  the  sight  of  Theagenes:  τῆς  ἐκείνου θέας 
ἐμφορουμένη.   See  also  Hld.2.25.2  where  Calasiris  is  loaded  heavily  or  overloaded, 
ἐπιφορτισάμενος,with πάθος ἐρωτικόν. 
517 Chariton 6.6.4 refers to anxiety: the ‘weight’ of the King’s  ἔρως upon Callirhoe.  With all these 
metaphors of carrying and heaving against the emotion it is no wonder that ἔρως is described as work 
(Ach.Tat.1.10.1).     
518 Compare the euphemism ‘to make love’ and the relationship term ‘to be in love’.  I will develop 
this further in the conclusion.  
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metaphor  envisions  the  person  as  being  crowded  by  the  emotion.   The  verb 
ἐνοχλέω generally  means  to  trouble  or  annoy  (see  Pl.Alc.1.104d)  and  this 
conception coheres with the portrayal of ἔρως or emotion generally as suffering.519  
The verb φέρω usually refers to the emotion as being bearable or unbearable 
by the person, but the person can also be borne by the emotion.   Amazement  at 
Chariclea  secretly  bears  Achemenes  down  into  erotic  passion:  τὸ  θαῦμα 
λανθάνον εἰς ἐρωτικὸν πάθος αὐτὸν κατέφερε (Hld.7.15.3).  One abstract, 
amazement, is personified as carrying him down into ἔρως.  Thus the designation of 
agency indicates  a process where one emotion causes another.   We see a similar 
expression used of Arsace, when we are told that  ἔρως stealthily bore her ‘down’, 
ὑπο,  into  mania:  καὶ  ἁπλῶς  εἰς  μανίαν  λοιπὸν  ἐλάνθανεν  ὁ ἔρως 
ὑποφερόμενος (Hld.7.9.4).520   As stated above in the chapter upon madness, the 
agency of ἔρως bearing her down into manic ἔρως indicates an interesting causality, 
where madness is a subsequence of the emotion.  This statement implies that Arsace 
was not initially struck down with manic ἔρως, but that as her emotional experience 
developed  the  intensity  of  it  increased,  and  it  became  manic.   Neither  excerpt 
attributes agency to the person feeling the emotion.  Arsace is also ‘driven’ by the 
emotion  into  looking  at  Theagenes:  ἐπειγομένην  πρὸς  τὴν  θέαν  τοῦ 
Θεαγένους (Hld.7.15.5).  The emotion forces her to look and brooks no resistance. 
The metaphor of the emotion leading the subject entails the passivity of the 
person feeling the emotion.  We see this metaphor used of erotic desire.  Chariclea is 
experiencing grief at being separated from Theagenes and is unaware as to whether 
he is alive or dead.  Calasiris finds her with ‘her hair dishevelled, her dress hanging 
in  tatters  over  her  breasts,  her  eyes  still  swollen  and  bearing  the  marks  of  the 
delirium that had preceded her sleep’.521
519 See X.Mem.3.8.2.  
520 The melancholic Theagenes is ‘easily born under’ with regard to every change:  πρὸς πᾶσαν 
μεταβολὴν ῥᾳδίως ὑποφερόμενος (Hld.3.10.4).  He is experiencing mood swings. 
521 Translation Morgan in Reardon 1989, 481.  
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Οὐ γάρ με δημώδης οὐδὲ  νεωτερίζουσά τις  ἐπιθυμία πρὸς  ταῦτα  ἐξάγει  τὴν 
ἀθλίαν  ἀλλὰ καθαρός  τε  καὶ  σωφρονῶν ἀπειράτου  μὲν  ἀλλ΄  ἔμοιγε  ἀνδρὸς 
πόθος καὶ τούτου Θεαγένους,  λυποῦντος μὲν καὶ ὅτι  μὴ σύνεστι  πλέον δὲ εἰ 
περίεστιν ἢ μή, φοβοῦντος (Hld.6.9.4-9).
The  emotion  here  is  grief,  λυποῦντος, and  she  mourns  as  if  Theagenes  were 
already dead. However, her grief is  ἔρως-motivated, and she explains it as arising 
not  from  a  common  desire,  but  a  ‘clean  and  sensible’  one,  καθαρός  τε  καὶ 
σωφρονῶν, meaning by it her erotic relationship with Theagenes based on ἔρως. 
The  conceptualisation  of  her  desire  is  consistent  with  the  leading  metaphor  of 
emotion.  Her desire, ἐπιθυμία, leads her out, ἐξάγει, towards these actions.522  Her 
point is not that she is not constrained by desire, which she is as the metaphor makes 
clear, but that she is constrained by the correct kind of desire.  Whether her desire 
was a sensible one or a common one, it would still lead her passively along a route 
(metaphorically); it would still be conceptualised in the same way.  Her desire here is 
metonymic of her whole relationship with Theagenes, of which  ἔρως is the bond, 
and indicative of her character, in that she has correct desires according to the moral 
aspirations of the novel.                    
The  metaphor  of  leading  in  the  psychology  of  emotion  does  not  always 
feature the emotion as the grammatical  subject.   Mithridates  has to ‘lead himself 
together’, συναγαγὼν ἑαυτὸν (one thinks of the English ‘pull oneself together’ or 
‘collect oneself’), when he hears the name of Callirhoe (Chariton 4.2.13).  This usage 
is interesting as it involves the person affected by the emotion as subject, and implies 
the reunification of a dispersed self.  This metaphor of leading or bringing is not of 
the emotion, but of the self’s response to the emotion.  The emotion exerts a force 
upon the self, and in this case the force is seen as fragmenting the self.  The response 
522 See  also  Hld.1.19.1  where  the  prompting  of  desire  is  conceptualised  as  the  desire  ‘leading 
him/being leader of him’: αὐτῷ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐξηγουμένης.  In context we are told that Thyamis 
interprets his dream along the lines dictated by his pre-existing desire: desire constrains the way one 
looks at the world and the way one forms ideas.  The verb ἐξηγέομαι refers to being a leader and to 
ordering—see Hdt.5.23—and thereby emphasises the passivity of the person affected by the desire. 
The element of personification here coheres with the conflict of emotion, but contrasts in the sense 
that it lacks a sense of opposition.  I will explore the relationship between emotion and desire in terms 
of ἔρως at greater length in the concluding chapter.  
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is to reunify the self, and thereby control one’s reaction to the emotion.523  This is 
analogous to the notion of the self wandering under the effect of madness or emotion 
(see above).     
Metaphors of loads, carrying and leading therefore form a structure within 
which either the person affected or the emotion can be assigned the agency, and, like 
the two versions of the container metaphor, the person can either carry the emotion 
or be carried or led by it.  However, all these different attributions of agency cohere 
in the sense that the emotion exerts a powerful force, which it is difficult for the 
person to deal with, whether by bearing it or picking up the pieces of the self left 
over.      
523 See Plu.Phil.20.2 where Philopoemen, in grief  and confusion,  λύπῃ καὶ θορύβῳ,  can hardly 
collect himself in order to sit up: συναγαγὼν μόλις ἑαυτόν.
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IV Motion - Storms, Waves, and Submersion
The next set of metaphors is those which involve some sort of motion or confusion. 
This  experience  of  confusion  in  the  face  of  ἔρως has  a  long  heritage  in  Greek 
literature, exemplified by Sappho 31, and it duly makes its appearance in the Greek 
Novel.  Callirhoe speaks to Dionysius (like his Sapphic predecessor he is unable to 
respond) and this causes him to be in a state of  ἀπορία, ‘confusion’: ἀπορηθείς 
(Chariton 2.3.8).  Shortly afterwards Dionysius tells Leonas that he has brought fire 
into his soul and that the lack of information upon this woman is ‘disturbing him’: 
ταράσσει δέ με καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον τὸ περὶ τῆς γυναικός (Chariton 2.4.7).  This 
word refers to the emotional disturbance of the person affected.524  Here, according to 
Dionysius, it is worry at where Callirhoe came from and whether she is a slave or 
not.   Since  we  know  that  Dionysius  is  keenly  aware  of  his  own  status  and 
expectations it could very well be the case that his emotional turmoil is caused by his 
lack of knowledge of the woman’s origin.525  Even if his turmoil is not caused by 
that, but merely by the meeting with Callirhoe, and Dionysius is trying to excuse his 
excessive  reaction,  which  he  would  also  be  concerned  about  given  his  strong 
524 It is possible that there is a concrete usage which indicates the motion of a restless sea (Od.5.291; 
Archil.54).  See also Longus 3.27.3 where a wind ruffles the sea at night:  νυκτὸς δέ, πελαγίου 
ταράξαντος ἀνέμου τὴν θάλασσαν.  However, it may be that in these examples the sea is being 
personified.  The verb can be used of fear (A.Ch.289) but probably indicates general psychological 
disturbance, which can be a feature of more than one emotion.  The following is a list of forms of the 
verb ταράσσω, including compound forms, which refer to emotional effect.  The English translation in 
parentheses is only a suggested translation of the experience of the subject(s).  Obviously in English is 
it  often  difficult  to  distinguish  between  being  disturbed  or  upset,  due  to  the  coherence  of  the 
metaphorical conceptualisation in the two adjectives.  Ach.Tat.1.12.3 (afraid); Ach.Tat.1.12.6 (afraid); 
Ach.Tat.2.10.4  (disturbed);  Ach.Tat.2.11.1  (upset);  Ach.Tat.2.23.4  (disturbed);  Ach.Tat.2.23.5 
(afraid);  Ach.Tat.2.23.6  (upset/afraid);  Ach.Tat.2.26.1  (excited);  Ach.Tat.2.37.10  (ἔρως); 
Ach.Tat.4.1.8  (upset);  Ach.Tat.4.14.4  (surprise);  Ach.Tat.5.3.3  (upset);  Ach.Tat.5.17.8  (worried); 
Ach.Tat.6.8.2  (upset);  Chariton  1.12.6  (upset);  Chariton  2.3.6  (worried/upset);  Chariton  2.4.6 
(worried); Chariton 2.4.7 (worried); Chariton 3.7.4 (upset); Chariton 5.9.3 (distress); Chariton 6.8.3 
(afraid); Chariton 8.1.7 (excited); Chariton 8.5.11 (disturbed but used with a negative);  Hld.1.18.2 
(disturbed); Hld.2.5.2 (afraid); Hld.3.7.2 (worried); Hld.3.18.1 (afraid); Hld.3.18.2 (afraid); Hld.6.9.2 
(disturbed);  Hld.7.4.1  (disturbed);  Hld.7.9.5  (disturbed);   Hld.7.11.2  (disturbed/afraid);  Hld.7.12.3 
(afraid); Hld.7.29.1 (disturbed); Hld.8.1.5 (afraid); Hld.8.5.6 (afraid); Hld.8.13.3 (afraid); Hld.10.21.1 
(disturbed);  Hld.10.28.2  (afraid);  Longus  1.21.3  (afraid);  Longus  1.22.2  (afraid);  Longus  1.28.3 
(afraid);  Longus  2.17.3  (excited);  Longus  2.26.4  (afraid);  Longus  2.27.2  (afraid);  Longus  3.16.1 
(distress);  Longus  3.24.3 (afraid);  Longus  3.26.2 (worried);  Longus  4.6.3 (worried);  X.Eph.1.12.4 
(afraid).  
525 See Chariton 2.1.5: Dionysius is glad to hear that Callirhoe is beautiful, but not that she is a slave, 
for he could not consider taking on a slave as a consort. 
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commitment to παιδεία and appearance, it is clear that ἔρως is the issue.526  If it is 
the reason he gives it is not ἔρως directly but an ἔρως-motivated emotion: he is only 
concerned  about  the  matter  because  he desires  Callirhoe.   Both explanations  are 
coherent within the model of ἔρως.  The verb refers to emotional disturbance and as 
we  have  seen,  ἔρως behaves  much  like  another  emotion  in  this  respect.   In 
Euripides’  Hippolytus Theseus says that young men are as likely as women to be 
disturbed by Cypris (Aphrodite): ὅταν ταράξηι Κύπρις ἡβῶσαν φρένα (969).527 
In the Greek Novel this verb can be used of multiple emotions.  Achaemenes is stung 
by  ὀργή,  ζηλοτυπία and  ἔρως,  emotions  capable  of  ‘disturbing’  anyone, 
διαταράξαι, let alone a barbarian: ὑπ΄ ὀργῆς ἅμα καὶ ζηλοτυπίας καὶ ἔρωτος 
καὶ  ἀποτυχίας  οἰστρηθείς,  ἱκανῶν  καὶ  ἄλλον  τινὰ  διαταράξαι 
πραγμάτων,  μή  τί  γε  δὴ  βάρβαρον (Hld.7.29.1).528  This  concept  of  inner 
disturbance  is  therefore  coherent  across  many  emotional  experiences,  and 
conceptualises ἔρως in the same way as other emotions.                 
Chariclea  is  described  (by  a  reanimated  corpse)  as  a  young  lady 
‘scared/driven away by ἔρως’: ὑπ΄ ἔρωτος σεσοβημένον (Hld.6.15.4).  The verb 
σοβέω refers  properly  to  being  scared  off.529  The  next  phrase  describes  her 
wandering  because  of  ἔρως,  ἐρωμένου  τινὸς  ἕνεκεν  ἀλώμενον,  and  the 
psychological metaphor highlights that ἔρως has set her in motion and that ἔρως has 
directed her.  There is a motif in previous Greek literature of lovers wandering due to 
ἔρως.530  This reference in Heliodorus plays a dual psychological and narrative role. 
It references the motion involved in her wandering which is caused by the internal 
stimulus of ἔρως.  
526 On παιδεία see Anderson 1989, Borg 2004, Gleason 1995.
527 The phrenes are a faculty of emotion in epic and tragedy.  On Homer see Darcus Sullivan 1988 in 
general; on Greek tragedy see Padel 1992, 14,18, 20-4, 28-9, 32, 39 ,42, 48, 63-4, 67-70, 73, 76, 80, 
83, 87-89, 91-3, 97, 110, 116-9, 128-9, 133, 135-7, 158, 162, 164, 175-7, 180-1, 186, 188-9 and 
Thalmann 1986, 491–4.
528 This form with the prefix  διά can also be used psychologically,  such as  when in Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia Socrates avoids ‘disturbing’, i.e. worrying, Euthydemus: διετάραττεν (X.Mem.4.2.40). 
529 It however, can be used erotically: see Philostr.Im.1.8 and.AP.6.219 [Antip.].
530 See Call.Dian.3.190-3, Theoc.13.64-67 and 20.40-4.  On wandering in general see Montiglio 2005. 
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External motion can be paralleled by internal motion.  When Theagenes and 
Chariclea look at each other during a festival they stand there ‘fluttered’ or ‘scared’: 
ἀθρόον τι καὶ ἐπτοημένον ἔστησαν (Hld.3.5.5).  This metaphor often refers to 
fear, as with σοβέω above, but can be extended to indicate the effect of ἔρως.531  If 
it does refer prototypically to fear, then it conceptualises the sudden sensation of fear 
as a symptom of the erotic experience.  As we have seen already, other emotions 
such as fear can be  ἔρως-motivated.  The concept of the person ‘fluttering’ inside 
coheres with the metaphors of internal  motion seen above.   This hyperactivity of 
emotion  causes  it  to  be a  kinetic  entity.   Theagenes  mastered  by  ἔρως acquires 
‘quickness  of  movement’  for  the  race,  τὸ εὐκίνητον (Hld.4.2.3),  and the  pirate 
Trachinus has a ‘manic motion’, μανιώδη κίνησιν, for Chariclea (Hld.5.29.5).532  
Aural disturbance can be mapped onto internal emotion.  In Achilles Tatius 
Clitophon is suddenly in the presence of Leucippe and he is so confused that he does 
not know what to say: ὡς ἂν τεθορυβημένος οὐκ ἔχων τί εἴπω (Ach.Tat.2.6.1). 
Τεθορυβημένος means ‘confused by noise’ and conceptualises internal confusion 
as  a  person  beset  by  load  noise  on  all  sides.   The  experience  of  ἔρως is 
conceptualized  through  many  metaphors  with  a  wider  register  which  apply  to 
emotion in general.  In book five of Achilles Tatius Melite upbraids Clitophon for 
not  giving  in  to  her  ἔρως,  because  nothing  ‘excited  him’  towards  Aphrodite  (a 
metonym for sex): οὐδέν σε ἠρέθισεν εἰς Ἀφροδίτην (Ach.Tat.5.25.7).  This is a 
metaphor for the sharp sensation of lust, which is a component of the broader erotic 
experience.   The  verb  means  to  ‘arouse’  or  ‘excite’,  but  there  is  perhaps  an 
insinuation of the fire metaphor here, as in Heliodorus the verb is used of fueling a 
531 Examples  of  this  metaphor  in  Heliodoros:  erotic;  ἐπτοημένον (Hld.3.5.5);  ἐπτοημένον 
(Hld.6.7.8);  ἀναπτερώσασα (Hld.7.22.1).   Non  erotic:  ἀνεπτέρωσας (Hld.3.4.9);  ἐπτοεῖτο 
(Hld.6.1.2); ἐπτοημένων (Hld.7.7.4).  In Longus it is only used of fear (Longus 1.22.2; 4.8.1).  This 
verb also appears in previous literature.  In relation to  ἔρως see in particular:  τό μοι καρδίαν…
ἐπτόαισεν Sapph.2.6;  τὴν δὲ  φρένας ἐπτοίησεν Κύπρις A.R.1.1232;  Κύπρις  ἐπ'  Αἰακίδῃ 
κούρῃ φρένας ἐπτοίησεν Poet.ap.Parth.21.2; ἔρωτι ἐπτοάθης E.IA.586; πτοιηθεὶς ὑπ' ἔρωτι 
Call.l.c.; τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι Pl.Phd.68c.  
532 For  κίνησις and emotion see Hld.4.3.2,  ἐκεκίνητο,  Hld.7.17.3,  ἀνεκίνησε,  and Hld.10.29.4, 
κίνημα.  In the fragmentary romance Pathenope and Metiochus there is a definition of  ἔρως as a 
κίνημα of  thought  which  arises  because  of  beauty and  increases  with familiarity  (Stephens  and 
Winkler 1994 col. II, vv. 60-62). 
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fire, παντοίως τὴν φλόγα ἐρεθίζοντες (Hld.8.9.14), and Clitophon is possibly 
conceptualized  as  a  flame  which  was  not  roused  into  passion.   In  any  case  the 
parallel examples show that the verb can indicate an increase in intensity and implies 
movement.       
One metaphor which indicates motion or rather a change of state of the body 
is that of wasting away or rather ‘melting’.  Longus tells us that the young men in the 
summer ‘burned at what they heard and melted at what they saw’: ἐξεκάοντο πρὸς 
τὰ ἀκούσματα καὶ ἐτήκοντο πρὸς τὰ θεάματα (Longus 3.13.3).533  The verb 
τήκω means  ‘to  melt’:  see  Hdt.3.96.6.   However,  it  has  also  been  used 
metaphorically  in  an  emotional  sense  since  Homer  (see  Od.19.264)  and  is  an 
established symptom of ἔρως: ἔρωτες τήξουσιν κραδίην (AP 5.277 (Agath.)).534 
It seems to be a reaction to  ἔρως which involves the dissolution of the self under 
emotional  duress.   It  is  therefore  akin  to  the  dispersal  of  the  self  but  this  time 
conceptualised as dissolution.  It also emphasises a change in state and damage to the 
self.                       
These metaphors entailing internal motion are possibly related to symptoms 
of  emotion.   The  lovesick  Chariclea  lies  ‘agitated’,  ἀλύουσαν,  upon  her  bed 
(Hld.3.7.1).  At Chariton 2.1.1 Dionysius is also ‘agitated’, ἀλύων, with grief for his 
dead wife.535  The verb seems to connote motion, as we see from the description of 
the Cyclops in the Odyssey thrashing around in his pain to remove the stake from his 
eye:  τὸν μὲν ἔπειτ' ἔρριψεν ἀπὸ ἕο χερσὶν ἀλύων (Od.9.398).536  Since these 
are  participles  with the  person as  the  subject,  the verb could refer  to  a  physical 
symptom rather  than internal  psychology.   In  this  case  the motion  of  inside  and 
outside  would  parallel  one  another.   Perhaps  the  externally  observed motions  of 
people undergoing certain emotional experiences are mapped onto the abstract and 
533 Other references to melting under  ἔρως in the Greek Novel are Ach.Tat.5.25.5; Chariton 4.2.3; 
Longus 1.18.1, 1.21.1.  Melting is a reaction to grief,  λύπη, at Ach.Tat.2.29.2; Chariton 2.7.4 (as a 
subsection of ἔρως).
534 For softening or melting in erotic contexts see also Alcm.3.fr.3.col.ii.61; Anac.459; Pi.fr.123.10-11; 
Pl.Phdr.251b; Theoc.14.26; X.Smp.8.3.
535 This can be used of grief in previous literature (Il.5.352; Il.42.12).   
536 At Chariton 1.12.6 the pirate Theron wanders upset and eventually sits down in a workshop: οἷα δὲ 
ἀλύων ἐπί τινος ἐργαστηρίου καθῆστο.
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unknown internal processes: a mapping from the concrete experience of Chariclea 
tossing and turning in bed to the abstract concept of emotion as internal restlessness. 
The conceptualisation of emotion as motion (see the English etymology) is 
cognate with metaphors which depict ἔρως as weather or sea.537  Most of these occur 
in Chariton.  Dionysius is overtaken by a storm, κατείληπτο μὲν ὑπὸ χειμῶνος, 
and has his ψυχή submerged, τὴν ψυχὴν ἐβαπτίζετο (Chariton 3.2.6).  The verb 
βαπτίζω, ‘to dip or plunge’, implies an object entering into a liquid substance.  It is 
used of a person entering the sea at Plu.de superstitione 166a and of being drowned 
at Epict.Gnom.47.  Dionysius is also submerged by desire earlier on, βαπτιζόμενος 
ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, and he debates with himself as if he is popping his head above 
the waves:  καθάπερ δὲ ἐκ κύματος ἀνέκυπτε (Chariton 2.4.4).  His emotional 
experience at this point is complex.  He is not just feeling ἔρως but is also insistent 
upon the fact that it is shameful, αἰσχύνῃ, for him to be giving into it as an educated 
and  wealthy  Greek  man  (part  of  his  self-image).   The  metaphors  reflect  this 
emotional complexity in the erotic experience.  The sea surging around him is desire, 
an  essential  component  of  ἔρως,  and by putting  his  head  above the  water  he is 
fighting the onset of his emotion (to no avail of course).  Therefore this extended 
imagery,  metaphor  and  simile,  conceptualises  being  ruled  by  emotion  as  being 
drowned at sea.  Swimming is Dionysius’ attempt at  λογισμός.  This shows that 
emotional response is mediated by one’s perception and expectation of oneself as a 
social participant.  Yet even such a developed image coheres with the basic model of 
emotion  as  a  container  (a  person in  the  sea)  and  the  metaphor  seen  in  previous 
literature of emotion as waves.538        
Chariton seems to explicitly favour weather metaphors.  He quotes Homer 
three  times  (Chariton 2.7.4;  3.1.3;  4.5.9)  for a  metaphor  comparing  the effect  of 
emotion to a mist: τις ἀχλὺς αὐτοῦ κατεχύθη (Il.5.696).  The first occurrence is 
when Dionysius learns that Callirhoe has arrived to see him, the second is when he 
learns that Callirhoe has consented to marry him, and the third is when he intercepts 
537 Greek tragedy has many examples of emotion as storm or weather: see Padel 1992, 81-88 and 114-
117.
538 For the association of ἔρως and stormy seas see the Anthologia Graeca 12.156; 12.157; 12.167.  
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a letter sent from Chaereas to Callirhoe.  Therefore we have one metaphor embedded 
in  a  Homeric  quotation,  used  of  three  slightly  different  emotional  experiences, 
perhaps nervousness, joy/relief and jealousy, which are all components of ἔρως.    
Metaphors for a sea or waves of emotion in the rest of the novels are rare. 
Achilles Tatius conceptualises αἰδώς, λύπη, and ὀργή as three waves, κύματα, of 
the soul in an extended pseudoscientific passage, which is too distinctive to be taken 
as  indicate  of  general  conceptualisations  of  ἔρως in  the  Greek  Novel 
(Ach.Tat.2.29.1).539  In Heliodorus Arsace oscillates in her desire for Theagenes.  She 
is  confused in her mind and surrounded by a wave of concerns:  συνεχέθη τὴν 
διάνοιαν καὶ κλύδωνι φροντισμάτων περιεστοίχιστο (Hld.7.4.1).  Συνεχέθη 
means ‘poured together’ and represents confusion (see also of course the Latin root 
of  confusion—confusio,  derived  from confundo (to  pour  together)).540  Arsace  is 
feeling multiple emotions here (as we learn from the following lines) including anger 
and ἔρως.  
Erotic storm imagery (wind and wave) is not common in the Greek Novel, 
excepting the notable examples used of Dionysius in Chariton,  which do seem to 
suggest an authorial emphasis.        
539 See Morales 2004, 201.  It is Leucippe who experiences this at almost being caught in flagrante 
with Clitophon.
540 Unlike  κατεχύθη (to  pour  down)  above  which  is  part  of  the  source  metaphor:  the  mist  is 
conceived metaphorically (at least partially since mist does not behave like running water) as pouring 
down, and the whole source description is mapped onto the experience of strong emotion.  
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V Wine and Food
The psychology of ἔρως, in particular erotic visual dynamics, can be conceptualised 
as  consumption.541  This  metaphor  is  used  in  previous  Greek  literature  and  is 
particularly apt because one desire is representing another.542  At Chariton 6.9.4 we 
are  told  that  the  desire  of  the  king  is  ‘nourished’  by  idleness: ἐπιθυμίαν  ὑπὸ 
ἀργίας  τρεφομένην.   Nourishment  conceptualises  the  desire  as  living  and 
growing.  Since eating is a desire we can see the conceptual connection between the 
two.  Metaphors of consumption also utilise the container metaphor.  Heliodorus tells 
us that Theagenes and Chariclea were both ‘stuffed’, κορεννύμενοι, with a chaste 
ἔρως (Hld.5.4.5).543               
A  specific  instantiation  of  consumption  metaphors  is  that  which  connects 
ἔρως with alcohol.  The two themes are traditionally associated in Greek Literature, 
especially related to symposia.544  Arsace, looking at Theagenes, draws more of ἔρως 
than her drink: τοῦ ἔρωτος πλέον ἢ τοῦ κράματος ἕλκουσαν (Hld.7.27.3).  The 
metaphor conceptualises ἔρως as drink and there is a further metaphor of drinking as 
‘dragging’ or ‘drawing’:  ἕλκουσαν.  We also see the explicit  comparison of the 
concrete with the abstract favoured by Heliodorus in particular.  In Achilles Tatius 
Clitophon  asserts  that  wine  is  the  food of  ἔρως (Ach.Tat.1.6.1;  2.3.3).   This  is 
feeding in the sense of nourishing, not feeding in the sense of satisfying a desire.    
In Heliodorus Calasiris gives us an extended comparison of the drunkard with 
the lover.545  
541 On consumption see in particular Morales 2004, 165-172, and Morales 2005, 11.  
542 See Pl.Phdr.247d, 248b–c, 251b of ἔρως as consumption of food or drink.  Hunger and thirst are 
types of ἐπιθυμία: see Aristotle, De anima 414b12; Pl.Philebus 34e; Pl.Lysis 221a.  
543 See also Hld.1.15.8, κόρος γὰρ ἔρωτος.  Thisbe is convincing Demaenete that once she has had 
sex with Cnemon her ἔρως will abate: she will be sated.  At Hld.7.21.4 Chariclea tells Theagenes to 
feed the Barbarian’s (Arsace’s) desire with promises:  τρέφων ἐπαγγελίαις τῆς βαρβάρου τὴν 
ὄρεξιν.    
544 See Plato’s Symposium and the erotic context for the competing speeches upon ἔρως.  Xenophon’s 
Symposium also features much on ἔρως.      
545 For the psychological experience of ἔρως as drunkenness see Anac.376.2, 450.
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Διάνοια γὰρ ἐρῶντος ὅμοιόν τι καὶ μεθύοντος εὔτρεπτόν τε καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἕδραν 
ἀνεχόμενον͵ ἅτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἀμφοτέροις ἐφ΄ ὑγροῦ τοῦ πάθους σαλευούσης· διὸ 
καὶ πρὸς μέθην ὁ ἐρῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐρᾶν ὁ μεθύων ἐπίφορος (Hld.3.10.5).
Heliodorus says that the mind of a lover, διάνοια, is like that of a drunkard and that 
the  lover  is  drawn  towards  drink  as  the  drunkard  is  drawn  towards  ἔρως: 
ἐπίφορος.546  The explanation for this is the psychological effect of both, which is 
the wavering of the soul upon a watery  πάθος.  This metaphor coheres with the 
storm imagery above, as the verb  σαλεύω is associated with ships at sea.547  The 
same verb is also used of psychology at Hld.1.26.3 in the context of ἔρως.  Chariclea 
explains to Theagenes that she has bought them time by agreeing to marry Thyamis, 
because those who love more rustically (i.e. more simply),  ἀγροικότερον, believe 
that this promise is valid and thereby ‘waver’ upon their hopes: ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλπίδων 
σαλεύοντες.548  The verb conceptualises the person as deriving movement from an 
emotion itself mobile (hope as a sea driving the subject).  Chariclea is perhaps subtly 
indicating the unsteady basis for Thyamis’ hopes, which she is well aware of: she has 
no intention of marrying him.  This metaphor coheres with the one above where the 
soul  wavers  upon  the  watery  πάθος:  the  emotion  as  a  sea.549  Therefore  the 
comparison of the psychological state of the lover and the drunkard here relies upon 
sea imagery, rather than being a consumption metaphor as such.550  It is a metaphor 
mapping the psychological state of the drunkard onto that of the lover, rather than a 
metonym  viewing  the  inception  of  ἔρως as  taking  in  drink  (like  the  passage 
featuring Arsace above).                    
    
546 Alcohol  and  ἔρως are  traditionally  associated  (see  previous  footnote).   Anacreon  376  PMG 
features a lover diving into the sea drunk with ἔρως.  At Ach.Tat. 2.3.3 the gods Eros and Dionysus 
both work together upon the person affected by the emotion.
547 See X.Oec.8.17 and Hld.10.4.6. See also the metaphor in Sophocles of the city as a ship ‘wavering’ 
(S.OT.23).
548 Morgan translates the adverb as ‘coarse’, which captures the sense well (in Reardon 1989).  
549 For the adjective used of the sea see Pi.O.7.69; P.4.40, A.Supp.259.  Normally this adjective would 
just  indicate  ‘watery,  liquid’,  but  its  salience  in  the  above  context  means  that  there  are  other 
connotations.  It will be familiar to readers of Greek literature from where it is used of the erotic gaze: 
see Anacreont.15.21; AP 7.27.  It could also be a pun on πόθος ὑγρὸς (see h.Pan.33). 
550 One of these occurs at the start of Heliodoros’ novel.  The narrator writes that ‘unmixed’  ἔρως 
overcomes pleasures and pains: ἔρως ἀκραιφνὴς (Hld.1.2.9).  
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VI Winged Eros
One of the most  famous metaphors  for  ἔρως in all  of  Greek literature  is  Plato’s 
image of the soul sprouting wings, which draws upon the prototypical image of ἔρως 
as a winged boy.  Achilles Tatius’ novel is famous for the ekphrasis of a painting the 
(initial) narrator is viewing: the abduction of Europa by Zeus.  In this picture Ἔρως 
is depicted leading the bull with wings, quiver, and torch (Achilles Tatius 1.1).  In 
Daphnis and Chloe Ἔρως makes an appearance to Philetas, and the old man sees 
wings sprouting from his back (Longus 2.6).551  
This imagery also appears in metaphors of Ἔρως personified in addition to 
art and epiphany.  The god  Ἔρως in Achilles Tatius threatens to catch Clitophon 
with his wing: αὐτῷ σε καταλήψομαι τῷ πτερῳ (Ach.Tat.2.5.2).  This features 
the  metaphor  of  Ἔρως as  a  hunter  with  his  prototypical  feature  used  as  an 
instrument.  The hunter will be too quick for the hunted, due to his winged speed. 
Speed  is  intrinsically  associated  with  Ἔρως’  wings,  and  given  the  quickness  of 
erotic inception in the Greek Novel this is understandable.  Theagenes tells Calasiris 
that he will win the footrace in armour for a prize given from Chariclea’s hands.552 
The sight of Chariclea makes him ‘winged’, and this is why painters depict  ἔρως 
with  wings  (Hld.4.2.3).553  This  direct  comparison  in  the  text  between emotional 
effect and artistic depiction makes the connection explicit.  Winged love is our best 
candidate  for  a  culturally  specific  conceptualisation  of  the  emotion,  since  its 
Nachleben  in  European culture  follows from Greek and Roman  sources.   In  the 
Greek Novel it is also a highly stylised and self conscious depiction, as with much of 
the  genre’s  use of  literary material,  and an  essential  feature  of  Eros  personified. 
551 See  Moschus  1  for  the  personification  of  ἔρως as  a  naughty  boy looked  for  by  his  mother 
Aphrodite.  See also Anthologia Graeca (Meleager) 5.177, Nonnus 33.60-4, and Anacreont.33.11-13
552 This scene, as with many in Heliodorus, is complex.  Although swiftness is attributed to erotic 
influence, Theagenes’ speed also evokes his alleged ancestry from Achilles (swift-footed), and the 
foot race for erotic purposes is well established in Greek mythology: see Pelops racing in order to 
marry Hippodamea at Pi.O.1.69-90.
553 This attribute of ἔρως can be transferred to the lover.  See Anacreon 378 PMG where a lover flies 
to Olympus (see also Pl.Phdr.255c–d).  On winged ἔρως and emotion see Padel 1992, 129-132.  Fear 
flies  at  A.Ag.976-7  and  ἔρως at  E.Hipp.1270-4:  ὁ  ποικιλόπτερος  ἀμφιβαλὼν  ὠκυτάτωι 
πτερῶι· ποτᾶται δὲ γαῖαν εὐάχητόν θ' ἁλμυρὸν ἐπὶ πόντον.  See also hope at S.Ant.615: ‘far-
wandering’.     
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Perhaps the most famous example is in Longus.  Philetas tells Daphnis and Chloe 
that  Ἔρως is young, handsome and flies.  On account of this he takes pleasure in 
youth,  pursues beauty and makes  souls winged:  ὁ Ἔρως, νέος καὶ καλὸς καὶ 
πετόμενος· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ νεότητι χαίρει καὶ κάλλος διώκει καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς 
ἀναπτεροῖ (Longus 2.7.1).  This image derives from Plato’s description of eros 
making the ψυχή winged (Phaedrus 251c).554  It is also associated with excitement. 
At  Hld.2.34.8  Calasiris  is  madly  ‘aflutter’  to  see  Theagenes:  μανικῶς 
ἀνεπτέρωμαι πρὸς τὴν θέαν.  Therefore the specific imagery of ἔρως winged in 
its evocations of movement and speed coheres with a body of metaphors which view 
ἔρως as motion.                   
554 This is not confined to Plato.  For the winged ψυχή see Il.16.856-7 = 22.362-3; Od.11.222, 24.1–
10. For respresentations of the ψυχή as bird or winged homunculus in art from the Mycenean period 
onwards see Vermeule 1979, 9-10, 18-19, 26, 31-2, 58-9, 65, 160-2.
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VII Economics
Economic  metaphors  used  of  psychology might  be unexpected,  because  they are 
more obviously mapped onto relationships.  For instance if someone conceptualises a 
relationship as economic, requiring equal or uneven exchange of commodities such 
as  time,  affection  and  material  gifts,  this  would  determine  at  least  in  part  how 
someone understands what a relationship actually is.  As it turns out we have one 
example which blurs the boundaries between psychology and relationships.  Chariton 
narrates  that  Chaereas  and  Callirhoe  ‘exchanged  erotic  passion’:  ταχέως  οὖν 
πάθος  ἐρωτικὸν  ἀντέδωκαν  ἀλλήλοις (Chariton  1.1.6).   This  metaphorical 
conceptualisation might support the view that ἔρως can be thought of not in terms of 
a power differential (the pederastic paradigm), but in the (more) romantic version of 
ἔρως as  an exchange  between two people.555  This,  however,  is  to  confuse two 
elements  which are  interlinked but  should not be conflated:  the  emotion  and the 
relationship.   In  fact,  what  this  passage really  displays  is  the power  of  emotion. 
There is reciprocity here, but it is important that the entity which they ‘give’ to one 
another  is a passive affect.   They exchange a passion and are therefore mutually 
under the power of the emotion.  It is important, in Chariton’s novel as in the others, 
that we have an interest in both parties feeling  ἔρως.  However, it is not valid to 
speak of a different kind of  ἔρως qua emotion, but of a different emphasis in the 
narrative of relationships.  The problem we have with equating these two aspects of 
ἔρως perhaps lies in the English word ‘love’ which we prototypically understand as 
being about a relationship.556 
The emotion can also promote a false sense of reciprocity.  Ἔρως can easily 
persuade  a  lover  that  they  are  loved  in  return:  ὁ  Ἔρως  καὶ  ἀναπείθειρᾳδίω 
ἀντερᾶσθαι (Chariton 8.5.14–5).   The implication  is  that  the emotion  does not 
depend on any reciprocity  whatsoever,  and that  the mutual  affection  of the main 
555 On the pederastic paradigm see Dover 1978 and Foucault 1990a.  For a convincing argument that 
the  Greek  Novel  differs  significantly  from  previous  Greek  literature  in  its  depiction  of  erotic 
relationships see Konstan 1994.  For less successful arguments that pederasty in the ancient world was 
not  pervaded by this paradigm see Hubbard 2002 and Davidson 2007.  On homoeroticism in the 
Greek Novel see Effe 1987.
556 For more see conclusion.  
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couple is contingent.  Finally and even less romantically Dionysius seeks to ‘bring 
profit’, ἔρωτα λυσιτελεῖν, to his own ἔρως by making Callirhoe forget about her 
former husband (Chariton 4.1.2).  Here we have the extension of ἔρως to include the 
whole relationship, but it is an unromantic one.  Dionysius wishes his ἔρως to profit 




By far and away the most extensive personification of ἔρως is that of an opponent 
using brute force against his adversary,  such as in the chapter on conflict and the 
hunting metaphor seen in the chapter on vision.  Eros is also a god, inspiring his 
victims,  and even metaphors  of  the emotion  leading  imply that  it  is  personified. 
Personification  is  therefore a  conceptual  tool  which underlies  a great  deal  of  the 
structure of  ἔρως, and it has been so pervasive in the study so far that it does not 
require an extensive discussion now.   However, there are a few personifications of 
ἔρως in the Greek Novel which are not based on exerting a physical  force as an 
opponent,  and these particular  metaphors  can colour the relationship between the 
emotion and the person affect.    
Ἔρως is a god and a prominent association of the Greek Novel has always 
been with mystery cult.557   At the beginning of Achilles Tatius the narrator notes that 
Clitophon appears like an initiate of the god: τελετή (Ach.Tat.1.2.2).  Later on in his 
lessons with Clinias Clitophon refers to him as initiated before him into the mysteries 
of the god (Ach.Tat.1.9.7).  Learning how to seduce a woman and experiencing it is 
conceptualised  as  entering  into  the  mysteries  of  ἔρως.558  When  Melite  tries  to 
seduce Clitophon she refers to her flame as a mystic one, ὢ πυρὸς μυστικοῦ, and is 
eager for Aphrodite’s mysteries:  τὰ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης μυστήρια (Ach.Tat.5.15.5-
5.15.6).  The mystery metaphor is therefore one which pertains to the relationship 
and act of sex rather than being psychological metaphor as such.         
It  is  a  πάθος—the  passion  for  a  beautiful  woman—which  ‘advises’  the 
Persian  King  to  send  for  Callirhoe  (Chariton  4.6.6),  and  Eros  is  described  as  a 
‘counsellor’ at Chariton 6.1.9.  These metaphors imply that Eros is an advisor who 
merely helps one on the way to a decision.  This conceptualises emotional causation 
differently,  not in terms of force, but there is no evidence in this novel that Eros’ 
557 On Mystery Cult and the Greek Novel see Burkert 1987, Chalk 1963 and Merkelbach 1962.
558 For references to the mysteries of ἔρως as seduction or sex in Achilles Tatius see Ach.Tat.1.10.5, 
1.18.3,  2.19.1,  5.15.6,  5.16.3,  5.25.6,  5.26.3,  5.26.10, 5.27.4,  8.12.4.   At Chariton 4.4.9 Callirhoe 
speaks of her and Chaereas’ wedding night as a one of a mystery: μυστικός.  Mystic language is used 
of ἔρως in Plato: see Pl.Phdr.248b, 249c–d, 250b–c. 
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advice will be rejected.  In a narrative sense it might be the case that the emotion 
uses different approaches with different characters: he forces Dionysius, but merely 
cajoles  the  less  resistant  Great  King.   Nevertheless  the  different  format  of  the 
emotion’s  power  leads  to  the  same  result:  ἔρως-targeted  action  of  the  affected 
person.  This advice is not necessarily to be relied upon.  Mithridates warns Chaereas 
that  ἔρως is  deceptive  by  nature:  οὗτος  ὁ  θεὸς  ἀπάταις  χαίρει  καὶ  δόλοις 
(Chariton 4.4.5).559  The god is seen as a trickster, but this personification highlights 
elements of the circumstances.  Mithridates is warning Chariton of the tricks or guile 
which Dionysius might use against him if he were to go to claim Callirhoe openly. 
Therefore the deception is that which either the god (the emotion) causes in those 
affected or generally in the circumstances.  Those feeling ἔρως have a great stake in 
their emotional wellbeing, and therefore are more likely to use devious tactics.    
As  we  have  seen  already  Heliodorus  often  places  the  abstract  beside  the 
concrete, and he does so at Hld.4.1.1 when he compares the Pythian Games with the 
other tournament refereed by Ἔρως, which is the love of Theagenes and Chariclea: 
βραβεύοντος Ἔρωτος.  He goes on to say that Ἔρως’ aim is to prove his contest 
the greatest of all, and all this is reported as Calasiris’ opinion (the priest narrates the 
story of Chariclea and Theagenes’ elopement).  This is a personification of Ἔρως as 
a  narrative  force.   Longus  has  an  elegant  variation  upon  this  theme  of  Ἔρως 
directing  the  plot  and relationship  of  the two lovers.   While  Daphnis  and Chloe 
played  games  he  ‘moulded  the  following  σπουδή’:  τοιάνδε  σπουδὴν  Ἔρως 
ἀνέπλασε (Longus 1.11.1).  The aorist  ἀνέπλασε is from ἀναπλάσσω, a verb 
originally used of moulding in clay,  but it is also used of constructing prose (see 
D.H.Dem.46).  The  σπουδή referred  to  involves  Daphnis  falling  into  a  hole—
designed to catch a wolf and evoking notions of Daphnis as the animal hunted by 
Ἔρως—which eventually leads to him washing naked and thereby arousing desire in 
Chloe.  Therefore the metaphor shows  Ἔρως as a divinity moulding Daphnis and 
559 In previous Greek literature ἔρως is associated with deception.  According to Montiglio 2005, 85, 
‘the representation of Eros as a wanderer thus projects his duplicity and deceptiveness’.  At Moschus 
1.10 ἔρως is a cheat:  ἠπεροπευτάς.  Further on at line 25 one has to watch for his deceitfulness: 
φυλάσσεο μή σε πλανάσῃ.  
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Chloe’s  relationship,  and  exciting  passion  in  them  through  events:  Ἔρως as  a 
narrative force.  There is no conflict between this conception of a divine force and 
ἔρως as  an  emotion,  and  indeed  the  directing  of  the  action  can  be  seen  as  an 
extension of the emotion’s powers through its action as a divinity.
Each personification depicts the power of the emotion in a slightly different 
way, but retains the basic asymmetrical power relationship between the emotion and 
person  afflicted.   These  personifications  also  show  that  ἔρως can  be  seen  as 
representing the relationship as well as the psychology of the person affected.      
The use of metaphors reveals coherent systems, where emotions can be borne 
or not and emotions can lead you or not.  The range of metaphors and imagery above 
shows that the Greek Novel is far from one dimensional in terms of its depiction of 
ἔρως, and that there exists significant variety in the way these models are utilised in 
each novel.  It also shows that the dominant models in terms of frequency in the 
novels are those of fire, lovesickness, ἔρως as an opponent, and, to a lesser extent, 
madness: these are prototypical of  ἔρως in the Greek Novel.  This chapter shows 
that there are many other conceptualisations which are present but less prototypical. 
From this  study emerge  two important  points.   First  psychological  metaphors  of 
ἔρως are largely coherent with those of other emotions.  Therefore a study of ἔρως 
must take into account how the category of emotion functions in ancient Greek.  In 
fact  the  psychology  of  ἔρως engages  models  broader  than  those  used  of  the 
emotions,  such as desires and container  metaphors,  and it  might  be the case that 
ἔρως must be viewed as part of a complete picture of Greek psychology.  Second all 
metaphors  used  of  ἔρως have  some  engagement  with  previous  Greek  literature. 
Therefore in the Greek novel we are not dealing with a conceptually distinct kind of 
ἔρως.   If  there  is  a  difference  between  this  ἔρως and  that  of  previous  Greek 
literature, it is in the weighing (frequency of metaphors and emphasis) and in the 
social, genre and authorial assumptions and aims of the works: the manipulation of 
existing cultural models, not the emergence of new ones.  I will expand upon these 
comments in the conclusion.  The coherence of these metaphors and relationship to 
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our own metaphors  of emotion show that  conceptual  metaphor  provides a  robust 
model with which to compare the culturally relative conception of emotions. 
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Conclusion - Ἔρως in the Greek Novel
 
The following excerpt from Morales’ chapter on ‘The History of Sexuality’ in The 
Cambridge Companion to the Greek and Roman Novel sets out a working definition 
of ἔρως in the Greek Novel.
Erōs, ‘desire’, in the ancient Greek novel is a disruptive force.  The young men and women 
do not so much choose to fall in love as are zapped into an altered state from on high, either 
by Eros himself (theomorphised in Chariton and Xenophon) or by the visual aspect of the 
beloved which stimulates desire.  It threatens the health, sanity, even the lives of those it 
afflicts.560 
Ἔρως is disruptive in a narrative and a psychological  sense, but it  is an emotion 
central  to the point of the novels, that the two young lovers be united.  Morales’ 
metaphor of the lovers being ‘zapped’ is not an unfitting one for the emotion, despite 
the  anachronistic  associations  of  an  electrical  effect.561  This  is  because  the  folk 
model of ἔρως prototypically involves metaphors of force, and these metaphors are 
coherent with the general portrayal of emotion not only in ancient Greek but in many 
languages.562  The emotion  ἔρως, whether theomorphised or not, strikes the person 
instantly at the vision of the beloved (no god causes ἔρως in someone when they are 
not looking at the beloved).  Indeed the role of theomorphism in psychology can be 
related to the broader category of personification (or anthropomorphism) of emotion: 
‘Aphrodite struck me’ entails personification, but ‘I am stricken by love’ does not 
entail  theomorphism.   Ἔρως can bring youths  to death’s  door  (see Xenophon of 
Ephesus),  but  ἔρως as  lovesickness  or  madness  can  also  be  metaphorical  or 
metonymous: a way for the subject or observers to communicate and understand the 
emotional  experience,  to  others  and  to  themselves,  in  line  with  folk  models  of 
emotion.  
Morales then proceeds to draw conclusions about the subjective experience of 
emotion and agency:               
560 Morales 2008, 42.
561 The verb ‘zap’ can be used of a strong emotional effect in English: see OED s.v.I.1.b3.
562 See Averill 1990, 107-112 and Kövecses 2004, 61-86 and 192-9.   
212
Let me emphasise from the outset that this conception of erōs has profound implications for 
thinking about the sexual subject in the ancient novel.  Sometimes characters are represented 
as subjects, actively desiring; often they are ciphers, through whom and despite whom, erōs 
acts.  In the latter representations, it is not clear that the sexual subject is a subject, as such, 
at all (or, at least, subjectivity here is differently configured).  It is particularly interesting 
that sexual agency is portrayed so erratically in the novels, given that they are narratives 
much concerned with responsibility, with trials and tests that assume active agents.563    
The folk model of emotion commonly regards them as passive affects.564  After this 
initial sensation the person affected has the opportunity to react to the emotion in line 
with  their  own  (socially  mediated)  agenda  and  expectations.   The  attribution  of 
563 Morales 2008, 42.  See also Morales 2008, 42 n.21: ‘this is a complicated area.  The idea of the 
emotions  as  quasi-external  to  the  self  is  not  uncommon in  ancient  Greek  culture  and  has  many 
different configurations’.  Emotion personified as acting upon the person experiencing it is one of the 
most common metaphorical conceptualisations not only in ancient Greek, but in English and many 
other  languages  (see Kövecses  2004, 37).   Morales  does  not  go on to provide examples of  these 
different configurations.  
564 See Averill  1990, 108: ‘the emotions share with certain  other  conditions (sensations,  feelings, 
diseases) a common meaning, namely, the connotation of passivity.  This shared meaning has been the 
source of many metaphors throughout the ages, and it continues to shape our theories of emotion…
(and  also  underlies)  the  notion  that  emotions  are  irrational  responses  over  which  we  have  little 
control’  (words  in  parentheses  added).    Solomon  2003  believes  that  this  long-standing  folk 
understanding  of  emotion  is  unjustified:  ‘“Struck  by  jealousy,”  “driven  by  anger,”  “plagued  by 
remorse,”  “paralyzed  by  fear,”  “felled  by  shame,”  like  “the  prick  of  Cupid's  arrow,”  are  all 
symptomatic metaphors betraying a faulty philosophical analysis. Emotions are not occurrences and 
do not happen to us. I would like to suggest  that emotions are rational  and purposive rather  than 
irrational  and disruptive, are very much like actions, and that we choose an emotion much as we 
choose a course  of action’ (3).  Solomon is influenced  by the Aristotelian view that  emotions are 
judgments (2003, 18): see more on this below.  Fusillo notes this in the Greek Novel,  but in the 
context of two particular metaphors: ‘l’éros comme maladie et comme folie…, deux conceptions qui 
se  sont  maintenues  depuis  la  Grèce  archaïque  dans  toute  la  société  occidentale,  et  qui  ont  pour 
fonction de délivrer l’individu du sentiment de culpabilité’ (1991, 240).  Perhaps Solomon is focusing 
on the subject experiencing emotion too much and not the complexities of social engagement.  For 
example, at Hld.7.21.1 Chariclea responds to Arsace’s propositioning of Theagenes (her betrothed) by 
remarking that she should never have felt this emotion in the first place, and failing that she should 
control herself (‘bear her passion’):  τὸ πάθος.  However,  since she has succumbed, it is best for 
Theagenes to submit.  Chariclea manages to maintain the pretence of giving in to Arsace’s will while 
‘taking a pot shot’ at her.  This response shows an impressive level of characterisation in depicting the 
leakage of Chariclea’s jealousy, which she cannot keep to herself, even if it is to her best advantage. 
There is, however, a further point to be made from her exchange.  An individual may try to excuse 
themselves by conceptualising their emotion as a temporary state: see the English expression ‘I spoke 
in anger’, which implies that the individual wishes to retract what they said.  Others are likely to be 
less kind with their interpretation of another’s emotion, especially those with a vested interest being 
compromised such as  Chariclea.   Chariclea’s  assertion that  Arsace  should not  have even  felt  the 
emotion in the first place is contrary to every instance of ἔρως in the novel: it shows a biased personal 
opinion.  Her assertion that  Arsace’s  ἔρως should be controlled is  also culturally  motivated and 
reflects the opinion Chariclea has of her own emotion earlier in the novel.  Therefore there can be 
multiple perspectives upon an emotion in a social context, and it is up to the individual to see how 
much ground or advantage for themselves  they can gain in the face  of  potential  opposition from 
others.  Therefore Solomon is not taking into account that in social interaction a more nuanced line 
might be more profitable, balancing the advantages of disclaiming responsibility for one’s emotion 
with what one can achieve within social constraints.     
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narrative agency—directing the plot—to divinities such as Aphrodite and Ἔρως is a 
salient and integral part of the novels’ literary depiction of causation, and is rooted in 
social  and  religious  cultural  models.565  However,  it  is  clear  that  these  cosmic 
portrayals of emotion are in line with the folk models.  If the Greek Novel had a folk 
model  of  ἔρως where  a  subject  always  actively  created  their  own  ἔρως,  then 
attributing  emotion  to  the  agency  of  gods  would  potentially  clash  with  the  folk 
model.  The passivity of emotion and divine agency provides the Greek Novel with a 
coherent conceptual continuum. 
This concluding chapter will outline the prototypical scenario of ἔρως in the 
Greek Novel, arguing that  ἔρως is a  πάθος and explaining this in the light of its 
differing  depictions  within  the  novels.   I  will  then  argue  that  metaphor  plays  a 
fundamental role in the conceptualisation of this scenario.                 
565 For example at Chariton 4.7.5  Ἔρως is personified as sending the expedition to Persia himself. 
This metaphor of causation makes sense in terms of emotionally motivated action: Mithridates has 
caused the journey by his actions, which are ἔρως-motivated.  At the same time it is consistent with a 
divinely motivated scenario.  Towards the end of the novel we are told that Aphrodite engineered the 
plot, because she was angry at Chaereas for his ἄκαιρος jealousy (Chariton 8.1.3).    
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I The Prototypical Scenario of Ἔρως
I have modified the prototypical scenario of Anger in American English postulated 





Target of ἔρως = Beloved
Immediate Cause of ἔρως = κάλλος (beauty)
Erotic Behaviour = Attention directed onto beloved
Stage 1: Initial Event
Beloved possesses κάλλος
S sees beloved
ἔρως comes into existence.
Stage 2: Ἔρως
ἔρως exists.
S experiences physiological effects.  
ἔρως exerts force on S to devote attention to the beloved.
Stage 3: Attempt to control ἔρως
S attempts to control ἔρως.  
Stage 4: Loss of control
ἔρως takes control of S. 
There is damage to S.
Attention is directed towards the target of ἔρως, the beloved.
S  propositions  the  beloved  (directly  or  indirectly)  or  fails  to  take 
action (often due to social strictures).
Stage 5: Frustration
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ἔρως is unsuccessful. 
ἔρως continues to exist.
Intensity of ἔρως remains high or increases.
S experiences physiological effects.
Stage 6a: Consummation
ἔρως is consummated by marriage or sex.
The intensity of ἔρως drops.
ἔρως continues to exist.566
Stage 6b:567 Frustrated ἔρως 
ἔρως is not consummated by marriage or sex
The intensity of ἔρως does not drop.
ἔρως continues to exist.
Stage 5 is repeated
Subject takes further action
By analysing the above scenario we can say what is significant or salient about ἔρως 
qua emotion in the Greek Novel and how cultural models of emotion inform specific 
literary manipulations of it.  There are several significant links in the chain which 
vary according to character type in the Greek Novel.  Stage 1 is entirely consistent 
within the novel, and even when a character like Callisthenes does not experience 
ἔρως directly from vision, he moulds a visual image of the beloved from what he has 
heard:  ἀναπλάττων  γὰρ  ἑαυτῷ  τῆς  παιδὸς  τὸ  κάλλος (Ach.Tat.2.13). 
Ultimately, therefore, vision or a visual image is always involved.  The element of 
stage 1 in the Greek Novel which is  striking is  the speed of the accuracy of the 
judgement.  A cognitive evaluation of the person viewed is made instantaneously but 
566 It is this consequence which seems to differentiate ἔρως in the Greek Novel from other emotions. 
See more below.
567 Strictly speaking I should not have two sections for 6 in a prototypical scenario: one should be the 
prototypical one and the other less prototypical.  However,  both 6a and b are salient in the Greek 
Novel: the everlasting ἔρως of the main couple and the continued frustrated ἔρως of the love rivals, 
can arguably be said to drive the plots of all the novels.  Each eventuality of ἔρως is only meaningful 
in light of the other (potential one).
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reliably.568  No one regrets their ‘first impressions’; no one falls out of love (at least 
explicitly).   Of course only beauty is evaluated.  No one’s character is taken into 
account,  unless  we  accept  the  dictum  in  Chariton  that  Callirhoe  must  be  noble 
(implying something about character) because she is beautiful.569  
Stage 2 is also universal and the chapter on symptoms outlines the various 
physiological and behavioural affects (although these are not necessarily limited to 
stage 2).  Variation arises in the final four stages.  Whether an attempt to control 
ἔρως is  made  varies  among  lovers  and love  rivals.   For  example  Chaereas  and 
Callirhoe submit to ἔρως straight away (at least there is no indication of resistance in 
the  text),  but  Habrocomes,  Chariclea,  and  Dionysius  all  try  to  fight  against  the 
emotion.  Therefore stage 3 can be instantly bypassed.  Motivations for this vary, but 
they are all socially mediated.  For instance Dionysius is aware of his social standing 
and background and Chariclea and Habrocomes of their own moral expectations.570 
A character such as Arsace is aware of the illegitimacy of her desire but gives in to it 
out of personal choice (a character statement).  Stage 4, however, is universal in the 
novel and crucial to the theme of an all-powerful ἔρως.  Many people fight against 
ἔρως but no one is successful.  Even the wise priest Calasiris flees his homeland 
Egypt rather than accept the inevitable mastery of emotion.  
568 This is contrary to other opinions of sexual desire in the ancient world.  In book four of Lucretius’ 
De Rerum Natura we see a criticism of the change of judgement involved in how the lover perceives 
the beloved: ‘the dark skinned (woman) takes on a hue of golden-honey,  the dirty and disgusting 
becomes a natural beauty, the grey eyed a little Pallas, the sinewy and wooden a gazelle, and the short 
and dwarvish a Grace’; nigra melichrus est, inmunda et fetida acosmos, caesia Palladium, nervosa et 
lignea  dorcas,  parvula,  pumilio,  chariton  mia  (1160-4).   No one  in  the  Greek  Novel  makes  this 
inaccurate judgement.  The peerless beauty of the main lovers exists like some Platonic form before, 
during, and after any ἔρως felt for them.      
569 See Chariton 2.1.5.
570 Chariclea perhaps provides an interesting response to the effect of the emotion.  At Hld.4.10.2 she 
gives an account of her illness: ‘although I am caused great pain by the malady which is now at its 
height, I am caused even more pain by not having overcome that malady at the outset, but having 
instead  succumbed  to  a  passion  whose  temptations  I  had  hitherto  always  resisted,  and  the  very 
mention of which is an affront to the august name of virginity’   (translation by Morgan in Reardon 
1989, 434).  She confesses both that she has been defeated by ἔρως and that her recognition of this 
fact increases her emotional suffering.  She conceptualises her experience as fighting the illness, as we 
see from the words κρατῆσαι and ἡττηθῆναι.  According to Chariclea, ἔρως did initially cause her 
pain, but the knowledge that she has succumbed increases her pain.  She attests this to letting down 
her own expectations.  Her father, Charicles, is keen for her to marry, and so her absolute rejection of 
ἔρως is a personal choice.  This is the motif of the stubborn lover we see so often in the novels, and 
which might be termed the Hippolytus paradigm, and the gender reversal in Heliodorus is interesting. 
This contrasts with a famous heroine such as Apollonius Rhodius’ Medea, who is not against  ἔρως 
and love per se, but is keenly aware of the social obstacles (her father) to her desire. 
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At stage 5 we begin to see divergence within the emotional scenario (rather 
than  sections  being  bypassed).   Ἔρως is  frustrated  and continues  to  exist,  while 
promoting actions such as violence or revenge and emotions such as jealousy, grief 
or  anger.   Most  characters  experience  this  stage.   The main  lovers all  suffer  the 
frustration of ἔρως before the fulfilment.  They do so with the same metaphors and 
symptoms as love rivals, but more narrative space is generally devoted to the lovers’ 
experience due to their more central role.  Stage 5 continues to exist as long as no 
action  is  taken.   This  action  can  be  direct  or  indirect.   For  instance  Chaereas 
propositions Callirhoe via his parents, Theagenes Chariclea via the priest Calasiris, 
and Lycaenion propositions Daphnis directly.  Therefore the action taken is by the 
individual  but  culturally  mediated:  social  pressure  usually  prevents  women  from 
propositioning directly or even at all.  In Chariton Callirhoe suffers more because of 
her silence due to the shame of being ‘caught in the act’: δεινότερον δ' ἔπασχεν ἡ 
παρθένος  διὰ  τὴν  σιωπήν,  αἰδουμένη  κατάφωρος  γενέσθαι (Chariton 
1.1.8).   Thus  gender  can  also  influence  one’s  response  because  of  certain  social 
expectations.   The  adjective  κατάφωρος is  evaluative  (its  etymology indicating 
being ‘caught as a thief’) and provides a negative social evaluation of her actions.     
In the case of a lack of action stage 5 persists.  Longus is the most emphatic 
example of such a stage in the emotion.  After the young couple experience  ἔρως 
fairly quickly at the sight of one another’s physiques their frustration is drawn out, 
first by lack of knowledge of what action to take and second by social barriers, for 
instance  when  it  is  revealed  that  Daphnis  is  actually  Dionysophanes’  son.   The 
teleology  of  Longus’  novel  is  sex  and  marriage  is  the  means,  which  is  clearly 
indicated by Lycaenion’s lessons and the closing remarks: ‘Daphnis did some of the 
things Lycaenion taught him; and then, for the first time, Chloe found out that what 
they  had  done  in  the  woods  had  been  nothing  but  shepherds’  games’  (Longus 
4.40).571  Changing the focus from marriage to sex also legitimises Daphnis’ sex with 
Lycaenion.   If  marriage  is  the  main  purpose  then exclusivity  between the  lovers 
571 Winkler 1990, 101–29, gives an excellent reading of this ending as dissonance by calling attention 
to the underlying threat to Chloe of sex/rape throughout the novel.  Whether the final ‘sex scene’ is 
positive or negative—and the negative interpretation surely relies for some of its effect on the surface 
‘positive’ reading—it is still focused upon sex!  On the pivotal role of Lycaenion, ‘little she wolf’, see 
Levin 1977.    
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should be maintained.  If sex is the aim then a stage necessary to fulfilling that goal, 
Lycaenion’s lesson, is acceptable.572  This is obviously not the case for the marriage-
oriented Chariton, Xenophon of Ephesus and Heliodorus, where we would say (at 
least  on  a  surface  reading)  that  sexual  attraction  is  the  means  for  marriage  and 
thereafter  devotion  and  loyalty.   Achilles  Tatius  lies  somewhere  in  the  middle: 
Clitophon in the first few chapters pursues sex and narrowly misses it (the seducer), 
but as the novel progresses chastity and unification with Leucippe are emphasised 
(probably humorously).573  Sex or marriage are not necessarily the ultimate goals, but 
can each be the means for the union of the main couple and their perseverance in that 
unity, which is a salient feature of the Greek Novel.574          
Social restrictions clearly affect stages of the scenario.  The attention of the 
lover is always directed towards the beloved, but whether they attempt to act upon 
this feeling directly or chose to suffer it passively seems to be related to their gender 
and status.  For instance the youthful lovers are less likely to act on their passion and 
suffer in silence, but this can be explained by their youth and by their gender, as 
women  are  more  likely  to  be  passive  than  men  (see  the  start  of  Chariton’s  and 
Heliodorus’ novels).  Initially Dionysius does not want to act upon his ἔρως because 
of his expectations of his own behaviour as an aristocratic gentleman.  Women as 
predators, whether positive or negative characters, are prototypically already married 
or of independent means (Arsace, Demaenete, Lycaenion, Melite).575                    
Stage 6 is the most interesting stage in relation to the version of ἔρως which 
we find in the Greek Novel and ἔρως compared with other ancient Greek emotions. 
Ἔρως does not cease in 6b of the scenario, which is understandable, because it has 
572 Of course it could still also be gendered: it is significant that the male is taught the lesson and 
Chloe remains virginal.
573 For  fidelity,  matrimonial  love  and  chastity  see:  Ach.Tat.5.14.2;  5.26.4;  8.12.2;  8.12.4;  8.12.7; 
8.12.9.  Of course this is satirised by the sexual relations between Clitophon and Melite, which is 
maybe a clever nod in the direction of the initial theme of the first few chapters, where Clitophon is 
portrayed as trying to seduce Leucippe.  
574 Ἔρως involves a longing, ὄρεξις, for sex with a person, but not because of any action by them, 
but for their state of being (beauty).  Chariclea asks Theagenes to nourish Arsace’s desire for him with 
(false) promises:  τρέφων ἐπαγγελίαις τῆς βαρβάρου τὴν ὄρεξιν (Hld.7.21.4).  Her  ὄρεξις is 
metonymous for her ἔρως.    
575 Manto in Xenophon of Ephesus is an exception to this.  She is beautiful and ripe for marriage: ἦν 
δὲ καλὴ καὶ ὡραία γάμων ἤδη (X.Eph.2.3.1).  There are no female ‘predators’ in Chariton, which 
is again perhaps an example of his sanitised version of romance.  Rhodopis seems to be a woman of 
independent means (Hld.2.25), but see the chapter on vision as to whether she is a ‘predator’ or not.  
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not been successful.576  What is interesting is that even after success it does not cease 
in 6a: the  ἔρως of the main couple endures.  According to some characters in the 
Greek Novel ἔρως is satisfied by sex.577  The lasting ἔρως of the main couple would 
be a disposition towards ἔρως.  Ἔρως is periodically aroused by the beauty of the 
beloved and periodically satisfied by sex with the beloved.  The erotic relationship 
would then feature a disposition towards this πάθος from both parties.  However, I 
do  not  think  that  this  is  the  case.   The  overwhelming  majority  of  metaphors 
conceptualise  ἔρως as a passive state which is continuous.  It is a state of emotion 
which revolves around a sexually motivated attention directed towards the beloved, 
and sex is only a component of this.  It is therefore a πάθος which endures past the 
fulfilling  of  a  desire.578  The  Greek Novel  is  not  alone  in  this  view.   In  Plato’s 
Symposium Diotima states that the reason for ἔρως and ἐπιθυμία in animals is that 
they are erotically disposed, ἐρωτικῶς διατιθέμενα, towards not only sex but also 
rearing the offspring (207b1-2).579  This gives one explanation for why ἔρως should 
not  cease with sex.   As the popularity  of treatises  such as Plato’s  Phaedrus and 
Symposium and the composition of new ones such as Plutarch’s Amatorius shows us, 
what ἔρως is, ideally and actually, and how someone feeling it should behave, was 
of great interest to the Greek speaking culture of the Eastern Mediterranean during 
the Roman Imperial period.  It also shows that the ancient Greeks vigorously debated 
what they perceived it to be.  Plutarch’s own opinion is interesting because he sees 
no problem with defining the bond between husband and wife as an ἔρως which is 
576 There can often be violent  reactions to rejection by the beloved in the Greek Novel.   See for 
example the character Thersander in Achilles Tatius.  At Hld.1.26.3 Chariclea tells Theagenes that she 
agreed  to  Thyamis’  demands  in  order  to  play  for  time.   Resistance  would  have  aggravated  this 
aggressive passion, κρατούσης ἐπιθυμίας μάχη μὲν ἀντίτυπος ἐπιτείνει, whereas acceptance 
has delayed the force of Thyamis’ violent passion for now: τὸ κάτοξυ τῆς ὀρέξεως.  She is not only 
recognising multiple outcomes but manipulating them in a social context.    
577 At Hld.1.15.8 Thisbe tells Demaenete that once she has slept with Cnemon her desire will most 
likely  be  quenched:  εἰ  δὲ  τύχοις  ὧν  βούλει,  μάλιστα  μὲν  εἰκὸς  σχολάσαι τὸν ἔρωτα, 
πολλαῖς γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην πεῖραν ἐναπεσβέσθη τὰ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας· κόρος γὰρ ἔρωτος 
τῶν ἔργων τὸ τέλος.  See Morgan 1989, 108.  Of course this is part of Thisbe’s persuasion strategy, 
but the model must be culturally viable enough to allow for persuasion.
578 There are references to ἔρως as a πάθος: see Chariton 1.1.10; 3.2.6; X.Eph. 1.5.4, 1.9.1.
579 Pl.Leges 783a says that the fire of ἔρως is geared towards the rearing of offspring. 
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more than sexual lust.580  This is the difference between sexual lust  and  ἔρως,  a 
passion which has sex as an integral component but to which it is not reducible.
580 See Plu.Amatorius 766e and 769e.  In the same treatise there are of course many opinions upon 
ἔρως which are more negative.   
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II - Ἔρως and Emotion
The question as to whether ἔρως is a desire or a passion is one central to the 
study of the emotions in ancient Greek.  In ancient Greek thought there were many 
opinions as to the exact nature of ἔρως.  Due to the abundance of expert models for 
ἔρως it is unlikely that one of them would provide a definitive version of ἔρως for 
the ancient Greeks over such an extensive time frame.  Likewise the ancient Greek 
Novel will not represent any definitive version of ἔρως for the ancient Greeks.  I do 
not assume either that the disparate works collected under the genre of the ‘Greek 
Novel’  have  a  right  to  a  unified  version  of  ἔρως.   I  believe,  however,  that  the 
evidence  in the thesis  does show that  there  is  a  significant  common basis  which 
underlies all of them.  I will now outline this by surveying the evidence for ἔρως as a 
desire and as a passion, before discussion the metaphorical evidence.   
Ἔρως is  prototypically  sexual  passion in  the Greek Novel.   This  term is 
superior to the terms desire or lust.  Desires are components of πάθη and therefore 
are a part of  ἔρως rather than a description.581  If someone has  ἔρως for someone 
then they do have a desire for sex, but they have many other desires and wishes as 
well according to character and context, such as a wish for the beloved’s safety, one 
for  marriage,  or  in  one  case  a  wish  to  kill  the  lover  whom  they  cannot  have 
(Thyamis).   Therefore  ἔρως features  multiple  desires  and wishes which are  also 
bound up in other ἔρως-motivated emotions such as jealousy, fear and anger.  It may 
581 I am arguing that it was a  πάθος in the Greek Novel: see, for example, the following:  ψυχῆς 
εἶναι τὸ πάθος (Hld.4.7.7);  εἰς ἐρωτικὸν πάθος (Hld.7.15.3).  This does not mean that it could 
not be considered an ἐπιθυμία in antiquity.  See the reported opinion of Zeno at D.L.7.113 (3.396 
SVF) who says that ἔρως is not a desire among the morally good (and therefore is a desire) but is an 
attempt at making a φίλος on account of apparent beauty: ἔρως δέ ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία τις οὐχὶ περὶ 
σπουδαίους· ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον.  We do have many 
references to ἔρως as a desire, an ἐπιθυμία, in Heliodorus: ἐπιθυμία κρατήσειεν (Hld.6.9.7); οὐ 
γάρ με δημώδης οὐδὲ νεωτερίζουσά τις ἐπιθυμία πρὸς ταῦτα ἐξάγει (Hld.6.9.4);  ἥττων 
ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας (Hld.7.21.1); δι’ἐπιθυμίας αὖθις ἐξέκαε (Hld.8.2.1); ἐβιαζόμην ἐπιθυμίᾳ 
(Hld.5.1.4).  However, this is a case of metonymy.  Desire is an integral part of a πάθος.  In anger it 
is a desire for revenge, with ἔρως it is a desire for the beloved.  This leads us back to Morales’ view. 
Morales is correct that desire is an integral part of the erotic process.  However, in terms of emotional 
analysis, to label ἔρως in the novel as a desire is reductive: it is a human πάθος.    
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be that the notion of possessing the beloved is an essential component of ἔρως as a 
πάθος:  a long-term state.   This is exemplified in the Greek Novel—every lover 
wishes to keep the beloved to themselves—and Plutarch in his Amatorius states that 
when ἔρως is present no lover will share the beloved (759f-760c).582  It may be that 
the possession or exclusivity of the beloved is a key part of making ἔρως more than 
merely  a  desire  for  sex.   This  would  make  a  disposition  towards  jealousy,  or 
ζηλοτυπία, under threat of loss of possession a prototypical element of ἔρως as a 
πάθος.  In the introduction I suggested that  ἔρως might be a compound emotion, 
made up of other more basic ones.  However, it is clear in the Greek Novel that is is 
causative of other emotions.  These emotions result from the passive state of ἔρως, 
but are not reducible to it.     
Let  us  also  consider  some  of  the  symptoms  and  metaphorical 
conceptualisations.   We  would  not  describe  someone  wasting  away  from 
lovesickness as lusting: therefore the ἔρως scenario is far more complex than that of 
a desire.  There are a few usages of  ἔρως which emphasise the relationship: love 
rather  than  sexual  passion.583  When Callirhoe’s  grave  is  found empty,  Chaereas 
assumes that he had a goddess for a wife, along the lines of others who wed mortals 
such as Thetis, but he laments that he has been abandoned at the height of his ἔρως: 
ἐγὼ δὲ ἐν ἀκμῇ τοῦ ἔρωτος ἀπελείφθην (Chariton 3.3.6).  We could read this 
as the height of his lust—both parties are still young and beautiful—yet this would 
jar with our knowledge of Chariton’s general  aversion to direct erotic description 
(compare Achilles Tatius) and furthermore not be fitting in a grief scenario.  The 
noun  ἀκμή denotes a high point and reflects the metaphor that higher is more or 
better.  This might imply, if we can trust characters to have any secure knowledge of 
their  own  psychology,  that  Chaereas’  ἔρως will  diminish  in  future  and  would 
therefore  be  an  interesting  admission  that  perhaps  ἔρως is  not  the  static  and 
582 See especially 760b:  ἆρ' οὖν, ἐραστῶν τοσούτων γεγονότων καὶ ὄντων, οἶσθ' ἐπὶ ταῖς 
τοῦ Διὸς τιμαῖς προαγωγὸν ἐρωμένου γενόμενον;  ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶμαι.   In Plato's  Lysis, 
Socrates  claims that it  is  their own,  τοῦ οἰκείου,  which ἔρως and  φιλία and  ἐπιθυμία aim at 
(221e3–4).
583 Less prototypical here is defined in terms of frequency.  Without native speakers it is perhaps too 
difficult to judge the prototypical status or saliency of a usage in any other meaningful way.
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unchanging principle usually presented in the Greek Novel.584  However, it seems 
most  likely  to  refer  to  ἔρως in  the  sense  of  a  relationship:  the  main  couple’s 
relationship  was in  its  optimal  stage.   This  reference  to  ἔρως clearly  cannot  be 
reduced to sexual passion.  When Chaereas is enslaved by the Persians he is weighed 
down by fatigue, neglect, his chains, and most of all his ἔρως: πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτὸν 
ἐβάρει,  κόπος, ἀμέλεια,  τὰ δεσμά, καὶ τούτων μᾶλλον ὁ ἔρως (Chariton 
4.2.1).  The list forms a crescendo of items with increasing importance and compares 
the concrete (chains) with the abstract (ἔρως).  It is difficult to read  ἔρως here as 
sexual  passion,  since  Chariton  is  upset  at  failing  to  recover  his  wife,  and  these 
occurrences suggest that ἔρως, even if it is prototypically the initial burst of passion 
which  couples  feel,  can  be  extended  onto  a  long-term relationship.   Since  he  is 
separated from his wife we cannot rule out an element of jealousy in his lack of 
possession of her.  
Heliodorus is perhaps the most distinctive novelist in terms of his depiction 
of  ἔρως.   The  religious  teleology  of  his  novel  has  invited  speculation  that  it  is 
allegorical  and a Neo-Platonist  work.585  It  seems to me that there are two major 
trends  in  his  depiction  of  the  erotic  relationship  which  are  integral  to  his  own 
distinctive depiction of  ἔρως.  First the ἔρως of the main couple is one of mutual 
self-control.586  This contrasts with the other novelists.  In Chariton and Xenophon of 
Ephesus marriage is conducted at the start, and so the premarital abstention from sex 
584 Elsewhere the ἀκμή can be used of disease.  In Achilles Tatius Clitophon tells us that when the 
eyes and ears are heavily loaded with work the intensity (ἀκμή) of the  νόσος (ἔρως) is lightened 
(Ach.Tat.1.6.3).  However the term is used in previous Greek literature to denote any high point or 
flowering: e.g. ἐντῇδε τοῦ κάλλους ἀκμῇ Cratin.195; ἀκμὴ ἥβης S.OT 741.  In context Chaereas 
seems  to  be  lamenting  something  positive—the  height  of  his  love—and  therefore  the  negative 
evaluation of the disease metaphor would be out of place.     
585 See Merkelbach 1962 on the novels as mystery texts and Laplace 1992 on Heliodorus as a work 
reflecting  Neo-Platonist  ideas.   My  interpretation  of  emotion  in  these  texts  neither  supports  nor 
excludes these readings.
586 Theagenes claims that the main couple are captives of a sensible ἔρως: σωφρονοῦντος ἔρωτος 
αἰχμάλωτα (Hld.4.18.2).  Anderson 1997, 304, speaks of Heliodorus’ novel ‘resolutely sponsoring 
chastity as the cardinal virtue among women’.  On chastity see also Rattenbury 1926.  On the band 
which Persinna leaves to her daughter she exhorts her to value σωφροσύνη (Hld.4.8.7).  Longus in 
his prologue appeals  to the reader  to remain ‘under control’,  σωφρονέω,  in spite of  the novel’s 
content.  This is probably insincere.   On love in Heliodorus see  Dowden 1996, Hani 1978, Keul-
Deutscher 1997, Laplace 1992 and 1994.  On Women in the Greek Novel see Egger 1989 and 1994b. 
See also Goldhill 1995, 35, on Heliodorus placing the strongest value upon chastity. 
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between the  main  couple is  not  thematically  important.   In  Longus and Achilles 
Tatius the male protagonist sleeps with another woman, meaning that any chastity 
between the main couple is an asymmetrical one.  Therefore Heliodorus stands out in 
this respect, and, as others have noted, this strongly contrasts with the negatively 
valued erotically motivated action of other characters.587  The second point is that the 
self-control of the two lovers allows the completion of the plot.   If  they are not 
virgins then they cannot fulfil the criteria for the religious festival at the end, and 
thereby cannot be reunited with Chariclea’s real parents and cause the Ethiopians to 
drop their habit of human sacrifice.588  However, the importance of self-control with 
regard to sex relies for its significance upon the prototypical understanding of ἔρως 
as  sexual  passion:  Theagenes  and  Chariclea  channel  their  passion  in  the  correct 
direction.   In  some  ways  the  main  couple  are  not  different  with  regard  to  their 
experience of  ἔρως.  They are both Hippolytean in their resistance to it  and both 
suffer pain in the frustration stage of the emotion.589  Possession is also an integral 
part of their relationship.590  However, it is certain that their  ἔρως is different from 
587 See Morgan 1989 who contrasts the degraded version of love seen in Cnemon’s story and other 
characters in the novel with Theagenes and Chariclea’s, which is reciprocal and idealistic.  He makes 
the important point that Athenian love in Cnemon’s story is unreciprocated, egocentric, and grounded 
in an appetite to be satisfied and upon deception (Morgan 1989, 107-9).  However, love as Morgan 
discusses it reflects the English term: a concept which governs multiple emotions and emotionally 
motivated desires and the relationship between people in light of their own socially mediated wishes, 
moral  ideals  and  awareness.   Therefore  Morgan’s  explanation  of  love  in  Heliodorus  (which  is 
undoubtedly  correct)  does  not  conflict  with  my  analysis  of  ἔρως because  the  terms  are  not 
coterminous.  
588 Sisimithres, the Ethipian King and Chariclea’s father, attributes the ‘happy ending’ to the will of 
the gods (Hld.10.40).
589 Chariclea is δύσμαχος towards ἔρως at Hld.3.17.5.  Theagenes tells Calasiris that before he saw 
Chariclea he spat, διαπτύσαι, upon all women and even marriage itself (Hld.3.17.4).  Of course this 
is not literal but a metaphor for disdain or rejection.  Charicles also tells Calasiris that Chariclea was a 
disappointment to him, because she disdained marriage: she devoted herself to Artemis and spent her 
time  hunting,  and  claimed  that  virginity,  παρθενία,  is  almost  divine  and  pure  and  unmixed 
(Hld.2.33.4-5).   After  she elopes with Theagenes Chariclea still  requires him to swear an oath of 
chastity until they reach her home (Hld.4.18.5).  At the conclusion of the novel it is essential for them 
both to pass the chastity test (Hld.10.8-9).  The theme of  ἔρως as a necessity which it is up to the 
person to channel is present in the other novels: Clitophon calls Leucippe ‘faithful in regard to the 
necessity of ἔρως’: ἀνάγκην ἔρωτος (Ach.Tat.3.10.4).  Of course chastity turns out to be essential 
for  Achilles  Tatius  too.   Leucippe  passes  her  test  at  the end  honestly,  but  Melite  does  so rather 
fortuitously upon a technicality.   It  appears  that  Heliodorus  takes  the theme more  seriously than 
Achilles Tatius.  
590 In book two Chariclea is a little put out at the news that Theagenes has kissed another girl (the dead 
Thisbe) and asks who she is.  She qualifies her statement by saying she hopes that they do not think 
her  bitten  by  ἔρως:  ἀλλ΄  εἰ  μή  τί  με  δακνομένην  ἔρωτι  ὑπονοεῖν  μέλλετε (Hld.2.8.2). 
Morgan’s  translation (in Reardon 1989, 383) , ‘please do not suppose that love is making me feel 
pangs of jealousy’, summarises the emotional experience nicely, but the Greek makes no mention of a 
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the norm.  This is signified at the start of the novel when we are first introduced to 
the main couple:
Οὕτως ἄρα πόθος ἀκριβὴς καὶ ἔρως ἀκραιφνὴς τῶν μὲν ἔξωθεν προσπιπτόν 
των ἀλγεινῶν τε καὶ ἡδέων πάντων ὑπερφρονεῖ͵ πρὸς ἓν δὲ τὸ φιλούμενον καὶ 
ὁρᾶν καὶ συννεύειν τὸ φρόνημα καταναγκάζει (Hld.1.2.9).
Chariclea is attending to an injured Theagenes and ignores the bandits who approach 
them.  The reason is that acute longing, πόθος ἀκριβής, and unmixed ἔρως, ἔρως 
ἀκραιφνής,  looks down upon pain and pleasures  from the outside,  ἔξωθεν,  and 
force attention upon the object of φιλία:  τὸ φιλούμενον.  The focus of attention 
upon the beloved is a standard part of the erotic scenario.  However, the motivation 
for it here is unique.  A pure ἔρως overlooks external pleasures and pains.  Ἔρως 
and  φιλία are  used  in  relation  to  affection  and  concern  here,  not  eroticism. 
Therefore,  as  in  the  examples  from Chariton  above,  ἔρως is  extended  onto  the 
erotically motivated relationship that develops from the initial passion.  The purity, 
ἀκραιφνής, most likely refers to the chaste nature of their relationship compared 
with  other  more  negative  characters  in  the  novel.   The  primary  meaning  of  the 
external pleasures and pains is that other considerations are overlooked by someone 
focused upon the beloved.  There is also perhaps the suggestion that other characters, 
unlike the main couple, are slaves to pleasure and pain.591  Later on Chariclea gives 
us another assertion of her uprightness:
Οὐ γάρ με  δημώδης οὐδὲ νεωτερίζουσά τις  ἐπιθυμία πρὸς  ταῦτα ἐξάγει  τὴν 
ἀθλίαν ἀλλὰ καθαρός τε καὶ σωφρονῶν (Hld.6.9.4-5).  
Calasiris comes to her room and finds her in the throes of manic grief because she is 
separated from Theagenes (see chapter on madness).  He upbraids her and asks why 
she is giving in to excessive grief, instead of enduring for the sake of Theagenes. 
She asks for forgiveness, but confesses that her desire is no common one, δημώδης, 
word for jealousy.  The context makes it clear that jealousy is at stake, as another (potential) rival for 
Theagenes is involved.  What we have here is  ἔρως as a metonym for ζηλοτυπία.  The model of 
ἔρως is superimposed onto or conflated with the model of jealousy.             
591 See Morgan 1998.
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but a pure and chaste one: καθαρός τε καὶ σωφρονῶν.  She is disclaiming that her 
erotic grief  is motivated by a baser  ἔρως,  and certainly extending the concept of 
ἔρως beyond sexual desire  to the bond of a relationship,  and I see no reason to 
distrust her assertion in the light of anything else in the novel.    
Heliodorus has manipulated the emotion ἔρως for his own purposes.  He has 
used established folk models of the emotion (see the other chapters), but has done so 
with an idealism which postulates an erotically motivated relationship based upon 
self-control and abstention from sex before marriage as the supreme moral virtue.592 
It is not a case of a different ἔρως, but a positive evaluation of the frustration stage, 
stage 5 (becoming self-control instead), which is maintained with a focus upon the 
future,  upon  the  directing  of  their  sexual  passion  into  the  appropriate  channel: 
marriage.                      
Sexual passion is the prototypical scenario; this maps well onto the lovers’ 
and love-rivals’  experiences.   It  is a passion which does not end with sex but is 
sexually  motivated:  the desire  to  possess the beloved and keep them in a  sexual 
relationship.   What  is  distinctive  about  the  Greek  Novel  is  that  the  emotion  is 
irresistible and it is implied that the main couple’s ἔρως will be unchanging.593  In 
this case it clearly can denote a relationship grounded in but not reducible to sexual 
desire.  It therefore reflects several English concepts such as love, lust, and desire, 
but is probably not coterminous with any one of these.  
592 Chariclea  is  described  in  ways  which  would  register  with  the  Greek  cultural  climate  up  to 
Heliodorus’ period.  In his  Amatorius, a dialogue on love, Plutarch maintains that  σωφροσύνη is 
integral to the appropriate type of marriage:  ἔπειτα σωφροσύνη πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἧς μάλιστα 
δεῖται γάμος (767e).  Pisias, who argues that decent women should have nothing to do with erotic 
passion, says that a women who is σώφρων cannot decently be involved in ἔρως—οὔτ' ἐρᾶν οὔτ' 
ἐρᾶσθαι—but his is  the opinion of  one in favour of pederasty over  marital  passion (752c).   At 
Hld.3.17.5 Calasiris describes Chariclea as ‘more austere’, αὐστηροτέρα, and resistant, δύσμαχος, 
towards  ἔρως.   The  second  term  is  from  the  ἔρως as  an  opponent  metaphor.   Plutarch  in  his 
Coniugalia Praecepta says  that  some wives are too austere,  pure,  and unpleasant:  αὐστηρὰ καὶ 
ἄκρατος γένηται καὶ ἀνήδυντος (142b).  However, Calasiris’ description occurs before Chariclea 
gives in to ἔρως for Theagenes, which is the correct course of action for her.  
593 See Morgan 1989, 112: ‘In romance, on the other hand, the possibility of not loving is hardly 
countenanced.  Even  the  potentially  ascetic  priestly  characters  of  the  Aithiopika act  willingly  to 
promote the love of Theagenes and Charikleia and rejoice at its happy ending’.
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III – The Prototypical Scenario and Metaphor
The focus of this thesis has been metaphor, and it remains to specify how the vast 
array of metaphors and metonymies in the Greek Novel relate to the psychological 
effects and actions of the prototypical scenario.  
The first thing to note is that metaphors are structural.  A metaphor highlights 
either  a  part  of  the  scenario  or  structures  multiple  parts  of  the  scenario.   The 
metaphor of lovesickness structures the emotion as beginning with its contraction, 
followed  by  a  duration,  which  is  eased  only  by a  cure.   This  highlights  several 
important  features  of  ἔρως.   Disease  and  ἔρως are  contracted  passively  by  the 
recipient.  This metaphor therefore reinforces the structure of the scenario rather than 
merely  reflecting  it.   A  disease  can  get  worse  or  better  and  this  metaphorical 
conceptualisation is mapped onto the frustration stage of the emotion.  In this respect 
the fire metaphor also reflects a pattern: ignition, duration with increase or decrease 
in  intensity,  and  an  extinguishing.   Both  these  concepts  are  evaluative  and 
metaphorical: they portray the emotion as negative and map the concrete onto the 
abstract.  Diseases and fire are common parts of human experience, and they are used 
to understand the abstraction of an emotional experience.  Manic  ἔρως can be an 
extreme psychological state provoked usually by the overextension of the frustration 
stage,  or  mania  can  merely  be  metonymous  for  the  emotion.   These  metaphors 
evaluate certain stages of the emotion as negative, but crucially not always the whole 
emotion.  For instance, Averill describes how the metaphor of emotion as a disease, 
common in the history of psychology, evaluates an emotion negatively.594  However, 
the negative scenario of ἔρως as a disease refers to the frustration stage.  The ἔρως 
between the two lovers after marriage is not a disease.  
The  relationship  of  metaphor  to  the  prototypical  scenario  is  not  merely 
structural.   In  important  ways  the  ontology  of  this  prototypical  scenario  is 
metaphorical.  Lakoff and Kövecses posit the following conclusions from their study 
of anger in American English.
594 Averill 1990, 106.
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In  the  ontology,  anger  exists  as  an  independent  entity,  capable  of  exerting  force  and 
controlling a person… A person’s anger does not really,  literally exist as an independent 
entity, though we do comprehend it metaphorically as such… Anger is understood as being 
capable of exerting force and taking control of a person.  The FORCE and CONTROL here 
are also metaphorical, based on physical force and physical control.595 
Lakoff and Kövecses argue that basic source domains such as entity, intensity, limit, 
force and control are constitutive of the ontology of anger.  We see examples of all of 
these metaphors in our scenario of ἔρως (see especially the chapter on the ontology 
of ἔρως).  Without the metaphor of ἔρως as an entity, there is no scenario other than 
a reductive behaviourist one.  However, the importance of metaphor does not end 
here.  More specific source domains, such as fire, sickness and ἔρως as an opponent, 
add important conceptual material to the metaphors of entities and forces.  What kind 
of  entity  is  ἔρως and  what  kind  of  force  does  it  exert?   These  metaphors  are 
therefore salient cultural and literary conceptualisations of the emotion.  While none 
of the four major conceptualisations of  ἔρως in the Greek Novel—fire,  sickness, 
madness and opponent—are unique to that emotion or even ancient Greek culture, 
the choice of these four as the most pervasive, especially if we note that madness is 
less  common  than  the  other  three,  is  illuminating.   This  shows  us  that  some 
metaphors are more prototypical of the emotion than others.  For instance Lakoff and 
Kövecses note the main metaphors which map onto the anger ontology are hot fluid, 
insanity,  fire,  burden,  and struggle.   Ἔρως on the other hand lacks the hot fluid 
metaphor  (in  the  Greek  Novel)  and  adds  the  sickness  metaphor.   Therefore 
metaphors provide a way of differentiate between emotions while keeping them as 
part of the same category.  It may also be the case that certain models become more 
or less prototypical over time, perhaps due to historical factors.596  The Greek Novel 
certainly seems to reflect this: it features a complex reworking of many previous and 
contemporary folk, literary and expert models of emotion, and is distinctive in terms 
of which models are most salient.      
595 Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, 218.
596 This diachronic approach to lovesickness is made by Toohey 1992 and 2004, 59-103.  However, he 
perhaps  underplays  the  complexities  involved  in  gauging  the  relationship(s)  between  manic  and 
depressive ἔρως. 
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There is another important point to be made about metaphors for  ἔρως and 
that  is  that  they show prototypical  structure.   In certain  ways  metaphors  used to 
conceptualise the emotional  experience of the same person are not consistent.   A 
manic motion can contrast with a passive disease.  The opponent must be defeated 
(implying  that  one should resist  emotion)  but  the fire  must  be quenched and the 
disease must be cured (sex or possession of the beloved).  If we look at the numerous 
metaphors in the section on ontology we do not see consistency among all of them. 
Therefore it is better to see metaphors of ἔρως as showing similarity—a prototypical 
category—and to see some metaphors, such as opponent, disease, and fire, as being 
more prototypical than others. 
What I hope to have shown in this thesis is that  metaphor is essential  for 
understanding the concept of  ἔρως,  and that folk and expert models underlie the 
highly stylised and sophisticated use made of this concept in the Greek Novel.  It is 
never a case of a different kind of ἔρως developing, but rather different or multiple 
models in relation to the prototypical one(s) of the emotion, and different or more or 
less salient metaphors of the emotion.  A dissection of complex literary models of 
emotion  shows that  it  is  possible  to  have  culturally  unique  emotions  which  are, 
however, related to our own and more crucially understandable in relation to our 
own: emotions can be translated.
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